•SEDE•VAC | ANTE•1559
Arms of Guido Ascanio Card.Sforza, Camerlengo of the Holy Roman Church (1537-1564), surmounted by the Ombrellone, crossed keys.
Berman, p. 104 #1060.
GUIDO ASCANIO CARDINAL SFORZA (1518-1564) was the son of Bosio Sforza, Conte di Santa Fiora e Cotignola, and Costanza Farnese, the legitimized daughter of Alessandro Farnese (Pope Paul III). He became Cardinal at the age of sixteen on December 18, 1534, in his grandfather's first Consistory. He was named Bishop of Parma (1535-1560), and became Camerlengo of the Holy Roman Church in 1537 at the age of 19, a post he held until his death on October 6, 1564. He served as Legate of Bologna and the Romagna ( from 1537), and was Papal Legate in Hungary in 1540. He presided over the Interregnum of 1549-50, the two interregna of 1555, and that of 1559.
On February 15,1559, Paul IV held a Consistory, in which he published the Bull Cum ex apostolatus officio [Bullarium Romanum Turin edition VI, no. xxvii, 551-556], in which a vote, active or passive, in Consistory was denied to those Emperors, Kings, Princes, or Cardinals who had been accused of heresy, qui hactenus a catholica fide deviasse aut in aliquam haeresim incidisse seu schisma incurrisse aut excitasse seu commisisse.deprehensi aut confessi vel convicti fuerint:
§ 5. Et insuper qui ipsos sic deprehensos aut confessos vel convictos scienter quomodolibet receptare vel defendere aut eis favere vel credere sue eorum dogmata dogmatizare praesumpserint, sententiam excommunicationis eo ipso incurrant, efficianturque infames, nec voce, persona, scriptis vel nuncio aut procuratore aliquo ad publica seu privata officia aut consilia seu synodum vel concilium, generale vel provinciale, nec conclave cardinalium aut aliquam fidelium congregationem seu electionem alicuius, aut testimonium perhibendum admittantur, nec admitti possint; sint etiam intestabiles, nec ad haereditatis successionem accedant; nullus praeterea cogatur eis super aliquo negotio respondere.
In another Consistory on March 10, he made a decree that no Cardinal under inquisition for heresy, whether arrested or confessed or convicted, could be elected Pope (Laemmer, Meletematum, p. 209-210) These decrees were intended to influence the election of his successor, and were directed principally against Cardinal Giovanni Girolamo Morone, who was at the time imprisoned in the Castel S. Angelo, even though he had been cleared of all charges by a Committee of Cardinals (Alessandrino [Ghislieri], Pisa, Reuman, and Spoleto [Farnese]) who had been appointed to deal with his case [Cantù, 421-442; the charges and testimony are catalogued in a contemporary document compiled by the Roman Inquisition, published by C. Corvisieri (1880)]. This was fine with Paul IV, whose bull had prescribed lifelong solitary penitence even for someone who was forgiven (ex ipsius Sedis benignitate et clementia in aliquo monasterio aut alio regulari loco, ad peragendum perpetuam in pane doloris et aqua mestitiae poenitentiam retrudendi fuerint). Such were the decrees of the Grand Inquisitor who had become Pope. In terms of these decrees Morone, therefore, who had been accused of heresy and had been imprisoned, was ineligible to participate or vote in the Conclave of 1559. Fortunately, the College of Cardinals decided otherwise. According to the Bishop of Anglone, Giulio de Grandis, one of the agents of Ferrara in Rome (writing on August 18, the day of Paul IV's death), at their first Congregation the Sacred College immediately sent a committee of Cardinals (Sforza, Lenoncourt and Pisano) to liberate Cardinal Morone from S. Angelo [F. Sforza-Pallavicino, Istoria del Concilio di Trento, Book 14, chapter 10 (who erroneously states that Morone was about to be condemned to death for heresy); Petruccelli II, 118]
According to Onuphrio Panvinio, the continuator of Bartolommeo Platina's papal lives, and an official in the Vatican Library, the Pope was suffering from a lingering and fatal disease [Historia B. Platini (1568) pp. 444-445]: gravis aegritudo pontifici subsecuta est, qui aqua intercute laborans, diu in quibusdam Palatii Vaticani cubiculis reclusus medicorum consilio fuerat. Itaque crescente morbo quum eius vita desperatus esset, ad XI Kal. Septembris [sic! read XVI] hora XII Pontifex, qui sibi mortem instare sentiebat, Cardinales omnes evocare iussit, quibus in eius cubiculum convenientibus, admirabili eloquentia , qua erat praeditus, orationem habuit. The Spanish Ambassador Juan de Figueroa took note of the poor state of the Pope's health when he was finally received in July of 1159 [Hinojosa, p. 32]. The importance of the fever in killing the aged pontiff is also remarked on by Luigi Mocenigo, the Venetian Ambassador [Alberi, 50], and by Vincenzo Bello [Laemmer, Meletemata, p. 212—diary of Vincenzo Bello, Romano]:
Alli undici da Agosto si ammalò il Papa di vomito di flusso e con un poco di febre, et in otto giorni se ne mori, che fu alli XVIII.
Pope Paul IV (Carafa) finally died on Friday, August 18, 1559, at the age of 83. In the same room in which he had died, the Pope's body was opened, according to custom, its praecordia removed, and enbalmed. It was then dressed in its traditional vestments and, at the second hour, the body was placed on view in the Capella Paolina, where, the next morning, August 19, the customary Office was sung. The body lay in the chapel the entire day until the 20th hour. At that point, the Chapel was opened for the Cardinals, who were assembling for the First General Congregation, and thereupon the chapel was opened for general viewing. After the General Congregation, around the 22nd hour, the Canons of the Vatican Basilica and the Cardinals who had been created by Paul II, escorted the body to the Basilica and placed it in the Chapel of the Blessed Sacrament, where the accustomed rites were performed. The body was then carried to the Chapel of S. Sixtus, and at the second hour of the night they entombed the body.
At the last of the Requiem Masses of the Novendiales, the Funeral Oration was pronounced on September 2, 1559, by Joannes Paulus Flavius [text in Caracciolo, pp. 116-129; bibliographical notice with date in Novaes, Introduzione p. 258].
Paul IV was widely hated for his narrow-mindedness, harshness and intolerance. Rome was so excited that the body of the pope had to be interred in deep secrecy in the middle of the night [Mocenigo, Relazione, in Alberi, p. 38; Giovanni Francesco Firmano, Papal Master of Ceremonies, in Caracciolo, pp. 114-115], and guards had to be posted at the grave for some time [Panvinio, in Historia B. Platini, p. 445]. Riots ensued lasting several days, destroying the Palace of the Inquisition and liberating its prisoners; Paul's statue on the Capitoline was overturned and its head used as a football for three days before being thrown into the Tiber [letter of the French Ambassador, Philibert Babou, Bishop of Angoulême, to Cardinal de Lorraine-Guise, Prime Minister of François II, August 18, 1559; September 15, 1559; Ribier I, pp. 828-829; Pallavicino, Istoria del Concilio di Trento Book XIV. cap.ix. 7]. More than 2000 Romans watched the Palace of the Inquisition burn to the ground. The convent of Dominicans at S. Maria sopra Minerva was also attacked with the intention of setting it on fire [Giovanni Firmano, in Baronius-Theiner, Annales Ecclesiastici 34, sub anno 1559, no. 36, p. 40]:
XVIII Augusti agente in extremis Paulo IV coorta seditio, fracti carceres, Inquisitionis domus expoliata facto impetu, partimque combusta, concursumque ad conventum Sanctae-Mariae super Minervam, atque ad delendum thammis coenobium paratae faces, sed auctoritate Juliani Caesarini populi signiferi compressi seditiosi.
All insignia of the Carafa throughout Rome were ordered removed or defaced by order of the Senate and People of Rome. Cardinal Carafa, the Pope's nephew and principal minister, had to hide himself in the palazzo of Cardinal Pacheco for two days [Bishop of Anglone to Ercole II of Ferrara (August 18, 1559): Petruccelli II, 118]. The City was not finally reduced to calmness until September 1 [Pallavicino, Istoria del Concilio di Trento Book XIV. cap.ix. 9].
The Throne of Peter remained vacant for four months and seven days. Although the Cardinals appointed a Governor for the City of Rome and a Governor of the Borgo for the Conclave, the Governor of the City did nothing at all to deal with the crowds of Romans. Neither did the Caporioni. The Roman nobility, for once, was united against the Carafa [Mocenigo, Relazione, in Alberi, p. 39].
There had been a number of deaths in the previous year which had considerably altered the political situation in Europe. The Emperor Charles V had died at Yuste on September 21, 1558. He had retired in 1556, but his influence remained considerable. In France Henri II had met with a sudden accident (died July 10, 1559), placing a minor of fifteen, François II, on the throne, under the control of his mother and his uncles, the Guises. In England, Queen Mary had died (November 17, 1558), as had her greatest support, Cardinal Reginald Pole (November 19, 1558), and they had been succeeded by Elizabeth Tudor, who had been raised a Protestant but who was feigning conformity to the Roman Catholic Church. Most recently Duke Ercole II d'Este of Ferrara, Cardinal Ippolito d'Este's brother, had died on October 3, 1559, in the middle of the Sede Vacante; he had supported the French and Pope Paul IV in the war against the Spanish.
The political requirements of King Philip of Spain and the French Court of the new king François II (in fact under the control of Catherine de Medicis and the Guise faction) were, as usual, the determining factors in the choice of a pope. Prominent also among the deliberations and maneuvers were Cardinals Farnese (grandson of Paul III), who was in close touch with King Philip and who controlled perhaps four votes; Carlo Carafa (nephew of Paul IV), who controlled around eleven votes; and Ippolito II d' Este, the Cardinal of Ferrara, who was the leader of the French interest, which included Louis I de Guise and Lorenzo Strozzi (both of whom arrived on the 15th of September).
The Venetian Orator, Luigi Mocenigo, remarked in his relazione of 1560 to the Venetian Senate, some six months after the Conclave [Alberi, 55 and 51],
Non è dubbio alcuno ... che il Duca di Fiorenza l' ha fatto Papa, però che lui l' ha fatto poner nei nominati del Re Filippo, e poi con diversi mezzi fatto raccomandar anco dalla Regina di Francia, e finalmente guadagnatoli con grande industria e diligenza la parte Caraffesca; per effetuar la qual cosa si crede che quel Duca, oltre li boni mezzi che ha in ogni corte, abbia ancora speso in doni e subornazioni, come è suo costume di fare, molta quantita di danari; di modo che bisogna per necessità che questo Pontefice riconosce, come fa, il papato, dopo Dio, dal Duca di Fiorenza.
The Carafas' anti-Spanish policy (Paul IV was planning to invade Spanish Naples at the time of his death, and Philip II had put the Duke of Alva on alert) made King Philip II determined to influence the cardinals to elect a pope friendly to Spanish interests. The Emperor, Ferdinand I (whom Paul IV had refused to recognize), and King Philip wanted help in dealing with problems with the Protestants. But the Council of Trent, which would have greatly helped in that direction, was looked on with grave suspicion by the Emperor and kings, because the reforms which were being promoted (especially in the realm of episcopal appointments, episcopal residence, and the holding of benefices) threatened the control of monarchs over the Church, its leaders, and its finances. Philip had actually begun working on the problem of a new pope in October of 1558, when he appointed Don Juan de Figueroa as his Castellan and Governor of Milan. Figueroa was provided with letters of credence directed to Cardinal Guido Ascanio Sforza di Santa Fiora, the Camerlengo, who was also Protector of Spain at the papal court. King Philip's choices for a future pope were Rodolfo Pio de Carpi (chief of the Imperial faction), Giacomo Puteo (an eminent legalist), Giovanni Angelo de' Medici (whose brother was the Imperial general in Germany, and in Siena), and Clemente D' Olera, OFM Obs. (Minister General of his order, 1553-1557) [Hinojosa, p. 30-31].
In carrying forward his designs, King Philip relied heavily on his Ambassador (Orator) in Rome, Don Francisco de Vargas Mejía. Vargas' activities, however, were so intrusive and offensive that he became an object of loathing. The Venetian Ambassador, Luigi Mocenigo, commented on him [Alberi, p. 44]
Oltra di cio gli ambasciatori di questi principi, anco per loro affetti particolari, si mettono a favorire o disfavorir qualche cardinale, secondo che il vien voglia, come ha fatto ultimamente l' ambasciatore Vargas. che per far Carpi o Paceco pontefice, ha posto sottosopra tutto il mondo, facendo milti offizi maligni ed iniqui, come si crede, anco senza commissione del re suo, contra diversi cardinali, anzi contra ognuno che lui vedesso esser in atto di poter riuscire pontefice; e questi uffizi faceva con tanta rabbia e con tanta passione, che in vero era cosa odiosa e quasi insopportabile, come fu quello contra il cardinal Pisani, che di certo gli ha tolto il papato, però che ormai molti cardinali gli andavano a dimandar grazie come a papa già fatto.... Non passava quasi notte ch' esso Vargas non andasse alli buchi del conclave, e talvolta v' è stato fin all' alba, oltre che venivan fuori e ritornavan dentro diversi che negoziavano seco, come fecero Don Ferrante di Sanguini, l'abate di Gambara che fu mandato dal Cardinal Farnese, e Monsignor Alessandro Casale per conto del Cardinal di Carpi.
The Tridentine reformers were also promoting the reform of the Roman Curia—which certainly did not want to be reformed. They looked for a pope who would reopen the Council and move forward with the agenda of definition of disputed doctrines and church reform.
What everyone could agree on is that they did not want a pope like Paul IV. Everyone, that is, except the nephews of Paul IV, headed by Cardinal Carlo Carafa. They needed to negotiate some sort of immunity for the misdeeds of the Carafa clan and their hangers-on. Their crimes and misappropriations were already under attack. Marc' Antonio Colonna, who was the rightful owner of the fortress of Paliano, had been dispossessed by Paul IV in favor of his nephew Giovanni, the Duke of Paliano. Colonna immediately appeared before the fortress, the minute the Pope was dead, and expelled the Carafa agents, reclaiming his ancestral property. Gianfrancesco di Bagno also made the effort to claim back his Marquesate di Montebello. He was supported by the French King, who was also demanding from the Papacy the restoration of the Conte di Bagno, as well as the 80,000 ecus which the French government had spent in helping the Conte di Bagno against the illegal dispossession carried out by Paul IV. Colonna and the Roman nobility then appeared before the Cardinals, requesting permission to kill the Duke. And yet the Carafa family continued to annoy and outrage people. Paul IV had appointed his grand-nephew, Alfonso Carafa, to a newly created office, Regent of the Apostolic Chamber. The duties and powers of the Regent vis-a-vis the Chamberlain, however, were unclear, and when the Pope died, Alfonso claimed that he was in charge of the Sede Vacante. The Camerlengo, Cardinal Guido Ascanio Sforza, had no intention, however, of yielding his traditional powers and prerogatives and appealed to the College of Cardinals. The Cardinals supported Sforza, perfectly aware as they were that Sforza was a favorite of the people of Rome and that placing Carafa in charge would bring serious danger. The stupidity and greed of Alfonso Carafa can only be marvelled at [See the.letter of the French Ambassador to the French Prime Minister: Ribier, p. 828]
Duke Cosimo in Florence revealed some of his thoughts in a letter to Lottini, the secretary of Cardinal Sforza, the Camerlengo: the election of Cardinal de la Cueva would be a disaster for the Spanish and would cause a scandal; Cardinal Puteo would be another Paul IV. In a letter to Duke Cosimo in Florence, written on August 18, the Florentine Ambassador in Rome, Buongiani Gianfigliazzi, wrote that among the soggetti were Cardinals Carpi, Puteo, Medici, Montepulciano and Aracoeli. Cardinal Ercole Gonzaga was playing a prominent part. Cardinal Ippolito d'Este, the Cardinal of Ferrara, the favorite of the French Court (he judged) would not win, but he had influence with his faction [ portrait of Cardinal d' Este at left ]. Because of his enmity toward d'Este, Farnese would do everything he could for Carpi [Petruccelli II, 121]. Duke Cosimo, had his own agenda. He was interested in keeping control of Siena, which was now in Florentine hands. Cosimo and The King of Spain (who had become his feudal overlord) had an agreement about Siena, and the French were no longer direct players in Italian regional politics. But the wrong pope could look favorably on a Sienese embassy, and begin to make demands about the Patrimony of St. Peter and attempt to compel Florence to relinquish Siena. This was to be avoided at all costs [Hinojosa, 23-24]. The Venetian Ambassador, Luigi Mocenigo, remarked [Alberi, p. 59]:
Vedendo molto ben l'interesse dello Stato Ecclesiastico, quel Duca, col suo impadronirsi del Senese, dubitò assai che Papa Paolo IV, dopo conclusa la pace fra il re Cristianissimo e il Cattolico, non mettesse qualche impedimento, e non contaoperasse a tal cosa; e però fece opportunamente fare allora per il suo ambasciatore con Sua Santità quelli cosi caldi offici in questa materia, ch' io scrisse a quel tempo alla Serenità Vostra, e si sforzò finl di metter li Senesi in odio di Sua Beatiitudine con dirle che erant eretici e luterani, ma principalmente si sforzò di far capace il Pontefice che l'impedire la consegnazione del Senese a esso Duca, saria un romper quella pace, e poner di nuovo guerra in Italia.
On August 27, 1559, King François II of France wrote to his ambassador in Rome, Philibert Babou, the Bishop of Angoulême, that his first choice for pope was Cardinal Ippolito d'Este, his second was Cardinal François de Tournon, and his third was Cardinal Ercole Gonzaga of Mantua [Ribier II, 830]. On the same day, the Queen Mother, Catherine de Medicis, wrote to her cousin the Duke of Florence in favor of Cardinal d'Este and Cardinal de Tournon [Ribier, pp. 831-832]. Neither letter showed much insight. D'Este was the Royal Family's personal friend, and was favorable to France. That was sufficient for them. But he had no chance of getting elected. And the fact that five French cardinals did not bother to attend the Conclave was no help at all to the French interest. The French ambassador in Venice, Noailles, had very recently complained Cardinal de Lorraine about the unwillingness of the French Cardinals to live in Rome, to become familiar with the other Cardinals, and to learn the ways of the Curia [Ribier II, p. 825 (August 1, 1559)]. The Cardinal of Ferrara had lived a very unreligious life at the French court, and no one thought of him as a theologian, a canon lawyer, or an adept at ecclesiastical politics—even though he was a grandson of Pope Alexander VI. He was exactly the sort of prelate that the Counter-Reformation was beginning to frown upon. His failed candidacy in 1555 may have left a bad taste in some mouths as well.
The French, likewise, seem to have taken no account of the Spanish or Imperial interests in their calculations [Hinojosa, pp. 33-36], or of other interests that were at work (Farnese, the Duke of Florence). Their actual interests are shown in the Memorandum attached to a letter of François II to the Cardinal de Guise written after the news of the election of Medici had reached France: the right of the King to nominate to benefices in France, reformation of the Church in Scotland (a Guise interest), not creating Archbishoprics or Bishoprics in Flanders, the Inquisition in France, and the rights of the Queen Mother. There were better candidates by far than D'Este, Tournon, or Gonzaga, for the good of the Church and the Faith. The French plans for D'Este and Tournon were in ruins by September 27. They then turned their support to Cardinal Ercole Gonzaga, d'Este's cousin. He was another aristocrat from a ruling family; he had held the family's bishopric in Mantua since 1521, but in all those thirty eight years down to the Conclave of 1559, it never occurred to him to have himself episcopally consecrated. Gonzaga, too, was the sort of ecclesiastic who did not fit the requirements of the Counter-Reformation. Afterwards, François II reminded Cardinal de Guise that he had also recommended the candidacy of Cardinal de' Medici; but that was after the fact.
Gulik-Eubel, Hierarchia Catholica III editio altera (edited by Schmitz-Kallenburg) (Munster 1923), p. 36 n. 1. A list of the cardinals, present and absent, is provided by Eugenio Alberi, vii-viii, who lists only 52 cardinals, and marks Georges d'Armagnac and Giovanni Antonio Capizzuchi as absent; he fails to mention Antoine Sanguin de Meudon and Girolamo Dandini, who were absent (both of whom died during the Sede Vacante), nor does he include Cardinal Capodiferro, who died in the Conclave on December 1, 1559.
At the beginning of the Conclave there were fifty-five living cardinals, of whom forty-seven took part (according to Müller, 66-68). Cardinal Joannes Baptista Ghislieri Consiliarius, Cardinal Deacon of S. Lucia in Septisolio died on August 25, 1559, during the Sede Vacante, but before the Conclave had begun [Eubel-Gauchat III, p. 36 n. 5] Luigi Mocenigo, the Venetian Ambassador, estimated that 23 or 24 of the Cardinals hoped to become pope [Alberi, p. 45].
On September 5, 1559, the Conclave opened, with forty-four cardinals in attendance. The Mass of the Holy Spirit was sung by Cardinal Ridofo Pio di Carpi in the Sistine Chapel of St. Peter's Basilica. The customary Oration de pontifice eligendo was pronounced by Giulio Poggiano [Gattico I, p. 332; Novaes, Introduzione p. 286-287]. This was eight days after the customary date of opening of a Conclave. After lunch, the ambassadors of the Powers and others swore their oaths of fidelity to the College of Cardinals. At the fourth hour of the night, the Cardinals who had been assigned the task, demanded to see all the Conclavists, and they expelled a large number of persons who were found in various places who were not on the official list. That night, some Cardinals slept inside the Conclave, some elsewhere in the Apostolic Palace, and others at their homes.
On September 6, Cardinal du Bellay, the Dean of the College of Cardinals, celebrated the Mass of the Holy Spirit in the Capella Paolina. At the 21st hour, the Cardinals assembled in the Capella Paolina, their names were checked by the Master of Ceremonies, the door was closed. This was apparently the 'Extra Omnes' ceremony. Then a Congregation was held. The beginning was casual and disorganized. Cardinal Pacheco was one of those who arrived late. The Master of Ceremonies, Ludovico de Branca, noted in his diary, "Nuntiaverunt magistro cerimoniarum adventum Rmi domini Pacecco, quem magister cerimoniarum nuntiavit quatuor deputatis cardinalibus, qui statim iverunt ad portam quae a magistro cerimoniarum aperta fuit." [G. Constant, "Les maîtres de cérémonies du XVI siècle," Mélanges d' Archéologie et d' Histoire 23 (1903), p. 177 n. 5]
On September 8, at the 22nd hour, a General Congregation took place, in which the Electoral Capitulations (which had probably been worked on during the 7th of September) were read out.
On September 9, after Mass celebrated by the Sacristan, the Bull of Julius II against Simony, Cum tam divino, was read out, and the Cardinals swore the customary oath to observe its provisions. Cardinal du Bellay and Cardinal de Cesi were not present because of illness, and they were therefore sworn by the Master of Ceremonies, Giovanni Francesco Firmano, and the Secretary of the Conclave, Pietro Gualterio, in their cells. The first scrutiny was then begun. (Diary of Giovanni Francesco Firmano, in Gattico I, p. 332). On that day the Dean (du Bellay) and Cardinal Cesi (Bishop of Palestrina) were ill, and scrutators (Cardinals Carpi, Morone, and Sforza) had to be sent to their cells to collect their votes.
No one, however, seemed to be in a hurry. Firmano remarks that the heat of the summer was oppressive, and for the first month people went about sluggishly. Had it not been for the water fountain in the Loggia, there would have been a disaster [stetimus omnes cum magno labore ac timore, praesertim in principio, cum maximi essent calores, et nisi aqua fuisset tracta in Conclave in capite Lodiae, gravius fuisset ibi stare, quod optimum fuit remedium].
On September 26, the Imperial Ambassador had an audience with the Cardinals and exhorted them to elect a pope, especially considering the spread of heresy. He was followed by the Ambassador of the King of Spain, Francisco de Vargas Mejía, with the same message. The Spanish Ambassador returned on October 13 and on December 7. The French Ambassador, the Bishop of Angoulême, appeared on November 14. On November 19 it was the Savoyard Ambassador, and the Imperial Ambassador again on November 25 (Gattico I, p. 332 n. 2). On November 26, Vargas again harangued the Sacred College, and yet again on December 8 (Hinojosa, p. 18 n.)
On September 27, Cardinals d'Este and Louis de Guise wrote to King François II to advise him that Cardinal Tournon had failed definitively in the scrutinies and that there was no hope for a French candidate; they had therefore transferring their efforts to Cardinal Gonzaga. Their breathless prose announced that the letter had to conclude because they were about to rush off to elect Gonzaga by adoration [Ribier, 834]. It was not to be. The rest of the story is told in a letter sent by Louis de Guise privately to his brothers, the Duc de Guise and the Cardinal de Lorraine [Ribier, 833-835], in which he reveals that, despite promises of votes to the number of twenty-eight, the scrutiny on the 22nd gave Tournon only fifteen votes (with five more on the accession). They then consulted Sforza on switching their efforts to Cardinal Gonzaga, d'Este's cousin. It was Sforza who had suggested to them that a scrutiny would not work in electing Gonzaga, and that they should try to elect him by acclamation (It is perfectly possible that Sforza's suggestion was intended to ruin Gonzaga's chances; Sforza, after all, was a Spanish agent). The scheme was to be carried out after dinner on the 25th, but the support was so weak, even inside the French party, that it failed. The French anger was directed, of course, at Cardinal Farnese and Cardinal Carafa, who were working against their efforts, but even more so at Cardinal Reumont [Jean Suau de Rieumes], who, as a fellow Frenchman and loyal subject of the King, ought to have followed royal instructions (which Guise had shown him during a private talk) and supported Gonzaga. Reumont's excuse of being indebted to Carafa for having been made a Cardinal just made Guise more furious. The Spanish, of course, were against Gonzaga, but Guise and his supporters continued to work on his behalf. Farnese and Carafa, nonetheless, appeared to be using the exclusiva against him; they seemed to command between eighteen and twenty-two votes in the scrutinies [Ribier II, 835, October 18, 1559]. It was Ambassador Babon's view that the Spanish Ambassador Vargas was behind the exclusiva against Gonzaga [Ribier II, 837], which was certainly true, but the instruction had come from King Philip.
During the first month, and beyond, there was no security to speak of. The windows were not properly shut, and people could see and be seen, as well as pass messages. A person was noticed standing at the Rota and talking to someone outside. The Governor of the Borgo reported on October 2 that Conclavists had been sighted here and there from the Atrium of St. Peter's [Gubernator Burgi dixerat, quod multi Conclavistae fuerant visi in quibusdam fenestris stantibus supra cortile magnum S. Petri, quod erat mali exempli]. The physician of Cardinal Mercurio of Messana was actually going out of the Conclave by way of the Rota; other Conclavists were stepping out too, using some open windows; and the number of Conclavists was not regulated. Representatives of the Powers were still inside the Conclave area. The food supply was not being controlled. Inside the Conclave. Cardinals and others were eating in each other's cells in what were more like banquets than simple Conclave fare.
On that same day that the Governor made his report, October 2, Cardinal Capizzuchi left the Conclave because of illness. Cardinal de Guise slipped out the entry while it was open and quickly returned. After the ceremonies a meeting of the Cardinals was held, and a Reform Committee was organized, including the Dean, du Bellay, and Cardinals Tridentinus [Madruzzi], Tranensis [Scotti], Ferrariensis [d'Este], and Carafa. The crackdown began immediately. It was completely ineffective. Conclavists were restricted to three per cardinal, unless the Cardinal was ill, in which case he could have a fourth. The Master of Ceremonies, Giovanni Francesco Firmano, was ordered to supervise personally the intake of food at the Rota.
In addition to all this, letters were passing freely. Cardinal Pacheco wrote to King Philip II of Spain on September 20 and 27, and again on October 17 (Hinojosa, p. 18 n.). According to the French Ambassador (in December, 1558), Cardinal Pacheco hoped to become Pope, and was courting both Cardinal Carafa and the King (Ribier II, 775).
On October 9, the hammer fell on the agents of the Powers, but with little real effect. Without security the prattica continued as before. The number of Conclavists was finally reduced to approximately 170. That number, however, was more than sufficient to allow the games to go on. But by November 28, the Cardinals had finally had enough of some of their own Conclavists, in particular members of the nobility, who spent a good deal of their time engaging in electoral politics, contrary to the rules. Five of them, it was said, did nothing else. These five noblemen were expelled from the Conclave, under some protest. They included Don Garzias de Arco, the nephew of Cardinal Paceccho; Lactantius of Orvieto; Camillo Piperantius; Annibal Oricellaus; and Benedetto de Callia. Next day eighty of their number were expelled (Firmano, in Gattico I, p. 334)..
The source of the material in Conclavi for the Conclave of 1559 remarks that for months there was no serious effort in the scrutinies to elect a pope. Candidates were named and votes were given for the sake of honor, not because a candidate had the qualifications necessary for the office. The example of Cardinal de la Cueva is offered, who, in his sweet and insinuating way, importuned both the Imperial and French factions to give him their votes; he did well in the scrutiny, until Cardinal Capodiferro spoke up and invited the attention of the voters to the character of the man they were supporting, whose credentials were no more impressive than several others among them. Votes were quickly changed, and De La Cueva's candidacy ended as quickly as it had begun (Histoire, 130-131). Dirty tricks were in evidence as well. The French Ambassador, the Bishop of Angoulême, passed on the report that Cardinals Carpi and Ricci [Montepulciano] were circulating a story that Cardinal Medici was actually a Lutheran; who had said that to recover Germany it would be expedient to let priests marry and let the laity have communion in both species [Ribier II, 837, October 20, 1559].
On October 25, Cardinal Jean Bertrand, Archbishop of Sens, entered Conclave. Amazingly he was not in major orders, and therefore did not have the right to vote in the election.
On October 26, one of the sealed doors of the Conclave area was broken open, which caused a great uproar and a command from the Dean not to open any of the doors. At a General Congregation in the late afternoon, the matter was raised, and it was ordered that any open doors should be sealed.
On October 30, Cardinal Capizucchi. though ill, returned to the Conclave. Considering that November 1 would be the Feast of All Saints, four Penitentiarii were admitted for the purpose of hearing confessions and granting absolutions for all of the participants in the Conclave. The Penitentiarii were required to swear not to speak to any cardinal about the papal election, nor to reveal anything that was told to them in the Conclave.
On November 1, there were forty-seven Cardinals in Conclave, five of them confined to their rooms due to illness. In addition there were 170 Conclavists.
Cardinal Girolamo Capodiferro died on December 1 [Gulik-Eubel III, p.29 n. 7: 1559 Dec.1 hora X noctis sequentis obiit in conclavi et portatum ad capellam S. Mariae de febribus]. On December 5, the ancient regulation limiting the food of the Cardinals to one dish was finally put into practice, a requirement which ought to have been instituted after the third day.
On December 17, the money on hand finally ran out. The soldiers under the command of General Antonio de Gravina demanded their pay, and there was no cash to give him. The clerks of the Chamber were summoned, and instructed to make every attempt to find funds for necessary expenditures and military pay.
On December 19, Cardinal Bertrand received minor orders, and on the same day (with special written permission which had been granted him earlier) the major orders as well. He had finally become qualified to vote in a papal election. A decision was near, it seems.
On the afternoon of Christmas Day the serious prattica began (according to the Master of Ceremonies, Giovanni Firmano) toward making Cardinal Giovanni Angelo de' Medici pope. In the early evening the Cardinals began to gather in Cardinal de' Medici's rooms to congratulate him. Cardinal Carafa, however, stood at the door and tried to persuade the other Cardinals to wait until morning to take any action. But some of them surmised that he was attempting to buy time so that he could put together an exclusiva. They therefore moved forward and escorted Cardinal de' Medici to the Pauline Chapel. The Master of Ceremonies and the Secretary of the College of Cardinals had already gone ahead to prepare the materials needed for an enthronement. When all had arrived, the Cardinals proceeded to an election by acclamation (Firmano, in Gattico I, p. 335; cf. Histoire des conclaves, 136). the Cardinals asked him whether he would consent to an election by scrutiny on the next morning, and he agreed, stipulating, however, that the election of December 25 was valid and canonical. The entire business was completed by 8:00 p.m.
On the next day, December 26, after the Mass of the Holy Spirit, the choice of the previous day was ratified. A scrutiny was held, and forty-four votes were cast. Medici naturally received all the votes except his own. His ballot cast votes for François de Tournon, Rodolfo Pio di Carpi, Pedro Pacheco de Villena, Ercole Gonzaga, and Ippolito d'Este. These were, of course, complimentary votes. Cardinal Saraceni, who had been ill on the 24th and was not in Conclave, had returned to take part in the final ratification of Christmas Day. The Cardinal Dean, Jean du Bellay, was absent.
Giovanni Angelo de' Medici was crowned on January 6, 1560, as Pius IV, by Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, the Cardinal Protodeacon [Petramellari, p. 62]. During the ceremonies, when money was being tossed to the people from the steps of the Basilica, there was a stampede and more than twenty-five people were killed in the crush [Acta Consistorialia, quoted by Eubel III, p. 36 n.3]:
1560, Jan. 6, Pius PP IV simpliciter coronatus est triplici diademate in loco, quo pontifices solent populo benedicere: quo tempore in spargendis populo pecuniis obiere in scalis S. Petri ultra homines suffocati a multitudine.
The new Pope took possession of the Lateran Basilica, his cathedral church, on January 28.
Pius IV forgave the Roman crowds for their wild and inappropriate behavior during the Sede Vacante, but he required the Senate to participate in a Mass of expiation at S. Eustachio on January 17, 1560 [Artaud de Montor, Histoire des pontifes romains IV, p. 185] On January 31, three new cardinals were created, Giovanni Antonio Serbelloni (the pope's nephew), Carlo Borommeo (the pope's nephew), and Giovanni de' Medici (aged 17, Duke Cosimo's son).
A. Massarelli, Diario del Conclave di Paolo IV, creazione del Pio IV e suo pontificato (manuscript Vaticanus Ottobonianus 2608) [non vidi]
Somma dei capitoli conclusi e segnati dai Cardinali in Conclave in Sede Vacante di Paolo IV di Ottobre 1559, da osservarsi dal futuro papa (manuscript Codex Vaticanus 9729) [non vidi]. Francesco Sforza Pallavicino, Relazione della morte del Card.e D. Carlo Caraffa nipote di Papa Paolo Quarto strangolato in Castel S. Angelo p(er) ordine di Papa Pio Quarto, descritta dal Card.e Pallavicino (ms. Vat. Lat. 8665) [Vincenzo Forcella, Catalogo dei manoscritti relativi alla storia di Roma I (Roma 1879), p. 242 no. 677]. [non vidi].
Giovanni Francesco Firmano (Papal Master of Ceremonies), Diary in Joannes Baptista Gattico, Acta Selecta Caeremonialia Sanctae Romanae Ecclesiae ex variis mss. codicibus et diariis saeculi xv. xvi. xvii. Tomus I (Romae 1753), pages 332-335.
Guillaume Ribier, Lettres et mémoires d' État des Roys, Princes, Ambassadeurs et autres Ministres sous les règnes de François Ier, Henry II et François II Tome II (Blois 1666).
J. J. J. von Dollinger, Beiträge zur politischen, kirchlichen, und Cultur-geschichte der sechs letzten Jahrhunderte Band I (Regensburg 186 ).
Historia B. Platini de vitis Pontificum Romanorum a D. N. Jesu Christo usque ad Paulum II Venetum Papam longe quam antea emendatior, doctissimarumque adnotationum Onuphrii Panvinii ... vitae usque ad Pium V. nunc recens adiuncta sunt (Coloniae: Maternum Cholinum 1568). Giovanni Antonio Petramellari, Ad librum Onuphrii Panvinii de summis Pontif. et S.R.E. Cardinalibus a Paulo Quarto ad Clementis Octavi annum pontificatus octavum Continuatio (Bononiae: Heredes Joahnnis Rosij 1599) 60-124. For details of the conclave of 1559, see: [Gregorio Leti], Conclavi de' Pontefici Romani nuova edizione Volume I (Colonia: Lorenzo Martini, 1691), 277-292. Histoire des conclaves depuis Clement V jusqu' à présent troisème edition Tome premier (Cologne 1703), 129-137. Francesco Sforza Pallavicino, SJ, Istoria del Concilio di Trento (ed. Francesco Antonio Zaccaria) Tomo VIII (Venezia: Giacomo Zanardi 1803), Libro XIV, Capo X, pp. 324-331. Lorenzo Cardella, Memorie storiche de' Cardinali della Santa Romana Chiesa Tomo Quarto (Roma: Pagliarini 1793). Giuseppe de Novaes, Elementi della storia de' sommi pontefici da San Pietro sino al ... Pio Papa VII third edition, Volume 7 (Roma 1822) 143-146. G. Moroni, Dizionario di erudizione storico-ecclesiastica Vol. 51 (Venezia 1851) 131; Vol. 53 (Venezia 1851) p.84-85. Alexis François Artaud de Montor, Histoire de pontifes IV (Paris 1851), pp. 184-185. F. Petruccelli della Gattina, Histoire diplomatique des conclaves Volume II (Paris: 1864), 119-170.
Antonio Caracciolo, De vita Pauli Quarti Pont. Max. collectanea historica (Coloniae Ubiorum: ex officina Joannis Kinckii 1612). Carlo Bromato [Bartolomeo Cararra], Storia di Paolo IV. Pontefice massimo 2 vols. (Ravenna: Antonmaria Landi 1748, 1753), Vol. 2. René Ancel, "L' activité réformatrice de Paul IV: le choix des cardinaux," Revue des questions historiques (Juillet 1909) 67-103. René Ancel (editor), Nonciatures de France: Nonciatures de Paul IV 2 vols. (Paris 1909-1911).
Ugo Pesci, "La politica Mediceo rispetto ai conclavi," Rivista europea 6 (Firenze 1878) 26-46. George Duruy, Le Cardinal Carlo Carafa (1519-1561): Étude sur le Pontificat de Paul IV (Paris 1882) 308-314. Miles Pattenden, Pius IV and the Fall of The Carafa: Nepotism and Papal Authority in Counter-Reformation Rome (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press 2013). Theodor Müller, Das Konklave Pius' IV, 1559 (Gotha 1889). R. de Hinojosa, Felipe II y el conclave de 1559, según los documentos originales, muchos inéditos (Madrid 1889). J. B. Sägmüller Die Papstwahlbullen und das staatliche Recht der Exklusive (Tübingen 1892), pp. 43-84. Paul Herre, Papsttum und Papstwahl im Zeitalter Philipps II. (Leipzig: Teubner 1907) 33-64.
Hugo Laemmer, Meletmatum Romanorum mantissa (Ratisbon 1875).
Cesare Cantù, "Il Cardinale Giovanni Morone," Illustri Italiani Volume II (Milano: Brigola 1873), 393-465 [containing both Morone's defense against the charges of heresy (421-439), and Paul's bull which refused to accept the findings of his own Commission, which exonerated Morone (440-442)]. Costantino Corvisieri, "Compendio dei processi del Santo Uffizio di Roma (da Paolo III a Paolo IV)," Archivio della Società romana di storia patria 3 (1880), 261-290; 449-471 [list of charges and testimony against Cardinal Pole, Cardinal Moroni, and many others]. Massimo Firpo, Inquisizione romana e Controriforma. Studi sul cardinal Giovanni Morone (1509-1580) e il suo processo d'eresia (Brescia: Morcelliana 2005).
Cardinal Otto Truchess: Bernard Duhr, "Die Quellen zu einer Biographie des Kardinals Otto Truchsess von Waldburg," Historische Zeitschrift 7 (München 1886) 177-209.
M. de la Jonquiere, "Le Cardinal du Bellay," Bulletin du Perche (1891)
Eugenio Alberi (editor), Le relazioni degli ambasciatori veneti al senato Volume X (Serie ii, Tomo IV) (Firenze 1857).
© April 28, 2007, October 13, 2011, John Paul Adams