Casey R. Jenison

HS 579 – US Diplomatic History

Dr. Devine

9/16/12

 

Précis for America’s Mission by Tony Smith

 

In Tony Smith’s words, “This book explores the origins and the consequences of the central ambition of American foreign policy during the twentieth century,” to spread democracy abroad by examining the United States’ influence in, “the Philippines, the Dominican Republic, Germany, Japan, and Iran.” It is a three-fold story recounting, “…the identity of America’s self-assigned role in the world, the influence of America’s democratizing mission … and the effect of America’s ambitions and the international system as a whole.” Smith focuses in particular on the administrations of Woodrow Wilson, Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry Truman, and Ronald Reagan. He offers his book primarily as a historical account, but admits that it can also serve as a guide for current policy-makers in their own quest to, “make the world safe for democracy.”

 

Chapter 1 – The United States and the Global Struggle for Democracy

            By the turn of the twentieth century, most Americans, believed the world needed the democracy the United States was offering.  A variety of factors, in particular the events leading up to the Spanish-American War, had convinced them of this. Since that time, it has been America’s mission through its foreign policy to make the world safe for democracy. This democratization occurs when a mix of cultural, economic, and social factors initiate, consolidate, and perpetuate democracy (more specifically liberal democracy). The United States’ perception of what liberal democracy should look like is, “a state limited by strongly organized social forces acting through freely organized political parties.”[1] The effort by the victorious northern states during the Reconstruction period is a clear example of changing a illiberal-democratic entity into a democratic Union that could be preserved.

 

Chapter 2 – Democracy in the Philippines

            The Spanish-American War can be seen as watershed in the history of American foreign policy, though, as Smith notes, few realized this at the time. Since this conflict, the United States has been more actively involved in international diplomacy. Washington rationalized the taking of the Philippines as the United States’ first colony by arguing that its people needed to be democratized before eventually winning their independence. This stood in stark contrast to the more nefarious rationales that the European powers of the day were offering for their imperialism. Indeed, on July 4, 1946, the Philippines became an independent democracy. The most crucial impact the United States had made since 1898 was the political system that had been instituted. Had neither Spain nor the U.S. ever involved themselves in that nation’s domestic politics, the Philippines would most likely have become some form of an oligarchy. It was this traditional oligarchic land-owning system that had led the resistance to reform. This conflict between the political system and the socio-economic system still plagues the Philippines today.

 

Chapter 3 – Wilson and Democracy in Latin America

            The Woodrow Wilson administration made clear that it was taking the unprecedented step of making the expansion of democracy in the world the guiding principle for its foreign policy. America’s interest in Latin America beyond the Monroe Doctrine was based primarily in concerns regarding geo-strategy and national security. The Roosevelt Corollary to the doctrine greatly expanded America’s involvement in Latin American economic affairs thus leading to America being a policing agent. Wilson expanded further on Roosevelt’s corollary by stating that the U.S. would not recognize regimes that had come to power by non-constitutional means.

Wilson had limited success in Mexico and the Dominican Republic where he sought to put his ideals into action. Wilson’s savior mentality seemed to lead him blindly into countries that lacked the preconditions necessary to insure that democratic reforms would last. Unfortunately, there is no success story of U.S. liberal democracy being imposed in Latin America in any meaningful and lasting way.           

 

Chapter 4 – Wilson and a World Safe for Democracy

In his quest to spread liberal democratic internationalism, Wilson did not limit himself to intervention in Latin America. Setting his sights on Europe, he sought to wed democracy and nationalism and move the world away from the competitive nature of capitalism in pursuit of a “covenant of cooperative peace.” Ultimately, he saw the League of Nations as being the primary vehicle through which this would come about.

The Treaty of Versailles and the U.S. Senate’s rejection of the treaty shattered any hope Wilson had of achieving these lofty ideals. The French were simply too retributive in their view of the Germans; the post-revolutionary regime in Russia was nowhere near democratic enough to work with; the battle for democracy in Germany after the war produced unclear results; and democracy was just too far from the minds of the Eastern European states for Wilson to realize his aspirations of liberal democratic internationalism. While Wilson’s critics point out his flaws, they do not offer much in the way of alternative actions. Even though Wilson did not accomplish much in any immediately tangible way, the long-term effects of the spirit of his convictions were evidenced in Eastern Europe during the interwar years.

 

Chapter 5 – FDR and World Order: Globalizing the Monroe Doctrine

            Under FDR and Truman the United States shifted its commitment to liberal democratic internationalism and compromised in order to contain communism. In some cases, democratic governments were opposed to prevent communism from gaining a foothold certain parts of the world. Regional stability and independence took precedence over democracy. FDR embraced the Good Neighbor Policy in his dealings with Latin America and carefully carried it out to ensure a healthy balance of political reform and economic interdependence throughout the region. Elsewhere in the developing world, FDR pursued anti-imperialist policies, often to the dismay of the British and French, since these powers feared, with some justification, that these liberated colonies would seek to be economically dependent upon the United States. According to Smith, this bidding for international hegemony that the U.S. had entered into “constituted a form of anti-imperialist imperialism, aiming to structure other countries … so that they would presumably be part of a peaceful world order congenial to American interests.”[2] This was the “realism” that replaced Wilsonian idealism.

 

Chapter 6 – Democratizing Japan and Germany

            The demilitarization, democratization, and liberalization of Japan and Germany in order to integrate these nations into the global economy, “constitutes the most ambitious program American liberal democratic internationalism has ever undertaken.”[3] Democratization of Germany and Japan occurred hand-in-hand with demilitarization (coupled with purges). This process went more smoothly in Japan than in Germany since Japan had less experience with democratic government. Decartelization was carried out rather successfully most likely due to Washington’s having a better understanding of the socioeconomic system in Japan (especially when compared to the U.S. experience in the Philippines and the Dominican Republic). A psychological reprogramming took place as well which included the restructuring of the educational system and the mass media. Overall, it seems that Japan was impacted more than Germany by America’s democratization.

 

Chapter 7 – Eisenhower and His Legacy, 1953-1977

            Due to the initial weakness of democracy in many developing nations, the United States reluctantly (and not so reluctantly) began to support authoritarian regimes in order to contain communism. President Eisenhower was less concerned with actively opposing communism than his predecessors. After gaining confidence in the potential of American influence to produce pro-U.S. regimes in Guatemala and Iran, the United States pursued a similarly activist course toward Vietnam, yet the outcome was far from desired. This stance on foreign policy affected Henry Kissinger’s thinking later on in the 60s and 70s. Essentially, when there was no third alternative to a radical left and a conservative right, Washington ended up backing the conservative right, which often instituted authoritarian forms of government. “The dilemma for American foreign policy from 1947 to the end of the cold war in 1989 was that neither Wilsonianism … nor realism … proved itself to be a fully adequate guide for foreign policy.”[4]

 

Chapter 8 – Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, 1961-1965

            In Latin America, Kennedy’s plan was to side with nationalist revolutionaries in the newly decolonized areas. His proposed Alliance for Progress sought to achieve a socio-economic restructuring of Latin American nations. The program, however, was generally rejected and viewed with skepticism in Latin America even though the timing seemed appropriate. The main failure of the Alliance for Progress was its inability to find capable leadership to carry out its proposed reforms. The overall failure of the Alliance for Progress should remind Americans that Wilsonian idealism does not seem to be the most effective way to protect its national security. Still, the fundamental precepts of Wilsonianism (i.e., linking defense of American national security to the expansion of freedom and justice in the Western Hemisphere) cannot be cast aside altogether.

 

Chapter 9 – Carter’s Human Rights Campaign

            By the mid-1970s, the United States under Jimmy Carter revived its commitment to correcting the abuses of unjust and repressive regimes. Carter sought to put an absolute commitment to human rights at the center of U.S. policy. In 1979, his campaign for human rights suffered two serious setbacks – in Nicaragua and Iran. In the wake of these crises, it seemed obvious that authoritarian governments did little to enhance American security. Smith concludes that the travails of the Carter administration demonstrate how Wilsonianism can be misapplied when naïveté and moralism are mixed.

 

Chapter 10 – Reagan’s Democratic Revolution

            Reagan’s foreign policies mirrored Wilson’s more than any president after Wilson. He saw a community of democratic nations as the best way to achieve enduring peace in the world. Reagan employed constructive engagement to reassure new democracies going through trying times that they had the United States’ support. The essence of such a policy, Smith notes, “was its commitment to assist authoritarian regimes trying to democratize by aiding them through a difficult transition process.”[5] Reagan also tried with some success to encourage antistatist free market doctrines in these countries. The Reagan Doctrine exercised enough democratic influence in Latin America and in Afghanistan to indirectly affect Moscow. Though it played a crucial role in the spreading of democracy in the late twentieth century, Smith notes that Washington was not solely responsible for all of the gains that democracy has made in the contemporary world.

 

Chapter 11 – After the Cold War: Wilsonian Resurgent?

            George H. W. Bush took office when America’s power and international influence was at its zenith, and his response was “appropriately Wilsonian.”[6] This can be very clearly seen in how he handled the Iraq War. Overall, Bush managed foreign policy in a balanced manner with the help of his Secretary of State, James Baker. Although Bill Clinton criticized Bush’s foreign policy during the 1992 campaign, once in office he adopted it in almost all aspects.

            In the final analysis, Smith observes, “American liberal democratic internationalism has contributed concretely to basic structures of international politics today, from the organization of the world’s economy to the legitimacy of the nation-state as an international actor… Democracy’s current elevated status represents the effects of 175 years of Anglo-American international hegemony.”[7]

            Today, the Islamic world seems to be most resistant to democracy. Significant social and political reforms will be necessary if the Islamic nations are to move toward liberal democracy. Implementing such reforms will be difficult and could produce unintended consequences if undertaken irresponsibly. Still, Smith cautions that if the United States loses sight of the importance of liberal democratic internationalism, it would jeopardize its own national security.



[1] Smith, America’s Mission, 17.

[2] Smith, America’s Mission, 143.

[3] Ibid., 147.

[4] Ibid., 213.

[5] Smith, America’s Mission, 284.

[6] Ibid., 312.

[7] Ibid., 331.