"Now this is not the end. It is not even the beginning of the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of the beginning." Sir Winston Churchill. November 10, 1942.

Let me first bring you up to date on what is happening with the section. On July 15th the section had 304 members. This means we have fulfilled the ASA requirements to become a regular section. Thanks are due to everyone for the interest and effort that made reaching this goal possible. Continued on page 3...

Research on Philanthropy in Europe: A Growing Field
René Bekkers, Philanthropic Studies, VU University Amsterdam, and Head of Research at the European Research Network on Philanthropy

Across Europe, attention for philanthropy in the academic community is growing. An increasing number of sociologists do research on charitable giving, volunteering, nonprofit organizations and foundations. Traditionally volunteering has been studied by sociologists as a form of voluntary association participation. In the field of philanthropic studies volunteering is viewed as a form of philanthropy – often defined as voluntary action for the public good. In the past decade monetary philanthropy has gained attention.

Continued of page 12...

Russian Solidarism in the 20th Century
Dmitry Efremenko and Yaroslava Evseeva
Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences

This article was executed in the framework of the research project Social solidarity as a condition of society transformations: Theoretical foundations, Russian specificity, socio-biological and socio-psychological aspects, supported by the Russian foundation for basic research (Project 11-06-00347a).

The rich tradition of solidarity studies in Russia in the 19th – the beginning of the 20th century (see our articles in the previous issues of the Newsletter) was broken by the revolutionary upheavals of 1917 and the civil war of 1918–1921. As it strengthened its power the Communist regime grew still less and less tolerant towards all currents of social thought that conflicted with the official Marxist ideology.

Continued on page 8...
Russia and United States Collaborative Project

On Sunday, August 22, from 8:00 To 10:00 PM, the Altruism, Morality, and Social Solidarity Section will hold a meeting to explore the ways in which a cooperative endeavor between sociologists in Russia and the United States who are studying altruism, morality, and social solidarity can be developed. Several sociologists from Russia who are attending the ASA Meetings will be present. This is a first exploratory meeting to consider how sociologists from these two national traditions can communicate and collaborate to further the study of altruism, morality, and social solidarity. It is our aim to enrich the perspective and scope of our scholarly work by bringing together the approaches and views that emerge from our two national traditions.

Three tentative suggestions to begin this project have been advanced by our colleagues from Russia. The first suggestion is for joint workshops. These would take place in the United States in 2012 and in Russia in 2013. The second suggestion is for joint publications. Three publications are proposed or advanced for consideration. These are as follows: (1) A special issue of The American Sociologist that would feature articles by Russian and United States sociologists on some aspect of the study of altruism, morality, and social solidarity as part of the sociological practice and traditions of the respective countries. (2) In Russia, there are plans to publish a volume on solidarity issues in 2013. Colleagues in the United States are warmly invited to contribute to this volume. (3) A third publication proposal is for a handbook on our field of study. A "Handbook on Altruism, Morality, and Social Solidarity" would make a major contribution to defining and illustrating the nature and coherence of the subject matter in this field. Major publishing houses in the United States should be interested in such a volume.

The third suggestion is for a joint research project. The topic of the project could be "Solidarity Studies in the United States and Russia." Research funding would be needed.

Everyone interested in finding out more about this project and possibly participating in it is urged to attend.

Continued on next page...
Important Altruism, Morality, Social Solidarity Sessions at the 2011 American Sociological Association Meeting in Las Vegas

**Altruism, Morality, and Social Solidarity—Organizational/ Business Meeting**

The Altruism, Morality, and Social Solidarity Organizational/Business Meeting will be held on Tuesday, August 23 from 10:30am to 12:10pm. We will consider any necessary section business at the start of the meeting. Topics will include the need for Nominations, Awards, and other committees, and the future direction of the section. Graduate student members of the section will give presentations of their work during the last half of the meeting. If you possibly can do so, please attend this meeting and the presentation of papers.

**PRESENTATIONS:**
1. "The Chinese YMCA, Moral Activism and the Birth of Chinese Communism." Xiaohong Xu (Yale University)
2. "Social Values, Perceived Altruism, and Reciprocity in Direct Favor Exchange." Matthew Hoffberg (Cornell University)
3. "Penny for Your Thoughts: Beggars and the Exercise of Morality in Daily Life." Shai Dromi (Yale University)

**How To Join**

The ASA website is www.asanet.org. From there go to "Membership Information," then "Join or Renew," and finally "Join a Section." We are on the list of sections: "Altruism, Morality and Social Solidarity (47)." Check to join the section, then go "Payment," which is only $5.

**The End of the Beginning**

Vincent Jeffries (Acting Chairperson) Continued from page 1...

Bylaws for the section are in process and will be submitted to the Committee on Sections for approval before the ASA Meetings in August. After the Meetings I will be asking for the formation of a number of committees. Most important is a Nominating Committee. It is essential that we have a full slate of candidates for section officers, with 2 candidates for each office. The ASA election will take place in the spring of 2012. Those elected will take office for the 2012 ASA Meetings in Denver. An Awards Committee is also important, so that we can begin giving awards for scholarship that are formally recognized by ASA. We will also need a Membership Committee. We need to keep our membership over 300 to guarantee 2 sessions at the Annual Meeting. Please think about volunteering to serve on one of these Committees.

Now we can take a closer look at the quote from Winston Churchill, delivered regarding a major battle of World War II. I believe that we can consider the activities described in the above paragraph as the "...end of the beginning."
The Pitirim A. Sorokin Foundation has been newly organized in Winchester, Massachusetts, as a not-for-profit corporation dedicated to preserving the legacy of Pitirim Sorokin as one of the most eminent analysts of social change. One of the Foundation’s main goals is to promote his research and that of others in various aspects of macro-sociology, including the dynamics of societies and cultures, the underlying causes of wars and revolutions, and the nature of altruism and moral and altruistic behavior as they contribute to social solidarity. Sergei P. Sorokin, younger son of the famous sociologist, is founder and co-Director of the Foundation. Richard F. Hoyt, Jr., a longtime friend and supporter of promoting Pitirim Sorokin’s heritage in the United States and abroad, has become the second co-Director of this organization. An Advisory Committee was also formed with an eye to keeping the Foundation’s activities in tune with current streams in the social sciences. Mainly constituted of professional sociologists Michael Burawoy, Vincent Jeffries, Lawrence T. Nichols, and Edward A. Tiryakian, it also includes Peter P. Sorokin, physicist and Pitirim’s elder son. The Executive Director, Pavel P. Krotov, was born in the same northern Russian region as Pitirim Sorokin and has completed several projects in the United States, Canada, and Russia to bring attention to social scientists to Sorokin’s heritage.

The Foundation already maintains two websites, www.sorokinfoundation.org and a Russian-language portal www.pitirimsorokin.org. Efforts are now being made to increase the flow of information through these sites and to make them more interactive.

The Science of Generosity Initiative aims to support the work of young researchers just beginning generosity research. We recently conducted a dissertation fellowship competition, awarding $25,000 each to five graduate students studying generosity in the social sciences. The proposal judges were encouraged by both the quality and the quantity of applications we received, and finally selected five projects focusing on matters of real social significance and promising to make an innovative contribution to generosity research.

The winners are Rahsaan Harris, Public and Urban Policy, New School University; Kathryn A. Johnson, Social Psychology, Arizona State University; Marisa Gerstein Pineau, Sociology, UCLA; Brandy Quinn, Education, Stanford University; and Gizem Zencirci, Political Science, University of Massachusetts, Amherst. To read more about the winners and their dissertation projects please go to http://generosityresearch.nd.edu/dissertation-fellows/.

Our 14 research groups are now in the second year of their generosity research and beginning to see preliminary results. To give just one example of early observations coming out of generosity research, Sonja Lyubomirsky, University of California, Irvine, is working on “The Causes and Effects of Workplace Generosity” and reports the following.

“We’ve recently been taking a more detailed look at our pilot study data and trying to identify the behavioral consequences of practicing positive activities at work. According to some preliminary analysis two interesting relationships seem to be emerging.

First, we examined peak behavioral rhythm hour and initial behavioral rhythm—in other words, the highest point of movement during the day and one’s movement when first arriving at the office. We found that participants who practiced a positive activity each week (which involved considering “three things that went well at work”) appeared to be more energetic at work. They were more active when they arrived at work, and they also “peaked” earlier, which suggests they were putting more effort into work during the day.

With respect to social interactions, we observed a general trend such that our participants spent less time talking to other people over time. However, this trend for decreasing social activity was more pronounced for people who practiced the positive activity with high effort—that is, those most likely to draw the greatest benefit from the activity. Because we know that these participants were also happier, we speculate that they might be conversing less because they already feel good, rather than seeking out social interactions to obtain a quick boost. Alternatively, the exercise could have inspired workers to be more task-focused.

One implication of these findings is that workers who appreciate their work become more productive. In our next study, in which workers will perform acts of generosity in the workplace, we will get a better idea of what’s actually happening. Also, practicing generosity at work is exciting because it’s a social positive activity, and should have a relatively stronger effect on our participants.” For more information on the Science of Generosity initiative, please visit our website at generosityresearch.nd.edu.
Whichever activity is regarded as the crucial event, whether it is attaining the required membership, the approval of our bylaws, or the installation of our first set of elected officers, is not of importance. What is important to recognize is that we have now established a community of scholars that will be formally recognized by ASA. We are beginning a new stage of our collective endeavor. Each of us needs to thoughtfully consider how the section could develop from this point. I would like to share some ideas with each and all of you as we seek to discern and begin to implement our collective future.

The nature of "...the end" needs to be considered. The absolute end will never be reached. We seek truth: a closer approximation of our knowledge and understanding with the reality that actually exists. In a sense our task will never end, since we will never have complete knowledge and understanding of the nature of our subject matter of altruism, morality, and social solidarity. We are engaged in a continuing practice of seeking knowledge and understanding of this subject matter. What we accomplish will be passed on to future generations of sociologists.

Though we will never reach "the end," in an absolute sense, there are a number of goals we can set for ourselves in the immediate future. When we accomplish these goals, we can perhaps consider that we have reached "the beginning of the end."

Our subject matter of altruism, morality, and social solidarity is of the greatest sociological importance. Knowledge and understanding of these phenomena also has clear policy implications, and is of great relevance to publics. As a discipline, sociology has not given this subject matter the attention and position its importance warrants. There have been major works published on aspects of altruism, morality, or social solidarity in recent years. However, this subject matter is not a generally recognized field within the discipline of sociology. We have created a foundation for such a field with the establishment of this section. A logical extension of our efforts is the goal of establishing the study of altruism, morality, and social solidarity as a recognized and flourishing field of specialization within the discipline of sociology.

We have a formidable task, both in its difficulty and in its necessary time span. We are privileged to be in the position to undertake the intellectual challenge of advancing the scope and sophistication of the study of altruism, morality, and social solidarity. The nature, forms, structures, and processes of these phenomena need to be studied. The interrelations between these phenomena, and their interrelations with varied aspects of the general sociocultural universe, must also be studied. Underlying these scholarly endeavors is the fundamental problem of the coherence of our subject matter. I believe there is general consensus that altruism, morality, and social solidarity are interrelated. But this is a varied and complex relationship. In some instances, social solidarity has served to increase altruism, while in other instances it has increased antagonisms. A similar duality of effect has been produced by systems of morality. Much work needs to be done to systematically look at the interrelationships among these phenomena, and to develop systematic and empirically based typologies of varieties of morality and varieties of social solidarity. On this basis, we can begin to formulate valid scientific generalizations that can be the basis of policy formulation and discourse with various publics.

Increased scholarly work and its publication is the foundation of establishing our field of study in other aspects of sociological practice. Courses in the sociology of altruism, morality, or social solidarity are not commonly taught at either the undergraduate or graduate levels. Courses in altruism are probably the most common, though they are still relatively rare. When I checked a few years ago, none of the three components of our subject matter was listed in "Special Programs and Areas of Expertise" in any department listed in the Guide to Graduate Departments. Within the ASA, we need to continue to expand the membership of our section to invigorate our community of scholars and to give increased opportunities to present papers at the Annual Meeting of ASA. Goals can be formulated and worked for in all these areas to contribute to the identity and development of our field of specialization.

How does all this sound? Please do think about our future and what you would like to do to contribute to the great task of establishing the study of altruism, morality and social solidarity in the center of sociological practice, policy formulation, and dissemination of knowledge and understanding to the general public. Let us move forward as a self-conscious and dedicated community of scholars. We can indeed make a significant contribution!
Once again, co-editor Vincent Jeffries and I have received a wealth of materials for the Altruism, Morality and Social Solidarity (AMSS) Section Newsletter. Upon reflection, it seemed to us that the label "newsletter" was not encompassing enough for diverse content of this issue (as well as previous ones). We have therefore decided to change the title of this publication to "Altruism, Morality & Social Solidarity Forum" to better reflect the fact that although this issue does contain news-related items, it also features significant scholarly works, including lengthy essays and the second of three installments of Samuel Oliner’s book, *Unlimited Love, Compassion and Forgiveness: Acts of Moral Exemplars*. From the provocative essay by Carlson and Horgan, to the rich synthesis offered by Vincent Jeffries’ article, to Edward Tiryakian’s noteworthy syllabus for “Altruism in the 21st Century,” this issue truly is a forum for important scholarship. We plan to incorporate peer-reviewed articles in the next issue and eventually hope to launch a full-fledged academic journal. Now that we have surpassed our goal of 300 members, these kinds of ambitions have become real possibilities.

Speaking of our membership drive, I would like to thank everyone who helped with this important endeavor. This was truly a collective effort and we should all share in the celebration of our success. But we all owe Vince a special note of thanks for his tireless efforts during the membership drive. He engaged in a lot of behind-the-scenes work, to put it mildly. Thanks Vince!

In case you missed it on pages 2-3, please do make a note of the AMSS sessions at the ASA meeting in Las Vegas and make an effort to attend. All promise to be interesting and informative, as well as opportunities to discuss important Section business. If our Section is going to thrive, it is not enough to simply register 300 members. We need the active involvement of members in these kinds of activities, particularly the session on Tuesday which will involve the presentation of research by graduate students. I urge you to attend these events and build social solidarity with others who share your interests!

Finally, Erik Olin Wright (ASA President-Elect) contacted our Section in 2010 to invite us to develop sessions around the theme the “Real Utopias” theme of the 2012 ASA annual meeting in Denver. We have responded by beginning to develop both a regular session and a roundtable session that will integrate the meeting theme and issues that are relevant to our Section. Watch for updates about how you might participate in these sessions on our email listserv.
Sociologists have long been concerned with how to build the good society. The section on altruism, morality, and social solidarity directly addresses this question.

In the broadest sense, the subject matter of altruism and social solidarity consists of activities intended to benefit the welfare of others. These activities span the micro-macro continuum, from individual, to interpersonal, to organizational, to global. They include phenomena such as generosity, forgiveness, unlimited love, virtue, philanthropy, intergroup cooperation, and universalizing solidarity. The subject matter of morality entails distinctions between good and evil, and between right and wrong. Such distinctions are an important aspect of each person's thoughts, actions, and moral judgments. They are also a component of all cultural systems, providing meanings that define for each collective some sense of the desirable and the undesirable. Norms regarding individual and intergroup relations are a part of these cultural systems. As a result, altruism and social solidarity are inevitably related to moral culture.

This foundational subject matter includes several general areas of theoretical development and empirical research. The first area is understanding the nature and variability of these phenomena, their forms and processes, and their anticipated and unanticipated consequences, at all levels of analysis. The second area is exploring the relationships that exist between altruism, social solidarity, and morality. This includes investigating the conditions under which cultural systems of morality vary, from mandating behavior harmful to others, to restricting concern for others to particular groups, to promoting a universalizing solidarity that potentially includes all persons and groups. The third area is the relationship between altruism, morality, and social solidarity and other sociocultural phenomena, such as the unequal distribution of power/authority and resources, the characteristics of social structures and of cultural systems, and the influence of different social institutions.

The intrinsic scientific, policy, and public relevance of this field of investigation in helping to construct "good societies" is unquestionable. The subject matter of the section gives scholars a unique opportunity to contribute to understanding the conditions necessary for a broad vision of the common good that includes all individuals and collectives.

Section activities are directed towards establishing the study of altruism, morality, and social solidarity as a recognized field of theoretical development and empirical research within the discipline of sociology. These activities include the following: providing for regular exchanges of information through the section Newsletter and the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Association; formally recognizing outstanding theoretical, empirical, and applied work in the field of altruism, morality, and social solidarity through annual awards; and linking with other scientific groups working on genetic, psychological, and cultural aspects of these phenomena.

In doing so, we seek to develop and augment a community of scholars motivated to gain greater knowledge and understanding of altruism, morality, and social solidarity. We emphasize the importance of the investigation of the policy implications of this knowledge, and the dissemination of information to publics regarding aspects of altruism, morality, and social solidarity that will benefit individual lives, the social organization of society, and the prevailing culture.
The expulsions of the leading intellectuals out of Soviet Russia in September and November 1922 (the so-called «philosopher’s ships») became a peculiar symbol of the toughening of the policy carried out by the Lenin government. Philosophers’ ships is the collective name of several boats that carried Soviet expelled abroad. The main load was handled by two German boats, the Oberbürgermeister Haken (see picture) and the Preussen, which transported more than 160 expelled Russian intellectuals in September and November 1922 from Petrograd to the German port of Stettin. Three detention lists included 228 people, 32 of them students. Among the expelled were such outstanding thinkers as Nikolay Berdyaev, Sergey Bulgakov, Ivan Ilyin, Semyon Frank and others. Pitirim Sorokin and other intellectuals were transported by train to Riga, Latvia.

The paradox of the expulsions is that what was a tragedy for these people, and for the social sciences in Russia, in the end saved them from almost certain death in the purges of the 1930s.

As a result, it was in the milieu of Russian political emigrants that the tradition of solidarity studies was not only continued, but was in fact originally developed, first of all owing to the newly-born trend termed «solidarism». At the cradle of the ideological platform in question was the lawyer Georgii Gins (1883–1971). During the civil war (1917–1922) he was a member of the anti-Communist government headed by Admiral Alexander Kolchak. After Kolchak’s troops were defeated, Gins lived in China for two decades. There he taught in the Harbin Russian Law Institute. In 1941 he moved to the United States, where he was a professor at the University of California, Berkeley and in 1955–1964 worked for the "Voice of America" Russian service.

In his main work "On the Way to the State of the Future: From Liberalism to Solidarism" (Harbin, 1930) Gins made an attempt to provide "an economic, psychological and juridical substantiation of solidarism" as a unified harmonious system. Gins considered solidarism to be "a doctrine of state and society whose ethic basis is shaped by the idea of solidarity conveyed in volunteer associations of persons sharing common interests and in the coordination of dispersing interests by the state that acts in a strict accord with democratic principles" (Gins 2007, p. 118).

Gins rarely used the term "solidarity" in the sense of the existing interdependence of individual members of society, rather in the meaning of a moral and utilitarian norm leading to cooperation. According to Gins, the democratic state, "in its principles and legal guarantees, not in trite forms of parliamentarism," ought to encourage the realization of solidarity through respective legislation as well as by means of immediate action, if principles of solidarity are nevertheless disregarded or violated (Voshinin 1969, p. 34).

Gins’ ideas were one of the sources of inspiration for activists of Russian emigrant youth unions who founded the organization of solidarists at the congress in Belgrade in June 1930.
Originally, the organization bore the name of the National Union of Russian Youth; in 1947 it was changed to the People’s Labor Union of Russian Solidarists (NTS). From the very start of its activity the organization was characterized by radical anti-Communism; in order to fight against the Soviet regime many of its activists were ready to collaborate with quite diverse forces, including German National Socialism. One should also take into account that at the early stage of the NTS activities its interpretation of solidarism was close to the ideas of the corporatist state à la Benito Mussolini. According to the appraisal given by the historian Marc Raeff (1923–2008), the NTS "rejected both Bolshevism and liberal capitalism and embraced Russian patriotism and the priority of national solidarity based on productive labor contributed by all societal sectors. They displayed a predisposition for a corporatist organization of society and a willingness to accept a temporary dictatorship in order to bring about the nation’s moral and spiritual regeneration. Their ideas unmistakably resembled those of Italian fascism and Portuguese and Austrian corporatism" (Raeff 1989, p. 305).

Even after World War II, while claiming to condemn Nazism and fascism, NTS leaders retained their general adherence to the corporatist state model. Their ideal of state order was still a coordination of associations (corporations) based on principles of voluntarism and self-governing which had been rooted in Russia’s society since Old Russian times. However, NTS leaders proclaimed that their aim was the replacement in Russia of the Communist regime by "a democratic lawful state". Until the break-up of the USSR in 1991 the NTS remained one of the most active anti-Soviet organizations while its "Posev" was the largest publishing house to print literature suppressed in the Soviet Union.

One of the leading ideologists of Russian solidarism in the middle of the 20th century was Sergey Levitsky (1909–1983). Levitsky considered himself a disciple of the philosopher Nikolay Lossky and a follower of "organic ideal-realism". According to the thinker himself, "solidarism combines socio-political realism with elevated spiritual idealism" (Levitsky 2003, p. 26). Another side of Levitsky’s conception is represented by personalism, which, in his interpretation, regards the human personality as the highest value; however, the true personality is one that will not withdraw into the world of self-interest, but devotes oneself to serving God and people.

From the point of view of its foundations solidarism can be traced back to the ideas of the Slavophils in whose works there appeared the notion "sobornost", the prototype of modern solidarity (see Efremenko, Evseeva 2010, p. 34–35). Levitsky allowed a formal division of state and church, which was a modern liberal-democratic norm, but it was religion (first of all, in the form of Christianity) that he thought the real basis of the life of both an individual and society. In this connection, solidarity itself ought to stem from no other source but Christian love for one’s neighbor.

On the other hand, Levitsky did not fully reject the Westernizers’ ideas. In his opinion, the given current of Russian thought introduces certain rationality into social philosophy and lets one place the ideas in question into the current political context. As the most progressive model of political order at the modern stage of development Levitsky held the welfare state, in which democratic governing was to be combined with socialist reallocation of resources in favor of those in need.
One of the central positions in the thinker’s idea system is occupied by the category of freedom. According to Levitsky, freedom was granted by the Creator to man made in His own image, and every person has to choose how to deal with that freedom. In today’s world people are hardly inclined to perceive freedom positively, as "freedom for", but rather in the negative sense, as "freedom from" – from faith, morals, spiritual seeking, responsibility for oneself and the world. In that way they voluntarily reject freedom as a divine gift and a high value and become prisoners of material interests and everyday cares. In totalitarian societies people finally lose their freedom as they grant the right of choice to their leaders. In this false, from his point of view, idea of freedom, Levitsky saw the crisis and even the tragedy of the modern world. An outcome could be found in the creation of a solidarist state, where the disintegrated "I’s" of Western democracies and the totalitarian "It" would be replaced by "We", a union of personalities serving society. In order to achieve the given aim Sergey Levitsky called upon his followers to be active social reformers. In his own words, "solidarism... ought to be imbued with an ideologically revolutionary pathos" (Levitsky 2007, p. 225).

Pitirim Sorokin, who contacted some of NTS members in the post-war period, pointed out that the key elements of the Russian solidarism doctrine were "national solidarity, based on a person’s natural attachment to one’s motherland and people, and labor solidarity expressing the person’s will to actively serve not only one’s motherland, but any other value worthy of such serving (science, art, economy)". In Sorokin’s view, "solidarism feels the entire world as an organic whole in which the human personality possessing a free will ought to seek not satisfaction, but creative ways to the realization of one’s destiny" (Sorokin 1990, p. 12).

A prominent popularizer of solidarism ideas was the NTS activist Roman Redlich (1911–2005). Redlich insisted on an original character of Russian solidarism. He believed that the latter, on the one hand, was based on the universalism of Russian religious and philosophical thought, and, on the other hand, rested upon scientific ideas on the phenomenon of solidarity. In an article published in 1985 Redlich wrote: "Through the eyes of a contemporary sociologist society no longer looks a mass of separate human individuals, but consists of associations, of various social alliances, interacting, competing, struggling, but supporting one another as well. Every big or small community, every societal "we" is nourished by the solidarity of the individuals comprising it" (Redlich 1985, p. 86).

Roman Redlich lived long enough to see the downfall of the Communist regime in Russia; in the evening of his life he repeatedly visited his homeland, where he taught in the Moscow Natalia Nesterova University. Nowadays, the NTS as an organization acts on the territory of Russia, but does not have considerable political influence. The publishing house «Posev» now also works in Russia, publishing materials on the history of solidarist ideas as well as the works of modern solidarism adherents – Valery Senderov, Boris Pushkarev and others. However, contemporary Russian discussions on the phenomenon of social solidarity are to a lesser extent defined by solidarists’ ideas. Russian social scientists’ current interest in solidarity issues is mostly determined by the political and social transformations of the last two decades.

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References:


With the increasing levels of wealth in the past decades and particularly with the concentration of wealth among a new economic elite, questions arise on the redistributive effects of philanthropy. These questions have gained prominence in light of the current economic crisis and the responses of governments across Europe. Increasingly, philanthropy is viewed as a substitute for a withdrawing welfare state. This view is reflected in the call for a ‘Big Society’ by UK prime minister Cameron. The ‘Big Society’ is a society in which active citizenship, volunteering, self-help and grass roots organization at the local level will compensate for budget cuts. The cuts will reduce the capacity of lower level government agencies to provide services to citizens. Whether the ‘Big Society’ is a utopian ideal or not, it raises the question: what role can philanthropy fulfill in public policy? Sociologists have much to say about what happens to citizens and non-profit organizations when they are given more responsibility in delivering public services.

In the past few years, scholars studying philanthropy in Europe have organized themselves in the European Research Network on Philanthropy (ERNOP; http://www.ernop.eu). Currently the network has about 100 members from almost 20 countries. Last June the ERNOP held its first research conference in Vienna. In his opening lecture, Professor John Mohan from the Third Sector Research Centre in the UK examined the capacity of civil society to deal with reduced government spending in service provision. Behind the ‘Big Society’ is the crowding out logic: the more government spending, the lower the level of active citizenship. This is in fact a testable hypothesis. Mohan showed that the crowding out logic is at odds with the empirical evidence on the development of civil society in the UK in the past decades. The number of voluntary organizations founded actually increased with increasing government spending. At the same time, the geographical areas in the UK where the need for philanthropy is growing at the fastest rate are those where the lowest levels of active citizenship are found. The research is available at the TSRC website (http://www.tsrc.ac.uk/Research/tabid/391/Default.aspx).

The major challenge for the ERNOP in the years to come is to establish a durable research infrastructure. Research initiatives are dispersed throughout Europe among individual scholars. There is currently no uniform methodology to study corporate philanthropy, household giving and foundations. While several surveys have included measures of philanthropy, such as the European Social Survey, there are severe problems with these measures. The lack of good quality data on philanthropy across Europe is a barrier to the development of philanthropic studies that needs to be overcome.

In the mean time, research on philanthropy progresses based on analysis of the data available and through academic discussion of its shortcomings. It is good to be a member of the ASA section that counts many experts who can contribute to the debate. And let us start that debate right now. I call upon you, fellow section members, to briefly express your views on what kind of data are needed to thoroughly study philanthropy. Send your views directly to René Bekkers at research@ernop.eu. They will be published in the next edition of this Newsletter.
This seminar proposes to look at altruism in its various forms as a major pro-social behavioral alternative to mainstream and media images of human conduct. Among these, destructive action on a large scale gets the media attention in the focus on violent ethnic and sectarian conflicts, gang wars over drug dealing, and terrorist bombings; the financial news is replete with egoism, greed, and fraudulent behavior in the market place; and a major emphasis in the social science literature also stresses the negative or “dark side” of contemporary society, such as various “isms” (sexism, racism, etc).

To provide a more balanced perspective on human conduct and the human condition, the seminar will examine a variety of theories and research endeavors which focus on prosocial behavior, particularly, behavior of individuals and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in which the “other” is the intended recipient of benevolence.

The course will operate as a seminar, in which each is expected to participate in discussions of readings or other material. Discussions will be done both in class at the weekly meeting and also online with the Blackboard information system.

It is recommended that you obtain your own copy (at the Duke bookstore or Amazon) of:


There will be no written examination but at the last week of the course (and not later than April 22), you are expected to turn in (electronically or hard copy) two documents: (1) a 300-600 word review of any of the above or a major optional reading, and (2) a 10-20 pages paper on a research topic approved by the instructor. It is possible that the paper be done with the collaboration of another student in the course.

**Grading** of the course will be based on seminar participation (75%) and the documents submitted (25%).

*Continued on next page...*
A Course on Altruism at Duke University:
Altruism in the 21st Century (Syllabus) (Continued from previous page...)

Syllabus

In addition to required reading assignments, optional readings are indicated in parentheses. Readings available online in Blackboard are designated with an *.

I. Overview of Altruism: Its Many Aspects – Past, Present, and Future

Week of:

January 17 organizational meeting. The paradox of altruism. Altruism as ordinary quotidian activity. Altruism as extraordinary activity.

“Altruism” in Wikipedia online


January 24 Altruism as a social relationship. Altruism and related emotions.

Post, Underwood, Schloss and Huribut, eds. Altruism and Altruistic Love (hereafter, Post et al, AAL) chapters 1-6, pp. 3-105

[Optional: Dacher Keltner, Born to be Good. The Science of a Meaningful Life 2009;]

January 31 Biological bases and evolutionary biology. Altruism and social animals.

Has evolution wired us for altruistic, prosocial behavior?

Post et al, AAL Part 3, chapters 9-13, pp. 145-245


February 7 Religion and Altruism. “Do unto others…” (but who are “others” ?)

Post et al, AAL Part 5, pp. 333-86;

[ Optional : Stephen G. Post, Unlimited Love. Altruism, Compassion and Service 2003]
II. New Sociological Directions

February 14    On the Shoulders of Sorokin


* Newsletter of the Altruism & Social Solidarity ASA Section, v. 1, issue 1, May 2009
* Newsletter of the Altruism & Social Solidarity ASA Section I, read either, v. 1, issue 2 (December 2009) or volume II, 1 (August 2010)


III. New Socioeconomic Directions for Capitalism, West and East

February 21    From Charity to Philanthropy, from band aids to system surgery. Can Wall Street Moguls Save the World?

Matthew Bishop and Michael Green, *Philanthrocapitalism*, foreword and chapters 1-5, pp. 1-98

February 28

Bishop & Green, *Philanthrocapitalism*, chapters 6-10, pp. 98-194


March 14

Bishop & Green, *Philanthrocapitalism*, chapters 11-15, pp.194-286

[* Optional: Barron’s “New Faces of Philanthropy”*]

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**Note:** Individual review of any of the major required or optional readings may be turned in at the last class meeting or earlier. The research project should be turned in (if electronically as a Word document) not later than 5:00PM Friday, April 22.
Altruism and Society sui generis: Countering Evolutionary Psychology with Durkheim

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Mervyn Horgan, Dept. of Sociology, Acadia University, Canada

Introduction

New beginnings allow for the creation of new perspectives and alternative orientations to existing work. And now is the time for us to think together and argue together about altruism, morality and solidarity. If the formation of a section can be seen in part as a new beginning, then it is also an opportunity to dispense with existing orthodoxies, or at least to put ourselves to work on querying their foundations so that we might think anew with a Socratic ‘second sailing.’ The process of beginning—as distinct from continuing—ought to forbid the dominance of any single perspective on the emergent form. We can offer only more or less compelling accounts, explanations and models. Such is the lot of those of us engaged in the social scientific enterprise.

In what follows we make the humble assertion that our new section might take Durkheim’s work to be central, though perhaps not so sacred in the Durkheimian sense. His texts are not to be left untouched as some sort of totem, rather they are to be used and applied in the important but nonetheless everyday sociological work of understanding things so diffuse in and integral to social life as altruism, morality and solidarity.

We would like to emphasize, especially, the importance of Durkheim’s epistemological argument, which is most thoroughly presented in *The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1915), and with which he claimed to have solved the dispute between empiricism and apriorism (21-33; 411-413; cf. Rawls 2004).

The centrality of this argument for the sociology of altruism, morality and solidarity derives from Durkheim’s assertion that the social bond (in both its religious and non-religious forms) is produced and formed by collective practices, collective practices that entail both *rites* and *beliefs* (51). These rites and beliefs generate shared emotions and collective representations of the group; that is, they generate both the reality and the ideality of social connection and obligation. We take this to mean that to know about the social is to take part in those collective practices that constitute the social. The social science of altruism, morality, and solidarity, then, is not merely empirical, nor is it a merely philosophical exercise in working out coherent systems in the sense of establishing a set of non-contradictory statements; it is performative and participatory; it entails not only the identification and observation of constitutive social practices but also involvement in them and representation of them.

Let us take altruism, for the moment, as our example. Durkheim’s account of altruism as an ideal constituted and mediated by effervescent practices of collective representation is particularly relevant, we believe, in the current social context, one in which the publicly dominant ‘expert’ accounts of altruism are the positivist and reductionist narratives that continue to emerge from evolutionary psychology. Indeed, one of the reasons for turning to Durkheim has to do with the fact that, in our attempt to reanimate these areas of sociology we must work, initially at least, to create new public space for sociologically inspired images of social life. In order to do so effectively, we need a sophisticated understanding of how particular ideals come to be produced and shared by social collectivities, and it is Durkheim that provides us with the most fully sociological account of the ritual production of shared emotions and the linkage of these shared emotions to idealized images, or collective representations, of the group.

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In the absence of this sociological voice we are left with a public discourse about altruism that has bifurcated into an expert and empiricist discourse on one side, dominated, we've suggested, by evolutionary psychology (with a mostly abstract form of moral philosophy occupying second place), and popular discourses, on the other side, divided between the notion that social ideals are divinely revealed and the idea that they involve the mere aggregation of private opinions. In fact, both the expert and the popular discourses duplicate the division between empiricist and apriorist positions that Durkheim claimed to have reconciled.

Evolutionary Psychology as Asociological Speculation

On the expert side of public discourse, where sociology ostensibly belongs, there have been many critiques of what used to be known as sociobiology, and from a variety of directions and disciplines (e.g., Freese 1994; Kitcher 1985; Lewontin 1991; Sahlins 1976), but the set of controversies that developed around sociobiology in the 1970s and 80s has lost much of its public coherence since sociobiology's re-branding, by its advocates, as evolutionary psychology. Since this re-branding, evolutionary psychologists seem to have become the go-to experts on all sorts of public discussions of morality.¹ The issue, here, is not whether evolutionary psychologists defend or criticize altruism. The problem is that, whether we're talking about the now classic genetic accounts by E.O. Wilson (1975) and Richard Dawkins (1976) that emphasize selfishness, or the more recent genetic selectionist defenses of altruism and cooperation that have begun to appear (e.g., Sober and Wilson 1999; Roughgarden 2009), evolutionary psychologists have successfully marginalized sociological accounts. On the one hand, their recent success may be attributed, in part, to a rhetorical move, a re-naming. “Evolutionary psychologists” have been able to slip away from the “mud-slinging” that sociobiology was subjected to (indeed, we read the power of a name-change as evidence of the importance of collective representations). In general, however, they have succeeded, we would argue, by managing to give the impression that the question of altruism is a (techno-scientific) empirical question of a particular kind, one rooted in our bodily nature and capacities, and that, as such, evolutionary theory is the best suited for addressing it.

What they actually produce, however, are studies that weave unevenly between quantitative social statistics, anecdotes with superficially intuitive appeal, and hypothetical abstractions like the 'Savannah Principle' or 'EEA' (e.g., Kanazawa and Still 2000). Insofar as they succeed in dominating the public discourse², we can expect a progressive impoverishment of the public sociological imagination and the social force of altruism as a collective ideal. Indeed, we would argue that the decline of altruism as a collective ideal is a direct entailment of a too-extensive public deferral to scientific expertise, one that, in Durkheim's terms, signals an egoistic state of the social division of labour (cf. Durkheim 1951; 1957; 1964).

¹This assertion, of course, begs to be studied.
²We should note that Kanazawa is a particularly controversial proponent of evolutionary psychology and has been heavily criticized by other evolutionary scientists. Most recently he wrote an article in Psychology Today proposing to answer the question “Why are Black Women Less Physically Attractive than Other Women?” (May 2011). This has provoked considerable back-lash and may serve to give him a permanent pariah status (or generate an even larger audience for him). The article has been taken down from Psychology Today, but the text can still be found here: http://tishushu.tumblr.com/post/5548905092/here-is-the-psychology-today-article-by-kanazawa.
That is, insofar as the reality and meaning of altruism is taken to be something best left completely to experts (of whatever kind), the struggle is already lost. Sociological expertise, we would contend (and by contrast), should be part of a democratizing movement to enrich public discourse and societal self-awareness and to increase both the strength and the legitimacy of social bonds, helping to move collective representations and social ideas from undefined obscurity to, as Durkheim puts it in *Professional Ethics and Civic Morals*, a “higher degree of consciousness and reflection” (1957: 50).

We can contribute to this process especially by emphasizing the Durkheimian insight that social ideals are irreducible to either empirical fact or abstract ideal; they are the ongoing products of social practices. As innovators in the sociology of emotions have demonstrated (e.g., Collins 2008; Katz 1999), this actually involves taking the emotional and bodily nature of the human being very seriously, perhaps more than much of evolutionary psychology. On the question of violence, this certainly seems to be the case, as a side-by-side comparison of Collins and the work of evolutionary psychologists like Kanazawa and Still (2000) and Daly and Wilson (1988) reveals, on the one hand, a careful attendance to the emotionally-charged details of micro-situational interaction, and, on the other hand, a one-dimensional reliance on second-hand crime statistics and an embarrassingly proclivity for evolutionary just-so stories.

In making their evolution-based arguments about fundamental human motivations, evolutionary psychologists have consistently demonstrated a lack of interest in or respect for sociological analyses, tending to colonize, misrepresent, or ignore sociological insight. This can be seen, for example, in Steven Pinker's *The Blank Slate* (2002), where he spends hundreds of pages ostensibly dismantling social science 'myths' but fails to address any particular social science author or tradition in any detail. His references to Durkheim, for example, exhibit a remarkably consistent tendency for cavalier cherry-picking, going so far as to include an elliptical quote from the *Rules of Sociological Method* that reverses the order of several passages in the original text (2002: 23-24) in order to argue that Durkheim sees human nature as some sort of silly putty and has views that may be subsumed under Kroeber's notion of a societal 'super-organism' (Kroeber 1917).

Pinker's weak reading of Durkheim is a relatively trivial bit of bad scholarship that has little to do with the over-all argument. The larger issue is the web of counter-myths that evolutionary psychologists spin and the share of the public discussion that they have managed to garner. In order to be effective in developing sociological research into altruism, we need to contest this space more directly. We see no particular reason to defend the straw-man advocate of the blank slate that Pinker constructs. If there are sociologists whose reflexes are blank slate ones, we should feel free to leave them kicking in the wind in the particular pumpkin patch they've chosen to defend. However, we believe that evolutionary theory still has a lot to learn about selfishness and altruism from the sociological tradition, and public discourses on altruism need (and this is a performative matter, a moral obligation concerning both solidarity and altruism) the active participation of sociologists, in our capacities as social members, in the ongoing construction of collective representations of our moral ideals, altruism among them. Taking up the voluntarist position that blank slate arguments purportedly defend, we believe that sociologists can be much more than scarecrows in scientific disputes over altruism and morality. Beyond this, we might collectively agree to work on re-framing the terms of the debate, embedding a more fully sociological approach into public discourse on altruism.
Durkheim’s Value(s)

In our view, one of the best places to start is with Durkheim's discussion of altruism in his *Moral Education* lectures (1961). The first move, here, is to reconstruct the relationship between egotism and altruism. Durkheim does this by moving us from consideration of the *urges or motives* for action, whether selfish or selfless, whether pleasure-seeking or painful and sacrificial, to consideration of the *objects* of our actions, and to the difference between those actions which affect only ourselves and those which affect things which have an existence outside ourselves. Altruism does not contradict the egotistic, it transcends it and in so doing *extends* it. It takes us beyond ourselves. Durkheim puts it this way:

Thus, what differentiates altruism and egotism is not the nature of the pleasure that accompanies these two sorts of our observable behavior. It is the different direction that this activity follows in the two cases. When it is egotistical, it does not go beyond the acting subject; it is centripetal. When it is altruistic, it overflows from its subject. The centers around which it gravitates are outside of him; it is centrifugal (1961: 214).

In making this claim, that the issue is the direction of action, rather than the motive, and that we can think of egotism and altruism as the difference between centripetal and centrifugal rather than between selfish and selfless, Durkheim avoids a whole series of dilemmas on which much debate on altruism has run aground. On Durkheim's reading, altruism does not do away with the self, it is what constitutes it. In a dense depiction of the self which contains all of the essential elements of the theory of intersubjectivity, of Cooley's 'looking-glass self,' and of an alternative, one that already contains object relations theory *in nuce*, to the Freudian oedipal narrative, Durkheim suggests that

We have altruism, as was pointed out, when we are attached to something outside ourselves. But we cannot become attached to an external thing, whatever its nature, without representing it to ourselves, without having an idea of it, a sentiment about it, no matter how confused. By virtue of this fact alone—that we do represent an external object to ourselves—it becomes in certain respects internal. It exists in us in the form of the representation that expresses it, reflects it, is closely related to it. Thus—as with the symbolic representation, without which it would mean nothing to us—the object becomes an element of ourselves, a state of our consciousness. In this sense, we have become attached to ourselves. If we suffer because of the death of someone close to us, it is because our image of the physical and moral person...cease[s] to function...it is to a part of ourselves that we are attached (1961: 215).

This remarkable passage demonstrates the fruitlessness, it seems to us, of any attempt to scientifically prove or disprove, by any methodologically individualistic means, the existence or non-existence of altruism. The self is constituted not only intersubjectively but also symbolically. But the constitution of this intersubjectivity and this symbolism is witnessed, seen, heard, enacted (cf. Rawls 2004); it is first and foremost social.

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Our purpose, so far, has been to offer a twofold reminder of 1) evolutionary psychology's domination of public discussions of altruism and 2) Durkheim's relevance. These two orienting points have been relatively absent from the early issues of this newsletter, which have emphasized the importance of Pitirim Sorokin and Peter Kropotkin for orienting theory and research for the section. We would like to argue that, for engaging with competing explanations in the evolutionary sciences, Emile Durkheim's conception of the social as constituted by concrete and ongoing practices of collective representation remains one of the most vibrant.

With this in mind, we suggest that one practical task for this section in-formation should be to develop strategies for generating increased public and media attention to the sociology of morality, altruism, and solidarity, through a robust response to evolutionary psychology thoroughly grounded in the sociological tradition. By way of beginning then, we use Durkheim’s work to trace out some of evolutionary psychology's main weaknesses. Three such fault-lines are addressed here:

(1) Evolutionary psychology exhibits an incapacity to comprehend socialization as a thick process of initiating new members of the social world into ongoing practices of reflection, interpretation, and idealization. If, as Dawkins argues, we are genetically wired to be selfish, socialization teaches us to be otherwise. Indeed, for Durkheim, all education is essentially the methodical socialization of new members of society into the sentiments and habits of that society (1966: 41). The socialization process, which is based in authoritative and disciplinary relations (54-58), builds a self out of these authority relations and the internalized attachments that they entail. Similarly, if we are by nature altruistic, it is our broader culture, the discourses in which we are enmeshed and with which we align ourselves that make us less than altruistic. Durkheim's (1961) work on the sociogenesis of morality as a mix of external constraint and inner obligation was engaged and challenged by the great theorist of moral development and child socialization, Jean Piaget (1997: 327-406). Despite some key differences round the role of authority, both Piaget and Durkheim agree that socialization trumps any kind of biological ascription in moral development. That contemporary evolutionary psychologists concerned with human development have neglected to engage with some of Durkheim's most basic insights signals a significant shortcoming.

(2) Evolutionary Psychology fails to account for the institutional dimensions of social life and the extent of our institutional embeddedness. Evolutionary psychologists do not, as a rule, recognize the role of the collective as a significant mediating force between individual behaviour and the life of the human species more broadly. Our social institutions, from war and wages, through markets and marriages, to neighbours and nations, organize our social lives in ways that are absolutely irreducible to the behaviours of autonomously acting individuals conceived as biological vessels for the transmission of genetic material. If social relations are viewed only as the intersection of individual behaviours, then our view of any individual’s action is always already oriented solely to self-interest and necessarily so. Social institutions have histories which are threaded through with individual actions and decisions, but institutions also operate with a great degree of autonomy over individuals. Institutions mediate, modify and motivate individual action and social interaction in ways that the analysis of genetic material, however advanced, is unlikely to reveal.

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This independence of institutions from individual aggregation effects is not adequately subsumed under the recent appropriation by evolutionary psychologists of the classic but decidedly non-Durkheimian notion of society as a “super-organism.” Such a move makes the same mistake as the supposedly sociological readings of Durkheim that take him for an “organicism”: they forget about the character of collective representations. For Durkheim, the organismic model of the social could only ever be a representation of the social. This is not to say that it is “merely” metaphorical, but that it is irreducibly mediated by constitutive social practices. Even our understanding of institutions are mediated by their collective representations and as ongoingly produced “just here, just now” accomplishments of immortal, ordinary society (as Garfinkel put it).

(3) What follows from this is an inability to recognize the extent to which individual behaviour is guided by the justificatory narratives and external accounts that organize it. Related to the mediating and organizing role of institutions above, genetic analysis cannot comprehend the place of collective representations in social life. For evolutionary psychologists, “words are only tools for our use” (Dawkins 1976: 20). But that is not true, or at least, if words are tools, they’re tools that some of us love and some of us hate, tools that some use well and others have never heard of. They are tools whose uses are emergent. Words change the way we feel when we use them to generate and form ideals and collective representations and we do not merely observe the way that language works, we participate in it. For this reason, when Dawkins describes life as a competitive struggle for existence, a struggle that goes on even if the life-forms are unconscious of it, he does more than describe, he also creates. And for this reason, Sahlins was right to suggest that sociobiologists were translating the contemporary law of possessive individualism into evolutionary terms (Sahlins 1976). Sahlins was wrong, however, to suggest that these were mere metaphors.

We collectively produce mediated and mediating mechanisms which calibrate our activities, that, for example, temper our proclivity for violence, and these mechanisms both reflect and instantiate, through symbols, the values to which societies—and, all going well, the individuals who populate them—subscribe. Altruism is not a kind of activity that exists or does not exist, a motive in an individual mind that is best measured as a peculiar type of neuronic twitch. It is a kind of ongoing symbolic demand that we make or do not make, of each other and of ourselves; it is caught up in concrete constitutive practices and the science that attempts to address these practices is itself constituted in medias res. Against this notion evolutionary psychologists persistently embrace a simplistic notion of the distinction between facts and values with a kind of Jesuitical naïveté that consistently leads into self-congratulatory claims about intelligence, neutrality, objectivity, and the meritocratic basis of scientific authority.

A summary of these three fault-lines might proceed as follows: By beginning with the premise that society is an aggregate of individuals, a mere sum of its parts, evolutionary psychology and allied fields offer thin conceptions of social life. Social institutions have lives and logics of their own, and operate independently of those who populate them at any given moment in time. In evolutionary psychology, social processes are weakly conceived as the aggregated behaviours of the individuals who populate a thinly conceived society, devoid of institutional constraint and symbolic coding. Over a century ago, Durkheim carefully cautioned against such a view and so, in beginning to think anew about morality, solidarity and altruism we would do well to be reminded of Durkheim's assertion: “Wherever there are societies, there is altruism, because there is solidarity” (Durkheim, 1964: 197).  

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Conclusion

There are now many versions of Durkheim. Parsons (1968) divided his work up into an earlier positivist phase and a later idealist phase. Nisbet (1965) saw him as a conservative. Pearce (2001) and Jones (2001) now read him as a radical. We do not, here, make (an egoistic) claim to possess the one right image of him or to have fully assimilated him. But that is precisely the point. Our identity as students of Durkheim constitutes the starting-point for a Durkheimian understanding of altruism, morality, and solidarity. To repeat, “[w]e have altruism, as was pointed out, when we are attached to something outside ourselves. But we cannot become attached to an external thing, whatever its nature, without representing it to ourselves, without having an idea of it, a sentiment about it, no matter how confused” (Durkheim 1961: 215). Our starting-point is our attachment to Durkheim. We love what we have learned and internalized from reading him, and we love his continuing alterity, his otherness. So we are both egoists and altruists about Durkheim, and we want you to share in the productivity and pleasure of continuing to read and work with his thought, with the centrifugal force of his thought. Through such ongoing practices—disciplinary in the sense that we bind ourselves to the authority of classic texts, productive in the sense that through thinking and arguing together about altruism, morality, and solidarity we generate the affective energies and symbolic resources that we need to go on living together—we may find ourselves, perhaps, moving toward a time when, as Durkheim suggested at the end of Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, “charity, in its true meaning...ceases, as it were, to be optional...and becomes instead a strict obligation, that may be the spring of new institutions” (Durkheim 1957: 220)

Works Cited

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Works Cited (continued):

Building the People’s Republic of Virtue: Moral Activism in Revolutionary China

Xiaohong Xu
Yale University

My dissertation research began as a simple empirical question: Why China’s Communist state was and still is, though to a much lesser extent, so involved with the private morality of its citizens? Political scientist Susan Shirk (1982) has laconically called it “virtuocracy” (also, Madsen 1984). The entanglement of government and morality is of course not unique to Communist China. Political theorists have analyzed this theme in diverse contexts from classical republicanism to Confucian political order. What is distinctive in many modern authoritarian and revolutionary states is that they often create what political scientist Amos Perlmutter (1981) calls “auxiliary structures” to deal with moral control and mobilization. These auxiliary structures are not part of the formal state machinery but are critical for the legitimacy of the state.

As I began my investigation, I found the existing sociological literature lent insufficient direct support to this inquiry. Since the virtuocracy of Communist China was a product of the Chinese Revolution (1911-1949), I started to probe into the origins and institutionalization of revolutionary moralism. I was of course inspired by Michael Walzer’s seminal study of how Puritans’ religious activism contributed to their extraordinary revolutionary power (Walzer 1965; also, Mazlish 1976). But in order to build an analytical framework where macro-level revolutionary changes, meso-level organizational dynamics and micro-level individual transformation can meet, I have to make bricolage from a variety of subfields, ranging from state formation and institutional analysis, to social movements and organization studies, to interactionism and group processes, etc.

In my study, I was stuck in discovering that organized self-cultivation was a critical issue that obsessed generations of Chinese revolutionaries in face of national and social crises. From the turn of the 20th century on, they had called for “new citizens” who could foster altruism and social solidarity based on collective moral practices to save China. This rang true to contemporaries with Confucian upbringing because Confucian self-cultivation was so far largely individual endeavor. To capture this dynamism, I coined the term “moral activism” by which I mean the advocating, organizing and practicing of collective actions oriented toward the moral uplifting and transformation of the individual and the community to counteract the forces of corruption and evil that are perceived to threaten the moral integrity of the individual and the community. This concept affords us to extend the conventional analysis of religious activism to a more general and abstract level and to investigate movements not religiously inspired yet with equally meaningful significance, such as self-help movements in the West and many others in non-Western contexts.

As my research deepened, I discovered that the Chinese Communist Movement actually emerged through the “bloc recruitment” approach (Oberschall 1973: 125) by absorbing a few self-cultivation societies during the May Fourth Movement era (1919-1921), a time characterized by cultural iconoclasm and youth activism. What distinguished these societies from the other dozens of youth organizations was that the strong group solidarity and disciplinary power derived from moral activism made them in affinity with the Bolshevik party discipline. Even more surprising was the fact that they combined Confucian self-cultivation with the group methods of moral practices that they absorbed from the Chinese YMCA, whose organizational technology dominated the field of youth organizations in this period. This finding led me to the transformation of the YMCA, its unquestionable success in China in the first quarter of the century and gradual eclipse by the Communists later on. The latter process accelerated especially when underneath the “Yan’an Way” of the Chinese Revolution (Selden 1971), there emerged what I call the “Yan’an Way of self-cultivation” in 1938-1941 in which the Communists developed intricate organizational techniques of collective moral practices informed by revolutionary discourses and centered on strong party discipline. This approach helped them achieve and consolidate their dominance and mobilization power among the educated youth. Around the same time, the radical wing of the YMCA developed its synthesis of social gospel with Communist ideology of social revolution.

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The YMCA and YWCA were gradually infiltrated by the Communists until in 1949 they became junior partners of the Communist Youth League.

In this study, I have systematically unearthed historical data and source materials from the Communist Party, the YMCA and even the Kuomintang intelligence agencies that have been largely neglected and glossed over by the existing scholarship. These empirical data and materials help me to reassess and demonstrate the significance of moral activism in enhancing our understanding of the revolutionary vanguard and revolutionary regime.

While doing this case study, I keep in mind the comparative question of why moral activism does not develop into revolutionary moralism in some contexts, why it develops into the latter but fails to institutionalize it in some others and why in situations like revolutionary China, it is successfully institutionalized. I do so by considering not only the macro-structural conditions of class, the state and warfare, but also the presence/absence and strength/weakness of institutionalized moral activism such as church-based movements on the meso-level. I expect my focus on moral activism in revolutionary settings will generate interests in aspects of revolutions which the existing Marxist and structuralist interpretations have not brought forth. I also hope it can further the interests of sociologists of altruism, morality and social solidarity in radical politics and revolutions.

References
The Nature of Good and Evil: Understanding the Acts of Moral and Immoral Behavior

Samuel P. Oliner's exploration of *The Nature of Good and Evil* is informed by his grasp of history, his mastery of sociology and the authority of his own experience as one who as a young child of the Holocaust experienced the nature of both good and evil when he was rescued by a Polish non-Jew at the risk of her life. In this work, by concentrating on the Holocaust, the Armenian and Rwandan genocides, Oliner has further solidified his well deserved reputation as a scholar of insight and discernment into an area often left to philosophers and theologians and he has enriched our vocabulary to comprehend both good and evil while enlarging our moral imagination. A valuable contribution to the field, an even more valuable contribution to moral discourse in our age of atrocity, he allows us to Understand the Many Faces of Moral and Immoral Human Behavior. -Michael Berenbaum


Words from Samuel P. Oliner:

In *The Nature of Good and Evil: Understanding the Acts of Moral and Immoral Behavior*, we revisit the nature of good and evil. Many times I have heard statements, “Enough talk about evil.” But it is our belief that not enough is said about it. Even though we keep talking and writing on evil, it still persists throughout the world in different forms; whether it is mass murder in Darfur, mass killings in Libya, assassinations by drug cartels in Mexico, or the dispute over our border, whether it is terrorism and killing of the innocent, to such things as abuse by the rich and powerful.

We examine what is evil and its different forms by focusing on historical and contemporary examples. Throughout the book we explore the nature of evil and how it has played out in several regions of the world, including the genocide in Rwanda, the Armenian genocide, and the genocide committed by the Nazis in Europe during World War II.

We also revisit the nature of goodness and its’ manifestations. There can never be enough altruistic inclination and altruistic behavior in the world. We maintain that processes of love, respect, dignity, justice and security for all are vitally important. We are also concerned with how to move humanity from the position and mindset of doing harm to others, to that of intervening on behalf of those in need, and thereby helping human society to establish a more caring and peaceful world.

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Reviewed by Matthew T. Lee

In The Hidden Gifts of Helping, Stephen Post (Professor of Preventive Medicine, Head of the Division of Medicine in Society, and Director of the Center for Medical Humanities, Compassionate Care, and Bioethics at Stony Brook University) sums up his argument by quoting the Dalai Lama: “Our prime purpose in this life is to help others” (p. 52). Post supports this claim with the help of rigorous scientific evidence, wisdom drawn from a variety of philosophical and religious traditions, and the recent personal experience of overcoming the trials of being uprooted through the strategy of generous giving to others. Although not sociological in its orientation or approach, sociologists interested in the relationship between altruism, social capital, and community will find much of interest in this popular work (recently a Wall Street Journal bestseller in philosophy). Post, a theologian employed by a medical school, speaks with equal authority about scientific and supra-scientific matters thanks to his diverse training and life experiences. Throughout, his tone of humility and honesty will disarm skeptics.

But what really sells his message -- and indeed it is a message that we all desperately need to hear in this time of economic hardship, crass consumerism, and political demagoguery -- is that it is delivered not by the smug gurus on the well-heeled positive thinking speaker’s circuit, but by ordinary people in unenviable life situations: a woman suffering from cerebral palsy, another who is a quadriplegic, a man battling cancer on the brink of financial ruin who recently lost his marriage and job, and a father whose daughter was brutally murdered. At first glance, these messengers of hope seem to deserve our pity. Upon closer inspection, it is probably we who need their sympathy. For they have discovered the secret to real, lasting happiness that seems to elude so many of us.

The power of Post’s message is enhanced by his candor about difficulties in his own life (and in his family) and how he surmounted them by putting into practice the timeless wisdom of benevolent service. Where others lament the intractability of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Post reminds us of the large body of scientific literature on Post-Traumatic Growth. And rather than glossing over suffering in the service of some vacuous affirmation of the pseudo-power of (self-centered) positive thinking, Post deals with suffering directly and demonstrates the real power of self- and other-directed benevolent actions. After reading this book, few will contest the evidence that helping others is clearly a win/win situation that also benefits the helper. Sociologists interested structural changes that might increase altruism and benevolence will benefit from reading the more individual-oriented narratives in the book and asking how Post’s insights might be applied to our organizations and social institutions.

Post’s efforts as founding president of the Institute for Research on Unlimited Love to bring science to bear on topics like altruism, helping, and Unlimited Love (spiritually grounded love for all people without exception) are evident in the pages of this book. But what sets this book apart from others he has written is the inclusion of his personal narrative showing how he has used his knowledge to overcome significant difficulties. We all experience such hardships as he describes and we can find hope in the power of generous love. It goes without saying that the dominant institutions in our society are not organized on principles of this kind of love. But thankfully, as this book demonstrates, we are not merely prisoners of this reality. We can create something better by experiencing the hidden gifts of helping.
Books of Interest (Continued)

Why Do People Write Memoirs? By Wendell Bell

I didn’t think much about why people write memoirs until I was mostly finished writing Memories of the Future. Rather, I had some stories that I wanted to share about becoming a World War II Navy pilot, a sociologist, a teacher, a Caribbeanist, a Yale professor in a period of change, an equestrian, and a futurist, illustrating how images of the future, as well as chance, can shape the arc of a life.

What I was writing, though, sometimes surprised me. Although still focused on past visions and hopes for the future, it also became a journey of self-discovery. Thus, I sought guidance from others, casting a wide net into the general category of “memoir writing” beyond the contemporary works I had already read, such as those by sociologists Edward Shils (A Fragment of a Sociological Autobiography), George C. Homans (Coming to My Senses), and Irving L. Horowitz (Daydreams and Nightmares), as well as collections of shorter pieces in books edited by Bennett M. Berger (Authors of Their Own Lives: Intellectual Autobiographies by Twenty American Sociologists) and Horowitz (Sociological Self-Images: A Collective Portrait).

“Memoirs,” I discovered, are far from being a homogeneous category. Rather, according to one writer or another, they are sometimes justifications of the author’s existence, coming-clean confessions that bare the soul, self-congratulatory victory laps of achievement and success, sexual boastings, or defenses of a style of life ranging from mildly perverse to wild and dangerous.

Some memoirs are collected anecdotes (what did Disraeli call that certain period of life, “anecdotage”?). Others are searching introspections, simple and honest presentations of the author’s achievements and flaws (I have plenty of the latter, but I tried not to dwell on them), surprising revelations of self-knowledge that the author discovers as he or she writes, a way to settle scores (punish abusers, get revenge for evil harms done to the author), a lofty effort to teach others how better to live their lives, a way to explain the end of illusion or hope, or, especially for the very old or the terminally ill, descriptions of waiting for death to come.

Although there may be a bit of each of the above in Memories of the Future, when I returned to my writing, I found that one major thread in what I had written was gratitude, a feeling of gratefulness toward many people whose kindness, concern, advice, protection, encouragement, understanding, teachings, and help at one point or another in my journey had made life and learning, love and hope possible for me. Starting with my mother and grandmother, who raised me, and adding my teachers, friends, colleagues, wife, and children—and sometimes complete strangers, such as a man in a passing car who saw me trapped by a vicious dog when I was a kid selling magazines door-to-door and who stopped and saved me.

Thus, I tried to capture in Memories of the Future the wonder of the basic decency of most people in the world by giving some specific examples. Especially in face-to-face situations, most people do not want to harm others. Rather, they want to be fair and just, honest, cooperative, friendly, helpful, generous, understanding, and respectful. And, when they fail to act decently, it is often not because they are personifications of evil, but rather because they are thoughtless, unwise, misguided, or the real or imagined victims of others. This is not to say that mean and angry people do not exist. Of course they do. But some of them need understanding more than condemnation, a hug more than a kick.

In Memories of the Future I try to complete this thread by tying it to the concept of image of the future and to actions designed to create a desirable future in an effort, lofty or not, to contribute something that might help people lead more satisfying lives and make the world a better place.

One part of that effort is to recognize that even in our corporate, global society, each one of us in our ordinary daily lives possesses a powerful means to affect the future. Each of us human beings constitutes part of the world—even if only some small slice of it—for those people with whom we share our lives, from our infant children and other family members to friends, neighbors, co-workers, and beyond them to others with whom we have but fleeting contacts, such as waitresses and store clerks—even a customer service worker speaking to us on the telephone from India or the Philippines. These are the people with whom we personally interact.

(Continued on next page...)
Although we ordinary people have little control of the actions of nations and transnational corporations or of the momentous events of history, we can control ourselves. Thus, we individuals can control how we treat other people. We possess the power to create a new future of dignity, self-restraint, empathy, fairness, honesty, trustworthiness, inclusiveness, generosity, and nonviolence for each person with whom we personally interact by how we treat them. You can do it and I can do it. For within that limited band of the lives of others that we each constitute, by our own behavior toward others we can create a small piece of the good society for them that we hope will become the future.

Such behavior on our part is not mere selfless altruism, because what goes around comes around. As we humans act, we create some part of the world, not only for others but also for ourselves.

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Book Description: Memories of the Future

Life courses, both professional and personal, are often directed by unplanned experiences. At crossroads, which path is followed and which hard choices are made can change the direction of one’s future. Wendell Bell’s life illustrates how totally unforeseen events can shape individual lives. As he notes, despite our hopes and our plans for the future, there is also serendipity, feedback, twists and turns, chance and circumstance, all of which shape our futures with sometimes surprising results. In Bell’s case, such twists and turns of chance and circumstance led to his role in developing the new field of futures studies.

In Memories of the Future, Bell recognizes the importance of images of the future and the effect of these images on events to come. Such images—dreams, visions, or whatever we call them—help to determine our actions, which, in turn, help shape the future, although not always in ways that we intend. Bell illustrates, partly with the story of his own life, how people remember such past images of the future and how the memories of them linger and are often used to judge the real outcomes of their lives.

This is a fascinating view of the work of an important social scientist and the people and events that helped define his life. It is also about American higher education, especially from the end of World War II through the 1960s and 1970s, a period of educational transformation that included the spread of the merit system; the increase in ethnic, racial, gender, and social diversity among students and faculty; and a massive increase in research and knowledge.

Wendell Bell

Wendell Bell is professor emeritus of sociology at Yale University, where he also served as chair of the department. Bell has written more than two hundred articles and authored or co-authored numerous books, including Social Area Analysis, Public Leadership, and Foundations of Futures Studies (two volumes, available from Transaction).

Unlimited Love, Compassion and Forgiveness: Acts of Moral Exemplars

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PART II. Part I is in the previous issue.
The Language of Apology/Forgiveness

The verb used in the Hebrew Bible for forgiveness is the Hebrew word *shuv*, meaning to turn or to return, implying that man has the power to turn from evil to good, to change, and this very act of turning will bring about God’s forgiveness (Schimmel 2002). Without t'shuvah (repentance) there can be no forgiveness. Judaism puts much greater emphasis on t'shuvah than anything else. In Judaism, there are strict rules regarding forgiveness. Forgiveness can be asked only from a victim himself, and only the victim can forgive. The famous philosopher Maimonides says, sins between one man and his fellow such as striking, cursing, or stealing are never forgiven until one pays up his debt and appeases his fellow. In Judaism, the most important holy day is Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement, in which people are supposed to be concerned with apology to those they may have hurt or offended in some way during the year. In most of the literature, reconciliation is an important act and plays a major role in conflict resolution; reconciliation helps repair the relationship between people. Forgiveness is an act of reconciliation that the heart makes and is a way to ease our heart from the burden of hatred, resentment and rage.

In Islam, forgiveness has been given much attention. It is called *tawba*, which also, like its Jewish counterpart t'shuvah, means repentance. It's a demanding process consisting of three phases identical to the Jewish law, and considered a necessary condition for forgiveness by God to the repenting sinner. The rituals titled *sulh* (settlement) and *musalaha* (reconciliation) are usually performed within a framework, and at the end, the individuals in conflict establish peace through acknowledgement of apology and forgiveness between individuals and groups.

Buddhism places forgiveness on top of the hierarchy of values. For Buddhists, forgiveness is always possible and one should always forgive. Tibetan Buddhism stresses that one should make a friend out of the enemy, implying that those who do not forgive are least capable of changing their life circumstances. In this sense, forgiveness is a shrewd and practical strategy for a person or a nation to pursue.

The Psychology of Forgiveness/Forgiveness and Health

The psychological case for forgiveness is overwhelmingly persuasive. Not to forgive is to be impris-
loned by the past, by old grievances that do not permit life to proceed. Forgiveness frees the forgiver. It ex-
tracts the forgiver from someone else’s nightmare.

Forgiveness also removes the right to avenge and revenge, and prevents people from attacking others. Forgiveness may initially seem to produce more pain than the original wound, since it involves accepting vol-
untarily the harm or evil that has been experienced and letting the other person go free. In love, we bear the cost of those sins against us.

Forgiveness can be a powerful health enhancement. It promotes healing. For example, when a person has back pain due to stress, perhaps caused by anger, forgiveness may help reduce the back pain (Smedes 1984 and McCullough, et al. 1999). Love and compassion are ingredients of forgiveness (Post 2003). In March of 2003, Parade Magazine stated that prayer contributes substantially to healing. Religious and spiritual beliefs, and practices seem to be associated with health and a component of that is forgiveness.

There is increasing interest in the relationship between faith and healing. Paula Zahn, of CNN, spent an hour on December 25th on a program entitled Faith in America (2003), in which she interviewed a variety of people who work in the areas of spirituality and healing. Experts, such as Dr. Herbert Benson of Harvard, Dr. Harold Koenig of Duke University, Dr. Nancy Snyderman, Dr. Mehmet Oz, and others made a case for the existence of a strong relationship between faith, prayer, spirituality and healing. Each of them gave examples of faith and prayer providing a strong supplement in recovery. Dr. Oz stated that there is empirical evidence from faith groups, such as Tibetan Monks and others, who pray for the sick, making them feel important and loved. Recovery is more likely to follow from that.

Newsweek Magazine (2003) reports a positive correlation between faith and healing, and gives several examples of how prayer, not only for loved ones but also for strangers, helps heal. Eighty-four percent of Americans think that praying for the sick improves their chance of recovery. On the other hand, 28% think that religion and medicine should be separate, as there may be a danger of people relying too much on religion and not using appropriate medical treatments.
It’s been found that people who regularly attend Church live longer than people who are not Church-goers. Scholars using brain scans have discovered that meditation can change brain activity and improve immunity, lower heart rate and blood pressure which reduces the body's stress responses.

Forgiveness clearly has an effect on health and wellness. Neil Krause, at the University of Michigan School of Public Health, found that people who forgive easily tend to enjoy greater psychological well-being and have less depression than those who hold grudges.\(^1\)

While the idea of a relationship between forgiveness and psychological health has its critics, the vast majority of researchers find significant association between religious beliefs and well-being, life satisfaction, hope, purpose, meaning, lower rates of depression, less anxiety, and lower suicide rates. More than 70 of the United States' 120 medical schools—from Harvard to Stanford—offer specific courses on spirituality or incorporate these themes into the curriculum, according to Dr. Christina Puchalaski, Director of the George Washington Institute for Spirituality and Health.

Sir John Templeton contributes large sums of money annually to the study the relationship of prayer and healing, forgiveness and reconciliation. The National Institute of Health plans to spend $3.5 million on ‘mind/body studies’ in 2004. Duke University's Dr. Harold Koening, Harvard's Dr. Herbert Benson, and Stanford's Robert Sapolsky support the value of this research.

A South African Psychologist, Pumla Gobobo-Madikizela, in her book, *A Human Being Died that Night: South African Story of Forgiveness* (2002), says that forgiveness of whites is one very important factor in healing the hurt of South Africa’s black population. Tutu and others established the Truth and Reconciliation Commission over a decade ago as a mechanism of easing tensions and preventing vengeance between the races. This public approach brought to light the fears and anger, and it eased them. As a result other countries in conflict have undertaken similar approaches.

Richard Fitzgibbons, a psychiatrist and one of the pioneers in studying forgiveness and mental health informs us that forgiveness has a remarkable healing power in the lives of those who use it. McCullough and
Worthington, in a study (1997) report that forgiveness is a motivational transformation that inclines people to inhibit relationship-destructive responses and to behave constructively towards someone who has behaved destructively toward them. They also maintain that forgiveness reduces anger, depression and anxiety, and most importantly, they find a positive relationship between forgiving behavior and altruistic behavior. Forgiveness is manifested in various therapeutic settings including marriage counseling. Most scholars in this area agree that forgiveness is a powerful force because it is a direct product of empathy, love, and altruism, and it frees the forgiver from the burden that he/she has carried for a long time.

In psychology there is an increasing interest in altruistic behavior, forgiveness, and positive psychology as perhaps three important topics of further research. Altruistic behavior, apology and forgiveness could help establish friendlier relations between and among individuals, groups and nations.

Apology from one group to another is, in my view, a very important step toward intergroup reconciliation. And it can work in more intimate groups as well. For instance, pre-Christian Hawaiian culture used the concept of Ho'oponopono to restore and maintain good relationships among family members. Through discussion, repentance, restitution and forgiveness, Ho'oponopono stresses the importance of setting right what is wrong (Pukui et al.1972). Further examples supporting the importance of apology in restoring intergroup relations on a more mega scale include: leaders of Germany apologizing to the world about committing genocide, leaders of convents in Kentucky apologizing to African Americans who were enslaved in the past, President Clinton apologizing to African American people for the Tuskegee experiments, and a recent dramatic apology by a group of clergy to Native American communities for the Indian Island massacre of 1860 in Humboldt Country, California. While these cases of apology may involve parties removed by time and distance from one another, like in the Hawaiian family, it is the apology that spurs reconciliation.

Apology is good for both sides in the conflict; and so is forgiveness. It has also been reported that forgiveness includes empathy. Paul Coleman defined forgiveness as a decision to offer love to someone who has betrayed that love. People say that when we have forgiven someone, we really free ourselves from bitter
ties that connect us to the hurt and the harm.

Acknowledging the anger and hurt caused by an identified offender often bars the offended party from any other thought of inflicting harm, pain or punishment. Forgiveness erases revenge or thoughts of harm and repayment, of punishment to those who harmed us. And when we allow ourselves to consider the offender's perspective and try to understand his/her attitudes and behavior, vengeance becomes pointless. Once we decide to accept the hurt without unloading it on the offender, we stop passing it back and forth and acerbating it. By trying to extend compassion and good will to the offender, we release the offended from the offense. Forgiving is not easy and some crimes may not be forgivable. It takes a long time to forgive, but it is important to forgive because through forgiveness, life can become more fair to all.

Forgiveness is a Process

Everett Worthington, an eminent scholar on forgiveness, proposes five steps for actualizing forgiveness: 1) Do not wait for an apology. Take the initiative to establish relations by giving the offending party the occasion to talk to you; 2) Allow yourself to empathize with the offender because he/she who may well have acted out of ignorance is the person who can heal your pain; 3) Perform a symbolic act. Make it public in some way that shows you are willing to forgive; 4) Remember that forgiving is not forgetting. Hurt feelings can linger even after one has forgiven the offender; 5) The offended party should be sure to include himself/herself in the forgiveness list.

Worthington cites a powerful example from his own life:

On New Years Eve of 1995, two men broke into his mother's house and murdered her. At first, Worthington was full of rage and anger and could not forgive these murderers. Later, he tried to understand the socio-economic background of the murderers, their fear, the rage, the anger, and the woundedness that must have been part of their inner world. After much soul searching, he decided to forgive them. It took a great deal of empathy to understand why this tragedy occurred. Being a spiritual person, Worthington thought of the words of Jesus Christ on the cross, "Forgive them for they know not what they do." Forgiving his mother's
murderers may be a dramatic example, but the literature shows over and over again that apologizing and forgiving is an important step toward healing relationships. Confucius said, "Those who can not forgive others break the bridge over which they themselves must cross."

There is an association between forgiveness and altruism, compassion, and agape. Eastern philosophies reaffirmed what Western scholars have stated, that forgiveness takes away anger and makes us peaceful and in harmony with ourselves again. Forgiveness is love, and love is always the right path to follow.

Both Vaclav Havel and Albert Einstein maintain that we need to rid ourselves of the destructive and straight-jacketed view of human relations which guides us to confrontation rather than reconciliation. Without a global revolution in the sphere of human consciousness and forgiveness, nothing will change for the better in the sphere of human relations. A number of solutions have been suggested to bring about a more caring world. The Buddhist monk, Thich Nhat Hanh (1993),\(^4\) tells us that what is needed is revitalization of established religions, enabling them to be more relevant to the changes in our time. Religions seem to have become stagnated in practices and rituals, and even become polarized against other religions.

According to Yehudith Auerbach (1991)\(^5\), apologies made by a nation's leader to another nation which was harmed is one of the major ingredients of conflict resolution and reconciliation. Forgiveness, for Auerbach, means the foreswearing of resentment, the resolute overcoming of anger and hatred that are naturally directed toward a person who has done an unjustified and non-excused moral injury.

The emergence of new socio-political institutions is encouraging. Non-Governmental Organizations at the United Nations and citizen diplomats are two opportunities for a wider range of citizens to take part in improving international relations by facilitating healing and reconciliation. Also encouraging is the important push for economic, political and social justice for all people on a global scale. Apology simply means expressing genuine sorrow for the harm done. This contrition has to be followed by remediation and justice. National interest is promoted through reconciliation and forgiveness because it may result in peace.
Forgiving in the Theory and Practice

There is a religious-cultural context for forgiveness in Christian teaching and its fundamental belief in cherishing love and mercy, and the Christian expression of these noble feelings through forgiveness of enemies.

Forgiveness is also associated with the practice of loving and not finding fault. A number of scholars, theologians and psychologists have found that forgiveness is also associated with empathy for the transgressor and, in the case of Professor Worthington, the willingness to restore the fellowship of the harm-doer. It requires emotional and spiritual transformation, as well as compassion for the transgressor. An important aspect of healing is that the transgressor confesses to wronging the harmed person in a serious way. The attitude and behavior frequently changes in the telling. There is a kind of catharsis on the part of the harm-doer, as well as the person or group that was harmed; an example of this can be found in the experience that took place when the three convents apologized to African Americans for slavery in Kentucky.

Another example of apology and forgiveness can be found in the Million Man March in Washington, DC on October 11, 1996. The march was undertaken by men to apologize and make restitution to women and children for not protecting and providing for them. In south central Los Angeles, the Grace Church began what is now referred to as the "Sister, I'm Sorry Movement." Male church members are apologizing to female Church members for committing wrongs, such as abandonment, rape, and sexual abuse, even if though other men committed those acts. This process is now spreading to other Churches.

In the criminal justice system, there is a new movement called Restorative Justice, which places emphasis on the offender apologizing directly to his or her victim and making restitution as part of or in lieu of prison time. As spirituality becomes more important in people's lives, they recognize the benefits of apology and forgiveness.

The Australian government has an official "I am Sorry Day" dedicated to asking Australian Aborigines for forgiveness for the pain and injustice that white inhabitants have caused the indigenous people.
Love and Forgiveness

Closely connected with forgiveness is the power of love. Steven Post in his recent book *Unlimited Love: Altruism, Compassion and Service* (2003), reviews an important process called unlimited love. Citing Vladimir Solovyov (1853-1900), he states that, "The meaning and worth of love, as a feeling, is that it really forces us, with all of our being, to acknowledge for another the same absolute central significance, which because of the power of our egoism, we are conscious of only our own selves. Love is important not as one of our feeling, but as the transfer of all our interest in life from ourselves to another, as the shifting of the very center of our personal lives." Post continues by saying: "Those who have the virtue of meaningful spirituality shape our love, and any spiritual transformation that is not a migration towards love is suspect."6 Sorokin,7 a Russian sociologist in his book *The Ways and Power of Love* (1954), has said: “Love is a life-giving force, as studies show that the people who are altruists live longer” (Post 2003; McCullough et al. 2000).

It has been well established that when processes such as love, compassion, empathy, and others involve apology, they lead to forgiveness which then leads to unloading one's burden and feeling of hurt, and leads to reconciliation and the recognition of the humanity of the offender. It is a powerful emotional release and is a clear acceptance of compassion for the offender and, if genuine, it helps to extinguish the rage and the feeling for revenge, as well as the cycle of violence.

The well-known story of the four chaplains further illustrates heroic altruism and forgiveness. The four chaplains, Alexander D. Goode, Jewish, George L. Fox, Methodist, Clark V. Poling, Dutch Reformed, and John P. Washington, Roman Catholic were on a troop ship by the name of Dorchester, which was taking American soldiers overseas. The troop ship left Saint John's, Newfoundland, headed towards the Atlantic carrying nine hundred and two soldiers. At 12:55 A.M., on February 3, 1942, a torpedo from U-boat U-223 slammed into the starboard side of the Dorchester below the water line. Hundreds of shocked and panicked men emerged from below deck. The ship rapidly drifted to starboard, rendering twelve of the thirteen life-boats inaccessible. Frightened and despairing soldiers called out for their mothers. All of the four chaplains tried to locate life jackets and to calm the men. Unfortunately, the Dorchester started sinking rather quickly.
and all of the life jackets were already distributed, there were not enough life jackets for everyone. At this striking moment, the four chaplains performed what we call the most heroic act of love and heroism by giving up their own life jackets and handing them over to frightened soldiers. The witnesses reported that the four chaplains were holding hands and singing and praying to God in their various ways. Of the nine hundred and two soldiers, only two hundred and twenty seven survived, and survivors told this heroic story over the years. The offspring of the victims were dedicated to promoting the memory of the Dorchester destruction. They attempted to find the perpetrators, that is, the U-boat shooter who torpedoed the Dorchester. The two shooters, Kurt Roser and Gerhard Buske, were found alive in Germany and were brought to Washington to seek reconciliation with the offspring of the four Chaplains. Sax (2003) informs us that the widow of Chaplain Goode had problems with the idea of reconciliation. Soon thereafter, though, when remorse and apology was expressed by the two German members of the U-boat crew, she was able to forgive. Buske's grandson and the grandson of the Rabbi Alexander D. Goode were communicating with each other and they, as well as the elder generation, committed themselves to ensuring that this heroic story of the four chaplains will not be forgotten.

Politicians, religious leaders, and others have made over 65 intergroup apologies to nations and groups around the world for harm done to them. The hurts come in all forms, including racism, slavery, genocidal massacres, concentration camps, extermination camps, etc. Most of these apologies had a positive effect both on individuals and groups, and had a religious or a psychological base. Apologies were mandated or encouraged by religious teachings, for example the teachings of Jesus Christ. The psychological base was derived from the necessity to reduce or eliminate stress and painful relationships between individuals and groups.

Now we will focus on the motivations of moral exemplars.

Acts of Moral Exemplars and Clergy: Why Do They Do Good?

Based on the analysis of data from a sample of moral exemplars and clergy, including a 93% overall score on the altruistic scale, I propose nine salient motivations to help explain why moral exemplars devote themselves to helping through altruistic behavior. Some of the nine reported below may overlap into other
motivations.

The nine motivations of altruistic behavior are: (1) religious/spiritual—defined as an attempt to align ourselves and our environment with transcendental reality, the ultimate meaning of existence, the holy, the divine, this motivation involves forgiveness, caring and love for all living things; (2) social responsibility—feeling a sense of obligation to help in society; (3) identity and moral goals—identifying oneself with a moral compass meant to improve society; (4) self-esteem—holding oneself in high regard and respect; (5) learned caring norms—behaviors and attitudes learned from others in the family or community; (6) commonality—the feeling that one has much in common with diverse other groups; (7) empathy—understanding and sharing another's feelings; (8) efficacy—one's belief in his own ability to create a desired outcome; (9) apology and forgiveness—a type of helping through a willingness to abandon one's right to resentment, negative judgement, and indifferent behavior towards the one who has harmed us, while fostering the undeserved qualities of compassion, generosity, and even love towards him or her.

In the literature on altruistic motivations, Story's (1992) review showed that helping and voluntarism is developed from two fundamental human inclinations: the self-regarding inclination, which focuses on creative human powers, and the other-regarding tendency, which focuses on altruistic human powers.

Archbishop Desmond Tutu emphasized the importance of forgiveness in this way:

Forgiveness and reconciliation are not just ethereal, spiritual, otherworldly activities. They have to do with the real world. They are realpolitik, because in a very real sense, without forgiveness, there is no future.

We begin our discussion with the combined qualitative and quantitative data from the moral exemplar and clergy samples.

Religiosity and Spirituality

The most salient motivating factor for helping was religiosity/spirituality. The respondents scored 81% on the religion/spirituality variable. Using both qualitative and quantitative data in comparing clergy and moral exemplars, we find that 87% of the 60 moral exemplars, and 96% of the 77 clergy felt a strong sense of
personal spirituality or religiosity. Prince and File’s (1994) research on philanthropists suggest that people are donating money to non-profits for religious motives, or because it's God's will. They give to others in need, and at the same time gain something for themselves. Gerard (1985), in a British study of 1,231 volunteers, identified religious motivation as an important motivating factor. Story (1992), proposes the primary nature of freedom of choice in the voluntary act, and the spiritual nature of volunteering.

One of our respondents, a Minister helping the homeless population in Humboldt County, works on the spiritual community level, and then carries that to the physical community:

I believe what we do in spiritual communities is perhaps the most important thing that happens within our communities. (Respondent 001)

Another chaplain at a hospital who ministers to the sick has based his acts of caring on his relationship with God, and that spiritual relationship stretches out to all of life.

For me it stems most in my relationship with God as what connects me with spirituality. But within that spirituality it's being able to appreciate a sunset, enjoy nature, enjoy sitting quietly having a cup of coffee. It involves relationships, caring for people, being compassionate, forgiving, merciful. (Respondent 014)

This next respondent, a philanthropist, bases his spirituality on his positive and generous interaction with others:

I guess I believe my spirituality is not traditionally religious spirituality. It's more of a belief in the value of the individual. It has to do with a concept of how I live my life, which is to be a person who is generous in all aspects; a sort of generosity of spirit, a positive attitude, an attitude of trusting people, an attitude of respect for myself and others. A feeling that each of us… our lives are in some way influenced by the lives of others. Being a person who distributes a sense of good will and good feelings not only enhances the lives the people around me, but my own as well. (Respondent 033)

This psychologist-turned-management-consultant still believes in the all-encompassing connection between all humans and other species. He states:

I have a belief that we are all connected; that there is energy in all of us; I think there are beings on other planets. I would say that I believe in everything, but I don't have the truth in all things. I try to treat even the smallest creatures with great respect. If I catch a fly or mouse I will throw it outside or in the garden, not kill it. (Respondent 008)

This physician intertwines God and friend, so they are one to him. He says that…
My whole life has been loving people. When I hear faithful people speak of their sincerity around their particular God, I hear them use the language I use for friends, so I assume my metaphor for God is friend. (Respondent 050)

This environmental activist has been involved with old-growth redwood stands in Humboldt County, and has internalized her caring for the earth:

One day I just felt this immense amount of love beginning to fill me up, and I was like, "wow, where is this coming from?" And I realized that what I was feeling was the unconditional love of the earth. (Respondent 004)

A Humboldt County environmental activist wants to create awareness and change about the watersheds, not only for the community, but also for the ecosystem and the fish that use the watershed. She relates her spiritual connection with the world:

Spirituality is how you connect to the rest of the world and the people and the beings in the world. And then also, how long after you're gone, how will your presence here have affected what happens a long time from now. What you do here now will somehow affect that whole. And if you do really good things, then you are going to leave that whole a better thing, and add to that energy, rather than detract from it. (Respondent 034)

This fifth-grade teacher defines his spiritual growth in terms of connections and relationships with others. He elaborates:

I feel the important things in life that help you to become a better person and interact with others, are the important things I focus on. So if spirituality involves being a part of a group of people that you feel connected with, want that relationship to grow with those people, then that sense of spirituality is strong. (Respondent 021)

A Humboldt County volunteer, a chaplain who gives spiritual support to patients in the hospital, correlates spirituality with interconnectedness with everything in the world. She states:

I'm finding myself. It's an evolving thing. I'm beginning to sense the world beyond the surface; to see interconnectedness. They talk about the luminous quality of being, to be sensitive to that presence. I'm highly aware of that synchronicity, and that when I'm on a path that feels right, things seem to flow and come to me without any effort; that efforting usually means I'm on the wrong path, not always, but usually. (Respondent 010)

This long-time activist with the League of Women Voters also addresses the spiritual connectedness with people and nature when she says:

I believe in the goodness of people. I believe in one’s spirit living on. I believe there’s a great deal that we don’t understand out there that is beneficial to us, and so forth…The most important thing is the
connectedness of people, and that we connect one another to the spiritual things we don’t understand – to the earth, to nature, to all of those things. I believe that it’s all connected together, and I think that’s important. If we forget our connectedness, then we miss out and we can go astray. (Respondent 042)

Three male clergy members speak to us on religion and spirituality:

Spirituality is the most important thing in my life and the lives of other people. Religion only helps me to live the spirituality. The spirituality is more for seeking peace and to live in a righteous way, and to be responsible for the neighbors. And also, to feel responsibility for community, nation and family. Religion is a set of rules, a set of rituals. (Respondent 064)

To be religious means to walk the talk. It means to be accommodating to peoples' real needs. It means to be in prayer contact with God. It means to teach one spirituality. It means to forgive, to be understanding. It means to search for meaning in life. We need to develop the soul aspect of our being rather than indulge the body. We need to enhance our minds, expand our consciousness of God and truth and beauty. For example, I am open to prayer forms that are not part of my own culture. I pray in ways that the Orthodox do, that the Buddhists do, that the Jews do. Religion is our relationship with God and God's relationship with us. Spirituality is the inner life. (Respondent 070)

My definition of a spiritual person is an individual who quests within the community after that which is sacred. I don't see spiritualism as many people do today as an issue of individualism. There is a big thing today to define someone as spiritual in a sense that's juxtaposed to organized religion. Actually, I guess I find myself too Jewish for that. I am reminded each time I hear that discussion that our prayer books have only one prayer that is in the first person. All the rest of them refer to "we" collectively. So, when I define spiritualism, I mean somebody who seeks the sacred in community with others. I see that as far more powerful. I am not denying that there is an individual element. There are certainly individual elements there, but it is a matter of questing for and yearning for that which is sacred in the universe. I don't think that the distinction between religious and spiritual is as meaningful as some people would make it out to be. (Respondent 082)

One Catholic Nun explains what guides her:

I think being a religious person is striving to deepen your own understanding of the reality of a Divine being. On a personal level, it is trying to be authentically who you are intended to be, to seek always to grow, as a human. Spirituality is more important then a religion, or adhering to a particular religion. Spirituality is a deepening sense of beauty. It is the sense of the beauty of all creation. It is a sense of wonder, a sense of awe and respect for all that is. One’s choice of a denomination is just a way of living out that reality, that realization that all that is, is beautiful. (Respondent 067)

Another Nun contrasts spirituality and religion:

Religion is more of guidelines, rules, dogma, principles and tenants that one intellectually as-
cents to and chooses to practice. Spirituality is for me personal rather than a set of objectives that you adhere to freely. Spirituality is one's personal response to those and the depth to which one aspires to them, and the meaning and the purpose of the ongoing challenge to be fully human (Respondent 069).

Social Responsibility

Social Responsibility, or the quality of assuming an obligation for helping to see that fairness and justice are doled out equally in positive ways, was the second most recognized motivating factor. Eighty percent of moral exemplars identified social responsibility as being important in their lives, while 89% of clergy reported the same, having learned from parents to help and put the welfare of others alongside their own.

In similar studies, Briggs, Piliavin, Lorenson, and Becker's (1986) study found that individuals with high social responsibility scores are more likely to be volunteers. Also, Adams (1990), in a study of voluntarism, reports that there is something called an imperative to volunteer—a cultural theme which states that Americans have an obligation, even a divine obligation, to contribute to the betterment of their community. For example, a nurse and member of her Church congregation states her purpose in helping others:

Sort of like Tuesdays with Morie, that you're not the wave, you're part of the ocean. (Respondent 012)

One businessman feels a sense of responsibility to help his fellow human beings. He states:

That's an empowering notion that people do not have to be relegated to be poor; that it's not that God wishes you to be poor and uneducated, but that there is a possibility that change has to come from people who are willing to take responsibilities in their lives who are affected by issues and distinct possibilities. At the same time, to have the resources to connect inner strength to reality of empowerment, to participate with strength. It's not a charity of simply the good Samaritan helping someone along the road, but going beyond that; more like liberation theology. And I think the morality is that we have to have responsibility for making sure that we do more than the minimum, so it's not just a crumb of bread, but helping people to move beyond the dependency. Anything less than furthering nurturing the whole independence of individuals is minimal; at it's best, maternalistic. (Respondent 018)

A similar sentiment of fairness and justice as a basic social assumption is shared by another philanthropist, who relates a story of racism in our society:

I feel I’m driven more by a sense of fairness, and justice, and equity. I feel that there is a basic obligation that people have to leave things better than they found them. While I’m not a great optimist about the human future, I can’t think of anything more interesting or important to do than work on it, so I’m not depressed by that. I think my life was more of a developmental process. I have certainly had experiences, which informed or
reinforced views I had. A couple of weeks ago I was in Beverly Hills in a restaurant with an African American friend who was treated very poorly in that restaurant, and I knew exactly what was going on, and so did he. That just reinforced my own concerns about fairness, and equity, and racism, and all that. (Respondent 023)

This man who heads the largest non-profit service provider to Native Americans in California, charges that it is everyone’s responsibility to do what can be done for the sake of all children and future generations:

Just that I think that it is our responsibility to make this world a better place for our children. Indians believe in our future generations as well, that you have to live your life in accordance with the things you know to be important and stand up for the issues that you believe in so you can make it a better world. (Respondent 041)

A doctor who works with AIDS patients in Washington, DC shares his insight on responsibility and the need for all of us to do something positive in order to establish world peace:

Establishing world peace, of course it depends on justice – true peace, that is the greatest struggle and battle humanity has ever had and it is an achievable goal. Most people would say, ‘Well it is not achievable, people are violent, people are jealous, people are selfish.’ But it is an achievable goal. We just have to get it in our heads that this is an achievable goal. We are much closer to it today than we were one hundred years ago. (Respondent 060)

This environmentalist feels it is a responsibility and a need to care for society and the world. She continues…

I was always one of those people who thought recycling, attending rallies and signing petitions is all we needed to do to make this world a better place. (Respondent 004)

A twenty-year volunteer for his community and the surrounding environment in central California, this man sees that planet Earth and its inhabitants are in jeopardy and he wants to create awareness through his activities:

Common good to me has a much broader reach than just for, say, one person or community. It’s more for the planet and all the inhabitants; the environment as a whole. And I think that preserving land for the future inhabitants, animals and plants that live there for the community of people very much fits in to that. On a larger scale we have to be looking at that; the planet is in jeopardy, in my mind, through the activities of the human beings. (Respondent 009)
A Humboldt County native and environmentalist feels it is her responsibility to protect this earth for the future generations:

We live on a planet, and this is the only one we’ve got, and that is never going to change. We have an absolute responsibility to protect it for the generations to come, and if we don’t, no one else is going to and every one of us has to do our part, otherwise seven generations down the line, or ten or fifteen, this is gonna be gone…and what a tragedy. It doesn’t matter how much money or how much power or how much whatever, there’s only one planet, and we’re not getting off it. (Respondent 034)

This writer/non-profit organizer/curriculum developer is attempting to start a charter school that connects the head to the heart, and, acting from the heart, to help humanity. She states her purpose for getting involved in this activity:

If we’re not working for social justice and the betterment of the human condition and the moral growth of the world and elimination of prejudice, then we’re really ignoring the spiritual responsibility. We can be spiritual in our actions by seeing the goodness in everyone and keeping our emotions in check and matching those habits of the heart, and we can be spiritual in our global perspective and our careers by being persistent in the world, bringing unity and harmony to the world. (Respondent 056)

For the past seventeen years this executive director of a non-profit organization helped raise funds for her local schools to build a theater, a library, and a health center. She contrasts people’s goodness and acting on behalf of others to those actions of the 9-11 attackers:

I have such a profound belief in the goodness of people and the strength of the human spirit, and so forth, and I am so sad when I see people or know of people acting in some way that is so against humanity. I think of these 19 people on these planes [September 11 attacks]. What could possess them to do that? Where did we miss the boat, we as human beings, that there are people who exist to do such horrible things? They are human beings after all, and what would come to that? You know, about World War II and the Nazi’s. (Respondent 020)

This Humboldt County woman, a volunteer on five boards, including the League of Women Voters and Affordable Housing Boards for the Homeless, shares her insight into when and how one should help:

I guess I would veer more to the volunteerism and being a productive part of society, and making the world a better place in which to live. And again that involves being able to take care of yourself, and then extending. If you can’t take care of yourself, you can’t do the other. People who don’t have the ability to take care of themselves draw
She elaborates on her work and bridges our discussion onto the topic of the moral goal of volunteering:

I suppose trying to improve people’s basic living conditions would be considered a moral goal. I think it’s pretty disgraceful that we let people live on the streets and children go homeless, so I guess that’s moral. (Respondent 036)

A Catholic Priest explains his understanding of social responsibility:

It is caring for my fellow brothers and sisters, especially those less fortunate, and to not be afraid. Just look at everything that happens in life as an opportunity for growth and something that is of the direction of God. (Respondent 065)

Another Priest illustrates how he was taught social responsibility:

My father…being a doctor, he'd go to someone's home and visit them, and give them a treatment. He would find that they didn't have any heat in their home, and this is Michigan, because they didn't have enough money or somebody was out of work, so he'd buy enough coal or fuel oil for the whole winter. Or he'd get the husband a job, he'd buy food for a couple of months for the family, that kind of thing. He did that all of his life. (Respondent 070)

Identity and Moral Goals

Those who find their motivation in identity and morality identify with the idea that we each have a moral compass and that any work to change society comes from a source with a moral basis. This was the third most common motivating factor with 77% of moral exemplars and 89% of clergy reporting this as an important motivation. These respondents have established positive goals and a moral framework of doing what is right because it is a part of who they are. The core beliefs, values, and moral goals they hope to achieve are internalized into a sense of self. Hart, Atkins, and Ford (1998) define moral identity as a self-consistent commitment to lines of action benefiting others. Davies' (1997) study of volunteerism in England and the U.S. found that volunteers are motivated by an individualist concept of society and moral responsibility in individual happiness, personal independence, independence of mind, temperance, self-restraint, and the neces-
A hospice and community volunteer we met is motivated to volunteer because it is a part of who she is:

I define myself by that. By my doing my volunteer work or being with people, I guess it’s just like they're my extended family. I travel and I enjoy doing that, and I read books, and I might take a college class, but my work as a nurse…I think of myself as a nurse, as the helper, as the nurturing. Trying to do that. So I guess that’s how I think of myself. It gives me the most satisfaction. (Respondent 012)

An author and coordinator for a new charter school, this woman wants to teach children the positive aspects of altruism, so they can learn and apply prosocial behavior throughout their lives. She says of altruism and identity:

Altruism is a very important word to me because I try to teach it to the children. In fact we were going to call our school the altruistic school, and somebody told us we shouldn’t because parents wouldn’t be able to spell it. But I think altruism is all about shaping your identity to the point where you instinctively act for the good of others. It’s good to have shape to your identity. (Respondent 056)

A man who has helped in the Jewish community for many years identifies with doing acts that are greater than himself:

My own feeling about being spiritual is that I’m a person that other people can look up to. I consider two main qualifications: one, that you do good (in Hebrew, tikun olan – fix the world), that you’re a constructive person in your family, in your community, and in your country. Secondly, that you have goals and beliefs and activities that are bigger than yourself. (Respondent 013)

This Chaplain identifies himself as a people-pleaser and helper. He says:

I’m a people-pleaser, and what happens sometimes for me is that I will repeat myself in order to please them. In this stage of my life as I get to be 50 and realize I’m not going to be here forever. When I die I want to be authentic, and I want to have that balance. So part of me wants to be able to help people discover who they are and know that there’s something greater that loves them, that cares for them, but also in not selling my soul in a sense to do that. So, I’m really working now to try and direct my energy in both ways: to discover more of who I am, and in doing that hopefully empowering and helping other people to discover who they are, and encouraging them...this is their work to do. I can help, or I can point out, or I can listen, but part of it’s their work to do. (Respondent 014)

A Jewish community member identifies herself with the culture of being Jewish and of helping:
Just being Jewish influences a lot given the... I mean it's such an infusion of persecution throughout Jewish cultural history that there is always a sense of helping out in communities for people who don't have as much, through thick and thin; you know, helping people more. And so I think just my whole identity with being Jewish has been that of a teacher.

She continues:

Who I am as a person is somebody who not only wants to have a little personal peaceful life, but I think that can only happen if we live in a peaceful community. Who I am cannot be separated from my community. I guess it gives me a sense of being active in creating a community in the world that embodies my values and my moral order. (Respondent 027)

One philanthropist explains what drives him to act to help his community:

I see myself as being generous, fair, honest, compassionate, loving, judicious. And all of the activities that I mentioned, are integrated with those value terms I just gave you. Those are my values. (Respondent 033)

A Hispanic businessman and food industry employer identifies with both his community and culture, and wants to help. He says:

Because I am Hispanic and given an opportunity to be on some of these different boards, I think I’m able to create a different awareness of either my area, or my community, or my race. So I kind of feel like I’m helping with change in that respect. (Respondent 043)

A social worker acts based on spiritual orientation and experience, and for him spirituality is a part of the basis of his identity:

I can’t imagine separating what I do from who I am in those ways because if I were to look at what causes this behavior I couldn’t look at it. I could say that this is contributed by my spiritual orientation, but it also contributes to my own spiritual experience. They are inseparable processes and to try to look at which one came first or which is more important doesn’t even make sense to me at this point. They are just a part of who I am with people. (Respondent 054)

A Humboldt County Minister working with youth and the homeless population shares his moral reasons for helping:

We are all living in this world together. I believe in that idea, that we are all sort of moving together toward whatever it is. It is not an individual matter of salvation. It is a corporate one, a community one. (Respondent 001)
A Priest working with the homeless population in the Sacramento area feels that the purpose of helping is to make the world a better place:

I think that the goal of being in solidarity with and supporting people who are on the outside and seeking a better life is a moral goal. And making the world a better place then I found it is a moral goal. (Respondent 025)

This female social worker defines her moral compass as one that stimulates positive social change, which works to create a society where everybody has basic human rights and freedoms. She states:

I guess it has to do with creating; being involved with activity that creates a society that respects self-determination and the rights of human beings, like live in their full capacity. Because in anti-violence work, basically the belief is that everybody has a right to be free, to walk free wherever they want, whenever they want, in their homes, outside of their homes, in every country, in every part of the world. So having that be the agenda creates a moral and just society because it respects each person's right to freedom. And that's a right that's important to the social order of our planet. It also engages individuals in that kind of societal change, although the path of doing eclectic work, or individual counseling is also public education and prevention. That then engages each person in their own moral inventory of how they act and behave with every other human being. So that is another way of showing it is a dynamic activity, because they do something in school, the kids have to engage in accounting for their own behavior, their fellow students' behavior, and we all have to do that with each other, as it engages society in a reflection of their own moral inventory. (Respondent 027)

Moral goals and identity include being honest and responsible for other human beings, as this food corporation owner and philanthropist states:

I guess I could say honesty is a moral goal. I think being a responsible human being is a moral goal. Other than the Ten Commandments...don’t lie, don’t cheat. (Respondent 043)

Some respondents did not feel that "goal" was an accurate word to use; rather, they just saw the opportunity to help and hoped some good came from it. As this social worker, professor, and counselor states:

I would see them as the moral output. I am uncomfortable with the word goals because I don’t know what else I could really do. My goal really is just to be present. The hope that I can, with my presence and the training that I’ve had to be helpful for people so that they can make the choices that will better their lives. You know, I have some expertise, but the outcome is to help people improve the lots of their lives. (Respondent 054)
The motivation for a doctor's work providing eye care in third world countries stems from the personal:

There are three women in my main life: my wife and my two daughters. All of them have pushed forward through my encouragement, through my sacrifice on their behalf; however you want to call it, I am an enabler on the beliefs of other people’s potential. And in many ways I have felt, you know you are not paying enough attention to your own development. You are helping other people, what about you? Why don’t you get a better job? Why don’t you get more recognition? Why don’t you have more income, etc, etc? And you always play second fiddle; you don’t play first fiddle. And I said, ‘Well, there’s truth in that, maybe I should sort of try to nurture my own capacities and focus on myself because now all three of these people are doing very well in life.’ Immediately, when I focused on that concept I was offered a wonderful position and it had to do with the fact of all the efforts that I made in my life on behalf of other people. It was like I knocked on a door and the door opened and I said, ‘Oh, my God.’ It is just like your life has a history that is written, and then you live it out. (Respondent 060)

It is immoral not to act on behalf of humanity, according to a clinical psychologist:

I guess working with the war-injured Vietnamese children would be more moral goals because I felt that it was immoral that they were left. I wouldn’t say it’s the same working with the dying; that just felt more like a compassionate response. It’s not like anything bad had happened to them. The one that I really feel was much more, and I’m not done yet, is the moral one of working with the torture survivors. I have such a sense that so few people know what is going on in terms of torture. They wouldn’t believe it, and they don’t want to believe it, and they don’t want to hear about it. Since I’m one of the few people who know about it, I feel an enormous moral responsibility to do something about it. I’m feeling stymied and dissatisfied with myself that I haven’t just totally given up my private practice and just gone out and tried to save the world in this regard. (Respondent 024)

A doctor who cares for the rural population in Humboldt County says that fairness and doing what is right is a moral issue:

You know, my parents say that there are stories about me from when I was little or that I would always say, ‘That's not fair.’ You know I’ve always been someone who's really concerned about fairness and doing what's right, since I was little. (Respondent 003)

A Native American educator maintains the importance of not forgetting who we are or where we come from:

When my dad went on and created a high school, I decided to go off to college because he worked so hard. And he told me: ‘Don’t bother to come home if you forget who you are. You know enough about the Indians, the ceremonies and everything like that. I want you to go out and learn about white people so that we will know how to live with them, not that I want you to change, but learn about them.’ (Respondent 044)
This internationally recognized martial arts instructor teaches young adults and at-risk youth to train their minds to think positively. He teaches that they can be better than who they were. His goal is to show them a better future:

I would say that working with any of these kids who don’t see options or opportunities before them, that’s the goal; to show them that you’re not stuck where you’re at. Your past doesn’t determine your future. Your own decisions do. I tell my students and the people I work with that the thoughts you think all day, they’re either pushing you forward, or they’re pulling you back; one or the other. And you basically have to pay attention to the thoughts you’re thinking. I tell them that when you wake up in the morning, the first thing Monday morning, and you’re saying to yourself, ‘I don’t want to get up; I’m tired; I don’t want to go to school.’ All you’re doing is setting yourself up. Whatever it is that you tell yourself in your mind, your mind is going to react to it. If you say to yourself, ‘Why am I so stupid?’, your brain will start giving you answers. But if you start saying to yourself, ‘Why am I so great? Why am I so smart?’ So what I tell them is when you wake up in the morning, you need to say, ‘Okay, what do I have to look forward to today? What do I have to achieve today?’ And I tell them to try to do two things every day towards whatever that goal is. And of course we go off into peer pressure and people that you hang out with, and on, and on. I’ve written booklets on this and it all has to do with going into basic human needs and what we need to feel that word, “successful.” (Respondent 039)

An activist/writer combines moral goals with social goals:

Yes, like I say, I think that the moral goals and the social goals are kind of the same in my mind. When people do better academically they are finding ways to apply their talents in the world, so even that can be a moral goal. When they feel a greater desire to serve, then the moral goal has been achieved, even if their skills don’t increase. (Respondent 056)

This woman has volunteered at a Battered Women’s Shelter for nearly 20 years, and intertwines the need of the community as part of her identity:

I think pretty much my identity is based on somebody who’s making a contribution to the community. This is where the dogmatic Marxism comes in. We (women) really did internalize being sort of a bamboo reed for the people, to quote Mao, to be a servant of the people, to not put your own needs first, but to work at all times and in all ways to create change. So I’ve learned that it’s okay to have some life; it’s okay to nourish myself and be energized, but also I think that there’s still that being compelled to create change instead of going my merry way like a lot of other people. (Respondent 053)
One Catholic Nun, who has worked on the apology to black communities in Kentucky, says:

We made commitments at the December 2000 celebration in which we said we would strive to do certain things in reference to ridding ourselves of racism, personally and communally, and then to look out on the broad world that we deal with to try to struggle against racism there too. (Respondent 066)

Another Nun said:

Our Convent has made thirteen corporate statements, beginning with opposition to the death penalty, and ending with opposition to economic sanctions against Iraq. That has been very important to be with a congregation willing to take risks on behalf of people, who are either on the fringes or economically disenfranchised. People must be willing to take risks, stand on principle and to be a voice for the voiceless. (Respondent 067)

A Catholic Priest thought:

People have the power to do good and be a tremendous influence for good and positive for other people. They also have the power to do a lot of harm. That is a choice everyone has to make and that lies in each one of us. (Respondent 063)

Self-Esteem

People with a strong sense of identity often help others in need. Seventy-three percent of moral exemplars and 81% of clergy felt that a strong sense of self-esteem and self-respect enhanced their ability to help others gain self-respect. Other studies also report that volunteers have high self-esteem, competence, an internal locus of control, and higher moral development (Staub 1978; Wilson and Pertruska 1984). Clary et al. (1992) finds that social values, career, understanding, and self-esteem may motivate volunteers. An artist we interviewed draws pictures of missing children to help find them and gains self-esteem as he sees his impact on the lives of others:

I believe again, when I look back at my own life, you know part of me has a huge ego and part of me has very little self-esteem and I juggle these two extremes, but I have realized in my life that I have been able to make a difference in the lives of a few thousand children and I have had a chance to be old enough now, at this ripe old age of thirty-five, to see some of them grow up and to have them confront me and tell me that I was able to change their life. (Respondent 057)
A long-time activist in helping minority groups get their contractors' license, as well as working to better the Jewish community, this man already had the self-confidence to help others:

First of all…I have self-confidence. I find that the most significant thing to me, aside from the love and solidarity of my family, is to be a constructive, even leadership person, in the community. That’s my idealism, my spiritualism, and what makes me glow, and gives me deep satisfaction. (Respondent 013)

Similarly, this social worker/teacher learned self-esteem early in her life from her mother and a teacher, and has been able to carry that with her to help others, often domestic violence victims. She says:

I got into drama when I was 14. I just loved theater. There was a drama teacher and he had a sense of purpose and told me, 'You could be a really good actor.' That was really great. That was some positive self-esteem building and development. (Respondent 053)

A lifelong volunteer in Central California gained self-esteem when he was volunteering. He says:

I’ve been through untold personal trials, and there’s no question in my mind that it’s educated me and made me a much stronger person, more self-confident. I was actually in many ways lacking self-confidence, so it certainly helped me with that. (Respondent 009)

As a martial arts instructor, this man radiates a positive outlook, and tries to offer this self-confidence to his at-risk students. He states:

A lot of it is visualizing what you want to be, and doing everything in your power to become that. To constantly see yourself as more than what you really feel you are, to be more. I just want to get as far as I can, no matter what that is – whether it's martial arts, or whatever. (Respondent 039)

A Catholic Priest comments on what has given him confidence and self-esteem. He says:

I found the strength to be able to cope with adversity in life. It is essential for young people be able to find anchors to hold onto. (Respondent 065)

Another Catholic Priest explains what gives him a sense of self and self-esteem:

I think in our day and age there seems to be an epidemic of depression, or a sense of fear about the future. People need the affirmation that they have some control over their lives and their destiny. They are not just at the whims of the ups and downs of the stock market, and those kinds of things, there is more to life than just driving SUV's and having all of the toys. They should find some kind of self worth other than material things. (Respondent 081)
A Catholic Nun explains:

It is important to appreciate of our gifts, to be happy, to be unique, and to appreciate the people around us. (Respondent 066)

To be continued in the next issue.

Footnotes:


In his 1965 Presidential Address to the American Sociological Association Pitirim A. Sorokin evaluated the state of the discipline. In so doing, he elaborated an important vision of how sociology could progress as a science. This vision of future growth included the prediction that sociology would replace an emphasis on the study of social pathologies with a more balanced approach. Equal attention would be given to positive sociocultural phenomena, such as creativity and altruism (Sorokin 1965:834-835,838).

A previous more detailed elaboration of this focus of scientific activity on the positive, or good, included a number of topics such as: increasing social harmony by discovering new resources for satisfying vital mental, moral and sociocultural needs, thereby alleviating the struggle for subsidence as a source of conflict; gathering and disseminating scientific evidence demonstrating the negative effects of crime and war as a means of reducing their occurrence; logically and empirically elaborating and substantiating the characteristics of a system of culture that would provide for the solidarity and unity of all human beings; investigating the nature of altruistic love and the techniques of altruistic transformation of individuals, institutions, and culture; developing deeper and more extensive knowledge of human nature, institutions, and culture that can serve as a basis for more effectively meeting basic human needs; providing scientific knowledge of which specific techniques of altruistic transformation are most effective for given individuals and situations; and increasing knowledge of how the adequacy of love, in terms of the effectiveness of actions intended to benefit others, can be improved. This reorientation of sociology toward the study of the positive would enable the discipline to generate knowledge and understanding that could contribute significantly to the general social welfare (Sorokin 1954:473-480).

This change in emphasis toward studying the positive, or good, has already taken place in psychology. After World War II the science of psychology focused on pathologies and ways of healing them. However, in recent years an intellectual movement espousing the study of human strengths, goodness, and flourishing has established a viable tradition referred to as "positive psychology" (Snyder and Lopez 2005). The aim of the positive psychology movement has been to correct the previous imbalance by studying positive human traits, and how they may function as preventives against pathologies. This "refocusing of scientific energy" has led to the study of phenomena such as love, forgiveness, the virtues, and human competency (Seligman 2005:8).

THE NATURE OF GOOD

At the highest level of value generalization Sorokin identifies goodness, along with truth and beauty, as the "supreme" values. In his view "the main historical mission of mankind consists in an unbounded creation, accumulation, refinement, and actualization" of these values (Sorokin 1957:184). Wendell Bell (2009:95-96) has characterized a "Sociology of the Good" as one focused on the investigation of values that appear to be universal, and an assessment of their beneficial effects.

Formulating a conception of the nature of the good, and the variety of its particular manifestations, requires a dialogue that would take place continuously within the discipline of sociology. This exploration of the nature of goodness is an important task of critical sociology in Burawoy's (2005) holistic model of the discipline.

A general orientation adequate for this article is that "good" means the perfection of those beneficial properties that are proper to the essential nature of a given entity. The highest range of good is thus the fullest possible actualization of all positive potentials (Aquinas 1981:663; 1993:4,41). The specific qualities of goodness thus differ according to the nature and potentials of the particular entity under consideration.
THE TRIADIC MATRIX AND THE STUDY OF THE GOOD

The substantive concerns of the scientific study of the good are inevitably shaped by the disciplinary context in which they are formulated. In sociology, the basic conceptual frame of reference of culture, society, and personality provides the most general context for formulating ideas regarding the nature of the good and its particular manifestations. Thus the nature of the good in the human person is of necessity different than it is in society or culture, since each are distinct entities with different properties and processes.

Sorokin explicitly proclaimed the concepts of culture, society, and personality as the basic frame of reference of sociology (1947:63-64, 1966:636-637). Parsons later located them in an interdisciplinary framework (1961; Parsons and Shils 1951). These foundational ideas were developed in the writings of the classical theorists (Parsons 1968).

Essential and universal components of the reality that is the subject matter of sociological analysis are identified by these concepts. Indeed, no single component can exist without the others. Therefore, to achieve the most complete and comprehensive sociological analysis, each component of the "triadic matrix" must be referred to the others (Sorokin 1947:64).

Each of these general concepts signify aspects of reality that include numerous, varied, and distinct phenomena. Accordingly, different concepts are necessary to identify and analyze specific phenomena within the abstract domain of each of these three general concepts. Similarly, different conceptions of the good are necessary depending on the particular focus of study.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE GOOD: ALTERNATIVE FORMULATIONS

The idea of the sociology of the good thus entails different sociological phenomena at different levels of analysis. Recent examples of phenomena viewed as positive or good include: generosity (Science of Generosity 2010); unlimited love (Post 2003); virtue (Jeffries 1999; Levine 1995; Smith 2010); human rights (Blau and Moncada 2005; Howard-Hassmann 2009); individual and intergroup forgiveness (Oliner 2009); global altruism (Tiryakian 2009); and universalizing solidarity (Alexander 2006).

Ideas of the good can be placed within a broad and integrated theoretical and research framework. In this systemic context, multiple conceptions of the good serve as fundamental organizing ideas at different levels of analysis. The works of Pitirim Sorokin and Eric Olin Wright provide examples of such systemic sociologies of the good.

Pitirim Sorokin specifies the nature of goodness at both the personality and sociocultural levels of analysis (Jeffries 2005: 72-76). His foundational premise is the beneficial nature of altruistic love. At the level of personality, this form of love is a curative, life-giving, integrative, and creative power in the lives of individuals. This love entails unselfishness, sacrifice, cooperation, and giving of self for the welfare of others. It is inseparably linked with the idea of the goodness of individuals (Sorokin 1954:47-79).

At the level of interaction, altruistic love is manifested in some instances of solidary interaction (Sorokin, 1954:13). In this form of interaction the intentions and behavior of the interacting parties concur and facilitate the realization of their objectives (Sorokin 1947:93-99). Solidarity can vary in intensity and extention. Only the more intensive and extensive solidary interactions manifest the characteristics of altruistic love.

At the more complex and sociocultural level of social relationships, the ideal type of familistic social relationships most closely parallels the characteristics of altruistic love as they are manifested in interactional patterns and normative and value systems (Sorokin 1947:99-102, 109-110). Familistic social relationships are characterized by a strong sense of unity, a willingness to sacrifice self to benefit others, and a normative system stipulating an unlimited ethical motivation toward providing for the needs of the group and each of its individual members. In purest form, these social relationships are most often found in harmonious families, although they can also predominate in various other groups, such as close friends, religious organizations, or military units. Conversely, many families seldom or rarely manifest familistic social relationships in their culture or interaction.

Altruism, solidarity interactions, and familistic social relationships are sustained by a culture in which
the ethical and normative systems emphasize cooperation, helping, and mutual aid (Sorokin 1947:119-144). When these norms are universal, they are generally effective in controlling behavior (Sorokin 1998:284-285).

The study of the good in Sorokin thus focuses on creative and unselfish love. As a sociological variable it is identified as altruistic love at the level of individual personality and as solidarity and familial relations at the sociocultural level. The normative system of culture is universal, effective, and supportive. This conception of the good is the foundation of a detailed program of altruistic transformation (Sorokin 1954), sociocultural reconstruction (Sorokin 1941, 1948), and the reorientation and restructuring of the exercise of power in societies (Sorokin and Lunden 1959).

Another perspective on the sociology of the good is provided by Erik Olin Wright’s (2010) model of emancipatory social science. The fundamental premise of this model is that the search for scientific knowledge has a moral purpose: eliminating oppression and creating conditions for human flourishing (Wright 2010:10). The good to be sought is identified as justice, entailing two forms, social and political. In social justice, access is available for the means necessary for human flourishing, viewed as the development of the various and different talents and capacities of individuals. In political justice, people have access to the means to participate in decisions that affect their lives, both as separate persons and collectively.

This idea of good in terms of the lives of individuals provides the basis for evaluating and potentially changing structures and institutions. Changes at this sociocultural level are necessary to achieve greater justice. Foremost in this regard is the development of economic structures based on democratic socialism. Such a transition requires that power be derived from voluntary associations located in a developed civil society. Democratic socialism is posed as an alternative to capitalistic economic systems, in which private ownership of the means of production is the source of power.

The realization of the normative purpose of sociology is achieved through a model of practice entailing three basic tasks. The first task, diagnosis and critique, assesses the degree to which existing structures and institutions harm individuals, and seeks to identify the relevant causal mechanisms. The second task of sociological analysis is the proposal of alternative structures and institutions that would more adequately provide for the conditions necessary for the stipulated good of the forms of justice. The final task is the exploration of the problematics of transformation and formulation of strategies and tactics to achieve movement toward sociocultural conditions conducive to greater social and political justice (Wright 2010:11-29).

Each of these theorists formulates multiple conceptions of the good that are located at different levels of analysis. Each also provides a program for reaching the stipulated goods. Yet the two systems of sociology and their focus are distinctive and different. A sociology of the good thus transcends any particular theoretical approach or particular conception of the good. What is common is a clearly articulated vision of the good and a theoretical and research agenda that can provide for the participation of sociology in providing vital knowledge and understanding to the general society.

ON THE CONCEPT OF VIRTUE

In exploring the nature of the sociology of the good this article focuses on the concept of virtue. In contemporary writings, the virtues are typically defined as personality traits that provide impetus to judgments, choices, and behavior. The virtues entail dispositions and behaviors that are manifestations of human excellence and flourishing of various types (Peterson and Seligman 2004:87).

The idea of virtue represents one of the oldest and most persistent ideas in the history of speculative thinking (MacIntyre 1984; Pieper 1966). From a historical perspective, analysis of the nature and effects of the virtues dates to Classical Greek and Roman philosophy, and to early Judaism and Christianity. The identity and nature of the virtues was explored further during the Middle Ages. Foundational schemes of the virtues such as those of Aristotle (1941:928-1112) and Aquinas (1981:817-894,1263-1879) focus attention on fundamental and continually recurring aspects of human motivation and behavior. The latter part of the twentieth century was characterized by a widespread and pronounced revitalization of interest in virtue ethics, which persists to this time (Smith 2010:385). Studies of the virtues have become an ongoing research topic in psy-
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Traditionally, virtues have been viewed as representing human goodness and as the criterion of greater perfection (MacIntyre 1084; Pieper 1966). Since virtue is a disposition that is directed toward the good, it is consistent with the true nature of human beings (Aquinas 1981:897). As acts, virtues are choices that can become operative habits with repetition. As such, they increase the goodness of the individual and contribute to the perfection of various positive potentialities of human nature (Aquinas 1981:819-827).

The writings of Aquinas (1981:817-894,1263-1879) present a comprehensive and logically systematic scheme of the virtues. In this scheme a distinction is made between "primary", or basic, virtues and "secondary" virtues. A secondary virtue is a "part" of a given primary virtue. This is the case because secondary virtues represent a more specific application of the essential characteristic of the primary virtue of which they are a part. Based on Aquinas' writings, five primary virtues are: temperance, fortitude, justice, charity, and prudence (Jeffries 1998, 2000). This scheme identifies a full spectrum of attitudes and behaviors that are inherent to human beings and to social interaction. The five primary virtues are defined, along with some of their attendant secondary virtues.

Temperance. The essence of temperance is restraint, moderation, and discipline with respect to the appetites, passions, and the desire for pleasure (Aquinas 1981:1757-1879). This foundational characteristic can be manifested in a number of more specific orientations. The secondary virtue of meekness is the exercise of restraint and discipline in the moderation, control, and positive use of the passion of anger. Another secondary virtue, humility, is an objective recognition of one's own limitations and failings, and a complementary recognition and deference to the good qualities of others. Sobriety and chastity are also parts of temperance.

Fortitude. The criterion of fortitude is steadfastness in pursuing the good in spite of difficulty, adversity, opposition, or danger (Aquinas 1981:1699-1755). Patience and perseverance are parts of fortitude. Patience involves persistence in seeking the good despite sorrows, especially the sorrows brought about by the actions of others. Perseverance pertains to the bearing of difficulties in pursuit of the good over a long period of time.

Justice. Rendering to others their basic rights, or dues, is the fundamental characteristic of justice (Aquinas 1981:1423-1698). This virtue includes both fairness, according to some kind of equality, and the effort to fulfill responsibilities to others. In this general sense, justice gives recognition to the rights of others. Friendliness, gratitude, and truthfulness are secondary parts of justice.

Charity. The essence of the virtue of charity is the love of benevolence, in which good is wished to another (Aquinas 1981:1263-1305). This virtue includes a variety of acts intended to do good to another. Appropriately meeting the needs of others, correcting them when necessary, forgiving them, and tolerating their faults and imperfections, are all manifestations of charity. Charity goes beyond the obligation of justice in that it entails benefitting others irrespective of their merit (Kohlberg 1981:311-372).

Prudence. Prudence is an intellectual virtue (Aquinas 1981:817-894,1263-1879. See also Pieper 1966:3-40; Selznick: 60-61). The other primary and secondary virtues define what is good. Prudence entails the use of reason and objectivity to choose the most suitable means to realize the good. The exercise of prudence thus perfects the ability to make right choices. Secondary parts of this virtue are docility, an openess to the viewpoints of others, and solicitude, a watchfulness and alertness in seeking to realize the good.

The virtues are attributes of the personality and behavior of individuals, yet they are inevitably implicated in varying degrees in the countless sequences of interaction that constitute group life. They are both independent and dependent variables: they influence the quality and direction of interaction, and are also formed partly through that interaction. Two substantive areas in which the concept of virtue has great analytical potential are the study of love and the study of morality.

Benevolent Love and the Concept of Virtue

Love is multidimensional. On the basis of his comprehensive study of the history of ideas about the
nature of love, Singer (1984:33-38; 1987:157-158) characterizes two basic forms of love, "appraisal" and "bestowal." Despite differences in terminology and emphasis, conceptions of the nature of love, ranging from Plato to contemporary writings, fall somewhere on a continuum between these two ideal types. Though analytically distinct, both forms of love are present in varying degrees in the psyche of individuals and in social interaction (Rubin 1973:214; Jeffries 2002; Singer 1987:389-406).

Appraisal is a love based on self-gratification. The utility of the other for the satisfaction of one's desires, appetites, and needs is of primary concern (Singer 1987:390-396). In contrast, bestowal is a love in which the general well-being of the other is of primary concern. The other is accepted as he or she is, with faults and failings. Benevolence is a necessary condition for bestowal, and is manifested in caring for the interests and welfare of the other, respect of individuality, protection of the other, and self-sacrifice (Singer 1984a:5-11; 1987:392-396). This same basic distinction between receiving and giving love is evident in both contemporary theories of love and in empirical research (Jeffries 1993).

Bestowal has traditionally been identified as benevolent love. This form of love is the focus of this article. Benevolence is the love considered by Aristotle (1941:1058-1102) in his analysis of true friendship, and by Aquinas (1981:1263-1335) in his analysis of charity. The concept of benevolent love is also generally comparable to various definitions of altruism in the interdisciplinary field of prosocial and altruistic behavior (Jeffries 1998).

The essential nature of benevolent love is that good is wished to the other, and appropriately manifested in behavior intended to benefit the other in some manner. Such a general idea obviously has many different and more specific manifestations, both psychological and behavioral. What is beneficial to the other can vary widely in content, and also according to both time and situational context (Jeffries 1998, 2000). A deeper understanding of the nature of benevolent love and its empirical referents thus requires an enumeration of its component parts.

One perspective through which this problem can be approached is to consider that the foundational components of benevolent love are the virtues. In personality theory, the virtues can be viewed as schemas. As such they are psychic structures that involve particular ways of thinking and acting, and are a basis for understanding and evaluating. They are stored in memory, exist at both unconscious and conscious levels, and can be activated by psychic or social sources (Brewer and Nakamura 1984).

Because of its content as an idea, each virtue provides for a particular way of benefitting the other. Each virtue can be regarded as both initiating and maintaining behaviors in response to the particular nature of the need of the other and the situational context.

Temperance, along with its various manifestations of self-control in related secondary virtues, limits behavior that is often contradictory to love. It further provides the discipline and stability necessary for giving to another in a consistent manner. Without temperance it is difficult for the other virtues to develop and be established as consistent habits.

Fortitude is relevant to a love in which the good of the other is sought because benefitting another is by its very nature a sustained activity that inevitably involves some degree of difficulty, hardship, and occasionally danger. Fortitude enables benevolent love to remain viable under such circumstances.

Justice provides for fulfilling basic responsibilities that are frequently an integral part of loving another. Justice requires a fundamental good will and fairness that is particularly important in situations of dealing with individual and group differences, and in relation to out-groups.

Manifestations of charity such as meeting needs, forgiving, giving counsel, and correction are necessary to do good to others under given circumstances. Such actions are often considered as representing the essence of love.

Prudence is the rational element necessary to make the best decisions about how to manifest the intent to love another, or to give love in a particular instance. Making the right choices of how best to benefit others is the foundation of an adequate practice of love (Sorokin 1954:17-19).

In summary, the love of benevolence is the attempt to benefit another person through caring, giving, and
in some instances sacrificing of self. Each virtue makes a particular contribution to the ability of the individual to consistently practice benevolent love in his or her relations with others. The relevance of particular virtues varies according to the situation. For example, at one time this love will call for the practice of justice; another time it will call for the exercise of fortitude, and so forth. The full and consistent expression of the love of benevolence requires the manifestation of all the virtues (Jeffries 1998, 2000).

The idea of benevolent love as virtue has the potential to make important contributions to understanding sociological phenomena. It specifies different dispositions and manifestations of seeking to do good to the other. In so doing, it opens new perspectives for the study of the structure and dynamics of interaction and intergroup relations in a variety of contexts. Except for the framework provided by the analysis of altruism and prosocial behavior, sociologists have failed to develop and apply a generalized concept of love that entails seeking the welfare of the other. For example, Bahr and Bahr (2001) note that self-sacrifice as a giving of self for the other is a basic part of both family life and social life generally. Yet a concept of sacrificial love is virtually absent from family theory, an area where it is obviously relevant.

Morality and the Concept of Virtue

The ideas of Emile Durkheim are foundational in the sociological study of morality. There are interesting parallels between Durkheim's (1953, 1961) concept of morality and its components and the virtues.

Morality is a system of rules that directs and determines conduct in a variety of situations (Durkheim 1961:24). Two aspects of these rules are essential. First, morality entails the idea of duty. Second, morality is also "a morality of the good, since it assigns to human activity an end that is good" (Durkheim 1961:122). Understanding the elements of morality does not involve "a complete listing of all the virtues, or even the most important" (Durkheim 1961:21), but rather a consideration of the fundamental mental dispositions that are the foundations of moral life. There are three: discipline, attachment to social groups, and autonomy, or self-determination (Durkheim 1961).

Discipline is the foundational element of morality (Durkheim 1961:17-63). It promotes regularity in conduct by limiting and constraining. It involves restricting inclinations, suppressing appetites, moderating tendencies, and exercising self-control. Discipline involves subjecting passions, desires, and habits "to law" and developing "self-mastery" (Durkheim 1961:46). Discipline "gives the unity and continuity" that are the "essential preconditions of personality" (Durkheim 1961:46). The practice of discipline teaches the individual that conduct should follow enduring principles that are ordered to determinate goals.

Attachment to groups is the second component of morality (Durkheim 1961:55-94). Morality involves goals that go beyond individual interests to the pursuit of impersonal ends. Their object is society, in terms of the collective interest. These "general interests of humanity" include "an access to justice," a correspondence between merit and conditions of life, and "preventing individual suffering" (Durkheim 1961:77). Charity is an interest in the welfare of others on a "person to person" basis (Durkheim 1961:82). Charity at this level has only "a secondar y and subordinate place in the system of moral behavior" (Durkheim 1961:83). However it "has moral value . . . because it points to a moral propensity to sacrifice, to go beyond one's self, to go beyond the circle of self-interest" (Durkheim 1961:83). Collective action that is concentrated and organized is necessary to affect society and remedy social evils. Therefore, "genuinely moral ends" are collective and involve attachment to groups, which are the "truly moral force" (Durkheim 1961:82). Morality involves identification with all groups, but the nation has "pre-eminence" (Durkheim 1961:80). Collective action in groups "takes on a higher moral character precisely because it serves more impersonal, more general ends" (Durkheim 1961:84).

The third element of morality is autonomy, or self-determination. It is constituted especially by the application of reason as a part of morality. Autonomy involves individuals deliberating and choosing in the formulation of moral principles. Morality thus entails "an enlightened assent" to a moral code because "we deem it good" (Durkheim 1961:120, 115). Adherence to a moral order is ideally based on knowledge of the "nature of things" (Durkheim 1961:116-117). Assessing the extent to which the existing moral order conforms to this reality, rather than being pathological, is an aspect of the exercise of autonomy. Morality involves a reasoned
and free choice in view of this knowledge. These aspects of autonomy are also exercised in the necessity of individual initiative in applying moral rules in particular situations (Durkheim 1961:21).

There are clear parallels between the five virtues emphasized in this article and Durkheim's three elements of morality. The primary virtue of temperance is essentially similar to the concept of discipline. The virtue of fortitude appears to be implied in Durkheim's mention of attributes of discipline such as effort, enduring goals, and self-mastery as ongoing dispositions of the moral life. Firmness in facing difficulties and hardships, the essence of fortitude, seems an inevitable requirement in developing and maintaining these dispositions over time.

Justice and charity are both explicitly mentioned by Durkheim as aspects of the second element of morality, attachment to groups. His ambivalence toward charity is focused on levels of analysis. Higher moral value is given to group activity. Yet, it appears the spirit of self-sacrifice and concern for the welfare of others characteristic of charity are still motivational forces giving impetus to individuals' involvement in collective action at meso or macro levels.

The emphasis Durkheim places on rational deliberation and individual choice in morality are similar to the essence of the virtue of prudence. Prudence is the operation of reason in making the best choices consistent with morality. Traditional ideas of this virtue emphasize reason, deliberation, objectivity, and openness to the ideas of others in making moral choices. In this sense prudence orders and commands the other virtues (Pieper 1966:3-40). The capacity to choose is a fundamental aspect of human nature that is inherently involved in moral development (Selznick 1992:148-182). Traditional ideas of the virtue of prudence thus closely parallel Durkheim's analysis of autonomy/self determination and its functions in the moral life.

Durkheim's analysis of morality is focused at the level of "fundamental" and "general dispositions" that are "at the root of the moral life" and "adapt themselves readily to the particular circumstances of human life" (Durkheim 1961:21). These dispositions are contrasted to the virtues, which are regarded by Durkheim (1961:21) as more specific and numerous. How the virtues fit into this more general scheme indicates the correspondence of the traditional virtues of temperance, fortitude, justice, charity, and prudence with Durkheim's formulation. The correspondence is high, ranging from similarity in the case of temperance and prudence, to recognition as components in the case of justice and charity, to implied presence in the case of fortitude. The idea that duty and good are foundational aspects of morality is common to both Durkheim's analysis and to conceptions of virtue. It is therefore reasonable to assume that traditional schemes of the virtues influenced Durkheim's views of the nature and components of morality, probably to a considerable degree. On this basis the sociological study of the virtues as a moral code can be viewed as a continuation and elaboration of Durkheim's foundational work.

Moral universals. The existence of "moral universals" in the form of general values or principles is supported by the analysis of cultures (Bell 1997:171-227; Selznick 1992:96-98). Though they may be expressed in specific rules and practices which differ in different societies, the "universals show that human societies are everywhere much the same in their appreciation of basic morality" (Selznick, 1992: 96). This basic morality emerges from three sources: human nature, requirements of group life, and limited alternatives (Selznick 1992:97-98).

The idea of morality depends on some theory of the good (Selznick 1992:98). For example, Selznick (1992:33) proposes a "certain kind of well being" that involves "the enhancement of fellowship" as the general criteria of the good. Both the integrity of the individual, and the interests of others deriving from the social nature of human existence, are encompassed in this conception of the good. It is manifested through the virtues. In this fundamental sense the virtues entail what is good in the character of human beings (Selznick 1992:32-35,148-151; Smith 2010:384-433).

A similar dual emphasis on social and individual good can be observed in the moral codes of the world religions. Starting at the most abstract level, all major world religions emphasize "the moral ideal of generous goodwill, love, compassion epitomized in the Golden Rule"(Hick 1989:316; see also Catoir 1992; Hunt, Crotty, and Crotty 1991). This doing good to others is accompanied in major religious traditions by the norm of effort toward personal transformation toward greater goodness (Hick 1989:36-55). The virtues can be re-
regarded as enumerating a comprehensive scheme of this positive form of the Golden Rule (Jeffries 1999). The virtues also express and enumerate classical philosophical conceptions of morality (Levine 1995:105-120).

Research by Peterson and Seligman (2004: 3-52) provides evidence of moral universals in beliefs about the identity of human strengths and virtues. A historical and cross-cultural literature search in the realms of philosophy, religion, politics, and education was conducted. The focus was to look for uniformities regarding notions of an exemplary life or person. Traditions of three areas were examined: China, including Confucian and Taoist virtues; South Asia, including Buddhist and Hindu virtues; and the West, including Athenian, Judeo-Christian, and Islamic virtues.

On the basis of this survey of influential religious and philosophical traditions, six "core virtues" that are universally valued by moral philosophers and thinkers in different historical periods and cultures are identified: courage, justice, humanity, temperance, transcendence, and wisdom (Peterson and Seligman 2004:33-52). Though there are some differences in terminology, these virtues are comparable to the virtues of Aquinas presented in this article (Peterson and Seligman 2004:47-48).

Normative culture, individual morality, and the virtues. The normative culture of a group defines the appropriate modes of conduct for its members. It specifies rights and duties, and the relations of group members to each other in a variety of situations. It also specifies relations toward those outside the group. Two types of norms are most important, law-norms and moral norms. The former are considered obligatory, the latter are urged or recommended, but not required. For the individual, group norms are the primary guide to conduct. They can, and often do, become convictions that provide normative and emotional motivation. Particular norms may vary, being obligatory in some groups, or to some individuals, and recommended in other cases (Sorokin 1947:70-85).

The virtues can serve to specify the content of the good, and of obligation, and thus of morality (Jeffries 1999). In fact, there is a long history of this usage, both with respect to cultural moral codes and individual morality (MacIntyre 1984; Peterson and Seligman 2004). In most instances, the virtues have been regarded as moral norms, and thus recommended but not required. In other instances, they have been considered obligatory.

The study of morality is far more comprehensive than that of the virtues. Other moral codes of the good have been important in the traditions of philosophy and of the world religions. In some instances, behavior that directly contradicts traditional conceptions of the good, such as the virtues, has been defined as desirable and good (Alexander 2001:170-172). In other instances the virtues have been embedded in more basic codes and assumptions that severely limit their application or contradict their basic meaning (Ferrara 2001). All of these variations are basic topics in the study of morality. The universe of moral codes needs to be described, its content needs to be categorized, and the causes and effects of different moralities need to be investigated. The study of the traditional virtues is an important part of this broader framework.

CONCLUSION

The concept of virtue has potentially great importance for sociology for a number of reasons. First, the virtues are a basic potential of all human beings. In this sense they are a universal attribute of personality, though actualization can vary over a wide range in the degree of its development (Krebs and Van Hesteren 1992; Sorokin 1954). Second, the virtues entail a multidimensional manner of relating to others, as enumerated in a general sense in the primary virtues. They are thus inherently involved in a considerable amount of the basic process of social interaction as it takes place through space and time and in different social situations. Third, the broad range of behaviors included in the virtues is potentially relevant to interaction in many different kinds of groups, ranging from families, to formal organizations, to global society. Fourth, the degree and configuration of the virtues manifested in interaction can be regarded as both cause and effect of some of the characteristics of groups and institutions. Fifth, the virtues can be linked to historical and worldwide traditions of the good, providing additional relevance to both policy and public sociologies based on knowledge and understanding of the virtues.
The study of the virtues can be placed in a broader approach to sociological research and theoretical development in which the virtues serve as a normative standard of good. In his description and analysis of the "Hellenic Tradition" Donald Levine (1995:120) maintains there is something "deeply attractive in Aristotle's vision of the good society and the kind of social science needed to promote it." This vision rests on the assumption that human nature is goal-directed toward perfection, which is reached through acquiring the habits of virtue. This is accomplished through the mechanism of human choice, directed by the use of reason, and by social environments that encourage the development of the virtues. The envisioned social sciences would study the general properties of human action, and those specific to various domains. In these different investigative contexts the "object would be one and the same: to arrive at prescriptive suggestions for ways to socialize . . . into optimal moral habits and reflective competences" (Levine 1995:120). The social sciences would also be focused on how to structure the relations between the parts of society to "achieve survival, justice, and the optimal achievement of its purposes"(Levine 1995:120).

A recent work by Christian Smith (2010:384-433) also examines the virtues as subject and as normative standard of evaluation. A normative understanding of both individuals and society can be formed in reference to the virtues. The good for human persons is to flourish by "achieving the essential nature of their true human personhood as fully as possible" (Smith 2010:400). The dispositions and habits that exemplify the good in human nature are the virtues (Smith 2010:402). Concern for the flourishing of others and "selflessness" are an integral part of the morality of the virtues (Smith 2010:406-408). The social good of societies is to "facilitate and foster through its institutions and structures" this good of human nature (Smith 2010:386). Societies that do this can be considered as good, those that do not as bad.

In summary, the idea of virtue can make an important contribution to sociological analysis. It can be incorporated into sociological traditions both as subject of study, and as normative standard of the good. As a subject of study, the virtues can be used as an enumeration of the components of benevolent love, in which the object is the welfare of the other. Viewed as a moral code, the study of the virtues parallels the Durkheimian tradition of the components of morality, and includes philosophical and religious traditions that can be regarded as universal. As a normative standard for sociological analysis, the virtues exemplify centuries of worldwide traditions regarding the greater perfection and good of human nature and of individuals. The concept of virtue can thus contribute to the moral purpose of the practice of sociology.

The principal theme of this article is a consideration of the nature and potentials of a sociology of the good. The study of the virtues is only one approach within this more inclusive, diverse, and comprehensive perspective. The study of the good transcends particular theoretical and research traditions. It also transcends particular conceptions of the good. Examples of variations in underlying theoretical traditions, and in the identification of the good at different levels of analysis, are illustrated by the systems of sociology of Pitirim A. Sorokin and of Erik Olin Wright. A systematic consideration of the nature and variable forms of the good, its locations in the sociological universe, and its causes and effects would add greatly to the theoretical and research scope of sociology as a science. It would supplement the analysis of problems with the analysis of the positive, desirable, and good. This study of the good would produce knowledge and understandings directly relevant to the betterment of the general society. This article can be viewed as an invitation to further explore the characteristics, functions, and potential contributions of a comprehensive and developed sociological study of the good.

REFERENCES


