Michael Hunt’s Lyndon Johnsons War is a concise look at the Vietnam conflict, the major players responsible for bringing us in

Autumn Hayner

17 Apr 2006

History 574

Précis

Hunt, Michael H. Lyndon Johnson’s War: America’s Cold War Crusade in Vietnam, 1945-1968. New York: Hill and Wang, 1996.

Michael Hunt’s Lyndon Johnson’s War is a brief but thorough look at the Vietnam war, the major players responsible for bringing the U.S. into the conflict (not only Johnson, as the title implies, but also Truman, Kennedy, and the “whiz kids”) and Johnson’s overwhelming responsibility for the escalation of American involvement in what would become the only foreign war ever “lost” by the U.S.

In chapter one, Hunt explores the background of American involvement in Indochina beginning with World War II. He uses the book The Ugly American by William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick to explain America’s Cold War inspired belief that by the Americans’ winning the “hearts and minds” of the Indochinese people, communism would not be able to gain a foothold in the region. He goes on to posit that while America spouted the ideas of self-determination and anti-colonialism, paternalism came to dictate U.S. policy in the region, inevitably leading to hostility from a people who fiercely craved their independence. Hunt goes on to set the historical context of the conflict by introducing the forces and factors that led to American involvement in Vietnam. He concisely discusses France’s colonial role in the region, introduces Ho Chi Minh and the rise of the Viet Minh, explains America’s role in installing premier Ngo Dinh Diem, describes America’s containment policy based on the domino principle, and contends that America’s misconceptions and preconceived notions about the Vietnamese people based on paternalistic ideas all came to play a part in the impending conflict.

In chapter two, Hunt discusses Ho Chi Minh’s “brocade bags.” Drawn from a Chinese tale in which three bags served as “repositories of ingenious solutions to daunting problems confronting their owner” (23), the author posits that Leninist ideology, patriotism, and populist programs filled Ho’s bags. Hunt begins the chapter by giving a biographical sketch of Ho Chi Minh, his anti-colonial upbringing and his communist political development in Paris. Garnering his communist ideology from reading a copy of Lenin’s “Theses on the National and Colonial Questions,” he would, in the early days of World War II, establish the Viet Minh and draw on the contents of his brocade bags to benefit the Vietnamese people. Hunt discusses the contents of Ho’s three brocade bags in detail, explaining how the combination of the three helped to draw the disaffected Vietnamese (especially, straying from Marxist doctrine, the peasants) into resistance against the “invaders.” The effectiveness of Ho’s military programs and the drive of the Vietnamese people to gain their freedom would be witnessed at Ap Bac in 1963. Hunt concludes the chapter by suggesting that American policymakers, including presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson, could not see Vietnam “as something more than the scene of a simple struggle between slavery and freedom or between a communist monolith and a free world.” (41) This narrow vision is what led to the undeclared war that would claim so many lives on both sides.

In chapter three, Hunt introduces the reader to the “best and the brightest” of the Kennedy (and, by extension, Johnson) administration, whose narrow and unqualified knowledge of Vietnam would drag America into the conflict. Hunt discusses the background of President Kennedy and his “whiz kids,” namely Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk, McGeorge Bundy, and Walt Witman Rostow and the elitism which led to a paternalistic view of a country they did not even “pretend to understand outside the broad goals and presumptions of the Cold War.” (43) The author posits that the limited and shallow understanding of foreign policy based on “reflexive anticommunism” (51) held by Kennedy and his advisors led to the installation of the ill-qualified and corrupt Ngo Dinh Diem and the inevitable introduction of “aid” to save the obstinate leader. The “best and the brightest,” however, failed to take into account the morale and motivation of the people of Vietnam. Thus, attempts to pacify the countryside were unsuccessful. Meanwhile, Diem’s popularity continued to decline and plans to stage a coup were put into the works. Hunt argues that the overthrow and assassination of Diem “served to accentuate…the policy bind that Kennedy and his advisers had created for themselves.” (66). They had effectively, if not somewhat unintentionally, increased American involvement in the country leaving the “whiz kids” searching for a solution. The problems associated with committing American forces to Vietnam would soon be thrust into Lyndon Johnson’s lap with Kennedy’s assassination in 1963.

Hunt goes on in chapter four to recount in some detail the policies and actions of Lyndon Johnson regarding Vietnam. He begins with a short biography of the colorful Texan whose upbringing and entry into politics helped form his paternalistic attitude and anti-communist ideology. Hunt contends that “Johnson’s foreign-policy stance reflected the qualities he shared with his Hill County constituents, neighbors and relatives – national pride, a macho sense of the importance of standing up to the bad guys, a proclivity to talk in terms of moral bromides, and a strong predisposition to support the president and the principle of a bipartisan foreign policy.” (76) Thus, perseverance and an unquenchable desire for victory in Vietnam came to dictate the decision Johnson made to escalate US involvement in the war when he assumed the presidency in 1963.

Hunt continues by discussing the “four discrete decisions” (78) Johnson made regarding the war in Vietnam. These four decisions, made at different periods early in his presidency, were to “stay the course” (78), “launch a sustained bombing campaign in North Vietnam” (79), “send U.S. ground troops to South Vietnam and authorize their combat role” (91), and make a “definitive, large scale commitment of U.S. forces” (94). Hunt contends that each of these decisions remain controversial to this day and goes on to discuss the four most common indictments made against Johnson and the war, confirming or debunking each charge in turn. He makes absolutely clear, however, that “Lyndon Johnson must bear primary responsibility for the Vietnam War. LBJ advanced toward his July 1965 decision confident in his Cold War faith, his nationalist ideals, and his code of manliness.” (106) Hubris led Americans to a war with a people that they did not understand and totally underestimated.

The consequences of the actions taken in Vietnam are explored in Hunt’s final chapter. The author discusses the results of the escalation which amounted to little more than frustrated American troops, heavy casualties on both sides, growing anti-war sentiment at home (especially after the Tet offensive), and the dissolution of Johnson’s domestic programs as the economy simply could not support guns and butter. He also examines the election of Richard Nixon, the Peace accords of 1972 and 1973 and the eventual fall of Saigon, a depressing end to an ill-conceived war. Hunt concludes the book by pointing out that the war was lost because “U.S. leaders plunged reluctantly and blindly into Vietnam (128),” and completely misjudged the enemy. In essence, Vietnam was lost primarily due to overzealous Cold War ideology and the hubris of those in power.

Small, Melvin. At the Water’s Edge: American Politics and the Vietnam War. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2005.

In At the Water’s Edge, author Melvin Small examines how domestic political considerations influenced the decisions made regarding the Vietnam conflict and how the legacy of Vietnam shapes American politics today. As with Hunt, Small opens his book with an examination of the origins of American involvement in Vietnam. Small approaches the background through the framework of American politics, exploring how the media and the public viewed policy makers’ decisions to become involved with the country. Small posits that the desire to win elections shaped policy in Vietnam beginning as early as 1956 with Eisenhower and proceeded through Nixon’s 1972 reelection campaign. Kennedy, however, was the first president to realize Vietnam’s impact on domestic politics. Kennedy knew that his reelection was, at least to a degree, dependent on the actions he took in South East Asia. Too little assistance, and the American public would view him as soft on communism. Too much assistance, and the American public would question aiding an unstable government in South Vietnam. Kennedy would not have to face this conundrum as his assassination left these (and a number of other) problems for Lyndon Johnson to navigate during the 1964 election.

Chapter two explores this election and how the Vietnam issue shaped the candidates’ campaigns. Johnson believed that the key to success in the election was to keep the people disinterested in Vietnam until after the votes had been cast. This was not to be, however, as his hawkish opponent, Barry Goldwater, brought the issue to the forefront of the campaign promising decisive military action in the country. Goldwater’s seemingly over zealous war talk was actually a blessing for the more moderate Johnson who was promising (falsely) no major American participation in the war. His position changed when the Gulf of Tonkin incident and subsequent Resolution passed by Congress virtually gave him a blank check to increase American involvement in the war – which he did shortly after being reelected. He retained his moderate stance for the election however, refusing to admit that escalation was most likely imminent.

In Chapter three, Small explores the escalation of American involvement in the Vietnam conflict in the year following the election and the political, social and economic results on the home front that resulted. Small begins with a discussion of the opposition that started growing within Johnson’s own party as the war heated up, making it a point to remind the reader that Congress, too, had to bear some responsibility since they had allowed for the passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. Small goes on to assert that as American involvement overseas intensified, the number of problems Johnson faced at home increased. These problems included the hardships the war put on LBJ’s Great Society programs and the need reenact and utilize the draft. These developments, in turn, led to economic instability and a growing, and at times violent, anti-war movement.

Chapter four examines many Democrats’ break with LBJ’s policies during the pivotal year of 1966. By this time, Vietnam had become a “living room war” (66) followed on television throughout America and shaping public opinion. Despite the fact that the polls showed that most Americans’ supported the actions being taken in Vietnam, dissention in Johnson’s party made him worry about reelection and he thus began to construct his Vietnam policy with “one eye on the upcoming election.” (75) This was a challenge since the uncensored, and allegedly unpatriotic media began running news reports highlighting what was really occurring in Vietnam. Small posits that a polarization had begun to occur in America by this time. On one side were the more “traditional” Americans, on the other were the media, the anti-war protestors, rioters, hippies, the counterculture, liberals, gays, etc., whose activities would influence American politics and policies in the upcoming years.

Chapter five focuses on the increasing opposition to the war, especially among Johnson’s own party and dovish Republicans in Congress. By this time, Johnson’s numbers had begun slipping and the Democratic Party had split between Kennedy Democrats and Johnson Democrats. Adding to Johnson’s concern was the fact that Martin Luther King Jr., the civil rights leader who, until that point, had been relatively silent on the Vietnam issue, began publicly to oppose the war. This created great anxiety in the White House that an alliance would form between the anti-war and civil rights movements. Adding to Johnson’s crumbling image was the state of the economy, which was rapidly deteriorating under the weight of the war and further weakening the Great Society programs. Reminiscent of Matusow, Small suggests that by 1967, “the United States… was unraveling economically, politically and socially.”

In chapter six, Small discusses the forces that led to Johnson’s withdrawal from the 1968 presidential election. The Tet Offensive in January left many Americans shocked, angry, and confused about what was really occurring in Vietnam and proved the event that catalyzed Johnson’s surprise decision in March. After Tet, the President’s numbers had dipped dramatically. Facing tough decisions regarding escalation and an increasingly virulent anti-war movement, Johnson dropped out. Meanwhile, Robert Kennedy, genuinely concerned about what was occurring in Southeast Asia, had decided to enter the presidential race. Small continues the chapter by discussing the turbulent Democratic convention in Chicago and the eventual presidential nominations of Hubert Humphrey (Democrat) and Richard Nixon (Republican). Small posits that the upcoming election affected negotiations for peace in Vietnam because Vietnamese policy makers understood that future American military action in that country would be overseen by the man who won the election. This led to underhanded dealings by members of Nixon’s faction in an effort to stall peace negotiations and improve their candidate’s chances of taking the election. As these manipulations were never made public, Nixon did not have to answer for them and was able to win the presidency in 1968.

The next chapter examines the increasing polarization that occurred in America after Nixon took office in 1969. As Nixon’s foreign and domestic policies were planned around his reelection campaign even from his earliest days in office, his tough stand against the media, anti-war protesters, and radicals, his secretive “intelligence collecting” activities, and offensive actions taken in Vietnam (including the bombing of Cambodia) were all centered around the desire to maintain a good image for the American people. This drove Nixon to continue withdrawing troops out of South Vietnam, reform the draft system, and appeal to the “silent majority” in the face of large anti-war demonstrations in the capital. Nixon’s tough stance and covert activities, especially against the media and anti-war groups, led to even greater polarization between the conservative “silent majority” and the anti-war left – which, the author suggests, may have been the President’s intent.

In chapter eight, Small explores the increasingly secretive and dubious activities of Nixon’s “plumbers” as they attempted to gather information on the President’s opponents. By this time, the level of U.S. combat in Vietnam (and the resulting anti-war protests) was starting to ebb, mostly as a result of the influence Nixon’s ever-constant eye on public opinion had on his foreign-policy decisions. Thus, the invasion of Cambodia was carefully worded when presented to the American public as only a brief “incursion.” Nonetheless, the movement of US troops into Cambodia led to both another violent wave of anti-war protest, especially on college campuses, and public criticism of Nixon in Congress. Nixon attempted to gain Republican control of the legislative branch during the 1970 congressional elections by stepping up peace negotiations with North Vietnam, launching on assault on Republican doves and the “left,” and attempting the rescue of American POWs in Vietnam. He also used the virulence of anti-war protesters (who most Americans were sick of by this time) to appeal again to the “silent majority” for votes. He also stepped up his dirty intelligence gathering campaigns. In the end, however, these actions did not help Nixon achieve his purpose and the President began to focus on his own re-election campaign, gaining popularity when he ordered the release of Lieutenant Calley, the perpetrator of the Mai Lai massacre.

Chapter nine discusses Nixon’s rekindled war against the media and Congress triggered by the release of the Pentagon Papers. While the Papers primarily indicted the Kennedy and Johnson administrations for mistakes made in Vietnam, Nixon feared the ramifications of their release. Thus began Nixon’s extra-legal attempts to collect information on those who allowed the leak of the Pentagon Papers. Despite the release of the Papers, Small notes, “Nixon’s political position continued to strengthen during the remainder of 1971, in good measure because of the continuing return of GI’s from the war and the falling number of casualties suffered by American forces” (179). Nixon still had his eye on the upcoming presidential election and his extra-legal activities ensured that George McGovern, the candidate Nixon would surely be able to beat, was nominated as the Democratic candidate. The President also stepped up his peace-making image, even taking a trip to China and Moscow in early 1972. Despite the fact that Nixon briefly increased bombing in Hanoi and Haiphong and the VVAW held a large anti-war protest at the Republican convention in August, he still won the 1972 election, thanks in large part to the extra-legal activities that would come to unseat him soon after.

Small dedicates the last chapter to the final days of the Vietnam conflict. He discusses the negotiations that eventually led to a peace treaty with North Vietnam – a peace that would be short lived, as the departure of American troops would eventually lead to the fall of South Vietnam to the North. He goes on to discuss the Watergate scandal and the resignation of Richard Nixon. More poignant, however, is his discussion of how the legacy of Vietnam affects politicians’ foreign policy decisions to this day. From Reagan to George W. Bush, each president has had to “think twice about foreign interventions” (208). Additionally, the polarization of America started during the war years remains. Small’s book makes it clear that the legacy of Vietnam clearly plays a substantial role in today’s domestic and foreign policies.

Gary R. Hess, “The Unending Debate: Historians and the Vietnam War,” Diplomatic History (Spring 1994), 239-264

Gary Hess’s historiographical essay explores the “principal interpretive issues in an emerging Vietnam War historiography with a focus on the literature that has appeared in the last dozen years” (239). He begins by introducing the reader to the orthodox interpretation of U.S. involvement in Vietnam which hold that the U.S. was drawn into a war that could not be won due to “mindless anticommunism and…disregard for Vietnamese politics and culture” (240). Such writers of the orthodox critique include David Halberstam and Franz FitzGerald whose respective books exemplify this sharply critical view of the US intervention in Vietnam. Hess goes on to show that the Pentagon Papers challenged these orthodox assumptions and opened the door to revisionist interpretations by such authors as Leslie Gelb and Richard Betts, Dave Richard Palmer, and Guenter Lewy. Revisionists hold that officials knew that escalated U.S. military action in Vietnam would likely fail and that policymakers promising progress had deliberately lied to the American public.

Hess explains the views of the three main groups of revisionists that emerged in the years following the initial upsurge of revisionist literature. These groups include the Clausewitzians, the hearts-and-minders, and the legitimacists. Clausewitzian scholars primarily hold the civilian leaders responsible for sending the military off to wage the “wrong kind of war” (242) against an enemy it did not understand. They see “fools and knaves undermining the Vietnam War effort” (242) and maintain “the media and the antiwar protest movement misled and divided the country” (242).

The hearts-and-minders take a different approach. While the Clausewitzians faulted civilian leadership for failure in Vietnam, hearts-and-minders blame army leadership “for both resisting and misapplying counterinsurgency doctrine,” (243) conceding that the military’s emphasis on conventional warfare was detrimental to “effective pacification” (242). To hearts-and-minders, the military’s failure to understand guerilla warfare and failure to secure the countryside ultimately led to America’s heavy losses in Vietnam.

Between the Clausewitzians and hearts-and-minders position is that of the legitimacists, who emphasize “the moral and political necessity of U.S. involvement in terms of national security and the viability and progress of the South Vietnamese government” (243). To legitimacists, backing Ngo Dinh Diem was America’s best hope for avoiding military action in the area and supporting his overthrow “necessitated U.S. military intervention” (244) in Vietnam. A number of legitimacist scholars have written about this notion and all, to at least some degree, fault the U.S. for failing to recognize the effectiveness of Diem as a leader and blame the U.S. for the “crisis” that forced his removal.

Scholarship on Vietnam in recent years has given way to the refinement of orthodox criticisms into neo-orthodox theories of the war. These works focus on the years 1954-1968 and place the Vietnam conflict in the context of the Cold War. Many neo-orthodox scholars see the war as a “flawed containment” policy perpetrated by the U.S. Additionally, some neo-orthodox scholars have begun writing about the war from the perspective of the North and South Vietnamese in an effort to understand their sides. Other revisionist scholarship includes the investigation of “culture imperatives” and the role new technology played in Vietnam (247). Many scholars have also written on individual facets of the war including America’s relationship with the Diem regime, Johnson’s role in escalating and Americanizing the conflict, and even how the decisions made regarding other foreign wars (such as Korea) influenced action in Vietnam. More recently, scholars have begun focusing on individual members of Johnson’s administration such as Robert McNamara, Maxwell Taylor, and George Ball to determine their role in escalating the conflict. Nixon as well has been at the center of recent Vietnam scholarship, but the scarcity of records makes investigation of his role difficult.

Vietnam historians have also scrutinized the domestic scene and the activities of anti-war protestors and the media. Authors such as Melvin Small, Daniel Hallin, and William Hammond have largely refuted revisionist claims that the media’s reporting encouraged anti-war sentiment in the United States, claiming instead that media coverage was sanitized and banal and probably had very little to do with shaping public sentiment regarding the war.

Historians have also explored the warfare conducted in Vietnam from both sides of the conflict. Such authors as Harold Moore and Joseph Gallaway have narrowed their scholarship to a single battle, while Mark Clodfelter, John Schlight, and Ronald Spector have analyzed the air and ground wars in Vietnam. Not to be overlooked is the body of scholarship that focuses attention on Vietnamese politics during the war including the resiliency and success of Vietnamese communism. Many authors have written about the nationalism, patriotism, and determination of the Vietnamese people, which created such a challenge to American pacification efforts in the countryside.

Hess contends that as more documentation is made available about the war, fuller and more synthetic works will emerge to provide further insight into the conflict and tragedy that was the Vietnam War.