John Fowler

History 583

October 26, 2006

Précis: Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson, Paul Finkelman. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2001.

The Constitution is proslavery and “an agreement with hell.”(p.ix) Paul Finkelman opens his account of slavery and the founders promoting this thesis on the very first page of his book, and does so unequivocally. He continues this line of reasoning stating that slaves were the next most valuably held individual property in the United States – they were not people. To contradict that slavery was not a critical issue to the founding of this nation, Finkelman maintains, is to ignore the facts. Slavery was central to the founding and what is surprising is that so many of the founders questioned the institution, but did very little to end the practice.

Finkelman immediately begins his argument with the debates of 1787 pointing out how the slave issue permeated the proceedings, and then reiterating the arguments that took place in Philadelphia that summer; especially the debate over Congressional representation and how that controversy related to slavery. Finkelman demonstrates that the structure of the Constitution has several places where slavery is either protected outright, or that an inference can be made that the founders intended to protect the practice. For example, the Electoral College gives the slave holding states greater influence over presidential elections due to the deal made with respect to Congressional representation. Finkelman also points out that the slave owners got what they wanted: “a Constitution that protected slavery.” The Constitutional provision for the return of fugitive slaves is but one offer of proof to sustain his central argument. Thus, from the summer of 1787 up until the Missouri Compromise debates, the national government pursued policies that protected slavery. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787, however, was one opportunity the founders had to end the practice, yet here, too, they revealed their intention to protect slavery.

At the time of passage, the Northwest Ordinance contained an antislavery provision that made it possible to eliminate slavery from the Northwest Territories. Yet the provision did not threaten southern slavery; in fact Finkelman suggests that the ordinance actually strengthened the institution south of the Ohio River. When Article VI of the ordinance was drafted it was passed without debate. Finkelman argues that had debate taken place, the Confederation Congress might have clarified its intent and meaning. For Finkelman, debate was critical because there were other sections of the ordinance that protected some slavery in the region with references to “free” inhabitants, while Article VI seemingly put an end to slavery. Finkelman then suggests that despite Article VI, slavery had a “power of inertia—which made eradication of the institution difficult.” This, coupled with the lack of resolve of local officials living in the region to enforce either the spirit, or the precise letter of the ordinance, doomed it to failure. Moreover, Article VI contained a fugitive slave clause that helped passage of the ordinance originally. This suggests that southern slave owners might have been in favor of a ban on slavery in the northwest, only to restrict competition from that region of the country.

From the 1790’s until Illinois’ admission as a state, slavery was not only protected, but encouraged through laws, statutes, and the use of indenture. Finkelman argues that a ban on slavery in the Northwest Territory would have been impossible. Indeed, the laws passed protecting the practice were intended to implement economic growth in the territory. This line of argument implies that the Congress was knowingly permitting, and some argue, even encouraging slavery to expand southward. The legalization of slavery in the Northwest Territories led to the constitutional legalization of slavery. From here Finkelman moves the context of the story to the Fugitive Slave Statute of 1793.

During the first years after the adoption of the new constitution, Congress dealt with many issues that involved slavery: the slave trade, the problem of slavery in the territories, and the admission of new slave states. The most important issue, however, was passage of the first Fugitive Slave Law. But the clash that was the catalyst for the new law was the problem between Pennsylvania, Virginia, and a “slave” named John Davis. Finkelman notes that the problem between these neighbors should have put northern Congressmen on notice that trouble was in the air. It appears that no one was able to foretell that the law could potentially threaten the harmony between north and south. Nevertheless, the law was a major benefit to the southern states with no equivalent gain in the north. Finkelman argues that the statute did not give Congress the power to pass additional measures to enforce the law, but simply directed the states to act in a certain manner. He maintains that the way in which Congress interpreted the statue actually made the Constitution even more proslavery than it was originally intended to be. Additionally, this line of reasoning claims that the northerners in Congress failed to appreciate the dangers that slave hunting posed to both free blacks and antislavery whites. The most critical problem with the law was that blacks who were legally free could not protect their liberty under this law, and that the south was never satisfied with the law. From here the story turns to the “Age of Federalism.”

In addition to arguing that slavery was central to the nation's founding, Finkelman also asserts that it created a "tension between the professed ideals of America, as stated in the Declaration of Independence and the reality of early national America" (p. ix). No one reflected that tension better than Thomas Jefferson. In spite of the principles that he expressed in the Declaration, Jefferson was a slaveholder and embraced the values associated with the planter class. Finkelman maintains that Jefferson hated slavery, but that revulsion was based on several factors which confirmed Jefferson's failure to rise above class and race or to honor the principles of his Declaration. He hated slavery because he detested blacks; they were, Jefferson believed, of a different order from whites. He hated slavery because it brought Africans to the nation and made them permanent inhabitants. He hated slavery because of its impact on whites, not because of what it did to blacks. Finkelman contends that the test for Jefferson's views on slavery should not be whether he was better "than the worst of his generation but whether he was the leader of the best;" not whether he embodied the values of southern planters, but whether he transcended his economic and sectional interests. In both cases, Finkelman concludes that "Jefferson fails the test" (p. 129). Finkelman ends the story of America and slavery with a condemnation of the Jefferson scholars who “created a mythical man—someone who went up to Mount Olympus.” (p. 196) He also complains that these historians have created an image that also encompasses our image of America itself. Finkelman argues that it is imperative for the modern historical scholar to look at Jefferson for what he was: “a person with virtues and faults.”