Overview
I am interested in all kinds of philosophical issues and approaches to them from different perspectives. However, the time limit and the reality of the academic life dictate that I can only pursue a few topics at the present time.
These topics can be divided into three categories. The first one is in the philosophy of science broadly conceived. This area of researcg originates from my Ph.D. dissertation that deals with the foundation of probability, and covers the general issues in philosophy of science such as theory evaluation, realism vs. anti-realism debate, causation, explanation,and issues in special sciences (phiosophy of biology in particular). The second area is Chinese philosophy. This starts from my personal interest in philosophical issues and approaches in Chinese philosophy. My work in this part not merely aims to attain a better understanding and clarification of the ideas and thoughts in the history of Chinese philosophy, but also attempts to see how Chinese philosophy can be developed to deal with contemporary challenges, and what kinds of contributions traditional Chinese philosophy can make to philosophy in general. The third area of interest is metaphysics and epistemology generally conceived (including related fields such as philosophy of mind and philosophy of language). This leads naturally to my interest in the history of western philosophy, especially modern philosophy.
Philosophy of Science
- Foundations of Probability
- Theory Evaluation
- Philosophy of Biology
- Scientific Explanation
- Causation
There are three interpretations of probabiity, the logical, and the subjective (personal), and the objective. The subjective interpretation now runs the day, yet there are some fundamental difficulties with this view. I like to defend an objectivist view that is consistent and explanatory. I would also like to account for appraent successes that the subjective view has enjoyed, and argue that all these can be achieved by the objective interpretation.
Whcih theory we should accept among a set of candidates is a such a basic question in scientific inquiry that there seems to be an answer readilly available. Yet it turns out to be a very difficult question that have puzzled philosophers for many years. The logical positivists' theory of confirmation has been replaced by Bayesian theory of confirmation, which is certainly an upgrade but still not complete. Kuhn's discovery of the internal dynamics of a scientific theory enriches our understanding, yet some of his claims regarding theory evaluation have led to relativism, and if anything, Kuhn only gives an outline of a theory of evaluation. The Inference to the Best Explanation seems to provide an intuitively sound framework, yet its details have not been fully worked out.
My current work in this field is mostly concerned with the conceptual issues in biology that relate to chance. These include the intrepretation of fitness and its related issues, the explanatory mechanisim in the theory of evolution, and debates concerning the neutral theory.
I am interested in the nature of scientific explanation. The D-N model of explanation has been widely discussed, criticized, and modified. There are three competing models available today, the pragmatic model, the causal model, and the unification model. All models reflect some part of our intution, but none of them solve all the problems and we don't have a clear winner.
The nature of causation always puzzles me. Actually the more I have learned and thought about it, the more puzzled I am.
Chinese Philosophy
- Chan Buddhism
- Chinese Science and Logic
- Daoist Philosophy
Epistemology & Metaphysics & Philosophy of Mind
- Mental Representation
- Mental Causation
- Apriority