I begin this “Notes from the Chair” essay with the famous passage from Book VII of Plato’s Republic, the passage in which Socrates describes the condition of humanity as comparable to men chained in a cave: “Picture men living in a cave which has a wide mouth open towards the light. They are kept in the same places, looking forward only away from the mouth of the cave and unable to turn their heads, for their legs and necks have been fixed in chains from birth. A fire is burning higher up at their backs, and between it and the prisoners there is a road with a low wall built at its side, like the screen over which puppet players put up their puppets…See again then, men walking under cover of this low wall carrying past all sorts of things, copies of men and animals, in stone or wood and other materials; some of them may be talking and others not…They see nothing of themselves but their own shadows, or one another’s which the fire throws on the wall of the cave.” (Plato, 123)

Plato introduces this parable of the cave in the context of a general philosophical argument about the relationship between perceptions, sensations and the knowledge of Forms (Forms, in this rendering, being eternal and transcendent). Alternatively, I would like to draw attention to the variety of forms (small f) and media that fill the scene in the cave – puppets, stone and wood copies (perhaps sculptures) of men and animals, speech, and shadows. For already here, even while still in a state of imprisonment and immobility, humans are flooded with an astounding variety of sights and sounds, even as their awareness is dim and one-dimensional. Somewhat orthogonal to the Platonic project of gaining knowledge of Forms, then, we might ask what it means to have a true knowledge of forms (small f) – in all of their specificities.

I want to follow the diverse pathways of the presentational and representational forms that suffuse our social worlds, however constrained or deluded our perceptions may be, to suggest that we sociologists can theorize with and through forms. This project takes seriously Ernst Cassirer’s and Suzanne Langer’s understandings of human beings as fundamentally symbol-making animals. It also takes seriously Georg Simmel’s quest to identify and characterize the lineaments of social forms – from the dyad to the Stranger. It is undeniable that we perceive and shape the world with and through the forms and images of it that we absorb. How might this ramify in sociological theorizing generally?

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We immediately encounter the representational aspects of forms. And different forms have diverse capacities of presentation and representation. Pictures seen in their entirety at a glance can prompt perceptions of simultaneity (even as the relations between a picture’s parts and whole expand for the viewer over time); narrative forms are existentially implicated in diachrony and causality (even though contiguity does not logically entail causality). Spatial extension and location, temporal duration, dimensionality – all of these are featured and activated differently in different forms. Some forms oscillate or vibrate in their representational capacities. What kinds of representations are brain images, for example? There is considerable disagreement among neuro-psychologists, for example about whether brain images represent structures, entities or processes (or some combination).

Pushing beyond representation, the literary and visual theorist W.J.T. Mitchell suggests ways that pictures and images can actually engage in acts of self-theorizing. He identifies three distinct ways they may do so: “ 1) pictures that explicitly reflect on, or “double” themselves, e.g. the mise en abime of the Quaker Oats box; 2) the picture that contains another picture of a different kind, and thus re-frames or recontextualizes the inner picture as “nested” inside of a larger, outer picture [for an example of this see the cover of my book, The Moro Morality Play: Terrorism as Social Drama, where the photograph of Aldo Moro, held in captivity by the Red Brigades has him holding a copy of La Repubblica, a daily newspaper with the headline, “Moro Assassinated?” Here the “inner picture” of the newspaper is reframed by the living Moro holding it in his hands]; 3) the discursively framed picture, a picture that is used to reflect on the nature of pictures, e.g. Las Meninas.” (W.J.T. Mitchell, 3) Mitchell articulates how pictures operate theoretically on their own terms, how they theorize identity, reflexivity, authority, and representation. The key insight is that these forms are specific and their theorizing mechanisms and capacities are specified.

How can this kind of specification of ontological and epistemological capacities of forms (in Mitchell’s analysis, pictures) be useful to sociologists in their theorizing? My answer is – it already has been. Scholars such as Jeffrey Alexander, Karin Knorr Cetina, Terrence McDonnell, Chandra Mukerji, Kim Lane Schepppele, William Sewell, Jr., Iddo Tavor and Ann Swidler, Eviatar Zerubavel, and Genevieve Zubrzycki have all developed analyses of forms that highlight their individual capacities to represent and signify, to reflect on their particular availabilities for deployment in political and social projects, and to theorize with and through them. There are certainly some continuities in these analyses with the assumptions and perspectives of Actor Network Theory. Nevertheless, I am most interested in the ways sociologists theorize via the recognition and identification of the very forms that carry forward social projects and their meanings.

Some of the forms take shape as material features of social and economic life – gardens and canals in absolutist France (Mukerji), condoms (Tavor and Swidler; McDonnell) in contemporary Africa, ticker tape machines and, later, computer screens in global financial markets (Cetina). Some forms are more explicitly and self-consciously sacred and legal in their symbolism – the Holy Crown of St. Stephen in Hungary (Lane Schepppele), St John the Baptist statues in French Canadian parades (Zubrzycki), and genealogical maps and family trees (Zerubavel). Some forms evoke both aesthetic and moral dimensions – icons (Alexander). And other forms are overtly political in their resonance and consequence – protests and revolutions (Sewell) and standoffs and surrenders (Wagner-Pacifi 2000, 2005).

In each of these scholars’ work rigorous questions are raised about the nature of the forms at play. What worlds can the forms articulate and constitute? What processes (political, cultural, institutional) pull them into the foreground or push them into the background? How do they manage and express time (past, present and future; speed; duration; continuity and discontinuity), space (proximity and distance; extension; localization; mobility and immobility), causality, boundaries, interaction and relatedness, law, and historical events? Are they available for circulation and, if so, in what ways?
History of Sociology as Sociology’s Collective Working Memory:
An Invitation to the Theory Section

Laura Ford, Cornell University

On August 10, 2013, the ASA History of Sociology Section and The New School for Social Research hosted a Symposium for Junior Scholars. Ambitiously inviting participants to “re-envision” the history of sociology, Michael Bare (University of Chicago) and I sought to inaugurate an institutional forum that would follow in the path of the Junior Theorists Symposium, generating excitement and energy around the history of sociology. In what follows, I will offer an overview of the Symposium, building on the originating vision of Richard Swedberg, the excellent papers and presentations by Symposium participants, and the thought-provoking comments provided by the discussants: Jeffrey Goldfarb (The New School for Social Research), Martin Bulmer (University of Surrey), and Jeffrey Olick (University of Virginia).

History of Sociology as Sociology’s Working, Collective Memory: The basic conclusion of the Symposium was that, both as a description of current scholarly practice and as a normative prescription for future activity, the History of Sociology Section provides an institutional home for collective memory studies, much more than professional historiography. Of course, the Section is very fortunate to have within its membership scholars like Martin Bulmer, whose book on the Chicago School of Sociology (1984) masterfully balances the demands of careful historiography with sociological generalization. However, as Goldfarb and Olick both emphasized in their discussion, most practitioners of the history of sociology are not aiming at professional historiography, but are rather seeking a reformation in contemporary understandings of the sociological enterprise. We are, in many cases, engaging in an activity of sociological theorizing, one that takes the form of a dialogue with personalities and institutions from the past.

This view of the history of sociology as a kind of sociological theorizing, or at least as a contribution to sociological theorizing, was very much in keeping with the vision that Richard Swedberg laid out in his 2012 opening speech as Chair of the History of Sociology Section. In that speech, and in his essays subsequently published in Timelines (the newsletter of the History of Sociology Section), Swedberg articulated a vision of the history of sociology as sociology’s “working memory.” This conception builds on contemporary cognitive science, pointing to the way that memory works in enabling human activity. Memories “work” in at least two important ways, from this perspective, to enable meaningful human activity. First, they are active, in the sense that they are constantly being remade in light of new experiences and new problems to be solved. Second, they actively organize perception and cognition. By analogy, then, the history of sociology contributes to contemporary sociological theorizing by remaking our sociological memory, focusing attention on particular social questions, and providing critical, conceptual resources for the creative, inferential activities involved in theorizing.

The history of sociology, as sociology’s collective working memory, links contemporary theoretical concerns to characters, events, and institutions from sociology’s past, while seeking to glean new insights from those characters, events, and institutions. Through this dialogue with the past, the history of sociology contributes to theoretical coherence, progression, and creativity. The History of Sociology Section, from this perspective, is not a preserve of antiquarian research, but rather a vital source for contemporary sociology.

Remaking Sociological Memory: Consistent with this perspective, several of the papers presented at the Symposium pointed the way toward a remaking of sociological memory. Gina Bellafatto (Boston University) highlighted the involvement of Christian social movements in the early development of American sociology. In “Christian Sociology in Transition: The Institute of Social and Religious Research,” Bellafatto traced a little-known chapter in American sociology, a point at which Christian social gospel and ecumenical movements came together in an Institute funded by John D. Rockefeller, Jr.; this Institute sponsored the controversial Middletown study, and helped to establish early paradigms for empirical social scientific research in the U.S. David Woods (NYU-Poly) pointed to the pragmatist foundations of C. Wright Mills’ Sociological Imagination. In “Reclaiming the Pragmatic Roots of C. Wright Mills’ Sociological Imagination,” Woods argued that a recognition of Mills’ pragmatism helps us to understand his commitment to “deep democracy.” As Jeff Goldfarb put it, an awareness of the pragmatist foundation of Mills’ Sociological Imagination helps us to recover a vision of sociology as a dialogue with publics. Finally, Jonathan VanAntwerpen (Social Science Research Council) drew attention to Herbert Blumer’s early work on “sexual excitation” and Hollywood movies. In his paper, “Empiricism, Interactionism, and Epistemological Authority: Examining Blumer’s Early Sociological Practice,” VanAntwerpen argued that Blumer’s early work on movies provides significant nuance in relation to the methodological skepticism that later characterized his symbolic interactionism, and sheds important light on the open-minded approach that Blumer took toward building Berkeley’s sociology department.


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If you’re plugged into the small and lively universe that is the sociological blogosphere, you probably already know there’s been some controversy about critical realism (CR). Part of the explanation for this particular iteration of l’affaire critical realism was Fabio Rojas linking to Kieran Healey’s tweets about CR at the popular sociology blog, orgtheory. Referencing Philip Gorski’s just-published introduction to CR at Contemporary Sociology, the tweets fit comfortably into the genre’s standard snarky tone. Most blog posts are not that different, of course: Rojas introduced the orgtheory conversation with the straightforward declaration that “critical realism is lame.”

Yet worries about CR’s relative lameness are nothing new. In fact, neither are worries about the ontological lameness of sociology, which is what CR is trying to fix. Critical realism is actually a pretty diverse philosophy of social science, and that diversity can be seen even in their two major thinkers, Margaret Archer and Roy Bhaskar, the latter of which especially can be divided into early, mid, and late periods. Most American critical realists ignore Bhaskar’s later, more cosmic work on dialectic and stick to the question that frames his A Realist Theory of Science: what has to be true about the world to explain science’s remarkable success? His second book, The Possibility of Naturalism, extends the question to social science, which is where critical realism really begins. Bhaskar and Archer both insist that social life is ontologically emergent: by positing the separation and interpenetration of various levels of reality, critical realists believe they are better prepared to identify causal mechanisms, distinguish between structure and agency, and make ontologically-rooted arguments about social life. The focus on ontology is perhaps what’s most distinctive about CR (hence “realism”), yet it is continually accompanied by an awareness of the “concept dependence” of social life. The “critical” in critical realism is more Kant than Marx, though the positing of a reality to social life is also – Bhaskar argues – what gives normative critique a solid grounding besides wishing it were so.

The conversation about CR at orgtheory was equal parts snark and thoughtfulness, with thorough re-articulations from Healey, who apologized for the tone and approach of his earlier tweets, and lengthy comments from all over the sociological universe, including three of the most important contemporary American interpreters of critical realism: Philip Gorski, Christian Smith, and George Steinmetz. Another orgtheory blogger, Omar Lizardo, wrote, “it is actually fun to see people align themselves vis-à-vis CR because it provides an opportunity for those people to actually lay their cards on the table in a way that seldom happens in their more considered academic work.”

A similar laying-of-cards had just happened in New York City, right after the ASA’s annual meeting. With funding from the Templeton Foundation, Philip Gorski organized a conference titled Critical Realism: Problems and Prospects, bringing “leading critical realists from the UK and the US into dialogue with leading social theorists of kindred persuasions.”

The lineups went one-to-one each round: A critical realist gave a paper, a non-realist responded, and then the ball was in play. The theorists were Gabriel Abend, Mustafa Emirbayer (who was not able to attend the conference but wrote a paper), Andreas Glaeser, John Levi Martin, Isaac Ariail Reed, Dylan Riley, and Andreas Wimmer. The other team’s lineup was led off by the two Brits many consider the “founders” of critical realism, Margaret Archer and Roy Bhaskar, along with with Berth Danermark, Claire Laurier Decoteau, Brian Ellis, Ruth Groff, Philip Gorski, Mervyn Hartwig, Alan Norrie, Margarita Mooney, Douglas Porpora, Christian Smith, George Steinmetz, and Frédéric Vandenbergh.

All the participants had read the papers beforehand, and so the conversation was well, an actual conversation, leading to the same kind of spontaneous (even if less snarky) back-and-forth over at orgtheory. The audience was all gathered around the participants’ central table like aides at a cabinet meeting, even if these were cabinet aides who actually talked. In fact, the audience was just as much a part of the conversation as the central participants (thanks largely to Gorski’s moderation). People came to the conference because they were either critical realists or broadly sympathetic with the sorts of questions critical realists were asking, and so the conversation was a mostly charitable interrogation of similarities and differences. Particularly given how much the table’s format looked like a political meeting, the conference sometimes felt like a series of peace talks, as people of good will tried to cobble together a coexistence. Had this been a meeting of only critical realists, there would have been much narrower conversations about strategies and small differences – how Archer’s conception of agency is different from Elder-Vass’s, for example, or whether or not we need Aristotle to talk about causation. The conference talked about these questions too, but they quickly morphed into a bigger one: what sort of philosophy of social science do sociologists need to do good work?

If the metaphor of peace talk seems hyperbolic, some of that hyperbole comes from critical realists themselves, who, as Lizardo and Healey rightly point out, have sometimes presented CR as a radical change to how we ought to think about sociology. To be clear, that’s not the same thing as saying radical changes to sociology (a difference some critics of CR often miss): in their writings, Smith, Steinmetz, and Gorski argue that CR explains why good sociology is good and how it could be better. Critics respond that if the work already works, it seems patronizing to call it critical realist, a bit like the German Catholic theologian Karl Rahner’s insistence that anyone doing good is actually an “anonymous Christian.” The answer is usually something like the following: CR provides a ground upon which good social science can be constructed, making clear the kinds of questions that actually can be answered and the ways they can be answered well.

(continued pg 12)
What is Solitary Action?

Ira J. Cohen, Rutgers University

Thanks to Harold Garfinkel, Erving Goffman, and George Herbert Mead, today we see with fresh eyes the dynamic development of sequences in the realm Goffman (1983) dubbed “the interaction order.” Curiously, we know far less about activities people conduct by themselves. Surely individuals somehow continue to act when disengaged from others. What is the nature of solitary action? In this space, I present some basic traits of solitary action and thumbnails of four common forms.

By solitary action I do not mean all that goes on when individuals are by themselves. After all things happen when we are uninvolved with others over which we have no control: impulsive reactions to pain or malaise, spontaneous intuitions, ephemeral memories, vague feelings, and wandering thoughts. But, as the recollections of individuals who have suffered through solitary confinement suggest, the frightening prospect of psychic disorder looms large for those who remain at loose ends for too long. But solitude, it turns out, offers a full and varied realm in which there are many things to do. Consider dull spaces such as waiting rooms and mass-transit vehicles. Upon entering such places, unaccompanied individuals immediately reach for materials to keep themselves occupied, including an array of electronic devices meant for solitary use. Now consider spaces set apart for intense concentration. Virginia Woolf’s “room of her own” is not just for writers, but also painters, composers, mathematicians, not to mention rank-and-file professionals and managers who need a quiet space to complete their solitary tasks. A virtually silent library may actually be one of the busiest places on campus or in town. Solitary actions, then, are constitutive features of everyday life. But as far as social theory is concerned, the entire realm remains in the dark.

What makes solitary action a species of social behavior? Briefly defined, solitary actions are sequences of behavior enacted by individuals with no input or interference by anyone else from one move in the sequence to the next. Like Goffman, Garfinkel, and Mead, this definition emphasizes sequences of action rather than the states of mind of the individuals who may be so engaged. For example, a musical beginner may practice her scales for a variety of reasons, but her exercises will be the same in any event. Likewise, an author may begin a novel for one reason, but her reasons may change as the construction of her narrative twists and turns. Solitary action is social action. We take our culture with us when we set out to do things by ourselves. This point holds in three ways. First, solitary action requires culturally acquired skills. Lighthouse keepers no less than computer programmers learn their techniques from others. Second, solitary actions sustain or alter established ways of life. Robinson Crusoe’s habitat would have been markedly different if he came from a South American tribe rather than from the eighteenth century English middle-class. Third, we often, though not always, perform solitary tasks that are implicated in our occupations or relationships with others. Accountants work alone on their client’s books, friends do solitary favors for one another. But we also do some solitary things with no one else in mind, e.g. gardening, casual reading, or single-player computer games.

Sequence and Contextual Reflexivity in Solitary Action: Garfinkel (1967) demonstrated that contextual reflexivity is intrinsic to all forms of focused interaction, i.e. each move in an interactive sequence simultaneously draws upon and advances previously developed contextual elements while also creating a more or less open set of possibilities for the next move to come. The richest forms of solitary action are contextually reflexive as well. Consider highly structured activities such as playing solitaire or solving jigsaw puzzles. In each case, each correct move must take an available position in a contextual tableau and the same move simultaneously changes the tableau, opening new possibilities for matching cards or pieces on the board. Now consider a highly creative activity such as composing a piece of music. At any point in the writing process, a composer will find that her next musical phrase must be consistent with the musical context she has already created, and the new passage will open new options for her to proceed. However, since there are no others on the scene who insist upon contextual continuity, some forms of solitary action rely less on reflexive behavior than others. School children are sometimes asked to memorize decontextualized lists of facts or spelling words. Some forms of solitary conduct intermittently form and dissolve contexts, e.g. browsing the web or shopping alone for whatever catches one’s eye. In solitary action contextual reflexivity is thus a variable rather than a fixed trait.

The Holding Power of Solitary Action: Conversation: As Erving Goffman (1967, p.113) once observed, exercises have a magnetic power to hold our attention. Surprisingly, given obvious differences, certain forms of solitary action can engage our attention for indefinite periods of time as well. Here again, think of solitaire on the one hand and creative art work on the other. In both activities, one quite structured, the other more improvised, each move virtually invites us to look for the next move we can make. The activity may so absorb the individual that she may lose track of time and other events. Some tedious forms of solitary action lack the capacity to preoccupy, e.g. sweeping floors, shelving items in a warehouse or store.

(continued pg 13)
The seventh Junior Theorists’ Symposium (JTS) took place at the New School for Social Research on Friday, August 9, 2013. The conference featured presentations by nine junior theorists and commentary from three of our field’s leading theorists: Wendy Espeland (Northwestern), Paul DiMaggio (Princeton), and Robin Wagner-Pacifici (The New School). The program was rounded out by an after-panel comprising JTS veterans and other luminaries. The conference was co-organized by Josh Pacewicz, Assistant Professor of Sociology at Brown University, and Fiona Rose-Greenland, PhD Candidate in Sociology at the University of Michigan.

First, a few numbers will help clarify the scope of the undertaking. The call for papers yielded 86 submissions from graduate students, postdocs, and faculty members at 41 institutions and from seven countries. As in past years, the field of submissions was strong and the organizers struggled to select just nine papers for presentation, often leaving out truly creative ideas in the process. The conference itself drew over sixty formal registrations, although the 100-person auditorium was often filled to capacity as people wandered in throughout the day.

Judging by these numbers alone, the state of theory within sociology is strong, but what does this mean and what are the implications? This thematic question arose repeatedly throughout the conference, particularly during a summary after-panel discussion on the future of theory in sociology that included Claire Decoteau (University of Illinois – Chicago), Neil Gross (University of British Columbia), Greta Krippner (University of Michigan), Iddo Tavory (New School for Social Research), and Richard Swedberg (Cornell University).

At last year’s JTS after-panel, the panelists expressed concerns about an emerging theoretical monoculture centered narrowly around the kind of theory easily published in AJS and ASR. In a related vein, they contended with the promises of, and drawbacks to, the appearance of an overly polished job market culture at JTS itself. By contrast, this year’s panelists were decidedly upbeat about sociological theory, pointing at times to the wide-ranging and eclectic papers showcased at JTS as evidence of theoretically innovative work by junior scholars. This view was channeled most clearly by Greta Krippner, who spoke enthusiastically about theory as a kind of anti-subfield subfield, to borrow a phrase of Monika Krause’s, a discussion network that links scholars working in different subfields and focuses their attention on common conceptual issues and problems. The strongest dissenting voice was that of Richard Swedberg, who argued forcefully that sociologists need to refocus their attention on the history of ideas, a term that captures nothing if not what “theory” once meant in sociology. Indeed, as junior scholars it is hard not to feel some nostalgia for the days when theorists were united by core questions and a common cannon rather than what can sometimes appear as simply a conceptual bag of tricks.

As in past years then, JTS continued as a forum for critical and honest discussion between scholars engaged in conceptually innovative research, an intellectual counterpart to the hustle and bustle of the ASA meetings themselves. It was thus exciting to witness the continuation of this tradition and the many new voices that joined the conversation at this year’s event.

These new voices largely reflected the continued evolution of a theoretical anti-subfield among junior scholars. Beyond a common focus on usual suspects like Habermas, Foucault, and Bourdieu, many submissions were motivated by a common attempt to colonize sociologically under-theorized areas ranging from architecture, to intellectual property, to home-buying. Most submissions focused on developing the eclectic conceptual tools that are virtually synonymous with theory today: boundaries, pragmatism, relational analysis, process, causal mechanisms, fields; and a few new ones, such as: the micro-foundations of macro-structures, units of knowledge transfer, and the social construction of sociological knowledge. The submissions used multiple approaches that included conceptual clarification, ethnography, historical analysis, social network analysis, and formal modeling, and demonstrated an emerging methodological ambivalence among junior theorists for whom the dividing line often runs between the interesting versus the formulaic, rather than the quantitative and qualitative.

The day began with a panel on knowledge and its production that was kicked off by Monica Lee’s (University of Chicago) paper on the Frankfurt School. Using innovative methods throughout the text and semantic mapping, Lee demonstrated how idea sharing among Frankfurt school philosophers, and especially the overall cohesiveness of their idea sharing networks, can account for the discrete phases of intellectual production from the School. Next, Alvaro Santana-Acuña (Harvard University) approached knowledge production from the point of view of bodily practices. Using the case of land surveying in early modern France, Santana-Acuña showed how particular bodily practices constitute a profession yet are subordinated to the standardized, supposedly objective procedures of the modern scientist. Finally, Dan Hirschman (University of Michigan) rounded out the panel with a paper on stylized facts. Examining a set of well-worn statements about the social world (e.g., “One in ten people is gay”), Hirschman asked what kind of statements these are and how we should understand them. He then called for a more critical awareness of stylized fact’s influence on knowledge production, policymaking, and shared understanding of the world. Wendy Espeland responded to the papers, wrestling out loud with each presenter’s ideas in an often humorous commentary. In addition to specific comments on each paper, Espeland pushed each presenter to clarify their ideas and to reflect upon ways of using theoretical models to facilitate empirical investigation or prediction.

(continued page 7)
Pacewicz and Rose-Greenland, continued

The second panel on institutions and power began with Damon Mayrl (Universidad Carlos III) and Sarah Quinn’s (University of Washington) paper on the “state effect.” Mayrl and Quinn began from the observation that the boundaries of the state are rarely taken for granted by political authorities and often become an object of explicit contestation. The authors then compared Johnson and Nixon-era educational and housing policy initiatives and showed that political actors sought to establish clear state-society boundaries in the former case but blur them in the latter case. Next, Eric Schoon (The University of Arizona) and Joseph West (The University of Arizona) presented a paper on the succession crisis in the Church of Later Day Saints that followed Joseph Smith’s death. Using archival data and social network analysis, West and Schoon illustrated a recursive routinization of authority, wherein interpretations of key prophecies and teachings transformed patterns of relationships between key church leaders, locked in religious interpretations as dogma and ultimately allowed Brigham Young to claim the mantle of church leadership. Finally, Camilo Leslie (University of Michigan) concluded the panel with a paper on trustworthiness, which argued for a model of trustworthiness as a dynamic construction involving multiple actors, or “a balance of ‘worth claims in circulation.” Leslie demonstrated the utility of this insight by analyzing the history of the Stanford Financial Group, an Antigua-based Ponzi scheme that collapsed in 2009, showing how the Group’s apparent trustworthiness was constructed by intermediaries between the firm and its customers. In his comments, Paul DiMaggio struck a balanced and cordial tone that was very much in keeping with the spirit of JTS. DiMaggio focused on specific problems with each paper, amicably admonished presenters to stop hiding conceptual weaknesses behind jargon, and offered many thoughtful comments for improvement that focused especially upon better integration between theory and data.

Finally, the day’s third panel on Meaning and Signification opened with Matthew Norton’s (University of Oregon) paper on contemporaries’ response to the 1858 “Great Stink” sewage crisis in London. Norton built on a structuralist cultural sociology and symbolic interactionism to show how public officials and laypersons responded to the crisis by re-interpreting situational reality within an intersubjective web of broader meanings. Jordana Matlon (Institute for Advanced Study – Toulouse) continued the panel with a paper on the gritty reality of Côte d’Ivoire’s informal economy. Through extensive fieldwork with Abidjanais men rendered economically redundant through neoliberal capitalism, Matlon theorized social legitimation and masculine identity as crucial strategies for surviving at the economic margins. Rounding out the third panel, Angèle Christin (Princeton) and Marianne Blanchard (Toulouse II Le Mirail) compared the evolution of the field concept within American and French sociology. The audience was particularly amused by one of the paper’s central claims: that different interpretation of fields within American and French sociology are paralleled in a fundamental incongruity between the actual organization of each nation’s field of academic production. In her comments, Robin Wagner-Pacifici urged the presenters to aim for better specificity about the medium of communication. What is the relative weight, she asked, given to the various components of our work? Why privilege language over other media or symbols? These and other questions pushed all of us to reconsider the empirical basis of our theory work.

The JTS will be held again next year in San Francisco the day before the ASA meetings. We’re pleased to announce next year’s organizers: Jordanna Matlon and Dan Hirschman. Please encourage your students and colleagues to submit a précis and plan to attend.

Call for Papers for a second special issue of Studies in Symbolic Interaction

In response to the great excitement and unprecedented interest that Studies in Symbolic Interaction’s special issue, “Radical Interactionism on the Rise” (vol.#41), generated in the academic community, I am pleased to announce a call for papers for a second special issue on this topic. The encore issue will be titled, “New Developments in Radical Interactionism: American and European Contributions.” It will focus on what radical interactionist’s exponent, Lonnie Athens calls “politics of everyday life” found, in among other research sites, marriage and the family, courtship and dating, religion, professions and occupations, (including academics), science, sports, health care, popular culture and leisure pursuits, sexuality, crime and deviance, print and broadcast journalism, the performing arts, race and ethnic relations, and urban areas and public spaces, educational and criminal justice institutions, social movements, and international relations. We are especially interested in submissions from North, Central and South American, and European scholars. To encourage the generation of a cumulative body of empirical knowledge from the application of this new, interactional perspective, which provides an alternative to its conservative, turned rival cousin, symbolic interactionism, it is strongly recommended that those making submissions consult the papers published in volume #41 of Studies in Symbolic Interaction (2013). Before submitting a completed paper, you should submit three to four page summary of your proposed project to Lonnie Athens (athenslo@shu.edu) no later than July 1, 2014. All outlines and completed papers must be written in fluent English.
Wagner-Pacifici, continued

A statue or a crown carried in the context of a parade or a demonstration organizes attention and sentiment differently from having these items on display in such places as parliamentary buildings. Canals built to connect the Mediterranean and the Atlantic convene and move people differently from multiple computer screens on a financial trader’s desk. Singular flags that are carried into and out of battle, receiving war wounds in the process, operate differently from endlessly replaceable, government-issued flags flown in schoolrooms. While both can be sacred and inspirational, the battle flag has a metonymic history (replete with traces of the battle itself) and individuality that conveys meaning and constitutes identity differently from a metaphorically connoteative flag evoking concepts and sentiments of nationalism. Social forms certainly lead contingent lives (the same flag that hung in the schoolhouse can be brought into battle and thus metonymically activated into individuality), but I maintain that forms are nonetheless constrained by their existential properties.

Theorizing with and through forms means first finding ways to know the forms better. Sociological theorists justifiably rely upon language to build and communicate theoretical ideas and models. Language is our common and most flexible medium of communication. Even A.J. Greimas ultimately gave up on the project of developing a semiotic program of gestural units vis-à-vis the human body. This was partly because of what Greimas called the dilemma of the “morphological disarticulation of the human body,” and partly because, as in the case of Mitchell and his own picture-theory, he was stuck with the much more reflexive symbolic medium of language when attempting to develop and theorize his gestural program. Nevertheless, the exhortation to theorize with and through forms means recognizing their highly specific modalities of signifying and constituting the social worlds in which they circulate. As even Plato understood, humans do not and cannot live in a formless world. The philosopher Richard Kearney assesses Plato’s paradoxical reliance on forms, writing: “Beneath the official censure of the mimetic image, there runs a counter-current which surfaces in certain passages...the meditational function of thought-images leads the mind from the lower to the higher – that is from the material to the transcendental world.” (Kearney, 99-100) While we sociologists are not existentially affiliated with the transcendental, it behooves us to understand the forms we continuously encounter in the realms of the social.

Bibliography


On the other hand, the mapping imagery has some limitations. If I am familiar with an area, I don't need a map, and just know my way about. So using a map is already a sign that you are somehow not fully attuned to the situation around you – it intervenes between you and the world. For me, when I have moved to new cities it has always been a sign of not-yet-being-at-home-there to have to walk around with a map. The day I throw it away and can just let the city take me there, so to speak, by following the indications that it gives to me, has always felt somewhat liberating. You might say it is being liberated from having to operate through a filtering schema. So I suppose my suggestion is that there are (at least) two ways to successfully use a map. One way: it gets you where you want to go. Another: it is a learning tool employed until you stop needing it.

MG: I think that the idea of cognitive maps can account for the difference between learning one’s way around a new environment and navigating it, as it were, on autopilot, without the aid of heuristic tools like physical maps. I would say that we’re able to discard physical maps once we develop a good enough cognitive map of a place. We develop cognitive maps not only by studying physical maps or learning directions but by walking around a place and acquiring a sense of where things are in relation to one another. Cognitive maps are maps insofar as they give us a sense of relative position and help us get where we want to go, but unlike physical maps, they largely operate at a pre-conceptual level. That is to say, they don’t provide us with a set of directions for how to get from A to B like Google Maps. Rather, they endow us with a sense of place. It’s a “sense” insofar as we can’t always articulate how we know, for instance, that we’ve gone too far or that, at the fork in the road, we should bear left. This pre-conceptual or “embodied” quality reflects how we learn these maps in the first place, by being in and making our way around – by experiencing – a particular environment. And so I would not say that cognitive maps, like physical maps, “intervene between you and the world.” They function in a more fundamental way. They help us recognize the world and situate ourselves within it, even if all that means is getting from A to B.

Cognitive maps are also different from physical maps in that they convey a distinctly social knowledge about the meanings of places and thus guide our behavior accordingly, in some cases leading us to avoid or gravitate toward certain places. Here, I think, we can draw a bridge to your concept of scenes as “the aesthetic meaning of a place.” I wonder though about your emphasis on the qualities of the situation itself – amenities and activities and consumption practices generally – speaking to or soliciting responses from actors. The question for me is how such qualities come to be recognized and how their recognition varies across social groups. In my paper, I show that social class, conceptualized as a cognitive structure or a sense of place, matters in how people use and interpret urban space.

DS: Let's give physical maps a bit more credit! They too are not always about getting from A to B. I was on a space committee, and we used (and drew) many maps of the office layout in our department. I already knew how to walk down the hall. But the maps were a useful way to think about relationships among offices in that they explicitly focused our conversations and planning on their spatial arrangement. They helped us to recognize the world and situate ourselves in it. And again, they do so not linguistically but practically and in pictures in ways that are not comprehensive but always selective. So I don't see something more fundamental happening when we move a map into the inner domain of cognition.

Why am I insisting on this? One of the initial goals of pragmatist philosophers was to critique and overcome "philosophies of consciousness." These sorts of philosophies were tangled up in intractable problems about how to connect an inner domain of consciousness to an outer physical world, as well as to other minds. Pragmatists wanted to sidestep this whole complex by starting from action and practice. The "problem of other minds" and of "the external world" is not fundamental, but something that, if it occurs at all in our practical lives, only does so in specific circumstances.

Today, this pragmatist orientation may make us a bit worried about talk of auto-pilots and maps in minds. Take "autopilot." This suggests a little pilot in my head, navigating the ship of Dan, who sometimes pushes a button before going to sleep for a while. But who is that guy and who is navigating his ship? A regress looms. Similarly with inner maps. I can't imagine a map without a map user. Who is the user of my cognitive map? The little me inside me? But there is just me; I am the actor, not an inner me driving me.

This is why I think it is important to keep the map in the world, so to speak, and to make its relevance a matter of practical circumstance: here I am, going about my business, not without thought, but in a mode of thought that flows from the demands of the matter at hand. Sometimes I hit a snag, and when that happens, it can help to turn to a map, whether that means pulling one up on my phone or mentally. But then when and if the map works, I put the phone in my pocket or out of mind, and get back to what I was doing. To the extent that the map-schema is operative, either physically or mentally, I am not yet back to letting myself learn from the world. This is just to say that we need to do some theoretical work to make room for the process you pointed out, "the experience of making our way about in the world" of which maps are an outcome.

MG: Yes, physical maps help us find our way by giving us our relative position. But the thing is, we need to translate the symbolic information contained in the map and then apply it to the environment we're trying to navigate. This requires deliberate cognitive work, and so even when we use physical maps, we do so with reference to the development of a cognitive map.

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Silver and Garrido, continued

Our knowledge of an environment that we've never experienced, that we know only by studying a physical map, can only be abstract and will never result in our truly acquiring a "feel" for a place. This is because the knowledge contained by cognitive maps, as I argued, largely exists at the level of a "sense"—still positive knowledge but not symbolically coded (and therefore hard to articulate), rather knowledge as feelings, reflexes, intuition, and sense. Because we possess this knowledge, we respond automatically to environmental situational cues. Cognitive maps are fundamental because they're essential to our orienting ourselves within an environment in a concrete way.

This view of cognition cuts through the dichotomies central to classical philosophies of consciousness. For one, it problematizes this notion of a world that's "external" to us. As I argued above, cognitive activity is largely situated; it takes place in a context, in response to environmental cues or situational tasks. We also off-load cognitive work onto the environment, for example, by taking notes or by looking up information on the web or—my favorite example—manipulating Tetris blocks to see if they fit. In other words, cognition operates in tandem with the environment. Second, it problematizes the distinction between consciousness and practice because cognition is so often expressed through practice, without necessarily registering at a conscious or discursive/symbolic level. To cite an example from my paper, the urban poor suddenly feel acutely self-conscious or overcome with shame when entering hotels, upscale malls, or other areas associated with the rich.

So, to take this metaphor of "auto-pilot." I simply mean that sometimes we navigate the world deliberately, usually when we're in a new environment or are particularly motivated to get somewhere, but once we're in a familiar environment, we don't expend as much effort plotting our path; we have greater cognitive capacity to dwell on other things (a knotty analytical problem, our schedule that day, our dream last night) while we let our feet take us where we're going. Now let's say our accustomed path is blocked by construction. We would need to engage in at least a moment's deliberation to re-chart our course. There is no doubt about who's acting here. It's me. It's just that I (and all of us) engage the world in different ways depending on what's called for by different situations.

So, in sum, I do think that physical maps are very different from cognitive maps and that their difference is analytically important. Moreover, cognitive maps are never "out of this world" or existing purely (or even largely) in the realm of consciousness. They develop from our experience in particular physical and social environments. This is not mysterious. Cognitive processes point to a clear research agenda consisting of three analytically distinct and yet practically inseparable empirical foci: one, particular environments or, specifically, certain social or spatial relations; two, the knowledge conveyed by these environments/relations (perhaps in the form of cognitive structures); and three, the practices (actions and interpretations) informed by this knowledge. An emphasis on practices or situations is welcome, particularly as an antidote to accounts of action (over-)emphasizing intentionality and effort, but we also need to consider the knowledge or cognitive structures that underlie practices and make situations legible. This knowledge matters because it links practices with social conditions and hence helps us understand why practices vary across different social settings. Too narrow a focus on situations may obscure the actor, the person who recognizes a situation as X or Y on the basis of knowledge learned from his or her experiences in particular social environments.

DS: This all sounds great, and I found myself in almost total agreement. I am definitely not recommending a narrow focus on situations but want to include situatedness as part of an enriched and expanded theory of action that also includes means, ends, calculation, effort, norms, etc.

But still, there does seem to be differences in the how the cognitivist vs. pragmatist traditions treat the action-environment complex. The key terms are different: "knowledge," "classification," "interpretation," "symbols," "legible," "processing," vs. "judging," "adapting," "creatively solving problems," "responding," "habituating," "resonating," "attuning." But it is one thing to (correctly or incorrectly) interpret and schematize a friend's smile (as warm and inviting, etc.); it is another to experience the smile as demanding a smile in return. The former drives toward knowing, the latter toward doing. They have different success conditions. You succeed cognitively if your interpretative schemas (whether articulated or vague senses) correctly classify information in the environment ("he wanted me to smile back"); you succeed practically if your response engenders further action, say, by eliciting a hug... and then... and then. Failure means bringing the action to a halt, and then a successful response to such failure means getting the situation going again (recovering from a slip-up, say), which in turn means re-awakening the (say, festive) mood in which smiles call for hugs and hugs for kisses and so on. These calls and responses are not automatic, they take lots of skilled involvement and engagement and judgment and creativity, which takes lots of learning and habitation. And yet they aren't well-described as deliberate either. That's why I find terms like "attunement," "calling forth," and "enriching the situation" useful. They point toward a register of experience that is hard to comprehend as either deliberate or automatic, which needs to be integrated with cognitive processes of "thinking things through" (of the sort Dewey talks about in How We Think).

MG: It seems that we may be thinking about cognition somewhat differently. My understanding of cognition includes the things you group under practice (skilled involvement, engagement, habitation).

(continued pg 11)
While we can consider knowledge and practice as analytically distinct, they’re inseparable in practice. Cognition is primarily deployed for action, to make sense of and thus interact with a particular environment. As such, its function is eminently pragmatic, hence Fiske and Taylor’s description of cognitive actors as “motivated tacticians.” This view of cognition, by the way, is explicitly indebted to William James’s conception of thinking as being for the sake of doing. More to the point, I don’t see the literature on cognition as opposed to, but highly compatible with, a practice-centered pragmatist approach. The advantage of a cognitive approach is that it connects practices to the material and social world through knowledge in the form of cognitive structures. This framework is useful because of its explanatory power. To illustrate: In my paper, I focus largely on segregating practices occurring in both typical and atypical situations of class interaction. Looking at similar kinds of practices across different situations allows me to infer the knowledge behind them. Why is this important? This knowledge—a sense of place—helps explain the trans-situational character of segregating practices, or rather, why situations formally defined in terms other than class come to be structured in class terms. By linking the two sets of practices, it also suggests a process of learning (acquisition of a sense of place), where regular segregating practices in typical situations—for example, with regard to the urban poor in the context of domestic employment, being made to use the back door, being made to use separate bathrooms and dining tables, or being forbidden from entering any of the bedrooms except on an appointed task—inform ad hoc practices in atypical situations (e.g., self-segregation in mixed settings).

Amplifying Hunter, John Boy (CUNY) pointed to the value of DuBois’ concrete and interactionist approach to macro-historical, cultural questions, as seen in The Souls of Black Folk (1903). In “The Axial Age and the Problems of the Twentieth Century: DuBois, Jaspers, and Universal History,” Boy demonstrates the helpfulness of DuBois’ approach to Hegelian “problems of universal history,” which are returning to sociology as scholars debate theories about the “Axial Age” of religious and philosophical foundations. Finally, Álvaro Santana-Acuña (Harvard) drew attention to the value of non-structuralist metaphors for theorizing society, as seen in Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) and Gabriel Tarde’s Monadologie et sociologie (1893). In “Outside Structures: Smithian Sentiments and Tardian Monads,” Santana-Acuña argued that Smith and Tarde point the way toward theoretical innovations locating social causality in human interdependence and interaction, rather than in social structures.

Critical and Conceptual Resources for Theorizing Anew: A third set of papers drew on the history of sociology to point out ways in which sociological theorizing can and should be reformed. Orit Avishai (Fordham) and Courtney Irby (Loyola Chicago) pointed to “The Missing Feminist Revolution in the Sociology of Religion.” Avishai and Irby document the marginalization of feminist and gender-based perspectives in the development of the sociology of religion, concluding that such perspectives are needed in order to deepen the conceptual and analytical frameworks being deployed. Similarly, Joan Donovan (UCSD) pointed to the entrenchment of an institutionalist framework in medical sociology, which focuses attention primarily on structural inequalities and health disparities. In “The Patient Effect: Social Order, Control, and Justice in American Medical Sociology,” Donovan argues that theories of health-related social movements can be further developed by focusing on the role that disease categories play in mobilizing collective identities and activities. Finally, Benjamin Merriman (University of Chicago) traced the development of three different conceptions of spatial locality (ecological, institutional, and perceptual) underlying the Chicago School’s approach to urban sociology. In “Three Conceptions of Spatial Locality in Chicago School Sociology,” Merriman argues that these conceptions point to partially-independent processes, which should be theorized more explicitly so that they might be more carefully integrated or distinguished.

An Invitation (Plea) to the Theory Section: As I hope will be evident, this Symposium provided a rich opportunity for theoretical discussion. The History of Sociology Section has voted to continue supporting the Symposium, but the Section is perilously small. On behalf of Symposium participants past and future, I invite Theory Section members to join the History of Sociology Section, to contribute to sociology’s collective working memory, and to help support a new forum for intellectually-rich, theoretical work.
However – as Healey, Lizardo, and others argued at orgtheory, and as many other pointed out at the conference – it is not as though other philosophers of social science have been ignoring these issues. Still, whether or not critical realists insist that everyone has to wear their t-shirt is a tactical question that distracts from more important ones. First, does CR accurately reflect what really exists, and, second, does that accurate reflection actually matter? In other words, do sociologists need ontology to do good work?

Neil Gross was especially insistent at the conference that even if much of critical realism is right that does not mean that much of critical realism is useful. How does CR affect regular working sociologists in a meaningful way? It’s a question that critical realists at both the conference and the blog acknowledged they need to work on. In a conversation I had with Gross a long time ago about getting published in Sociological Theory, he told me something I’ve thought about a lot, especially any time I start a paper. I was pitching some comparison of Weber and Foucault, and he told me it sounded interesting, but he wondered if it would actually make readers stop and think about the way they do sociology. That’s the metric: a theoretical argument might not make people change the way they work, but it has to at least make them think about it. I thought a lot about Gross’s advice while I was doing research for Philip Gorski on critical realism this past year, and over and over, I thought of the old joke that philosophy of science is as useful for working scientists as ornithology is for birds. If successful sociological theory has to affect all sociologists in some way, what does successful philosophy of social science have to do? Should it affect everyone as well?

There is an uncomfortable blurring of lines here, as CR often pitches itself as a meta-theory, or a theory that explains how theory works. Yet, both at the conference and at the blog, it sometimes appeared more a totalizing sociological theory (à la Bourdieu or Parsons), or a way of understanding social life that can explain just about all of it. That conflation was more common from CR’s critics, yet it’s sometimes so treated by its proponents as well. Of course, working scientists are affected by the philosophy of science (even if they don’t necessarily spend a lot of time thinking about it), and the lines between regular work, theory, and philosophy are probably blurrer for social scientists. Even if critical realism is more a philosophy of social science than a sociological theory, the paper topics at the conferences – among them agency, causation, emergence, structure, and method – are certainly issues that work at the theoretical and even empirical level, and not just the meta-theoretic. They’re stuff any working sociologist has to think about. The important question at both the conference and at orgtheory was how much we needed critical realism itself to resolve these longstanding issues (though, regardless of that answer, it’s still a useful way to get people thinking about them). At the conference, Steinmetz and Smith regularly insisted that just about any kind of sociology can be critical realist: the point of CR is not to change what sociologists study but to provide a basis in reality for the kinds of claims they make.

In his review article, Gorski compares sociology to swimming: anyone can do it, but you become a better swimmer if you learn how the water works.

The question, then, is whether critical realism can explain reality as well as fluid dynamics explains water. In his blog posts, Lizardo defended CR, arguing he doesn’t find it lame, though he does think it too often presents itself as a coherent and necessarily unitary response to the problems of contemporary social science, a strategy that appears ineffective both at the rhetorical level and as an argument about the social world. In the British academic field that gave birth to CR, there might well be enough unmediated postmodernism to merit a reminder that reality might well exist. Yet, as the responses at the conference and the comments at the blog made clear: that’s not a problem in the States. American ambassadors of CR might respond that the problem in the States is more ideological positivism than idealist postmodernism, yet it seems obvious that CR is not the first to say that sociology is not and cannot be physics. Bhaskar and Archer – along with CR importers like Christian Smith and Philip Gorski – pitch critical realism as the sweet spot between naïve number crunching and starry-eyed social constructionism, yet CR’s critics respond that these alleged sins are sociological straw-men.

A lot of what’s good about CR, both Healey and Lizardo argued, can be found elsewhere, and with less of the “us-against-the-world” rhetoric. Or, as Stephen Vaisey put it, (in response to one of Christian Smith’s many comments): critical realists should focus on unbundling their arguments, giving working sociologists realist tools without forcing them to accept the entire apparatus. By analogy, Vaisey argued that “Bourdieu has had an enormous influence without making very many ‘Bourdieusians’ because people have taken what they’ve wanted from him and left the rest. Some use habitus, others use cultural capital, still others are developing field theory. He insisted all of these terms must necessarily go together in a coherent package. Most of us ignored him, to our great benefit.” In an unusually brief response, Smith thanked Vaisey, writing, “yes, got that. Quite doable.” And so we’ll see what critical realism can do.

1. Thanks to Omar Lizardo, Philip Gorski, and Claire Decoteau for helpful comments.
Cohen, continued

But where the power to engage us is strong, the individual finds herself caught up in the process of context formation itself. As each move opens new possibilities, the individual finds it hard to resist the virtual invitation to move on. Some survivors of solitary confinement (e.g. Timmerman 1981; Waite 1995) report processes of context formation that held their attention and sustained them for months or even years.

Four Common Forms of Solitary Action: As is the case with interpersonal action, no single template can neatly organize the entire realm of solitary action with its numerous unruly instances and its many idiosyncratic forms. But some degree of sociological order might be helpful so that we are not overwhelmed by anecdotes and examples. To this end I have devised a set of four general types of solitary activities. The typology derives from cross-referencing the two variable traits of solitary action summarized above, viz. the tight or loose structuration of contextual activity on the one hand, and the high or low holding power of the type of activity in question on the other. To round out this account, I present thumbnail précis of each of the four forms.

1) Engrossments: (Tightly structured contextual reflexivity, strong holding power). Engrossments, as exemplified in solitaire and jigsaw puzzles, are activities that invite the individual to follow a preordained set of moves that leads to a predetermined outcome. A successful engrossment enables the individual to build just enough context with each move to encourage her to proceed. Engrossments can be useful as diversions in times of worry or stress, to procrastinate before completing unappealing chores, or simply as restful means of recreation.

2) Reflexives: (Loosely structured contextual reflexivity, high holding power). Reflexives are activities that invite individuals to solve problems or create something new through sequences of development they improvise for themselves. Reflexives engage individuals by providing a sense of continuity with each move and a sense of development to the task or project at hand. The category includes a diverse range of activities from trouble-shooting software or improvising a means to solve a difficult carpentry or plumbing problem to composing music, writing essays or other projects in the arts, sciences, and humanities.

3) Peripatetics: (Intermittent contextual reflexivity, correspondingly intermittent holding power). This form of solitary activity involves various kinds of browsing, e.g. along forest trails, city streets, library stacks, etc., or when scanning web pages, periodicals or television channels. Such browsing usually advances in sequences where the individual becomes absorbed in observing certain details in an item or following the unfolding line of a development or an event, then, after interest in the first item is satisfied or wanes, proceeding to a search for a new item in which to become absorbed.

4) Regimens: (No structured contextual reflexivity, no holding power). This category refers to the drudgework inherent in certain kinds of solitary activity. In regimens one item follows another in a sequence with no contextual development at all. Rote memorization in school assignments, or making repetitive delivery rounds across a work site or neighborhood are regimens in this sense. Regimens confront the individual with the need to devise means to cope with the boring nature of the work at hand.

Currently we are at a point in the sociology of solitary action where students of the interaction order were 50 years ago. Solitary action offers a new field of sociological investigation. I have tried here to break some new ground. But we have only begun to understand the world of activities that individuals undertake when they are on their own.

REFERENCES


**Theory Section Award Announcements**

**Lewis A. Coser Award for Theoretical Agenda**

The ASA Theory Section gives an annual award called the Lewis A. Coser Award for Theoretical Agenda Setting. This prize is intended to recognize a mid-career sociologist whose work holds great promise for setting the agenda in the field of sociology. While the award winner need not be a theorist, her or his work must exemplify the sociological ideals that Lewis Coser represented. Eligible candidates must be sociologists or do work that is of crucial importance to sociology. They must have received a Ph.D. no less than five and no more than twenty years before their candidacy. Nomination letters should make a strong substantive case for the nominee's selection and should discuss the nominee's work and his or her anticipated future trajectory. No self-nominations are allowed. After nomination, the Committee will solicit additional information from nominees and others for those candidates they consider appropriate for consideration, including published works and at least two additional letters of support from third parties. The Committee may decide in any given year that no nominee warrants the award, in which case it will not be awarded that year. Send nominations to the Chair of the Committee, who is Robin Wagner-Pacifici (wagnerpr@newschool.edu). The deadline for submissions is **February 15, 2014**.

**Committee: Chair** Robin Wagner-Pacifici

(wagnerpr@newschool.edu)

**Committee Members:**

Anna Maria Santiago, President, Society for the Study of Social Problems, Case Western Reserve (anna.santiago@case.edu)

Ivan Ermakoff, (ermakoff@ssc.wisc.edu)

Cecilia Menjivar, Vice President, American Sociological Association (menjivar@asu.edu)

**The Edward Shils-James Coleman Memorial Award for Best Student Paper**

The Edward Shils-James Coleman Memorial Award for Best Student Paper The Shils-Coleman Award recognizes distinguished work in the theory area by a graduate student. Work may take the form of (a) a paper published or accepted for publication; (b) a paper presented at a professional meeting; or (c) a paper suitable for publication or presentation at a professional meeting. Only papers authored by graduate students are eligible, i.e. no papers co-authored with faculty. Each year's selection committee has latitude in determining procedures for selecting the winner, including the option of awarding no prize if suitable work has not been nominated. This year the Shils-Coleman Award includes an award of $750.00 for reimbursement of travel expenses for attending the annual ASA meeting. Please submit the article electronically to the committee members at the email addresses below. Self-nominations are welcome. The deadline for submission is **March 1, 2014**.

**Committee Chair:** John R. Hall, University of California at Davis (jrhall@ucdavis.edu)

**Committee Members:**

Matthew Norton, University of Oregon (mnorton@uoregon.edu)

Neha Gondal, Ohio State University (gondal.2@sociology.osu.edu)

Josh Pacewicz, Brown University (pacewicz@brown.edu)

Fiona Rose-Greenland, University of Michigan (frose@umich.edu)

**The Theory Prize (Book in 2014)**

The Theory Prize is given to recognize outstanding work in theory. In even-numbered years, it is given to a book, and in odd-numbered years, to a paper; in both cases, eligible items are those published in the preceding four calendar years (2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013). Please send preliminary nominations to the Committee Chair by **February 1, 2014**, with copies to all Committee members. Formal nominations, together with the nominated books, must subsequently be sent to all Committee members. Self-nominations are welcome. Nominated papers must reach Committee members by **March 1, 2014**.

**Committee Chair:** Lyn Spillman, University of Notre Dame (spillman.1@nd.edu)

**Committee Members:**

J.I. Hans Bakker, University of Guelph (hbakker@uoguelph.ca)

Todd Goodsell, University of Utah (todd.goodsell@utah.edu)

Victor Lidz, Drexel University (victor.lidz@drexelmed.edu)

Omar Lizardo, University of Notre Dame (olizardo@nd.edu)
Theory Section Award Announcements

Junior Theorist Award

The Junior Theorist Award honors the best paper each year submitted by an early-career sociologist. Self-nominations are invited by scholars who have received the Ph.D. but who, at the time of nomination are not more than eight years beyond the calendar year in which the Ph.D. was granted. Nominations should consist of one article written or published in the 12 months preceding the nominations deadline and a letter explaining how the paper advances sociological theorizing. The winner will present a keynote address at the Junior Theory Symposium the year after the award is given. Please submit the article electronically to the committee members at the email addresses below by March 1, 2014.

Committee Chair: Eleanor Townsley, Mt. Holyoke College (etownsle@mtholyoke.edu)

Committee Members:
Andy Clarno, University of Illinois at Chicago (aclarno@uic.edu)
Mary Vogel, University of Manchester (mary.vogel@manchester.ac.uk)
Paul McLean, Rutgers University (pmclean@sociology.rutgers.edu)

2014 Junior Theorists Symposium: Call for Abstracts:

When: August 15, 2014
Where: Berkley, CA

SUBMISSION DEADLINE: 15 FEBRUARY 2014

We invite submissions for extended abstracts for the 8th Junior Theorists Symposium (JTS), to be held in Berkeley, CA on August 15th, 2014, the day before the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association (ASA). The JTS is a one-day conference featuring the work of up-and-coming theorists, sponsored in part by the Theory Section of the ASA. Since 2005, the conference has brought together early career-stage sociologists who engage in theoretical work.

We are pleased to announce that Marion Fourcade (University of California - Berkeley), Saskia Sassen (Columbia University), and George Steinmetz (University of Michigan) will serve as discussants for this year's symposium.

In addition, we are pleased to announce an after-panel on “The Boundaries of Theory” featuring Stefan Bargheer (UCLA), Claudio Benzecry (University of Connecticut), Margaret Frye (Harvard University), Julian Go (Boston University), and Rhacel Parreñas (USC). The panel will examine such questions as what comprises sociological theory, and what differentiates “empirical” from “theoretical” work.

We invite all ABD graduate students, postdocs, and assistant professors who received their PhDs from 2010 onwards to submit a three-page précis (800-1000 words). The précis should include the key theoretical contribution of the paper and a general outline of the argument. Be sure also to include (i) a paper title, (ii) author’s name, title and contact information, and (iii) three or more descriptive keywords. As in previous years, in order to encourage a wide range of submissions we do not have a pre-specified theme for the conference. Instead, papers will be grouped into sessions based on emergent themes.

Please send submissions to the organizers, Daniel Hirschman (University of Michigan) and Jordanna Matlon (Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse), at juniortheorists@gmail.com with the phrase “JTS submission” in the subject line. The deadline is February 15, 2014. We will extend up to 12 invitations to present by March 15. Please plan to share a full paper by July 21, 2014.
New Publications

**Articles**


Members’ News and Notes


Books

Awards/News
Elizabeth Popp Berman has been promoted to associate professor at the University at Albany, SUNY, and will be a member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton in 2013-14.
Mervyn Horgan has taken up a position as Assistant Professor of Sociological Theory at the University of Guelph, Ontario.
Matthew Kearney, Ph.D. Candidate at University of Wisconsin-Madison, received the Outstanding Graduate Student Paper Award from the SSSP section on Youth, Aging, and the Life Course for "Youth Authority in the Wisconsin Uprising" at the 2013 annual meeting.
Marc Ventresca won “Most Innovative Teacher” Award at the Social Sciences Division, Oxford.
Appendix: Spotlighting Current Dissertations

John D. Boy (CUNY Graduate Center)
Title: “Postsecular Europe and the Church-Planting Movement”

My dissertation investigates the global diffusion of voluntary religiosity. I study this phenomenon in the context of “church-planting,” that is, efforts by multi-institutional networks of individuals and organizations to found new conservative Protestant churches. I use a modified ethnographic approach to study the work of one of the most prominent of these networks in seven urban areas in Europe. I argue that this network makes strategic use of gentrified urban spaces to make a place for religion in the everyday lives of city dwellers. The result is a transformation of the religious landscape and a change in religious vitality in the broader society. My research places me at the intersection of comparative–historical sociology, cultural sociology, and the sociology of religion.

Laura R. Ford (Cornell University)
Title: “Intellectual Property: A Study in the Formulation and Effects of Legal Culture”

Despite its current pervasiveness, intellectual property – a legal category that includes patents, copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets – has not always existed. My historical and comparative dissertation – which covers England, Germany, France, and the United States, as well as international treaties – shows that intellectual property emerged in the Eighteenth Century, as part of the modern nation-state. The theory of semantic legal ordering that I develop in the dissertation explicates the social process through which cultural understandings and practices rooted in Roman legal traditions have contributed form and meaning to these quintessentially modern institutions. Drawing on Robert Bellah’s theory of cultural traditions, together with Max Weber’s sociology of law and property, I argue that certain experiential characteristics of our modern, globalized economy have been shaped, in very real ways, by legal traditions with deep historical roots, as seen in the case of intellectual property.

Ryan Gunderson (Michigan State University)
Title: “Nature, Sociology, and the Frankfurt School”

Ryan's dissertation is an exegesis and analysis of the works of the first-generation Frankfurt School to document how early critical theory can conceptually and theoretically inform sociological examinations of human-nature relations. One line of analysis establishes how the theories of Max Horkheimer, Theodor W. Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse are applicable to central topics and debates in environmental sociology. A second line of analysis examines how the Frankfurt School's explanatory and normative theories of human-animal relations can inform sociological animal studies. The third line examines the place of nature in Erich Fromm's social psychology and sociology, focusing on his personality theory's notion of "biophilia."

Sebastián G. Guzmán (New School for Social Research)
Title: “To Pay or to Protest: Consent and Resistance to Social Housing Debt in Chile”

This is an ethnography of low-income housing debtors in Chile, some of whom have sustained a six-year mortgage strike demanding that the state cancel their debt. In spite of the moratorium on foreclosures obtained by the debtors’ movement, some debtors continue to pay. Synthesizing top-down and bottom-up theories of political, social movement, and class subjectivities, I explain how debtors’ motivations to resist or consent to debt payment are produced in their lived experience. I argue for a “meso-cultural and motivated reasoning” explanation of consent and resistance: Expectations and justifications induced by institutions, “macro-culture,” and movements are reinterpreted in group interaction constrained by meso-cultures, as well as through individual efforts to validate interpretations that provide hopes and feelings of agency.
Appendix: Spotlighting Current Dissertations, continued

Kathleen C. Oberlin (Indiana University)
Title: “Mobilizing Epistemic Conflict: The Creation Museum and the Creationist Social Movement”

I shift the analysis of longstanding controversies surrounding creationism from courtroom battles to a new setting: a natural history museum. The Creation Museum in Kentucky was built in 2007. Given the historical importance of resources and the political opportunities for contestation, cultural institutions like museums have often been overlooked as viable movement targets. I link insights from this distinct case study with broader scholarship to address a core sociological question: how is cultural authority acquired and negotiated by social movements in the twenty-first century? To understand this, I use over two years of fieldwork, interviews with organizational leaders, and a unique historical dataset. I find the adoption of the natural history museum-form occurred through ideological repositioning, efficacious leadership, and a willingness to adapt to the sociocultural as well as political environment. In doing so, I identify how and why other social movements may also endure by constructing alternative institutions as they seek to acquire cultural authority.

Fiona Rose-Greenland (University of Michigan)
Title: “Ruling Culture: Tomb Robbers, State Power, and the Struggle for Italian Antiquities”

In my dissertation I study the construction and enforcement of nations’ cultural patrimony. Using Italy as my main case, I examine the process whereby mundane objects are transformed into national treasure. The study begins in the mid-19th century and continues to the present day, with the state’s all-out effort to eliminate tomb robbers. The core contributions of my project are (1) clarification of the relationship between state power, science, and culture by extending the concept of symbolic order; (2) original ethnographic data that complicate existing scholarly views on looting and the illicit cultural economy; and (3) a new theoretical framework for studying how cultural objects are evaluated at the margins of society, an issue that has received little academic attention.

Ian Sheinheit (University at Albany, SUNY)
Title: “In with the New - Out with the Old? A Structural and Cultural Analysis of Iraq War Focused Political News Media during the 2004 and 2008 Election Cycles”

My dissertation analyzes and compares ten media outlets that represent three prominent media formats (print, television and digital), with a topical focus on the Iraq War, in order to decipher the actualities of the political news media field during a time of liminality and volatility. I argue that particular political blogs and their content during the transition toward 2004 and between the 2004 and 2008 election cycles expanded and re-ordered the cultural and structural environment that envelops media, politics and the public sphere. I find specific organizational structures and discursive codes that are reinforced and ossified. Simultaneously, however, I find transformations that represent an altered hierarchy of cultural symbols and structural positionings.

Ana Velitchkova (University of Notre Dame)
Title: “Cosmopolitan Political Culture behind the Iron Curtain”

My dissertation makes a case for the existence of a unique type of political culture that originated in state-socialist Eastern Europe following World War II. I call it socio-cultural modernity and argue it persisted after the 1989 democratic transitions to organize social reality in the region differently. I show that socio-cultural modernity was not only a source of solidarity and domestic peace but also facilitated international cooperation across the Iron Curtain. I outline the elements of this cosmopolitan culture and illustrate its distinctiveness via a cross-country comparison of available survey responses from the early 1990s. I trace the modes of social relations, practices, institutions, and discourse styles that provided its semantic foundation and supported the development of globally oriented publics.