

IN THE "TWILIGHT WARZONE"

Overt and Covert Dimensions of the US Sports Offensive

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In the early years of the Cold War, Americans began to discuss the nature of Soviet sport with increasing regularity. For the most part, they reached a consensus of opinion. A range of US sports officials and athletes, along with politicians, journalists, and academics, charged that the "Reds" had ruthlessly turned sports into a tool of state politics and propaganda. With equal conviction, many of the same people stoutly defended the role of sport in American society by celebrating its freedom from government control. To some extent they were right. The United States did not possess a state-directed sports infrastructure, and it did not directly subsidize its athletes.

Yet during this period, the government did deploy sport for propaganda purposes, regardless of what the majority of Americans might have said or thought. Under the presidencies of Harry S. Truman and Dwight D. Eisenhower, for instance, the US government's information program began to organize and fund overseas sports tours to protect America's image abroad. This form of cultural diplomacy was, of course, an exercise in state propaganda, even if the officials who ran the exchanges denied this fact in public. While historians have examined this government initiative, they have overlooked the various other sport-related activities undertaken by US propaganda services in the early Cold War years.¹ Declassified documents released in the past few decades reveal that tours and exchanges were but a single aspect of a far broader US cultural effort in the field of sports. The scale of this effort was truly global and sometimes veiled by a cloak of clandestine secrecy. Throughout the late

1940s and 1950s the overt and covert branches of Washington's information apparatus used sports to advertise and promote American culture and attack the regimes of the Soviet Bloc. Even if the US public collectively disapproved of Communist states mixing politics with sports, their own government was engaging in much the same thing.

Why the United States embarked on this propaganda campaign reveals much about the peculiarities of the Cold War. To avoid the unthinkable consequences of nuclear confrontation, the United States and the Soviet Union fought to gain a preponderance of power in world affairs through the mobilization and exploitation of ideas and culture. At the outbreak of the Cold War, however, the United States was ill equipped for such a battle. While it had created a sprawling propaganda machine during World War II, this machine was largely dismantled after the defeat of the Third Reich. Yet in response to the desperate realities of the fractured postwar world, the waxing power of the Soviet Union across Europe, and the sheer effectiveness of Communist propaganda, the United States soon began to reassemble its information network. The "realization dawned," a government analyst observed, "that here was a weapon which could be used in this twilight warzone in which we found ourselves living."²

Toward the end of 1947, a year that witnessed the intensification of Cold War antagonisms, the United States began to sketch the contours of its postwar propaganda apparatus. As had been the case in World War II, the program would be split along overt and covert lines. In December, the National Security Council (NSC) asserted that the Soviet Union "is conducting an intensive propaganda campaign" and pressed for the "immediate strengthening of and coordination of all foreign information measures in the U.S. Government designed to influence attitudes in foreign countries." The NSC subsequently approved NSC 4, a policy document that stipulated that the State Department assume responsibility for the fractured overt "information measures" strewn around a variety of "departments and agencies." A secret annex, titled NSC 4-A, gave the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) authority to conduct "covert psychological operations designed to counteract Soviet and Soviet-inspired activities which constitute a threat to world peace and security."³

Just months later, in January 1948, the overt track of the propaganda apparatus was given legislative backing when Congress passed the US Information and Educational Exchange Act, which finally secured a permanent status for the overseas information program. Over the next few years, the size and scope of the Truman administration's cultural effort grew exponentially, as Congress

granted the State Department more funds to counter the "lies" of Soviet propaganda with the "truth" about the United States. By 1952, the United States could boast that it was communicating to a massive global audience through the international distribution of books, magazines, newspapers, and movies; through more than a hundred information centers in more than seventy countries; through broadcasts carried on the airwaves of the government's radio network, the Voice of America; and through a range of reciprocal cultural exchanges. The Eisenhower administration continued to build on this platform and, in 1953, consolidated the sprawling worldwide program into the United States Information Agency (USIA).⁴

In the late 1940s, the officers who staffed the overt propaganda program started to recognize that sport had become part of the total Cold War contest. Reports from American diplomats overseas recorded the increasing number of Soviet athletes competing in various international events and embarking on cultural exchanges. Soviet propaganda, State Department officials noted, hailed the achievements of its athletes, celebrated their victories, and praised their contribution to global peace and goodwill.⁵ The Soviets alleged, on the other hand, that US sport fed the capitalist system and furthered the pursuit of America's ruthless militaristic and imperialistic agenda.⁶ "Both at home and abroad," recorded a USIA intelligence analysis, "the Soviets have been promoting the idea that only under their system can sports attain perfection and embrace the masses of the population."⁷

As a result of this campaign, US information experts determined that foreign audiences had developed a distorted view of American sports and its place in American society. Addressing the distortion required deploying a similar approach. US officials realized that sport was a cultural medium that could be successfully "exploited" because it had such immense range. In numerous planning papers, American propaganda experts discussed the universal appeal of sports, particularly to the "man-on-the-street," the "worker," and the coveted opinion of the world's youth.⁸ They recognized that sports topics easily stirred interest on a global scale and allowed the United States to communicate with audiences abroad in a shared language and culture. Sport was a medium that was distinctly political but could be packaged otherwise.

Stories about America's sporting landscape became a staple subject as the Soviet "sports offensive" gathered momentum. By 1952, the year in which the USSR competed in the Olympics for the first time, the US government's overseas information *Bulletin* contained a regular column titled "Sports World."

Within two years the USIA established a monthly "feature packet" on sports full of cartoons, glossy photographs, articles, and carefully selected reprints from American newspapers and magazines. These materials were sent to US embassies, information centers, and public affairs officers around the world for distribution overtly and covertly in local and national media outlets. Moreover, the programming of the Voice of America included live sports coverage and stories in dozens of languages to an estimated audience in the hundreds of millions.

Without question, US propaganda had a defensive tone that attempted to refute Communist accusations about the role of sport in America. But there was more to the narrative than this. As Laura Belmonte has noted, for American propagandists, "life under democratic capitalism meant far more than escaping communist oppression. It signified a world of spiritual, material, social, political, and cultural benefits of which communists could only dream."⁹ The content of US materials, then, sought to present America as a land of sports far more vibrant, and far more diverse, than the physical culture experienced under Communism.

In numerous stories, films, and pictures, propaganda experts tried to demonstrate that sports in the United States unified and enriched the lives of the national citizenry. On any given day, people across the country were said to be willingly participating in a range of sporting activities. In a recurring theme, these materials paid homage to the private and voluntary aspects of US sports, praising their place in forging a morally and physically sound community. Civic engagement exemplified the limited role of government in the everyday lives of Americans. Propaganda strategists continually contrasted the state-dominated model that prevailed under Communism with the citizen-led teams, leagues, competitions, charities, and philanthropic events in the United States. In a series of stories, US propaganda took great care to explain that the United States Olympic Committee was "self-governing" by soliciting charitable donations from the American public. "No government subsidy has been offered," a 1952 *Bulletin* article read. "If it were, it would not be accepted."¹⁰

More generally, propaganda experts endeavored to depict US athletes as normal people in just the same way they tried to present Americans as a community of ordinary human beings.¹¹ While Communist propaganda charged that American athletes were "rough, dirty-fighting, gangster-like competitors," the USIA deluged overseas audiences with stories on the hardworking, diligent, humble, and well-mannered individuals who represented the Stars and Stripes.¹² While Communist propaganda proclaimed America to be a "cultural

wasteland," the USIA released materials about male and female athletes who had various hobbies, interests, and cultural talents. Unlike the one-dimensional figures in the Communist media, they enjoyed oil painting, drawing, writing, singing, listening to music, or expressing their religious freedom.¹³

The information program also portrayed American society as a place of social equality. Anyone could progress through hard work and honest fortitude; anyone could become a paragon of "People's Capitalism."¹⁴ In particular, the success and popularity of African American athletes helped counter one of the most powerful and persistent themes of Communist propaganda: racial discrimination in the United States. Propagandists attempted to deflect attention from racial segregation by portraying a gradual process of integration and change.¹⁵ The USIA's selective approach to presenting race and sport in American society was perhaps best displayed in the agency's film on the tennis star Althea Gibson. It was released in 1957, the same year world audiences watched the unraveling civil rights unrest that gripped Little Rock, Arkansas. The Gibson film "appropriated" the athlete's victories in the US Open and Wimbledon championships to "show American democracy in a positive light." Rather than admit that Gibson's race had obstructed her tennis career, the film focused on her work ethic and inferred that her achievements were a "normal" by-product of the American way of life.¹⁶

Gibson's film touched on another important theme in US propaganda: the need to answer Communist accusations that American women were not only "on the verge of prostitution" but also "slovenly, ugly, and silly."¹⁷ Instead, multiple USIA profiles of female athletes sought to portray a wholesome, feminine, domesticated, and productive vision of American women.¹⁸ Female athletes "enjoyed" doing housework and cooking, liked to sew and knit, hoped to marry and raise a family, and aspired to attend college or find a job. Once again, the narrative of progress was decidedly judicious. In the post-World War II era, women were vastly underrepresented on the US Olympic team, provided with few opportunities to participate in track-and-field events, and scrutinized for their ability to fulfill Western standards of femininity.¹⁹

While sport was used to construct a positive image of day-to-day life in America, US propaganda further explained that American citizens were noble participants in the far larger community of international sport. A host of features described the mutual transfer of ideas that occurred when foreign athletes, coaches, and physical educators visited the United States. There was also praise for Americans who traveled abroad to share their expertise on skills, techniques,

and training. These overseas excursions, many of which were organized by the State Department, provided just the sort of copy information experts craved. Pictures and articles of Americans on missions abroad were proof of a nation committed to fostering amity and goodwill.

For the USIA, American athletes on tours were effective because they understood and preached the core moral values of sport. Thus, the information program was particularly keen to demonstrate that the United States was an upstanding affiliate of the Olympic Movement.²⁰ Propaganda strategists acknowledged that the Games were a globally admired festival driven by a compelling, if largely mythical, mission to make the world a better place through "friendly" athletic competition. They recognized that by describing to overseas audiences that the American public upheld and revered Olympic principles, they would be insinuating that the United States was also committed to the same goals. In leading up to the Winter and Summer Games from 1952 to 1960, the information program filled its overseas output with a range of materials emphasizing the "true spirit" of the movement and pumped out items highlighting US adherence to Olympic principles.²¹

While the main thrust of the US propaganda offensive aimed to counter Soviet "lies" about America's athletic culture, it also sought to tell overseas audiences the "truth" about sport under Communist rule. Conveying this message became even more crucial throughout the 1950s as Soviet athletes began to improve their performances at the Olympic Games and other international competitions.²²

The bulk of the information program's stories about sport under Communism were based on accounts from Eastern European refugees living in the West. Fueled by a desire to end Communist rule in their homeland, refugees told deeply negative tales about the goals of Communist sport and the restrictive aspects of life in Eastern Europe. In one scathing attack broadcast on the airwaves of the Voice of America, Jozsef Halmai, a Hungarian émigré, explained that Communist states were solely focused on developing athletes for the sake of propaganda. Halmai, an Olympic canoeist who defected in 1954, also charged that athletes were locked in their hotel rooms during international competitions and locked in buses when they traveled to events. "I knew I was being used as a tool," he said.²³ Still, many of the information program's stories about refugees were also scripted to include a happy ending. The USIA frequently highlighted that émigrés were now living safely and contentedly in the "free world."

The overt US propaganda program relied on a high level of cooperation with private actors. Overseas output was littered with interviews and quotes from athletes, coaches, and sports administrators, while many of the tours described and pictorialized were organized by the State Department in tandem with American sports authorities. Yet the wealth of material gleaned from conversations with Eastern European exiles also masked the activities of the government's covert propaganda branch. The USIA did not tell overseas audiences exactly how some of these refugee athletes had managed to escape from their homeland in the first place. High-ranking American psychological warfare experts underscored the value of exploiting the propaganda potential of exiled athletes and, in some cases, began to fund and support defections. To shroud state involvement in these defections, they were sometimes organized by front organizations or other private groups supplied with government funds.

This use of nonstate intermediaries by the overt and covert strands of the information program was by no means limited to the realm of sports. During the late 1940s, the US government reacted to the unconventional nature of the Cold War by embarking on an unprecedented peacetime effort to work with and through private businesses, groups, and organizations to support US foreign policy objectives. In most instances, the public did not require convincing to join this fight. They were ready and eager to enter the fray, but they required resources and guidance to make their case effectively. The government filled this breach. Although this "state-private network" had an overt dimension, US officials understood that the general public, both at home and abroad, was wary of official government involvement in propaganda. The main thrust of the network was therefore developed covertly to shield the hand of the state.²⁴

The covert dimension of the state-private network emerged as a component of US psychological warfare initiated by NSC 4-A. With the ink barely dry on this document, the US government immediately began sabotaging the Italian Communist Party's chances of winning the 1948 national election and undermining Communist influence in French labor unions. Buoyed by the outcome of these efforts, strategists sought to expand the range of clandestine initiatives even further. At the forefront of this diversification was George F. Kennan, director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff. In a May 1948 memo, "The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare," he and his colleagues called for the US government to undermine Soviet control in Eastern Europe by supporting "specific projects in the field of covert operations." One such project would involve the government sponsoring "liberation committees"

led by refugees from behind the Iron Curtain. These refugees, the memo noted, would "act as foci of national hope and revive a sense of purpose among political refugees from the Soviet World."²⁵

Kennan's plans were soon put into action. In November 1948, NSC 10/2 recommended the creation of a new covert directorate—later named the Office of Policy Coordination—within the CIA and charged it to perform a range of clandestine operations. The NSC directive emphasized that the activities "conducted or sponsored" by the United States should be "planned and executed" so that the government could "plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them."²⁶ In 1949, the Office of Policy Coordination established the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE), a group inspired by Kennan's blueprint for liberation committees and therefore designed to provide a voice for Eastern European refugees who wished to levy an attack on Communism. In an advertisement published in the *New York Times*, the committee announced that it would support Soviet Bloc refugees to "continue their stand against communism, anticipating the day when the Iron Curtain will fall and Eastern Europe will be ripe for democratic remaking." To anyone in the public who might be interested, the committee simply claimed to be a private philanthropic group led by prominent American citizens. In reality, it received millions of CIA dollars to fund Soviet Bloc émigrés in an astounding breadth of activities.²⁷

A portion of this money found its way to the Hungarian National Sports Federation (HNSF), a refugee sports group based in New York and led by a Hungarian exile, Count Anthony Szápáry. The mission of the federation mirrored the goals of its financial benefactor. Yet unlike the multitude of other organizations funded by the NCFE, the HNSF sought to "deal the greatest possible blows whenever and wherever possible to the communists in the field of sports."²⁸ Indeed, the NCFE and HNSF cooperated on a number of projects and covert operations throughout the 1950s. They tried and failed to enter a refugee team at the 1952 Summer Olympics, created and distributed anti-Communist literature, publicly denounced the Communist sports system in the Western media, organized fund-raising events for the US Olympic team, demanded international sports bodies eject Communist nations from sports competitions, and helped Eastern European athletes defect and resettle in the "free world."²⁹

Arguably the most significant of their collaborative efforts occurred in the aftermath of the 1956 Melbourne Summer Olympics, when they helped thirty-four Hungarians and four Romanians—including athletes, coaches, writers, and sports administrators—defect to the United States. Few knew of this at the

time, and the details have been slow to emerge ever since. For years, most believed the explanation provided by the magazine *Sports Illustrated*. In a famous article published on December 17, 1956, just weeks after the closing ceremonies of the Games, journalist André Laguerre described in detail how he and *Sports Illustrated* had orchestrated the event. The thirty-four Hungarians in the group, Laguerre noted in particular, had chosen to live in a land of "freedom and opportunity" rather than return to their homeland, which had just witnessed a revolution crushed by the Soviet military. In the self-congratulatory piece, Laguerre claimed the athletes were "subjected to no pressure or propaganda. They had no contact with any U.S. official. They sought out representatives of *Sports Illustrated*."³⁰ While the article clearly emphasized that this was a private initiative and with minimal government involvement, it was, in fact, an example of far deeper state and private cooperation.

Aside from the HNSF and NCFE, other parties made pivotal contributions, none more so than Charles Douglas Jackson, a fascinating figure in the history of US covert operations. Like numerous other publicists and advertisers the government hired to assist in propaganda operations, he was plucked out of the private sector. Jackson graduated from Princeton in 1924 and spent his early career ascending through the ranks of Time Incorporated. During World War II, he was heavily involved with US psychological warfare, and his gift for propaganda made his services a commodity of great value after 1945. He regularly advised the Truman and Eisenhower administrations on Cold War planning and was instrumental in the creation of the NCFE.³¹ Szápáry and the HNSF benefited from Jackson's connections in the government. He aided the group on numerous occasions and never swayed from his belief that exiled athletes living and competing in America were potent weapons in psychological warfare.

Jackson's ties to *Time* are also significant. The owner of the company, Henry Luce, was a founding member of the NCFE and well connected in covert circles. He was a close friend of Allen Dulles, Eisenhower's director of Central Intelligence, and Jackson's presence at the company meant that the media mogul had a further direct contact into the government's psychological warfare machinery. *Time* magazine assisted in various government projects, provided cover for CIA staff, and often published articles that gave the Eisenhower administration favorable coverage.³² Yet to what extent was *Sports Illustrated*, a subsidiary of *Time*, caught in the US government's covert web? The magazine may not have had reporters on the CIA's payroll, but there is evidence to suggest it was not an

innocent and objective vessel. The events that transpired before, during, and after the Melbourne Olympic Games indicate that *Sports Illustrated* was part of Luce's personal war against Communism and that this war was not isolated by any means from the White House.

Nevertheless, it is with the HNSF, not *Sports Illustrated*, that the story of the Melbourne defection must begin. On the afternoon of November 11, 1956, Szápáry and his wife, Sylvia, entertained Whitney Tower (a relative of Sylvia) at their home in Pound Ridge, New York. Also present was Dr. George Telegdy, secretary of the HNSF. The start of the Melbourne Olympics was less than two weeks away, and Szápáry had just returned from Vienna, where he had been trying to organize relief for Hungarians in the wake of the revolution. He asked Tower, the associate editor of *Sports Illustrated*, if his employer could assist in the defection of Hungarian Olympic athletes, many of whom had decided not to return home after the Olympics.³³ Tower agreed to help. He produced an "urgent and confidential" memorandum on the idea that soon landed on Jackson's desk. Tower told Szápáry that "outside of top government officials there is probably no man who has more influence with Ike [Eisenhower] and the State Department than C. D. Jackson."³⁴ Within days, Tower wrote Szápáry that "things definitely look promising" and that "Jackson is at the moment probing deeper into the matter in Washington." He added in a handwritten note, "I cannot over-emphasize the importance of maintaining the closest possible secrecy on this subject."³⁵

Meanwhile, there had been some doubt surrounding the Hungarian team's participation in the Olympics. The Hungarian Revolution erupted in late October and was routed by Soviet troops on November 4. The Melbourne Olympic Games were slated to begin on November 22. Because of the upheaval in Hungary, the Associated Press predicted the national team would simply be unable to get to Australia. The report turned out to be wrong. The Hungarian National Olympic Committee sent a cable to the Melbourne Organizing Committee to confirm that its athletes would arrive in Australia on November 10, one week later than originally planned. The understated message blamed "unforeseen circumstances."³⁶

As fate would have it, the water polo competition at the Games provided the Hungarians an opportunity to exact revenge, in a sporting sense at least, against the Soviet Union. With a formidable history of success in the pool, the Hungarians marched through the early rounds of the tournament, handily beating each opponent. The luck of the draw, though, pitted them against the

Soviets in the semifinal. The match is now part of Olympic folklore. From the first whistle, this tense and highly symbolic encounter was filled with physical confrontations and controversy. Feeding off the reportedly partisan support from the crowd, the Hungarians built up, and never lost, a 4-0 lead. Near the end of the game came the most famous incident of all. A Soviet player, Valentin Prokopov, punched the Hungarian star, Ervin Zádor, opening a nasty cut on his face. Such "a vicious and violent blow" that it "stained the water red," the London *Daily Mirror* embellished. The expatriate Hungarians in the stands vented their strong disapproval, and the referee stopped the game there and then. The Soviets were booed as they left the pool. The Hungarians moved on to the final, where they narrowly defeated Yugoslavia by a score of 2-1.³⁷

As soon as the Hungarian team reached Australia, rumors of possible defections began to swirl in the Western media. Behind the scenes, the plan for a mass exodus was already coming together. The NCFE dispatched Telegdy to Australia, where he was soon circulating around the Olympic city and speaking with Hungarian athletes. He frequently imparted this intelligence to on-site *Sports Illustrated* reporters, including Laguerre, and this information was relayed to the magazine's headquarters in New York via coded cable messages. As might be expected, the athletes in question wanted reassurances that they would be granted asylum in the United States and assistance to resettle. Beyond this, Telegdy and Laguerre were in a race against the clock. With the Olympics scheduled to end on December 8, undecided Hungarians had precious little time to make an extremely difficult decision. Aside from leaving behind their country and loved ones, athletes feared government reprisals against family members and carefully considered whether their relatively privileged life as an athlete under Communism was worth giving up. Regardless, the *Sports Illustrated* leadership repeatedly assured everyone concerned that asylum would not be an issue.³⁸

Believing that their journey to the United States would be unimpeded, dozens of Hungarian competitors eluded Communist security agents and began to disappear into the city of Melbourne. Just days before the Olympics closed, the first two to leave, Zoltán Török (a rowing coach) and Róbert Zimonyi (a coxswain), "strolled" out of the Olympic Village and "sprang" into a car bound for Telegdy's house.³⁹ Other athletes made similar plans once their athletic exertions were over. *Sports Illustrated* reported that members of the Hungarian water polo team "had barely dried themselves and tucked their gold medals into their pockets before they were unobtrusively driven off."⁴⁰ Telegdy was

even approached by László Nadori, the chief of staff of the Hungarian Sports Ministry, who no longer wanted to serve the Communist regime. According to Telegdy, early one morning at 3:00 a.m., Nadori walked around the Olympic Village as though "indisposed" before climbing into a waiting car with the long jumper, Olga Gyarmathy. Both were taken to a nearby hotel, close to Telegdy's house.⁴¹

With the Games finally over, Olympic authorities allowed the Hungarians to stay in the US quarters of the Olympic Village from December 10 onward. Everyone waited for confirmation from Jackson that the athletes could legally land in the United States. Jackson had been active over the previous weeks, as he attempted to navigate and bend America's visa laws. In the wake of the revolution, the Eisenhower administration had relaxed its immigration policy to allow thousands of Hungarians into the United States and even increased the intake by admitting aliens into the country on "parole." This option was offered on an "emergency" basis, whereby refugees could enter the country if it "served the public interest."⁴² Even though the option of parole was created primarily to assist the dire situation for refugees crossing the border from Hungary into Austria, Jackson was able to persuade the State Department to allow the Hungarian athletes in Melbourne to utilize this particular loophole.⁴³

On December 18, *Sports Illustrated* sent a cable to Telegdy with the good news. The US government had granted "immediate" asylum to the Hungarians. A special Pan American flight, arranged by Jackson, carried them to San Francisco, where they landed on Christmas Eve.⁴⁴

Although it is sometimes hard to gauge the impact or legacy of covert operations, the Melbourne defection certainly shook the regime in Hungary. It sufficiently troubled the government, sporting establishment, journalists, and academics to a degree that few wrote about it for years to come.⁴⁵ It is also possible to argue that the other joint ventures of the HNSF and NCFE left a mark behind the Iron Curtain. Telegdy even insisted that the Hungarian regime was fully aware of his federation and that "a special section of the Hungarian Sports Ministry" worked exclusively to "counterbalance the activities of the HNSF."⁴⁶ Yet determining, or weighing, what this meant in the context of defeating the Soviet Union or ending Communism in Eastern Europe is impossible. It is perhaps better to consider the actions of the HNSF as just one of many in an ongoing process of secret propaganda and cultural infiltration pursued by the US government throughout the Cold War.⁴⁷

Judging the effectiveness of the overt information program is just as difficult. Did propaganda materials really sway the sympathies of the world's citizens? While government documents do herald the value of sports in communicating with overseas audiences, they also bemoan the symbolic power of international competitions. Strategists acknowledged that many of the foremost events demanded that all participating individuals or teams represented a nation, thus creating a sort of proxy battle. An American defeat to the Soviet Union at the 1956 Summer Olympics, argued one psychological warfare expert, "would certainly have an immediate impact on the man on the street, the worker, the rural citizen who reads little, the maiden who admires brawn. The mentality of 'my champion is stronger than your champion' reigns in every cafe in the world, and final proof is in deeds, not in arguments."⁴⁸ Policy makers came to realize that no matter how much they promoted the merits of the US system and denigrated the flaws of the Soviet model, the always unpredictable outcome of a sporting event carried a message that was hard to control.

There were glaring contradictions between the theory and the practice of the US sports offensive. The truth was often a flexible agent in American propaganda. Information officers were sometimes outrageous in their claims, proving little better than their Soviet counterparts. The links established with the HNSF and NCFE also reveal rhetorical problems. How indeed could a nation that forcefully endeavored to promote its ideological foundations of freedom and democracy work so diligently to mobilize the private sphere? Should the American people have been left to make such pronouncements if and when they wished to? The fear, however, was that the Communists were winning the war of words and deeds. Faced with the necessity of coming to terms with the "twilight warzone," US policy experts deployed methods that most Americans associated with their Soviet adversaries. "The choice between innocence and power involves the most difficult of decisions," noted one CIA officer. "But when an adversary attacks with his weapons disguised as good works, to choose innocence is to choose defeat."⁴⁹

in hermeneutic discussions of politics within the movement. David B. Kanin, *A Political History of the Olympic Games* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1981), studied the Olympics from the viewpoint of a CIA analyst. Using new material and an additional two decades of history, Alfred Senn, a specialist on Lithuania, took on the same subject in *Power, Politics and the Olympic Games* (Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1999). Most recently, Erin Elizabeth Redihan, *The Olympics and the Cold War: Sport as a Battleground in the U.S.-Soviet Rivalry* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2017), looked at the Olympics specifically through a Cold War lens. Book-length studies of individual Olympic Games also provide a lens onto Cold War issues at significant junctures. See, for instance, David Maraniss, *Rome 1960: The Summer Olympics That Stirred the World* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008); Christian Tagsold, *Die Inszenierung der kulturellen Identität in Japan: Das Beispiel der Olympischen Spiele Tokyo 1964* (Munich: Iudicium, 2002); Keith Brewster and Claire Brewster, *Representing the Nation: Sport and Spectacle in Post-revolutionary Mexico* (London: Routledge, 2010); Kay Schiller and Christopher Young, *The 1972 Munich Olympics and the Making of Modern Germany* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010); Paul Charles Howell, *The Montreal Olympics: An Insider's View of Organizing a Self-Financing Games* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2009); Jenifer Parks, *The Olympic Games, the Soviet Sports Bureaucracy, and the Cold War: Red Sport, Red Tape* (New York: Lexington Books, 2016); Nicholas Sarantakes, *Dropping the Torch: Jimmy Carter, the Olympic Boycott, and the Cold War* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and Matthew Llewellyn, John Gleaves, and Wayne Wilson, eds., "The 1984 Olympic Games: Assessing the 30-Year Legacy," special issue, *International Journal of the History of Sport* 32, no. 1 (2015).

37. See David McDonald and James G. Hershberg, "1972 Summit Series," *Sport in the Cold War* podcast, episode 18, aired February 2016, <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/resource/sport-in-the-cold-war/episode-18-1972-summit-series>.

38. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa, "East Asia: The Second Significant Front of the Cold War," in *The Cold War in East Asia, 1945–1991*, ed. Tsuyoshi Hasegawa (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2011), 2.

39. On the Cold War as an "imagined reality," see Masuda Hajimu, *Cold War Crucible: The Korean Conflict and the Postwar World* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015).

40. Michel de Certeau, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, trans. Stephen F. Rendall, 3rd ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

41. Stephen J. Whitfield, *The Culture of the Cold War*, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), 153.

42. See Robert Edelman, "Sport on Soviet Television," in *Sport and the Transformation of Modern Europe: States, Media and Markets, 1950–2010*, ed. Alan Tomlinson, Christopher Young, and Richard Holt (London: Routledge, 2011), 100–112.

43. See Robert K. Barney, Stephen R. Wenn, and Scott G. Martyn, *Selling the Five Rings: The IOC and the Rise of Olympic Commercialism* (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2002).

44. Vogan, *ABC Sports*.

45. Kuznick and Gilbert, "U.S. Culture and the Cold War," 6.

46. Rita Liberti and Maureen M. Smith, *(Re)Presenting Wilma Rudolph* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2015).

47. Thomas Lindenberger, "Divided but Not Disconnected: Germany as a Border Region of the Cold War," in *Divided but Not Disconnected: German Experiences of the Cold War*, ed. Tobias Hochscherf, Christoph Laucht, and Andrew Plowman (Oxford, UK: Berghahn, 2010), 12.

48. Andrew Port, "The Banalities of East German Historiography," in *Becoming East Germans: Socialist Structures and Sensibilities After Hitler*, ed. Mary Fulbrook and Andrew Port (New York: Berghahn, 2013), 28.

49. The majority of authors in this book have contributed to the *Sport in the Cold War* podcast series, hosted and produced by Vince Hunt and curated by Laura Deal, which is available on the Woodrow Wilson Center website, at <http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/theme/sport-in-the-cold-war/resources>.

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1. See, for instance, Damion Thomas, *Globetrotting: African American Athletes and Cold War Politics* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2012).

2. "Organizational Developments and Delineation of Psychological Warfare Responsibilities Since World War II," undated White House report, document number 3560, United States Declassified Documents Reference System.

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CHAPTER 2

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8. Cannon, quoted in Hauser, *Muhammad Ali*, 104.

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10. Hauser, *Muhammad Ali*, 82. For a discussion on how Ali became an emblem of the wider social, cultural, and political causes of the era, see Jeffrey T. Sammons, "Rebel with a Cause: Muhammad Ali as Sixties Protest Symbol," in Gorn, *The People's Champ*, 154–180.

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