Casey R. Jenison
HS 579 – US
Diplomatic History
Dr. Devine
9/16/12
Précis for America’s Mission by Tony Smith
In
Tony Smith’s words, “This book explores the origins and the consequences of the
central ambition of American foreign policy during the twentieth century,” to
spread democracy abroad by examining the United States’ influence in, “the
Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Germany, Japan, and Iran.” It is a
three-fold story recounting, “…the identity of America’s self-assigned role in
the world, the influence of America’s democratizing mission … and the effect of
America’s ambitions and the international system as a whole.” Smith focuses in
particular on the administrations of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt,
Harry Truman, and Ronald Reagan. He offers his book primarily as a historical account,
but admits that it can also serve as a guide for current policy-makers in their
own quest to, “make the world safe for democracy.”
Chapter 1 – The United States and the Global
Struggle for Democracy
By the turn of the twentieth century,
most Americans, believed the world needed the
democracy the United States was offering.
A variety of factors, in particular the events leading up to the
Spanish-American War, had convinced them of this. Since that time, it has been
America’s mission through its foreign policy to make the world safe for
democracy. This democratization occurs when a mix of cultural, economic, and social factors initiate, consolidate, and
perpetuate democracy (more specifically liberal democracy). The United States’
perception of what liberal democracy should look like is, “a state limited by
strongly organized social forces acting through freely organized political
parties.”[1]
The effort by the victorious northern states during the Reconstruction period
is a clear example of changing a illiberal-democratic
entity into a democratic Union that could be preserved.
Chapter 2 – Democracy in the Philippines
The Spanish-American War can be seen
as watershed in the history of American foreign policy, though, as Smith notes,
few realized this at the time. Since this conflict, the United States has been
more actively involved in international diplomacy. Washington rationalized the
taking of the Philippines as the United States’ first colony by arguing that
its people needed to be democratized before eventually winning their
independence. This stood in stark contrast to the more nefarious rationales
that the European powers of the day were offering for their imperialism. Indeed,
on July 4, 1946, the Philippines became an independent democracy. The most
crucial impact the United States had made since 1898 was the political system
that had been instituted. Had neither Spain nor the U.S. ever involved
themselves in that nation’s domestic politics, the Philippines would most
likely have become some form of an oligarchy. It was this traditional oligarchic
land-owning system that had led the resistance to reform. This conflict between the political system and the socio-economic
system still plagues the Philippines today.
Chapter 3 – Wilson and Democracy in Latin America
The Woodrow Wilson administration
made clear that it was taking the unprecedented step of making the expansion of
democracy in the world the guiding principle for its foreign policy. America’s
interest in Latin America beyond the Monroe Doctrine was based primarily in
concerns regarding geo-strategy and national security. The Roosevelt Corollary
to the doctrine greatly expanded America’s involvement in Latin American
economic affairs thus leading to America being a policing agent. Wilson
expanded further on Roosevelt’s corollary by stating that the U.S. would not
recognize regimes that had come to power by non-constitutional means.
Wilson
had limited success in Mexico and the Dominican Republic where he sought to put
his ideals into action. Wilson’s savior mentality seemed to lead him blindly into
countries that lacked the preconditions necessary to insure that democratic
reforms would last. Unfortunately, there is no success story of U.S. liberal
democracy being imposed in Latin America in any meaningful and lasting way.
Chapter 4 – Wilson and a World Safe for Democracy
In
his quest to spread liberal democratic internationalism, Wilson did not limit
himself to intervention in Latin America. Setting his sights on Europe, he
sought to wed democracy and nationalism and move the world away from the
competitive nature of capitalism in pursuit of a “covenant of cooperative
peace.” Ultimately, he saw the League of Nations as being the primary vehicle
through which this would come about.
The
Treaty of Versailles and the U.S. Senate’s rejection of the treaty shattered
any hope Wilson had of achieving these lofty ideals. The French were simply too
retributive in their view of the Germans; the post-revolutionary regime in
Russia was nowhere near democratic enough to work with; the battle for
democracy in Germany after the war produced unclear results; and democracy was
just too far from the minds of the Eastern European states for Wilson to
realize his aspirations of liberal democratic internationalism. While Wilson’s
critics point out his flaws, they do not offer much in the way of alternative
actions. Even though Wilson did not accomplish much in any immediately tangible
way, the long-term effects of the spirit of his convictions were evidenced in
Eastern Europe during the interwar years.
Chapter 5 – FDR and World Order: Globalizing the
Monroe Doctrine
Under FDR and Truman the United
States shifted its commitment to liberal democratic internationalism and
compromised in order to contain communism. In some cases, democratic
governments were opposed to prevent communism from gaining a foothold certain
parts of the world. Regional stability and independence took precedence over
democracy. FDR embraced the Good Neighbor Policy in his dealings with Latin
America and carefully carried it out to ensure a healthy balance of political
reform and economic interdependence throughout the region. Elsewhere in the
developing world, FDR pursued anti-imperialist policies, often to the dismay of
the British and French, since these powers feared, with some justification, that
these liberated colonies would seek to be economically dependent upon the
United States. According to Smith, this bidding for international hegemony that
the U.S. had entered into “constituted a form of anti-imperialist imperialism,
aiming to structure other countries … so that they would presumably be part of
a peaceful world order congenial to American interests.”[2]
This was the “realism” that replaced Wilsonian
idealism.
Chapter 6 – Democratizing Japan and Germany
The demilitarization,
democratization, and liberalization of Japan and Germany in order to integrate
these nations into the global economy, “constitutes the most ambitious program
American liberal democratic internationalism has ever undertaken.”[3]
Democratization of Germany and Japan occurred hand-in-hand with demilitarization
(coupled with purges). This process went more smoothly in Japan than in Germany
since Japan had less experience with democratic government. Decartelization was
carried out rather successfully most likely due to Washington’s having a better
understanding of the socioeconomic system in Japan (especially when compared to
the U.S. experience in the Philippines and the Dominican Republic). A
psychological reprogramming took place as well which included the restructuring
of the educational system and the mass media. Overall, it seems that Japan was
impacted more than Germany by America’s democratization.
Chapter 7 – Eisenhower and His Legacy, 1953-1977
Due to the initial weakness of
democracy in many developing nations, the United States reluctantly (and not so
reluctantly) began to support authoritarian regimes in order to contain
communism. President Eisenhower was less concerned with actively opposing
communism than his predecessors. After gaining confidence in the potential of
American influence to produce pro-U.S. regimes in Guatemala and Iran, the
United States pursued a similarly activist course toward Vietnam, yet the
outcome was far from desired. This stance on foreign policy affected Henry Kissinger’s
thinking later on in the 60s and 70s. Essentially, when there was no third
alternative to a radical left and a conservative right, Washington ended up
backing the conservative right, which often instituted authoritarian forms of
government. “The dilemma for American foreign policy from 1947 to the end of
the cold war in 1989 was that neither Wilsonianism … nor realism … proved
itself to be a fully adequate guide for foreign policy.”[4]
Chapter 8 – Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress,
1961-1965
In Latin America, Kennedy’s plan was
to side with nationalist revolutionaries in the newly decolonized areas. His
proposed Alliance for Progress sought to achieve a socio-economic restructuring
of Latin American nations. The program, however, was generally rejected and
viewed with skepticism in Latin America even though the timing seemed
appropriate. The main failure of the Alliance for Progress was its inability to
find capable leadership to carry out its proposed reforms. The overall failure
of the Alliance for Progress should remind Americans that Wilsonian
idealism does not seem to be the most effective way to protect its national
security. Still, the fundamental precepts of Wilsonianism
(i.e., linking defense of American national security to
the expansion of freedom and justice in the Western Hemisphere) cannot be cast
aside altogether.
Chapter 9 – Carter’s Human Rights Campaign
By the mid-1970s, the United States under
Jimmy Carter revived its commitment to correcting the abuses of unjust and
repressive regimes. Carter sought to put an absolute commitment to human rights
at the center of U.S. policy. In 1979, his campaign for human rights suffered
two serious setbacks – in Nicaragua and Iran. In the wake of these crises, it
seemed obvious that authoritarian governments did little to enhance American
security. Smith concludes that the travails of the Carter administration
demonstrate how Wilsonianism can be misapplied when
naïveté and moralism are mixed.
Chapter 10 – Reagan’s Democratic Revolution
Reagan’s foreign policies mirrored
Wilson’s more than any president after Wilson. He saw a community of democratic
nations as the best way to achieve enduring peace in the world. Reagan employed
constructive engagement to reassure new democracies going through trying times
that they had the United States’ support. The essence of such a policy, Smith
notes, “was its commitment to assist authoritarian regimes trying to
democratize by aiding them through a difficult transition process.”[5]
Reagan also tried with some success to encourage antistatist
free market doctrines in these countries. The Reagan Doctrine exercised enough
democratic influence in Latin America and in Afghanistan to indirectly affect Moscow.
Though it played a crucial role in the spreading of democracy in the late
twentieth century, Smith notes that Washington was not solely responsible for
all of the gains that democracy has made in the contemporary world.
Chapter 11 – After the Cold War: Wilsonian
Resurgent?
George H. W. Bush took office when
America’s power and international influence was at its zenith, and his response
was “appropriately Wilsonian.”[6]
This can be very clearly seen in how he handled the Iraq War. Overall, Bush
managed foreign policy in a balanced manner with the help of his Secretary of
State, James Baker. Although Bill Clinton criticized Bush’s foreign policy
during the 1992 campaign, once in office he adopted it in almost all aspects.
In the final analysis, Smith
observes, “American liberal democratic internationalism has contributed
concretely to basic structures of international politics today, from the
organization of the world’s economy to the legitimacy of the nation-state as an
international actor… Democracy’s current elevated status represents the effects
of 175 years of Anglo-American international hegemony.”[7]
Today, the Islamic world seems to be
most resistant to democracy. Significant social and political reforms will be
necessary if the Islamic nations are to move toward liberal democracy. Implementing
such reforms will be difficult and could produce unintended consequences if
undertaken irresponsibly. Still, Smith cautions that if the United States loses
sight of the importance of liberal democratic internationalism, it would
jeopardize its own national security.