Brian McConnell
History 574
Précis
Red Scare or Red Menace: American Communism and Anticommunism in the Cold War Era. By: John E. Haynes
Excerpt from The Culture of the Cold War. By: Stephen J. Whitfield
John Haynes’ work on the rise and fall of communism and anticommunism in America is possible, in part, due to the flood of archival evidence that has become available to historians since the Soviet Union’s collapse in 1991. The author points out four deficiencies that exist in current scholarship on American anticommunism. First, they minimize or deny links between the American Communist party and Soviet espionage. Second, they fail to show the continuity between prewar antifascism and post war anticommunism. Next, the focus of anticommunist sentiment is too narrow. Finally, they treat opposition to communism as irrational. The main purpose of the book is to fill in the gaps and present a more complete view of American anticommunism.
According to Haynes, people in the United States had a problem with communism because of its incompatibility with American values. “Americans have always held a variety of political views,” Haynes notes, “but most support private property, take immense pride in their individualism, and glory in political democracy…Most Americans are also religious and place considerable importance on their freedom to worship God as they please.” (7) Soviet communism, by contrast, promoted the collective over the individual, established a one-party dictatorship that violently suppressed dissent, suppressed Christianity, and promoted atheism.
Aside from the little “Red Scare” following World War I, American communists remained a small group on the periphery until World War II, even gaining some positive publicity by taking an antifascist stance during the war. The leaders of the American Communist party, funded and trained by the USSR, set their sights on infiltrating not only the government, but also labor unions and organizations such as the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). They did so by operating clandestinely and concealing their party membership.
World War II caused the United States to shift its focus from communism to combating fascism at home and abroad. Haynes points out that much of the postwar image of and reaction to American communism was based on attitudes developed toward fascism in the 30’s and early 40’s. (19) Initially, American communists represented one of the most militant antifascist groups, but after the Soviets and Nazis signed a non-aggression pact in 1939, they too became a target of antifascist anger. During this period, FDR signed the Smith Act which required all non- citizens to be fingerprinted and registered and made interfering with the loyalty and discipline of the armed services a crime. (33) When Hitler invaded Russia in 1941, the American Communist Party (CPUSA) threw its support behind the Allied cause, effectively repairing much of the previous damage it had done to its reputation. In fact, the CPUSA saw its largest increases in membership and achieved its largest institutional power immediately following WWII, topping out at nearly 70,000 members and essentially controlling about 20% of the CIO unions. Furthermore, what had once been a party dominated by immigrants now boasted a native born majority.
Several events during the 1940’s led to an increase in anticommunist sentiments. First, the fall of Poland and the rest Eastern Europe upset millions of Polish-American voters and their Eastern European counterparts. Their large constituency had a significant impact on Federal policy, causing lawmakers to make the problem their own. The Catholic Church and various protestant groups also took up the anticommunist cause. The Spanish Civil War had played a major role in fueling anticommunist sentiment among Catholics and helped create the image of Democracy and Communism as a battle of good versus evil. Other events concerned spying and breaches of national security. The author mentions the Amerasia scandal (50), the defection of Igor Gouzenko (55), the Rosenberg case (58), and the indictment of Alger Hiss.(79) There were also allegations of Communist influence in Hollywood, as seen in the trial of the Hollywood Ten.
To combat the perceived threat of a “fifth column,” Congress set up the House Committee on Un American Activities (HUAC) in 1938. Initially charged with rooting out pro-fascists, the committee quickly turned its attention to attacking Communists and Communist front groups after the start of the Cold War. HUAC is best known for its investigation of Hollywood, which the committee considered an attempt to root out Communists where they had the most influence. These inquiries ruined many careers but did little to prove any significant Communist infiltration of the movie and television studios.
The government also used the Smith Act to prosecute those considered “disloyal.” In 1951, Dennis vs. US upheld a ruling that, “Advocacy unconnected to overt revolutionary or violent acts could be a crime if ‘There is a sufficient danger of a substantive evil [overthrow of the government].’” (164) As a result, many real and alleged Communists were prosecuted for their beliefs and ideas, not actions. In 1957, Yates vs. US overturned the Dennis decision, as the court concluded that “Revolutionary advocacy by itself was no longer sufficient for conviction.” (166) Other anticommunist laws, such as the McCarran Act and the Personnel security system, like the Smith Act, never worked as lawmakers intended.
Stalin’s death in 1953 marked the beginning of the end of intense anticommunist sentiment. Haynes points out that the dictator’s successors could never match him in ruthlessness or aggression and his passing allowed cold war tensions to ease. The Korean war settlement also alleviated anxieties. Furthermore, NATO helped to stabilize central Europe. By the mid 1950’s people began to realize the CPUSA was a hollow organization, incapable of presenting any serious threat to democracy. Haynes maintains that the real downfall of the CPUSA came with the failure of the Progressive party and the Communist expulsion from the CIO in the late 40‘s (191). The book concludes with an overview of the Communist Party’s overall impact on the United States and Haynes’s statement that anti-communism, though often ugly, was an understandable, rational response to a real threat to democracy.
Stephen Whitfield’s The Culture of the Cold War contributes many of the same insights as Red Scare or Red Menace but does so with a much more cynical attitude. Whitfield points out the irony of the anticommunist movement; in order to protect America’s freedoms like speech, assembly, and ideas, lawmakers restricted them. By trying to protect its people from the Soviet threat, the American government established policy that paralleled that of the Soviets – albeit to a less brutal degree (14-17).
Whitfield focuses more on culture than politics per se. In looking at Whittaker Chambers’ biography, Witness, he concludes that it was a testament to anticommunist and anti-liberal ideology. Chambers, a former member of the Communist party, believed liberalism and communism were one in the same, and both needed to be defeated by conservative Republican ideals. The book ranked ninth on the bestseller list of 1952 and found readership among prominent conservatives like Ronald Reagan, Richard Nixon, and John Wayne.
Whitfield also touches on the civil rights movement and its connection with the culture of anti-communism. “The struggle for civil rights, which became conspicuous in the fifties,” he notes, “aroused the suspicion of those who inferred from the evidence that Communism was loathsome the conclusion that anything loathsome was Communism.” (21) Even the FBI connected political subversion with racial justice, the 1951 Warner Brothers film, I was a Communist for the FBI, illustrates this belief.
Anticommunist ideologies also found their way into popular fiction. Author Mickey Spillane’s character Mike Hammer has an intense hatred of Communists and uses brutal violence to combat the godless villains in works such as I Jury and One Lonely Night. (34-36) Spillane’s work found a very wide audience, and he ended up penning six of the decade’s ten bestsellers.
In the 40’s and 50’s, many states passed laws outlawing the Communist party. (45) Other jurisdictions required a loyalty oath to obtain certain jobs. Even Truman’s Secretary of Labor, Lewis B. Schwellenbach, called for a vote to outlaw the Communist Party.
Chapter
five deals with the morality of informants. According to Whitfield,“The culture
of the Cold War was distinctive for having punctured the abhorrence of
informing, which ‘in our time…is a duty.’” (101) The only way a HUAC witness
could clear their name was to confess and name others. Not everyone went along with this new thinking.
Most notably, Arthur Miller’s The Crucible voiced concern about this new
“civic duty.” On the other hand, Elia
Kazan’s On the Waterfront suggested
that in certain cases, “informing” was the right thing to do.
HUAC’s downfall came in 1957 when Watkins v. US. prohibited Congressional committees from asking questions that were not relevant to legislation under consideration. By the 60’s, a subpoena from the committee was an open invitation to ridicule it. All this policy and legislation did little to stop communism. Instead it created untold fear and anxiety among Americans. Differing in emphasis from Haynes, Whitfield concludes that “the cost that American society paid to crush domestic Communism was disproportionate.”