I. Introduction

Sherlock Holmes is a fictional individual. So is his favorite pipe. Our pre-theoretical intuition says that neither of them is real. It says that neither of them really, or actually, exists. It also says that there is a sense in which they do exist, namely, a sense in which they exist “in the world of” the *Sherlock Holmes* stories. Our pre-theoretical intuition says in general of any fictional individual that it does not actually exist but exists “in the world of” the relevant fiction. I wish to defend this pre-theoretical intuition. To do so, I need to defend two claims: that fictional individuals do not actually exist, and that they exist “in the world of” the relevant fiction. The aim of this paper is to defend the first claim.

There are two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive ways of holding the view that fictional individuals actually exist. One way is to hold that fictional individuals actually exist as a result of being created by the author(s) of the relevant story (stories). The other way is to hold that they actually exist but not as a result of being created by the author(s). According to the second way, fictional individuals actually exist either as a result of being created by someone (or something) else or not as a result of being created at all. I shall ignore this second way for its inherent implausibility and lack of supporters.
I shall focus on the view that fictional individuals exist as a result of being created by the relevant author(s).¹ Let us call this view creationism in fiction, or creationism for short. Creationism was always an option for theorists working on the metaphysics of fiction but has recently gained unprecedented popularity among analytic philosophers. I shall attempt to swim against this strong fashionable current. Creationism is the view that fictional individuals exist (i.e., actually exist) by being created by their author(s), and I shall defend the claim that fictional individuals do not (actually) exist by arguing against creationism.

The creationist literature is rich, but the most powerful and most frequently repeated justifications for creationism are to be found in the enormously influential papers by John Searle and Peter van Inwagen. It would be an exaggeration but not an unfair exaggeration to say that creationism in the recent incarnation was born in those papers. I believe it is high time we revisited those classic papers with a critical eye. Seemingly powerful and influential as their arguments are, I believe they are ultimately unsuccessful in establishing creationism. In the case of Searle, it turns out that it is not even clear that his view gives coherent support to creationism. In the case of van Inwagen, though it is clear that his view supports creationism, the support is far from conclusive.

More specifically, my criticism will be directed at Searle’s account of how an author of fiction creates a fictional individual and van Inwagen’s accounts of the semantic and metaphysical status of fictional individuals. I shall conclude my criticism of creationism with a more general objection based on the very concept of fictionality.

II. Creation by Pretense?
Searle summarizes his main ontological claim about fictional individuals succinctly as follows:

By pretending to refer to people and to recount events about them, the author creates fictional characters and events.\(^2\)

This connects two apparent platitudes about fiction, namely, that the author pretends to tell a true story and that the author creates fictional individuals. Searle says that the author achieves the latter by doing the former. This claim has been widely accepted. Here is one typical expression of its acceptance by another leading philosopher:

... fictional entities are created in a straightforward and unproblematic way by the pretending use of names: the fictional entity Jonathan Pine was quite literally and straightforwardly created by John Le Carré’s use of ‘Jonathan Pine’ in order to pretend, in the way definitive of fiction, to refer to a real person.\(^3\)

One cannot help wondering, however, how “straightforward and unproblematic” such creation by pretense is. Searle anticipates this and offers an elaboration in a famous passage. I shall quote the passage in full despite its length, as it is crucial:

But how is it possible for an author to “create” fictional characters out of thin air, as it were?

To answer this let us go back to the passage from Iris Murdoch. The second sentence begins,
“so thought Second Lieutenant Andrew Chase-White.” Now in this passage Murdoch uses a proper name, a paradigm referring expression. Just as in the whole sentence she pretends to make an assertion, in this passage she pretends to refer (another speech act). One of the conditions on the successful performance of the speech act of reference is that there must exist an objet that the speaker is referring to. Thus by pretending to refer she pretends that there is an object to be referred to. To the extent that we share in the pretense, we will also pretend that there is a lieutenant named Andrew Chase-White living in Dublin in 1916. It is the pretended reference which creates the fictional character and the shared pretense which enables us to talk about the character in the manner of the passage about Sherlock Holmes quoted above [“There never existed a Mrs. Sherlock Holmes because Holmes never got married, but there did exist a Mrs. Watson because Watson did get married, though Mrs. Watson died not long after their marriage’”] ... By pretending to refer to (and recount the adventures of) a person, Miss Murdoch creates a fictional character. Notice that she does not really refer to a fictional character because there was no such antecedently existing character; rather, by pretending to refer to a person she creates a fictional person. Now once that fictional character has been created, we who are standing outside the fictional story can really refer to a fictional person. Notice that in the passage about Sherlock Holmes above, I really referred to a fictional character (i.e., my utterance satisfies the rules of reference). I did not pretend to refer to a real Sherlock Holmes; I really referred to the fictional Sherlock Holmes.4

Searle’s reasoning is this:
1. Murdoch pretends to refer to an individual by her use of the proper name ‘Andrew Chase-White.’

But 2. A speech act of reference is successful only if there exists an object the speaker is referring to.

So, 3. Murdoch pretends that there is an object she is referring to by her use of the proper name ‘Andrew Chase-White.’

So, 4. Murdoch creates Andrew Chase-White.

The move from 1 and 2 to 3 seems acceptable. But the crucial step from 3 to 4 definitely seems abrupt and unwarranted. Murdoch pretends the following situation to obtain: there be an object she is referring to by her use of the proper name ‘Andrew Chase-White.’ She does this while in fact she is not referring to a fictional individual (“because there was no such antecedently existing character”). How is this supposed to result in her creation of Andrew Chase-White? It is not clear at all. This leaves Murdoch’s alleged creation of Chase-White mysterious. It does nothing to explain how the author can possibly create the character “out of thin air.”

There is an additional problem with Searle’s position. As we noted, he says that a speech act of reference is successful only if there exists an object the speaker is referring to. He also says with emphasis that we do really refer to Sherlock Holmes when we say things like “Holmes remained a bachelor.” It follows then that according to Searle, when we say things like “Holmes remained a bachelor,” there exists Sherlock Holmes. This accords well with his creationism. However, Searle also says, “Holmes and Watson never existed at all, which is not of course to deny that they exist in fiction.
and can be talked about as such.” This is surprising. Does Searle mean to say that Holmes exists when we say things like “Holmes remained a bachelor” and that Holmes never existed at all? An obvious but facile attempt to make this intelligible would be to say that although referring presupposes existence, talking about does not. Thus, we talk about Holmes when we say “Holmes remained a bachelor,” but we do so without referring to Holmes. The problem with this is that it makes the notion of talking about something quite mysterious. If we succeed in talking about Holmes and successful reference presupposes existence, then how can Holmes manage not to exist at all? Also, according to Searle, Holmes never existed at all, and according to Searle, Doyle created Holmes. Searle’s position seems hardly coherent.

Perhaps I am being uncharitable to Searle. Perhaps I should interpret him as claiming that Murdoch created Chase-White not in the sense of bringing him into existence in reality but in the sense of bringing him into existence in fiction, and that we can really refer to Chase-White despite his lack of existence in actuality because he exists in fiction. I find such a view attractive myself, but it is not Searle’s view and it does not support creationism. It is not Searle’s view because it flatly contradicts one of Searle’s central theses, viz., that the speech act of reference is unsuccessful if there does not exist an object the speaker is referring to. Here, of course, ‘exist’ means robust existence, viz., existence in actuality, not any watered-down kind of existence, such as existence in the speaker’s mind, existence as an idea, or existence in fiction. The view does not support creationism because creationism asserts the existence of fictional individuals in actuality, not just in fiction.

How should we understand the notion of existence in fiction in the first place? The best way is to start by noting that there is an obvious sense in which it is true to say that Holmes remained a
bachelor. It is the “intra fiction” sense. That is, it is true that Holmes remained a bachelor in fiction. The locution “in fiction” here is to be understood as a sentential operator. So we have, “In fiction (i.e., in, or according to, the fictional Sherlock Holmes stories), Holmes remained a bachelor.” Likewise, to say that Holmes exists in fiction is to say that according to the fictional Holmes stories, Holmes exists. Creationism should not be confused with the claim that Holmes exists in fiction in this sense, as most opponents of creationism would agree with the claim.

Another possible way to rescue Searle from incoherence is to have him deny the entailment of existence by creation, or more accurately, to have him deny that necessarily for any x, if x is created, then x comes to exist. There are two problems with this. First, it still does not make Searle’s view supportive of creationism, as creationism entails that fictional individuals exist because they are created. To sever the connection between creation and existence is to deny creationism. Second, it makes a mockery of the notion of creation. It is an undeniable conceptual, indeed (I dare say) analytic, truth that for any x, if x is created, x comes into existence. To create something is to bring it into existence. If Murdoch really created Chase-White, he must really have come into existence, hence he must really exist. We should be careful enough to distinguish creativity from creation. The creativity with which an author describes a fictional character need not consist in her bringing the character into existence. It may instead consist in an unusually imaginative manner in which she writes the story, for example.

Searle argues from pretense to creation. This is surprising, for many pretense theorists are anti-creationists. Kendall L. Walton is the arch pretense theorist of our time and has done much to popularize the idea of pretense, or make-believe, as he calls it. Gareth Evans follows Walton and takes pretense seriously. Both of these philosophers are anti-creationists. This is not surprising. Not only
does creationism seem unnecessary to a committed pretense theorist but it also seems hostile to the centrality of pretense in fictional discourse. In Evans’ words, creationism “fails to recognize the undeniable element of pretence present in this kind of discourse [about fictional characters].”

If pretense plays a major role in creating fictional individuals, it is only legitimate to ask what that role is. Incredibly, however, this question has never been seriously addressed beyond the relatively superficial level of Searle’s passage above. To see that the question is genuine and requires a substantive answer, let us imagine a purely hypothetical situation. Let us say that unlike Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, another writer, Sarthur Donan Coyle, endeavored to write non-fiction. As it happened by sheer coincidence, Donan Coyle ended up writing stories which contained exactly the same words as Conan Doyle’s stories in exactly the same order. Coyle, unlike Doyle, thought he was writing true stories, for whatever twisted and improbable reasons. Coyle thought that there really was a detective called ‘Sherlock Holmes,’ that he was referring to that detective by his use of the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in his stories, that he himself was a medical doctor named ‘John Watson’ and a close friend of Holmes, and so on. Doyle was pretending to refer, predicate, assert, etc., in writing his stories, while Coyle thought he was really referring, predicating, asserting, etc., in writing his stories. The challenge for the pretense-theoretical creationists is to articulate in an informative way how the presence of pretense in Doyle’s writing of his stories gave rise to the creation of fictional individuals and how the lack of pretense in Coyle’s writing of his stories failed to do so.

III. Abstract Entities?
In supporting creationism, Peter van Inwagen emphasizes the theoretical and abstract nature of fictional individuals. According to the story *Martin Chuzzlewit* by Charles Dickens, Mrs. Gamp is a fat old woman who is fond of gin. Does this mean that if we listed all fat old women in the world who was fond of gin, Mrs. Gamp would be among them? No. There are (in the past, present, and future) many fat old women who are fond of gin, but Mrs. Gamp, the fictional individual from *Martin Chuzzlewit*, is not one of them. Van Inwagen agrees with this and says that Mrs. Gamp is neither, fat, old, a woman, nor fond of gin. This, however, does not mean that when we say, e.g., “Mrs. Gamp is fond of gin,” there is no way to interpret our statement so that it comes out true. On van Inwagen’s view:

... we may say “Mrs. Gamp is fond of gin” and be talking about a theoretical entity of criticism without thereby predicating fondness for gin of that theoretical entity of criticism.12

What we may be doing is to be understood by means of a special triadic relation A, which van Inwagen calls “ascription.” He says ascription is a primitive relation and does not attempt to defined it. But the idea is clear: ‘A(x,y,z)’ is intended to capture what we ordinarily mean by ‘According to the fiction z, the fictional individual y has the property x.’ Since according to the story *Martin Chuzzlewit*, Mrs. Gamp has the property of being fond of gin, it is the case that A(being fond of gin, Mrs. Gamp, *Martin Chuzzlewit*). And this is what we intend to say when we say “Mrs. Gamp is fond of gin.”

This way of thinking about fictional individuals seems to have the consequence that any finished fictional story is a massively false story about existent individuals. For example, Mrs. Gamp is a fat old
gin-loving woman according to *Martin Chuzzlewit*, but Mrs. Gamp is none of these things. In fact (in van Inwagen’s view), Mrs. Gamp is not human. Worse yet (in his view), Mrs. Gamp is not even concrete! The novel is full of other fictional characters and other fictional individuals, and it is equally massively false about all of them. This poses a serious problem for creationism because it deepens the mysteriousness of the creation of fictional individuals. When Dickens finished writing *Martin Chuzzlewit*, he finished creating Mrs. Gamp, among other fictional beings, according to creationism. The problem is that it is very difficult to fathom how Dickens could create an individual by writing a story which, when finished, would be a massively false story about that individual. If the created individual were a concrete particular, say, a particular word token on a particular sheet of paper, there would be no problem. An author could perfectly well write a massively false story about a particular word token he produced. But in such a case, the fact that the author wrote a story would have nothing to do with the creation of the word token. The token would have been created if the author had not produced any other word token. Fictional individuals are different. Mrs. Gamp’s creation is supposed to be essentially tied to Dickens’ writing a certain story, not just his producing certain linguistic tokens, and the story Dickens writes turns out to be massively false not only about Mrs. Gamp but also about all other fictional individuals in the story. The creation of Mrs. Gamp or any other fictional individual in the story seems unfathomable.

A creationist may object to my characterization of a fictional story as being massively false about the fictional individuals its author is supposed to create. It may be said that a fictional story cannot be a false story about fictional individuals because it is neither true nor false about anything. This is a peculiar objection but its motivation is not hard to understand. It comes from the pretense theory of
fictional discourse. As we saw earlier, Searle is a representative pretense theorist. According to Searle, an author, in writing fiction, pretends to refer to and say true things about real individuals. Dickens did not in fact refer or assert anything true by using the term ‘Mrs. Gamp’ but he pretended to refer to a real woman and assert something true about her. Dickens did not make assertions but only pretended to make assertions. So, what he wrote was neither true nor false.

This may be an understandable train of reasoning but it is defective. It conflates pragmatics and semantics. More specifically, it conflates a speech act and its result. Dickens was engaged in a speech act of pretending to (refer and) assert. He did not assert. So he did not commit himself to the truth of the sentences he wrote. This means, among other things, that even if these sentences are not true, Dickens is not to be blamed for it, and even if they are true, he is not to be praised for it. But, of course, this does not at all mean that these sentences are not true or that they are not false. Searle himself puts a relevant point succinctly:

What they (the conventions of fictional discourse) do rather is enable the speaker to use words with their literal meanings without undertaking the commitments that are normally required by those meanings.

The sentences Dickens wrote retain their literal meanings and therefore are open to semantic evaluations. Dickens’ sentence

(1) Mrs. Gamp is a fat old woman who is fond of gin
in *Martin Chuzzlewit* retains its literal meaning. It contains the (apparent) proper name (with a title) ‘Mrs. Gamp.’ According to creationism, Mrs. Gamp exists, as it is created by Dickens’ writing of the story. From this, we must admit, it does not follow by logic alone that, given creationism, ‘Mrs. Gamp’ in (1) refers to Mrs. Gamp. But it would be very odd indeed, given creationism, if ‘Mrs. Gamp,’ as it occurs in the very story the writing of which was responsible for creating Mrs. Gamp, did not refer to Mrs. Gamp. We need to take special care here to remember to distinguish the term’s reference from the writer’s reference. Dickens may not have been referring to anything by ‘Mrs. Gamp,’ but ‘Mrs. Gamp’ is an (apparent) referential term and creationism provides the obvious candidate for its reference, namely, Mrs. Gamp. Creationists agree that given the fact that (1) occurs in the story, it is true to say that according to the story, Mrs. Gamp was a fat old woman. The only reason for creationists to be able to say such a thing is that ‘Mrs. Gamp’ as it occurs in (1) refers to Mrs. Gamp and that (1) says of Mrs. Gamp that it (she) was a fat old woman, among other things. To put it mildly, the burden of proof is on those who insist that Mrs. Gamp was created by Dickens’ writing of the novel and that ‘Mrs. Gamp’ as it occurs in the novel does not refer to Mrs. Gamp.16

Thus, according to the story, Mrs. Gamp was a fat old woman. But, given creationism, in fact Mrs. Gamp was not a fat old woman. Therefore, the story is wrong about Mrs. Gamp. Compare this to the following situation. According to Jane, Joe is a philosopher. But in fact Joe is not a philosopher. It then follows that Jane is wrong about Joe. Specifically, Jane is wrong about Joe’s being a philosopher. The story is wrong about Mrs. Gamp’s having being a fat old woman. Jane may be right about Joe’s being other things, like male, human, concrete, etc. But the story is wrong about Mrs.
Gamp in virtually every respect. The story is massively wrong about Mrs. Gamp.

A related auxiliary objection is this. If, as creationists say, Dickens created Mrs. Gamp, then Dickens created Mrs. Gamp as being thus and so. In particular, Dickens created Mrs. Gamp as a fat old human female, rather than, say, a slim young reptilian male. If $x$ exists as a result of being created by $y$, and $y$ created $x$ as an $F$, then $x$ exists as an $F$. So, given creationism, Mrs. Gamp exists as a fat old human female. But according to creationism, Mrs. Gamp is neither fat, old, human, nor female.

IV. Theoretical Entities?

Searle more or less confined his remarks to discourse about fictional individuals in the “intra fiction” sense. He did mention some discourse about fiction in the “extra fiction” sense, but without due emphasis or much theoretical mileage. An important contribution by van Inwagen is to go beyond that and concentrate heavily on discourse about fictional individuals in the “extra fiction” sense.

(2) Mrs. Sarah Gamp was, four-and-twenty years ago, a fair representation of the hired attendant on the poor in sickness (From Dickens’s preface to an 1867 edition of *Martin Chuzzlewit*)

(3) Mrs. Gamp ... is the most fully developed of the masculine anti-woman visible in all Dickens’s novels (Sylvia Bank Manning, *Dickens as Satirist* [New Haven, 1971] p.79).
According to van Inwagen, we should take these sentences “at face value: as assertions about a certain entity called “Mrs. Gamp”.” He explicitly asserts that Mrs. Gamp exists: “… there is such a thing as Mrs. Gamp.” He then says:

*Question:* But why do you say there *is* such a thing as Mrs. Gamp? *Answer:* Because there *are* such things as characters in novels. And if there are such things as characters in novels, then Mrs. Gamp is one of them.

So, the argument is this: Characters in novels exist; Mrs. Gamp is a character in novels; therefore, Mrs. Gamp exists. To justify the first premise “Characters in novels exist,” van Inwagen invites us to consider the following sentences:

(4) There are characters in some 19th-century novels who are presented with a greater wealth of physical detail than is any character in any 18th-century novel

(5) Some characters in novels are closely modeled on actual people, while others are wholly products of the literary imagination, and it is usually impossible to tell which characters fall into which of these categories by textual analysis alone

(6) Since 19th-century English novelists were, for the most part, conventional Englishmen, we might expect most novels of the period to contain stereotyped comic Frenchmen or Italians; but very few such characters exist.
He says that these are true sentences of literary criticism and have existential implications. For example, (4) entails that there are such things as characters in 19\textsuperscript{th}-century novels. Since (4) is true, characters in 19\textsuperscript{th}-century novels exist. Likewise from (5) and (6), we can conclude that characters in novels that are closely modeled on actual people exist, that characters in novels that are wholly products of the literary imagination exist, and that stereotyped comic Frenchman or Italian characters in 19\textsuperscript{th}-century English novels exist.\textsuperscript{24}

This is an ingenious argument and it seems to have convinced many philosophers. I, however, find van Inwagen’s exposition here a little muddled. So let us be clear about his reasoning before criticizing it properly. He mentions the sentences (4) - (6) as part of his answer to the question on the existence of Mrs. Gamp. As we have noted, this means that his discussion of (4) - (6) is meant to establish the claim that characters in novels exist. But it appears to fall short of doing so. In order to establish the existence of Mrs. Gamp, van Inwagen resorts to two claims: that Mrs. Gamp is a character in a novel, and that characters in novels exist. For this to work, the second claim has to be interpreted as fully universally quantified, i.e., as asserting that all characters in novels exist. However, one might think, the ensuing discussion of (4) - (6) does not establish such a claim. It would at best establish the existence of some characters in some 19\textsuperscript{th}-century novels, some characters in novels that are closely modeled on actual people, some characters in novels that are wholly products of the literary imagination, and very few stereotyped comic Frenchman or Italian characters in 19\textsuperscript{th}-century English novels. Or so one might think. If one thought so, since the missing premise is that Mrs. Gamp is one of those characters and this implicit premise is not obviously true, one might think that van Inwagen’s discussion of (4) - (6) is insufficient to show that Mrs. Gamp, or any particular fictional individual,
exists.

If one thought along those lines, one would be misunderstanding van Inwagen’s discussion. It is true that (4) - (6) do not establish by themselves that all fictional characters exist. But they are not intended to do so. Nor does van Inwagen’s argument for the existence of Mrs. Gamp require them to do so. Sentences such as (2) and (3), when understood correctly, are sufficient for establishing the existence of Mrs. Gamp, according to van Inwagen. (4) - (6) simply provide more sentences of the same pertinent general type as (2) and (3), except that (4) - (6) explicitly contain apparent existential quantification over fictional characters. All of these sentences are meant to be suggestive examples. The general thrust van Inwagen seeks to convey by these examples is that all fictional characters are “theoretical entities of literary criticism” and many statements in literary criticism are true when taken “at face value” and have existential implications. He takes literary criticism to “include all “informed” discourse about the nature, content, and value of literary works.” So, for example, as long as there is at least one piece of literary criticism in van Inwagen’s sense that is true and entails the existence of Holmes when taken “at face value,” van Inwagen has an argument for the existence of Holmes. And there appears to be such a piece of literary criticism about Holmes: e.g., “There is a unique fictional individual that is portrayed as a superb detective with the name ‘Sherlock Holmes’ in Arthur Conan Doyle’s *Holmes* stories.” Such a sentence appears to be true and have the right existential implication when taken “at face value.”

Let us not quibble with van Inwagen’s phrase ‘literary works.’ In distinguishing fiction from literature, Searle says, “The Sherlock Holmes stories of Conan Doyle are clearly works of fiction, but it is a matter of judgment whether they should be regarded as a part of English literature.” Let us ignore
what Searle says and simply read van Inwagen’s ‘literary works’ as ‘fictional works.’

We should also read van Inwagen’s word ‘discourse’ here charitably. His argument does not require that someone utter, even privately, a piece of literary criticism of the relevant kind. What is crucial is the truth of the relevant sentence of literary criticism, not its utterance or any other use. Furthermore in this connection, we should not take his word ‘character’ seriously, either. All fictional characters are fictional individuals but not all fictional individuals are fictional characters. Indeed, most fictional individuals are not fictional characters. Only those fictional individuals which are significant in the story, and perhaps also portrayed as animate, are fictional characters. We should not disregard “informed” discourse about fictional individuals which are not fictional characters. Thus, even if no one utters or even thinks of any piece of literary criticism about a particular insignificant fictional individual, say, the shoe lace on the left shoe Holmes was wearing when confronting Moriarty for the first time, as long as some sentence with the right existential implication is true when taken “at face value,” van Inwagen’s argument will go through in favor of the existence of that fictional individual, if it should go through in favor of the existence of anything at all.28

The idea therefore is that we should accept literary criticism “at face value” and if we do, we should accept the existence of the theoretical entities it postulates, namely, fictional individuals. So, what is really suggested by van Inwagen’s (4) - (6) is not a particular argument or arguments. It is instead an argument schema. Let us formulate it explicitly. One may be tempted to put it as follows:

(A) It is a truth of literary criticism that $M$.

(B) That $M$ entails "exists
So, (C) " exists.

Here the Greek letters, " and 'M,' are to be replaced with an (apparent) singular term for a fictional individual and a sentence of literary criticism with the relevant existential import, respectively. This is not an adequate formulation, for its invalidity is so obvious that it fails to be sufficiently charitable. What follows from the schematic premises at best is the conclusion schema,

(C') It is a truth of literary criticism that " exists.

I say “at best,” for (C’) follows from (A) and (B) only under the assumption that the truths of literary criticism are closed under entailment, and this is a dubious assumption. The more important point, of course, is that (C’) does not entail (C). Van Inwagen explicitly draws an analogy between literary criticism and physics. He says that just as we should accept the existence of theoretical entities of the theories of physics we accept, we should also accept the existence of theoretical entities of literary criticism we accept. We should take van Inwagen seriously when he says that we should take such sentences as (2) - (6) “at face value.” That is, we should understand him as arguing that if some sentence is included in literary criticism as true, then it is true. Taking a sentence “at face value” is tantamount to moving it out of the sentential operator “it is a truth of literary criticism that.” This leads us to inserting an additional lemma as a consequence of (A):

(A’) (It is true that) M.
(C) follows from (A’) and (B). Thus we now appear to have a valid argument schema. This is the
strongest reconstruction of van Inwagen’s argument I can think of that is faithful to his text.

Now the criticism: (A’) does not follow from (A). As I indicated, van Inwagen’s justification
for the move from (A) to (A’) is that we should take sentences of literary criticism, e.g., (2) - (6), “at
face value.” I see two problems with this justification.

First, it rests on the assumption that literary criticism is a discipline, or activity, that is aimed at
discovering truths about the actual world, on a par with physics. This assumption is false. No empirical
discipline is on a par with physics as a way of discovering truths. Every natural science is secondary to
physics in the sense that it is not allowed to contradict physics. Every social or behavioral science is
secondary to natural sciences in the sense that it is not allowed to contradict natural sciences. Literary
criticism is not even a social science. It is not a science of any kind. Its main aim is not to discover
truths, but to help enhance aesthetic and other kinds of experience by the readers and listeners of
literary or fictional works. Sometimes pointing out some truths about the actual world helps, but it is
only a means, not an end. Literary criticism is not a discipline or activity aimed at propositional truth at
all. Instead it is an activity aimed at practical results. Its main goal is to do something, namely, help the
readers and listeners of literary or fictional works appreciate them, in the broadest sense of the word
‘appreciate.’ Any means by which this may be achieved is allowable in literary criticism. Capturing the
actual world as it is has no privileged status.

Apart from this general point concerning the nature of literary criticism, an additional point
should be made concerning specific examples. Some sentences in literary criticism indeed express
truths about the actual world in the straightforward sense: e.g., ‘Dickens lived in the 19th century and
wrote in English.’ Such sentences, when occurring within literary criticism, should be taken to be true “at face value.” But this is so only because their truth is ascertained by other disciplines, history in this case. Unlike such sentences, (2) - (6) are indigenous to literary criticism, and that is why van Inwagen chose them. We should be careful not to take sentences indigenous to literary criticism “at face value.” Consider (3), for example. If we take it “at face value,” we will assert the sentence, ‘Mrs. Gamp ... is the most fully developed of the masculine anti-woman visible in all Dickens’s novels.’ Then by logic, we will be committed to the truth of ‘Mrs. Gamp is a masculine anti-woman.’ But Mrs. Gamp is not a masculine anti-woman, for Mrs. Gamp is not even concrete, according to creationism. Another example: (4). If we take it “at face value,” we will assert the sentence, ‘There are characters in some 19th-century novels who are presented with a greater wealth of physical detail than is any character in any 18th-century novel.’ Then by logic and the meaning of the relative pronoun ‘who,’ we will be committed to the truth of ‘Some characters are animate.’ But no characters are animate, for none of them are even concrete, according to creationism. An insignificant alteration to (4) gives us a slightly more dramatic example: ‘There are female characters in some 19th-century novels who are presented with a greater wealth of physical detail than is any female character in any 18th-century novel.’ By taking this “at face value,” we will be committed to the truth of ‘Some characters are female.’ But no characters are female, as they are abstract, according to creationism.

This brings out another objection to van Inwagen. He says, and most creationists agree, that we may legitimately refer to Mrs. Gamp by a feminine pronoun and other linguistic devices borrowed from the story, e.g., ‘the fat old gin-drinking female,’ even though Mrs. Gamp is abstract. So, for example, it is perfectly legitimate for us to say, “Mrs. Gamp is the most fully developed of the fat old
gin-drinking female in all English novels. She is well known among the readers of 19th-century English novels. The fat old gin-drinking female is also a fair representation of the hired attendant on the poor in sickness,” and thereby refer to the abstract object, Mrs. Gamp, and assert that it is the most fully developed of the fat old gin-drinking female in all English novels, is well known among the readers of 19th-century English novels, and is also a fair representation of the hired attendant on the poor in sickness. But when we do this, our words ‘she’ and ‘the fat old gin-drinking female’ are obviously not to be taken “at face value.” Mrs. Gamp is abstract, and not at all female, fat, or gin-drinking. Thus, here is a dilemma for van Inwagen: Either we can refer to Mrs. Gamp by ‘she,’ ‘the fat old ....,’ and the like, or we cannot. If we can, then literary criticism should not be taken “at face value,” as the language of literary criticism is not metaphysically straightforward but bound to the host story in such a way that what might appear to be asserted in literary criticism is heavily parasitic on what is truth in the story. If we cannot, then most pieces of literary criticism fail to refer to the intended characters. Either way, van Inwagen’s argument for the existence of fictional characters is undermined.

Let us assume with the majority of creationists that in literary criticism we can refer to fictional individuals by means of any of the (apparent) singular terms used for those individuals in the host story in which they figure. Then those terms so used in literary criticism should not be taken “at face value.” If the (apparent) singular terms are not to be taken “at face value,” neither are (apparent) quantifiers. Sentences such as (4) - (6) should be approached cautiously. They contain apparent quantification over fictional individuals. According to van Inwagen, we should take such quantification “at face value” and conclude that literary criticism commits us to the existence of fictional individuals. We now have reason to doubt this. The challenge for us now is to say how such quantification should be taken, if not
“at face value.” Here “at face value” means “with direct ontic commitment.” That is, quantification taken “at face value” is *objectual* quantification. An alternative kind of quantification that suggests itself quite naturally for literary criticism is *substitutional*. Under substitutional quantification, an apparent quantification over fictional individuals is to be interpreted as real quantification over (apparent) singular terms for fictional individuals in the host story. For example, (4) - (6) are interpreted as being true under the conditions along the following lines:

(4') There be (apparent) singular terms, \( t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_k \) (\( 1 < k \)), in some 19\(^{th}\)-century novels such that for any (apparent) singular term \( t_m \) in any 18\(^{th}\)-century novel the accompanying predicates for \( t_1, t_2, \ldots, t_k \) exhibit a greater wealth of physical detail than the accompanying predicates for \( t_m \).

(5') Some (apparent) singular terms in novels be accompanied by predicates that are closely modeled on the predicates for actual people, while others are wholly products of the literary imagination, and it is usually impossible to tell which terms fall into which of these categories by textual analysis alone.

(6') Since 19\(^{th}\)-century English novelists were, for the most part, conventional Englishmen, we might expect most novels of the period to contain (apparent) singular terms accompanied by predicates for stereotyped comic Frenchmen or Italians; but very few such terms exist.

One objection to the idea of substitutional quantification is that there is a mismatch between fictional
individuals and (apparent) singular terms for them. Some fictional individuals are not given with sufficient specificity for there to be even one (apparent) singular term for them in the host story: e.g., “A crowd lunged forward.” If nothing else is said of the crowd in the story, there is no (apparent) singular term for any member of the crowd. This objection forces us to abandon the strictest substitutional quantification, which requires that the quantification be over terms that explicitly occur in the host story. But we may safely embrace a less strict version. It has a parallel in the account of truth in fiction. So let us consider the latter briefly. Most philosophers, including most creationists, agree that truth in fiction goes beyond what is explicitly said in the story. Even though no sentence to the effect that Mrs. Watson had a liver explicitly occurs in the *Holmes* stories, it is true in the stories that Mrs. Watson had a liver. Likewise what is explicitly stated in the story, “A crowd lunged forward,” combined with what is expected of the story yields the truth that in the story each member of the crowd existed. So we can include in the domain of the substitutional quantifiers such terms as ‘the first member of the crowd to lunge,’ ‘the tallest member of the crowd,’ ‘the heaviest member of the crowd,’ etc. But what if the members of the crowd are completely indistinguishable from one another? Is it then not true to say, e.g., that in the story some members of the crowd are indistinguishable? If so, then since no terms are available as the substituents for the variables in ‘In the story $x_1$ is a member of the crowd, $x_2$ is a member of the crowd, ..., $x_n$ is a member of the crowd, and $x_1 \neq x_2, x_1 \neq x_3, ..., x_2 \neq x_3, ...$’ so as to yield a true sentence, are we not forced to read ‘some members’ objectually and accept the existence of fictional individuals that are, according to the story, members of the crowd? Not necessarily. The truth condition for the sentence in question need not follow the surface form of the sentence strictly. We can easily see that the following substitutional quantificational truth condition is perfectly adequate:
there be a substituent term for the variable in the sentence ‘In the story $x$ has indistinguishable members’ such that its substitution results in a true sentence. There is indeed such a term, namely, ‘the crowd.’ This kind of paraphrasing strategy is guaranteed to work as long as there is an (apparent) singular term for the collection whose members are indistinguishable, and it is hard to see how a story could include indistinguishable members of a collection while containing no (apparent) singular term for the collection at least implicitly.\footnote{31}

Thus we have found at least one way to mark the sense in which literary criticism differs from physics in ontological seriousness. Quantification in physics is objectual, while quantification in literary criticism is substitutional. There is much more to be said on this matter. But we need to proceed to further issues concerning creationism.

V. Like Other Creations?

As we saw, van Inwagen regards fictional individuals as theoretical entities of literary criticism. Among such entities he also includes “plots, sub-plots, novels (as opposed to tangible copies of novels), poems, meters, rhymes, borrowings, influences, digressions, episodes, recurrent patterns of imagery, and literary forms (“the novel,” “the sonnet”).”\footnote{92} Accusing anti-creationists of false parsimony, Amie L. Thomasson follows the spirit of van Inwagen’s remark and expands on it. There are two parts to her accusation.

First, she says that one should not eliminate fictional individuals on the basis of their dependence on mental states or their abstractness, for “such things as works of art and scientific theories, churches
and schools, and behaviors and social institutions depend on mental states just as fictional objects do’ and ‘[like] fictional objects, ideal entities like numbers (Platonistically conceived) and ... universals, laws, and scientific theories, ... fail to be located in space-time ... [and] are abstract.’\textsuperscript{33} This is the weaker of the two, for even if we assume for the sake of argument that works of art, scientific theories, churches, schools, behaviors, social institutions, numbers, universals, and laws exist, not all of them are of the same relevant kind as fictional individuals, namely, things that are both created in a certain specific way and abstract. Thomasson herself classifies all of these items except works of art as belonging to different ontological categories.\textsuperscript{34} So, the analogy with fictional individuals is weak.

The second part of her accusation does not suffer from this defect, as it concentrates on the analogy with literary works only. She says that fictional individuals and literary works are both abstract entities that are “generically constantly dependent and rigidly historically dependent on real entities” and “rigidly historically dependent on and generically constantly dependent on mental states.”\textsuperscript{35} Her point is that one should embrace fictional individuals as created existents just as one should embrace literary works as created existents. Plainly, her point is only as strong as the parallelism between fictional individuals and literary works. I think the parallelism is ambiguous, and when taken one way it is rather weak, and when taken the other way it supports anti-creationism.

The story \textit{A Study in Scarlet} is a collection of English sentences, which Doyle wrote in 1886. English sentences are sequences of English words in conformity with the syntactic rules of English. English words are those sequences of letters which are included in the vocabulary of English. The vocabulary of English is a finite list of sequences of letters from the English alphabet. A sequence of sequences of things is a sequence of those things. So, the literary work, \textit{A Study in Scarlet}, is a
collection of sequences of the letters of English alphabet in conformity with certain syntactic rules. As such, the work is at least as abstract as any sequence of letters, which in turn is at least as abstract as the letters. The letters are abstract line-shape types. So the work is at least as abstract as line-shape types. Line-shape types, like any type, may be instantiated. To write *A Study in Scarlet* is to produce an instance of the sequence of the line-shape types that is the story without copying another such instance. Doyle did so in 1886. The instantiation he produced is a particular collection of particular ink marks on particular sheets of paper arranged in a particular sequence. Thus, we have two candidates for our comparison with fictional individuals: the story itself and the instantiation of the story produced by Doyle. This is the ambiguity of the parallelism. Let us first compare fictional individuals to the instantiation of the story. The instantiation of the story consists of marks on sheets of paper and therefore is as concrete as anything, having a particular spatial location. Also, once created by Doyle, it needs no further mental goings-on to continue its existence. Fictional individuals, on the other hand, are abstract, lacking spatial location, and dependent on the mental goings-on of the readers for their continued existence, according to Thomasson. This makes the parallelism very weak in crucial respects. Let us then compare fictional individuals to the story itself. The story is abstract, and, according to creationists, so are fictional individuals. So far so good. But the story, as a sequence of line-shape types, did not come into existence when Doyle wrote it. It had existed prior to his writing it. Also, it will continue to exist independently of any mental goings-on. So, if fictional individuals are to be seen as being on a par with the story, creationism is undermined.

Creationists might object that I am being unfair to Thomasson by defining literary works merely syntactically. They might say that a literary work is not a mere collection of sequences of letters but
something further that crucially depends on mental goings-on. We should not forget semantics, they
might insist. Fair enough. But this merely points to the sense of literary work which calls for
interpretation of syntactic items. The story *A Study in Scarlet* under this conception is a certain
sequence of letters under interpretation, where the interpretation is in conformity with the semantics of
English. What is an interpretation? It is a mapping of syntactic items (e.g., sentences) to contents (e.g.,
propositions). So the story is a sequence of syntactic items combined with a particular mapping of
those items to contents. The “combined with” here may be understood in a variety of ways, but let us
go with a handy and fairly standard device of convenience and say that the story is an ordered pair of a
sequence of syntactic items and the corresponding contents they are mapped to. The story in this
semantically loaded sense then is an abstract object that existed prior to Doyle’s writing it and continues
to exist independently of mental goings-on. This does not help Thomasson.

Perhaps, I am still not being fair to Thomasson. She writes:

A literary work only comes into existence through the intentional mental states of an author; if a
pile of sticks happens to wash up on shore arranged into what looks like a series of letters at
the water’s edge, we have a remarkable occurrence, but not a work of literature, nor any
fictional characters, but only some marks that happen to resemble letters and words.\(^{37}\)

Here I believe she is confusing how literary works come into existence with how they are written.

Doyle wrote *A Study in Scarlet* in 1886. He did so through intentional mental states. If he had not
been in intentional mental states, he would not have been able to write the story. In this sense, his
intentional mental states played a key role in his writing of the story. In fact, the author’s intentional mental states played a similar key role in writing of any story that has ever been written by anybody, and this will probably hold true for any literary work to be written by anybody in the future. But this only shows the causal dependence of the author’s writing of a literary work on his/her intentional mental states, not the ontological dependence of the existence of the work on the mental states. Thomassn’s example of washed-up sticks underscores this. Such sticks do not constitute an instantiation of a literary work as written by anyone, for no one arranged the sticks that way. The right kind (i.e., intentional mental kind) of causal factors are absent. But this does not mean that the sticks do not constitute an instantiation of a literary work. Not all instantiations of literary works need to be written by someone. The sticks are certainly open to interpretation in accordance with the semantics of English. Whether they are actually so interpreted by someone or not should not affect its ontological status.38

VI. Fictionality

Let us conclude with a final objection against creationism. It is devastatingly simple. Unlike you and me, Mrs. Gamp is a fictional individual. To say this entails that Mrs. Gamp does not exist. Fictionality of a thing entails its non-existence. There are two standard creationist replies to this objection. Both use the paraphrase strategy. They say that when we say that Mrs. Gamp does not exist, what we say is not true but what we mean to say is true and that when one says that it is true that Mrs. Gamp does not exist, one is confusing what we say and what we mean to say. The two replies
differ on what we mean to say. According to the first reply, what we mean to say is that there is no such woman (or human or ...) as Mrs. Gamp.\textsuperscript{39} According to the second reply, what we mean to say is that nothing has all the properties ascribed to Mrs. Gamp in the story.\textsuperscript{40} The first reply has counterexamples: e.g., ‘Boojams do not exist.’ When we deny the existence of boojams on the grounds that they are fictional, we need not be able to give a sortal or other kind term to fill the gap in ‘There are no such (    ) as boojams,’ except for such an empty kind term as ‘things’ or ‘entities.’

Since creationists maintain that boojams exist (assuming that boojams are indeed genuinely fictional individuals, i.e., they are real, rather than fictional, according to the relevant story), it is false to say that there are no such things, or entities, as boojams. Another difficulty with the first reply is that it is unable to account for the apparent truth of some general statements: e.g., ‘All fictional individuals are unreal,’ ‘All fictional individuals are non-existent,’ ‘No fictional individual exists,’ ‘What distinguishes fictional individuals from you and me is that the former do not exist.’ The paraphrasing strategy of the first reply does not apply here. Does the second reply fare better? The second reply entails that what we mean to say when we say ‘Mrs. Gamp does not exist’ in our attempt to contrast Mrs. Gamp with you and me is false if some existing individual has all the properties ascribed to Mrs. Gamp in the story. But what we mean to say when we say ‘Mrs. Gamp does not exist’ in our attempt to contrast Mrs. Gamp with you and me is not false if some actual person about whom Dickens was not writing happens to have all the properties ascribed to Mrs. Gamp in the story. So the second reply does not fare any better.

There is no way to understand the fictionality of fictional individuals without making them non-existent.\textsuperscript{41}
Notes

1. I take it for granted that if an author creates a fictional individual, s/he creates it by (or, in, or, as a result of) writing the relevant story.


4. Ibid., pp. 71-72, emphasis his.

5. Except that we really need a stronger premise than 2, namely, that Murdoch knows that a speech act of reference is successful only if there exists an object the speaker is referring to. And even this is not enough, strictly speaking. Some kind of closure principle on pretense is required. But I shall ignore these minor defects.

6. On page 130 of “The Problem of Non-Existents, I. Internalism,” Topoi 1 (1982), pp. 97-140, Kit Fine expresses a seemingly different view of creation in fiction when he says of fictional individuals, “... they come into being as the result of [the appropriate activity of the author], in much the same way as a table comes into being as the result of the activity of a carpenter.” This analogy, however, does not help. Pretense, and story-telling in particular, plays no essential role in a carpenter’s creation of a table. Nor does the appropriate activity of the author essentially involve manipulation and reconfiguration of physical objects. This makes it hard to understand the sameness of the way of creation Fine alleges between creation of a fictional individual and creation of a table.

7. Ibid., p. 71.

8. Kit Fine denies the entailment. He says that fictional individuals are created but non-existent. To create something is to bring it into being but the “being” in question does not have to be existence. It may be actuality instead. For Fine, fictional individuals are created as actual individuals but they do not exist. Existence entails actuality but actuality does not entail existence. I find this notion of actuality unintelligible. Fine says that actuality is to be understood in contrast with mere possibility. But to be a possible individual is to be possible to exist. He would probably deny this and say instead that to be a possible individual is to be a possible being. Then I would not understand the notion of a possible being unless it is the same as a possible existent. See his op. cit., pp. 131-132.
9. Of course, he might have come into existence at one time and been annihilated later, so that he
does not exist now. I shall ignore such creation-then-annihilation scenarios.


11. Nathan Salmon would say that Coyle did create an individual. Such a view severs the tie
between creation and pretense, and therefore is not a version of pretense-theoretical
expresses reservations about Salmon’s view, in “Commitment,” *Philosophical Perspectives
12, language, Mind, and Ontology, 1998* (ed.) James E. Tomberlin (Boston & Oxford:

299-308, emphasis his.

13. If some creationist wants to claim that the creation of Mrs. Gamp was not completed when
Dickens finished writing the novel but it came about only when there was enough participation
by the readers of the novel, let us be more cautious and say that according to creationism,
Dickens did finish doing his obviously rather important part in the creation of Mrs. Gamp when
he finished writing the novel. This complication is minor and does not affect the rest of the
discussion seriously.

14. As we noted earlier, Kendall Walton has developed an elaborate theory of pretense but he is
not a creationist, so I shall not discuss him here.


16. Gregory Curry makes a similar point while defending the notion of truth in fiction. See his *The

17. The story is right about Mrs. Gamp’s being an entity, under creationism.

18. It is possible to be a creationist while maintaining that fictional individuals are concrete, or even
that they are exactly as they are described in the fiction. Though possible, such a position is
extremely implausible. I assume that any reasonable creationist would, following van Inwagen,
hold that all fictional individuals are abstract.


21. *Ibid.*, p. 301. He makes it clear that he takes ‘X exists’ as equivalent to ‘There is X’ or ‘There
is such a thing as X.’


24. The last of these implication is odd, thought not totally out of place, for (6) does not only entail existence but entails scarce existence.


28. The shoe lace example brings up another aspect of the mysteriousness of creation in fiction. If Doyle created Holmes by writing the stories, he must have created a host of other things by writing the same stories, including fictional individuals that are not fictional "characters." The shoe lace in question is such an example. But more interesting examples include fictional individuals that are parts of Holmes according to the stories: e.g., Holmes’ right arm, his right hand, his right index finger, etc. It is hard to deny that the creationists are committed to the existence and abstractness of such things as much as the existence and abstractness of Holmes. So, according to creationism, Doyle brought into existence a large number of abstract objects (e.g., Holmes and his body parts) which bear spatial part-whole relations to one another in the stories but not in fact. This is bizarre.


30. See the example of Dee and Dum in Fine, *op. cit.*, pp. 135-136.

31. Even if the story only contains the expression ‘some people’ for the collection in question, I say that the (apparent) singular term ‘the collection of people’ occur implicitly in the sense that it is true in the story that there is a unique collection of people in question.


34. As belonging to boxes other than the shaded box of Figures 9.1 and 9.2, *ibid.*, p. 131.


36. This allows the possibility for someone to write the story independently of Doyle. Some people think that such a story would not be the same story as *A Study in Scarlet*. Cf. Jorge Luis Borges, “Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote,” *Ficciones* (New York: New Directions,
1964). I find their reasoning highly unpersuasive.


38. Even when instantiations of sentences are produced by someone intentionally, his/her mental states need not determine the interpretation. As George A. Miller observes, “People who know only the rules of pronunciation can read a Spanish text aloud well enough that Spaniards can understand it, even though the readers have no idea what they are saying.” See his *The Science of Words* (New York: Scientific American Library, A Division of HPHLP, 1991), p. 56. Also see Herman Cappelen, “Intentions in Words,” *Noûs* 33:1, March 1999, pp. 92-102.

39. For example, see Thomasson on Parsons in *op. cit.*, p. 112.

40. For example, see Salmon, *op. cit.*, pp. 303-304. Van Inwagen seems to think that the second reply is a more precise version of the first. I believe they are independent of each other. See van Inwagen, *op. cit.*, p. 308, footnote 11.

41. I thank Amie Thomasson for helpful discussion.