Jonathan Wise

Précis: Gareth Davies, From Opportunity to Enlightenment: The Transformation and Decline of Great Society Liberalism

Gareth Davies’ book, From Opportunity to Enlightenment, charts the period of change in how liberals viewed the concept of guaranteed income in welfare during the period between 1964 and 1972. The traditional view on welfare was that of individualism. The individualist goal was to gain for all individuals an equal opportunity to work, and thereby grant recipients the opportunity to move themselves out of poverty by their own volition. This individualist view was the dominant traditional perspective of President Johnson and informed his Great Society programs. It had been inherited from the liberal tradition of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal. During the course of the period Davies covers, however, the perspective amongst liberals shifted from that of the individualist to the concept of guaranteed income to alleviate poverty. Davies states, “This book asks how American liberals came to repudiate a venerable and politically valuable individualist tradition, in favor of radically ‘un-American’ definitions of income entitlement” (Davies, p. 3). The bookends for his analysis are the 1964 Economic Opportunity Act, part of Johnson’s Great Society initiatives, and George McGovern’s 1972 presidential campaign in which McGovern campaigned around the premise of eliminating poverty through a guaranteed income. McGovern’s departure from ‘64’s liberal individualism is clearly shown when he told the press in 1972, “I would just provide that every person in this country is given a certain minimum income. If he wants to work in addition to that, he keeps what he earns” (Davies, p. 232). The evolution towards this change is covered through an examination of three challenges to Johnson’s Great Society. The first was the rise of black militancy and racial unrest in urban centers. The second was the Vietnam War, the ensuing financial crisis, and the criticism that resulted from it. The last challenge came from a loss of a liberal consensus, as Democrats would publicly criticize and split from Johnson to form the ethos of the New Politics.

The first great cause of ideological shift amongst liberals was the civil unrest and militancy in the ghettos of the cities. Chaotic disorder and the challenges posed to the Johnson administration by the African American community would ultimately cause President Johnson to lose a great deal of support not only for his administration, but in particular for his Great Society programs. The problem for the individualistic approach of the Great Society amongst African Americans was that it implied that African Americans indeed had an equal opportunity, “the rationale for a colorblind War on Poverty was significantly undermined by the changing character of the black struggle for equality” (Davies, p. 56). The problem with a colorblind approach was that opportunity for African Americans was inherently unequal. Ingrained prejudice and de-facto segregation in urban centers led to depressed and impoverished urban black ghettos. Since equal footing was impossible for African Americans due to these extralegal societal institutions, the concept of equal opportunity through individualistic advancement was hardly encouraging. By June of 1965, when President Johnson spoke at Howard University he was forced to admit as mch. As Davies notes, “Johnson told the graduating class at Howard University that black poverty was after all unique” (Davies, p. 62). This admission showed the failings of the idea that equal opportunity was in fact equal. Large scale race riots also occurred during this time period, most notably in New York in July, 1964, and most famously in the Watts Riot in August of 1965. Davies indicates these growing instances of urban unrest weakened the Johnson administration, “as the cycle of violence combined with other problems to destroy public enthusiasm for the Great Society” (Davies, p80). By this time President Johnson was under fire, and the racially based riots frightened white America, as evidenced by the statement of Roman Pucinski, a congressman from Illinois. Pucinski noted that among his constituents “people are not talking about Vietnam or rising prices or prosperity. They are talking about Martin Luther King Jr., and how the [blacks] are moving in on us and what’s going to happen in our neighborhoods” (Davies, p. 149). The white backlash against civil rights also was very damaging to Johnson, as there was no consensus to be found. The coup de grace for Johnson’s concept of individualistic aid to halt black poverty came when the Kerner Report of 1968 completely destroyed the concept of equal opportunity: “The summary proceeds from the ‘basic conclusion’ that ‘our nation is moving toward two societies: one black, one white- separate and unequal” (Davies, p. 204).

Davies cites the Vietnam War as an indirect obstacle for the task of instituting President Johnson’s Great Society. “The bitterness and ill will it generated within liberal ranks,” Davies concludes, “inevitably impeded cooperation on domestic matters, and not simply because the war diverted funds from the Great Society programs” (Davies, p. 241). The cost of the war led to an acute fiscal crisis. This economic strain would open Johnson up to criticism from both the right and the left. Vietnam’s cost came with a severe detriment to social programs since it caused rampant inflation. Davies discusses the problem of budgeting the war, “Additionally, Johnson had very little idea of what the war was likely to cost during FY[financial year] 1967, and hence how much strain defense expenditures would put on the budget and the economy” (Davies, p. 106-107). The financial burden was not the only problem with the war: “In addition to the curtailment of Great Society programs, war exacted what Senator Fullbright termed a ‘mental and spiritual’ cost” (Davies, p. 125). Added to the mental and spiritual cost was a political cost for President Johnson as his liberal consensus was fading quickly. As Davies concludes, “The war in Southeast Asia did more to disrupt the politics of liberalism, destroying the president’s authority and domestic vigor, thereby persuading erstwhile supporters that their interests were better served by distancing themselves from Johnson than by continued association” (Davies, p. 131). Schisms amongst liberals stemming from this war led to the great shift in policy from individualism to guaranteed income.

Plummeting popularity for the Democratic president produced a unique opportunity for many other liberal politicians. With the President’s poll numbers down, ambitious liberals like Robert Kennedy sought to distance themselves from the sinking ship of the Johnson presidency. Indeed, as Davies notes, “many colleagues, ostensible friends of the administration, welcomed the growing Vietnam controversy as ‘an excuse to assert some independence’” (Davies, p. 109). By criticizing the unpopular administration, liberals found a way to gain publicity for themselves, using the war, racial disharmony, and the failure of Johnson’s traditional liberal approach to welfare as lightning rods. “For the Johnson administration, Senator Kennedy’s attempt to meld education, civil rights, and military issues into an overall critique of White House policy was peculiarly significant” (Davies, p. 110). More significantly, Davies concludes, “centrist liberalism – a creed whose appeal had appeared almost consensual during 1964-1965 – was now under assault from both sides, and as the future of the New Deal Democratic Coalition came into question, it was this twin attack that did most to legitimize once improbable ideologies” (Davies, p. 132). In this case, the New Politics liberals who stepped out from under Johnson’s umbrella introduced the idea of guaranteed income as a means of welfare reform to alleviate poverty. The brand of liberalism the New Politics crowd embraced was embodied by Senator Kennedy. “If the system were not changed, he warned, ‘the results could be the ripping asunder of the already thin fabric of American life” (Davies, p. 172). By 1968, welfare rights advocacy – as in the right to a guaranteed income – would be a rallying cry for New Politics liberals like Eugene McCarthy, who campaigned for president on this principle (Davies, p. 184). Davies describes the complete transition to this line of thought for liberals, noting that “by 1972, it had become more common for liberals to define dignity as freedom both from hardship and from the stigma hitherto attached to dependency. In turn, independence, far from connoting self sufficiency in the conventional sense, meant freedom from want, however achieved. Dependency, in the old sense, was almost equated with independence in the new” (Davies, p235).

Abandoning traditional liberalism did not come without a cost according to Davies. The temptation to capitalize politically on the fall of the President due to deteriorating race relations and the Vietnam war led Democrats to embrace still more unpopular ideas: “As radicals and liberals (including McGovern) were driven to endorse extravagant definitions of entitlement, the Democratic Party demonstrated its virtual abandonment of an individualist tradition and work ethic whose popular appeal remained undimmed” (Davies, p. 212). The Democrats who vied for position did so, according to Davies, by pushing ideas that were not popular, thereby weakening the party, and leaving the Democrats devoid of their traditional values. Ultimately, however, the party would return to the more traditional “opportunity liberalism” articulated in the “New Covenant” introduced by Arkansas governor (and future President) Bill Clinton in 1988 (Davies, p243).