Sally Ashton

History 574

January 24, 2008

Précis – Debating the Origins of the Cold War: American and Russian Perspectives, Ralph Levering, Vladimir Pechatnov, Verena Botzenhart-Viehe, Earl Edmondson, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2002.

In presenting the information on the origins of the Cold War, Levering, Pechatnov, Botzenhart-Viehe, and Edmonson concentrate their ideas in two essays, one on the American perspective and one from the Russian perspective. On the American side, the authors concentrated on an international and domestic focus, without forgetting the important role of public opinion on the shaping of policies and how public opinion affects governmental officials. To support their arguments, various Cold War documents were sited, emphasizing the foreign policy of the Roosevelt and Truman Administrations. From the Russian perspective, the focus seems to concentrate on historic Russian/Soviet foreign policy, the personality of Stalin, and his suspicious nature when dealing not only with the West, but with his own Communist supporters. What is new to the Russian historians is the ability to read and review previously secret Soviet documents that shed yet another light on the inner-thinking of Stalin’s government.

From the American side, Levering and Botzenhart-Viehe point out that the anti-Communist feelings in the United States can be traced back to the World War I era when Wilsonian ideals clashed with the dictatorship of Lenin and the support for Communist uprisings around the world. Until the 1930s, the relationship was in a truce, then FDR recognized the Soviet Union, and the US experienced a rise the membership of the American Communist party (partly due to the economic crisis), an increase in Soviet espionage activity and perceived indifference to it by the US government. As a backlash, a subsequent rise in anti-Communist activity had Congress organizing the House on Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). During the beginnings of WW II, most Americans were outraged at the actions of Stalin as he dealt with Hitler. FDR worked through the difficulties American’s had with the USSR because he believed that the Soviets could be an ally against the Japanese and the Germans. One of FDR’s goals in the post-war world would be US leadership in world affairs and he had to be able to convince Congress and the American public that cooperation with the Soviets in war and peace was a reality. He managed to accomplish this by telling world leaders, Congress, and the American public what they wanted to hear, whether it was correct or not. By late 1944, early 1945, it had become clear that America would run the post-war world as she saw fit and FDR summed up this policy by stating “We can fulfill our responsibilities for maintaining the security of our country only be exercising our power and our influence to achieve the principles in which we believe and for which we have fought.” (p. 23)

At the end of the war, the jockeying for position in the post-war world had begun. Most Americans felt the post-war world should be free, democratic nations that upheld people’s basic human rights. Stalin’s communist governments did not fit that mold. After FDR died, Truman had to deal with the Soviets and felt that they should live up to their agreements. The more they balked, the more disappointed Truman became with them, until he finally reached his breaking point and was tired of “babying the Soviets” (p. 37). Truman’s new foreign policy would focus on post-war Germany, Soviet expansion, and atomic energy to ensure US security and to preserve peace in the world. This anticommunist foreign policy was pursued with the majority of support from the general public. The public did not hesitate to support aid to Greece and Turkey (Truman Doctrine) or Western Europe (Marshall Plan), nor did they turn their backs on Berliners when the Soviets tried to starve the Allies and force communism on the people (Berlin Blockade).

Every policy the Truman administration followed, with overwhelming public support, was one of American internationalism, the desire to see the world free in her image – democratic and capitalistic. If that meant pouring money into Western Europe for economic stabilization and being able to hold the Communists in the Eastern section of Europe, even better. Asia was yet a different story, but Truman’s main concern was to rebuild a democratic Japan as a buffer to the Soviets in the Pacific. China was determined not to be a vital US interest.

The Cold War from the Russian perspective is one of righting history’s wrongs. Stalin seized this opportunity to establish friendly countries on his borders, both east and west. To the west, Eastern European satellites and a feeble Germany; to the east, a demilitarized Japan and control of the Sakhalin and Kurile Islands. An increase in the military and economic output of the country would guarantee this self-preservation and security. One major problem Stalin had with the West was trust. Failure to open the second front early in the war convinced the Soviet leader that the US and Britain wanted to win the war with Russian blood so that a worn-down USSR would be easier to deal with in the postwar period. Two other problems with the west were its concealment of the Manhattan Project from the Soviets, and the disagreement over which Polish government was legitimate.

Things seemed to be going well for the Soviets until the death of FDR. Truman was considered anti-Soviet, the use of the atomic bomb was seen as blackmail, and, because the war ended so quickly, the Soviet role in Asia was reduced. The US took over Japan and so it seemed to Stalin that a new arrogance was beginning to emerge in American post-war policy. Stalin began to feel squeezed as the US moved to create hegemony over the European continent. Despite this, Stalin maintained relations with the US and recognized his limits so as not to provoke the US. In order to prepare his people for a possible showdown, he announced a new five year plan to surpass prewar industrial levels. The Russian people must be prepared, he declared, since a capitalist-dominated world is a dangerous place. This was the opportunity Stalin needed to rid himself and the party of all those disloyal to him or his policies and an anti-Western ideological campaign was launched.

As the Western powers sought to rebuild Europe in their own image, Stalin viewed this as threatening and expansionist and consolidated his hold on Eastern Europe, especially the eastern zone of Germany, to the point of almost forcing a showdown over Berlin in 1948. In the end he capitulated, but that did not stop him from strengthening his power in Eastern Europe. In Stalin’s view, he had to do all of this in order to protect his country. With the formation of NATO, the division of Europe was complete. The Marshall plan had divided it economically and NATO divided it militarily. The USSR could not think about reducing its presence in Eastern Europe. Finally, to protect his eastern border, Stalin made a pact with China, and encouraged other revolutionaries in Asia.

The Soviet Union did not seem so different than the US. Following history, Stalin simply pursued policies that other Russian leaders had implemented before – expansion for security. The US had done the same – expansion of its influence into Western Europe and Japan to enhance its own national security. The premium was on toughness, hide your weakness and exploit the strengths. Unfortunately for the Soviet Union, Stalin’s personality would not allow him to capitulate, and so he engaged in a Cold War that he could not win.

In addition to the book, the three articles by Leffler, Roberts, and Gaddis try to shed more light on the origins of the Cold War. The Melvyn Leffler article, The Interpretive wars of the Cold War, 1945-1960, is a broad summary of the scholarship that is available to historians. Interesting to note however, is his point that Chinese, Asian, east-European, and World historians having being uncovering the fact that these nations were not just pawns in the game, but could be “manipulative, cunning, and shrewdly self-interested.”(p. 106) Two other new trends in Cold War histories seem to be the integration of military and diplomatic history, especially in the geographic region of the Middle East, and a corporatist school of thought exemplified in the work of Michael Hogan that emphasizes the West’s desire to rebuild the world’s economy as capitalistic and based on the corporation model of global, multinational businesses.

In his article, Two Very Different Empires, John Gaddis points out that it was the differing definitions and perceptions of the word “empire” that made a difference in post-war Europe. The Soviet empire reflected Stalin himself – imposing, smothering, suspicious, purging – little or no individual freedom of behavior or thought – an authoritarian system, tightly centralized that based its policies on friendly countries on its borders and world wide revolution. The Soviet empire developed slowly – due in part to the widespread appeal of Leninism in the postwar world. The oppressive nature of this empire was not immediately apparent, and by the time the Eastern Europeans tried to resist, Stalin had consolidated his power with widespread repression. The Soviet leader recognized limits, however, and Gaddis points out that Stalin backed down in the face of strong Anglo-American objections. America, on the other hand, only built an empire when it fit into Washington’s timetable – the point at which the American public was ready to remain a global power for the nation’s own security occurred in the wake of Pearl Harbor. The postwar world for the US meant bases worldwide, a new and improved United Nations to ensure world peace, and an international economic community. When Stalin refused to accept this model, the Cold War developed. Do not forget the Europeans themselves in this high stakes chess game – they accepted American hegemony, and invited American strength to the continent, as a buffer to their own fear of what the new world order under the Russians might be like.

In Stalin and Soviet Foreign Policy, Geoffrey Roberts points to the fact that Soviet archival material, recently made available to researchers, shows that Stalin was attempting to work with his wartime allies. When comparing his public and private statements, Stalin’s decision making process remained the same – a foreign policy that would work with his World War II Allies, but one that would protect his country. He had three major points to his foreign policy – a peacetime Grand Alliance, a sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, and the establishment of people’s democratic governments in Europe. All was going well for Stalin, or so he thought, until after the Potsdam Conference. This is when the Western Allies began their considerable resistance to Soviet domination in Eastern Europe and to develop different plans for Germany. Stalin found himself defending his right to friendly countries on his border, and ideological differences between East and West made diplomacy still more difficult. According to the Soviets, peaceful co-existence with the West was their foreign policy, but it was to be achieved by “diplomatic confrontation, ideological struggle, political, economic, and military competition.” (p. 54)

It is significant to note that the book and the readings all point to the same conclusion, that perceptions or misperceptions of what the other guy was doing led to an action/reaction type of foreign policy on both sides of the Cold War question.