Jefferson Byrd HIST 574 2/14/08
Precis: The Irony of American History
Reinhold
Niebuhr’s The Irony of American History
evaluates the central ideologies of the United States and the Soviet Union
(liberal democracy and Communism, respectively) and determines that these
ideologies fail to address the political realities of both nations’ positions
as world powers. Finding the U.S. and Soviet Union’s
precarious situation to be neither noble enough to be tragic nor blameless
enough to be pathetic, Niebuhr holds up Cold War tensions as an example of
historical irony. He defines irony as involving “comic absurdities” that
cease being absurd once they are understood. The comic absurdity of the U.S.
and the Soviet Union is that all our national dreams have been refuted by
history yet we continue to find them necessary, even inevitable.
The primary fault Niebuhr finds in
both countries, and the source of the irony in their history, is their overly
optimistic view of human nature. Such optimistic views allow both countries to
protest their innocence and prevent both societies from understanding the
limitations of man as a creature of history. As such,
neither side is able to fully grasp the complexities of the challenge of the
Cold War. Beyond the basic ideological differences between the U.S. and Soviet
Union, Niebuhr highlights other important differences. While both sides court
irony by restricting personal liberties in the name of defending said
liberties, the level of Soviet repression is far greater, and therefore more
sinister. Niebuhr states that when a nation becomes aware of the irony of its
situation it must either change its course or embrace the ironic juxtaposition,
becoming evil. Contending that both sides must reconcile their hopelessly
idealistic ideology with the political reality of the Cold War, Niebuhr
proposes the adoption of a Christian realist perspective that accepts the role
of human sin in history. Such a perspective would be necessary to make possible
the conditions for a peaceful resolution to the hostilities of the Cold War.
Niebuhr’s
book, based on speeches he delivered during the height of the Cold War,
illuminates the similarities and differences between Soviet and American world
views. For Niebuhr both nations represent unsophisticated and unrealistic
perspectives. In the Communist view, the proletariat is unimpeachably virtuous
and capable of creating a utopian society with the abolition of private
property. Power is perceived as a means to an end rather than as an end itself.
In America’s liberal democracy view, the political structure created by the
Constitution generates a perfect balance of power, while all negative aspects
of human nature are purified through America’s liberal social structures. Both
national ideologies are flawed and self-contradictory, much like the U.S.’s
goals in amassing a nuclear arsenal to safeguard world peace.
Tracing the genesis of America’s
idealist ideology back to the origin of the republic, Niebuhr analyzes the
religious and nationalist views of the Puritans and Jeffersonian Deists. Both
groups held that America was created by God to be culturally unique and
theoretically separated from the corruption of Old Europe. Thus American
progress was, in a sense, ordained by God. Niebhur
views American progress as part of the inevitable force of Providence but
stresses the difference between the pastoral America of the eighteenth century
and America the world leader. He urges a break from outdated modes of thinking.
Both America and the U.S.S.R. utilize different ideologies to arrive at
basically the same conclusion: that their own country is faultless and
incapable of injustice and that all negative criticism of their country is incorrect.
Niebuhr portrays the Soviets as attempting to impose their faultless will on
history, forcing other countries to embrace Communism. He sees danger in the
U.S. pursuing a similar path, pointing out that all of America’s great
successes owe more to Providence than to a real or imagined American genius.
Should America persist in our Puritanical/Jeffersonian belief that Americans
are God’s chosen people, our post-World War II role as a world leader will suffer. America’s global status brings us into close contact
with nations that do not share our idealist ideology. Our unrealistic
perceptions often leave American foreign policy lurching between offering
economic aid and applying military intervention without understanding cultural
complexities.
Niebuhr’s argument is primarily philosophical/theological. As such he does not present a
course of action for the resolution of Cold War tensions. Rather he prescribes
a realignment of perceptions to eliminate contradictions in our national
thinking. This might not bring the Cold War to a halt, Niebuhr warns, but
without such a philosophical realignment the U.S. and Soviet Union will
continue to view each other as hopelessly antithetical without comprehending
the historical ironies that bind us together.