Ed Hinman

Dr. Tom Devine

History 573

15 October 2008

Ferrell, Robert H., Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 1917-1921. New York: Harper & Row, 1985.

Robert H. Ferrell’s, Woodrow Wilson and World War I, 1917--1921, is ultimately about the agency of a “great men.” Specifically, Ferrell recounts Woodrow Wilson’s impatient desire to “make the world safe for democracy”; that is, to break with the isolationist structures of American foreign policy. (2) Wilson simply wanted to change the world; World War I offered him the means to pursue his ends -- that is, world peace or a “new world order.” Ferrell often describes how Wilson, through his “Presbyterian soul,” sought to deliver the old world from its “war psychosis.” (158,125,154) Consequently, Ferrell sees Wilson as a man of principle. The President’s stubborn faith in democracy, vision for a better world, and refusal to compromise his ideals, all indicates, according to Ferrell, a man guided by “high morality.”(12)

Chapter 1 begins with President Wilson asking Congress for war on April 2, 1917. Here, Ferrell describes a nation ready for war, a nation capable of becoming a superpower and making 1917 a turning point in world history. At this time, the United States was an industrial juggernaut, with an energetic population that outnumbered any nation in Europe, save the “polyglot empire” of Russia. (4) Moreover, America’s mechanized agriculture, favorable balance of trade, and contented workers of 1917 all amalgamated a patriotic population that could rival Europe. Woodrow Wilson saw this American potential as affording him an opportunity to change the world. Wilson would lead this sacred mission for democracy; using his “Presbyterian soul” as his moral compass.

Chapters 2 through 7 all illustrate the agency of Americans in the Great War. In Chapter 2, The President’s adoption of the draft in May 1917 signaled the first contradiction in Wilsonian liberalism. Like many domestic reforms, Wilson wrapped the American flag around his Draft (or conscription) Bill. Thus, he used “excessive” or “coercive” patriotism to push his democratic goals. Though Ferrell rejects the characterization of Wilson as “Machiavellian,” it seems that the ends often justified the means for Woodrow Wilson. (12)

Chapter 3 emphasizes the maritime logistics of America’s entrance into the war, highlighting the rise of America’s Navy and use of the “convoy system” to transport men and supplies across the Atlantic. In Chapter 4, Ferrell analyzes American military leadership, finding a hero in Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Peyton C. March, while criticizing the more well-known American war hero and AEF Commander, Gen. John J. Pershing for being overbearing and tactically backward. (51,57) Ferrell describes March as an “extraordinary leader,” that transformed the Army’s outdated logistical, supply, and administrative systems. March’s “quick, incisive decisions” and “commonsensical procedures,” writes Ferrell, brought “order to [the army’s] bureaucracy.” (28,29) Appointing only the best men, “without regard to rank, seniority, [or] age,” March instituted “competence” as the only criteria. (28) Ferrell’s descriptions of General March are consistent with the book’s overall theme: that individual agency changed American history, the agency of men like Wilson and March.

Chapter 5 narrates America’s battlefield victories in World War I. Ferrell focuses specifically, on the Marines’ saving Paris at the battle Belleau Wood in June 1914, and Pershing’s final push in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive, which lasted from September 1918 until the Armistice on November, 11, 1918. As Chapter 5 describes tactical victories, Chapter 6 and 7 deal with America’s fiscal and supply responsibilities. The “persuasive methods” of Treasury Secretary William G. McAdoo, and Food Administrator Herbert Hoover again signify the individual agency Ferrell values. McAdoo’s “salesmanship and public participation” enabled America to spend $2 million an hour during the war. In all, the American war effort “reached the same cost as the first hundred years of the federal government.” While McAdoo raised funds, Hoover “urged the patriotism of food.” Through the Food Control Act in August 1917, Hoover retained the power to “buy and sell food.”(91) Victory Gardens, meatless days, and strict rationing all revealed Hoover’s watchful eye on the public’s consumption. The Federal Government had penetrated the homes of America; yet, this invasion of privacy was sold as “patriotic to the core.” (93) It remained to be seen what consequences would result from biting that particular apple.

Chapter 7 illustrates Wilson’s reliance on private industry to enable America’s war machine. Only through private industry, Ferrell declares, “was it possible to find experience” -- that is, the “organizers and operators of the world’s greatest industrial machine.” (116) Ferrell goes as far as to label the President and Secretary of War as “children” when “compared to industrialists such as Pierre du Pont.” (117) Thus, the agency of industrialists, such as du Pont, demonstrated that America’s military and diplomatic status was a clear derivative of the nation’s industrial might.

In Chapters 8, 9, and 10, Ferrell refocuses on President Wilson’s agency from the Armistice through the Paris Peace talks, and finally, with the United States Senate’s refusal to join the League of Nations. In Chapter 8, Wilson’s excitement at the prospect of becoming a “World Prophet” is palpable. (125) When notified of the Armistice on November 11, 1918, Wilson declared that it is now “[America’s] fortunate duty to assist . . . in the establishment of just democracy throughout the world.” Later that evening, Ferrell describes Wilson as too excited to sleep, that he and his wife “talked until early hours of the morning.” Then, before Wilson went to bed, Ferrell says he read a chapter in the Bible. (134) This begs the question, did Wilson see himself as a prophet for democracy? Did he believe that his agency, was guided by a higher power?

In Chapter 9, Ferrell describes Wilson’s role at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Here, Ferrell re-ignites Wilson’s excitement, asserting that the President “would not have been human, had he failed to be exhilarated by the possibility of reorganizing Europe and the world.” (135) Along with his “14 Points,” Ferrell describes Wilson’s vision for a new world order. First, Wilson proposed that nations would “never again acquire a foot of ground by conquest”; second, that all nations were equal – both large and small; third, that “governments not individuals, should manufacture munitions”; and fourth, the existence of an “association of nations, with a mutual guarantee.” This new, democratic, world, insists Ferrell, was the “embryonic Covenant of the League [of Nations].” (163)

Despite his noble visions of democracy, Wilson made several diplomatic errors during the Paris Peace Conference. Among these blunders was his desire to head the peace commission and his selection of weak peace commissioners. (136-138) As Wilson stubbornly held to his cosmopolitan notions of democracy, his submissive cohort of American diplomats never challenged his vision. Consequently, the more experienced and pragmatic European statesmen pursued their own agenda of revenge (i.e. war reparations from Germany), and re-consolidation of African and Asian colonies. (146,149) Thus, while Wilson “hypnotized himself” with rhetoric proclaiming a democratic world, Europeans diplomatically outmaneuvered him. Wilson’s chief weakness, according to Ferrell, was his reliance on “logic.” Yet, as his adviser, Edward House, later admitted, “logic” was only “a small part of politics.” (152)

Wilson’s diplomatic failures often resulted from his commitment to a high-minded ideology. In Chapter 10, Ferrell describes how Wilson’s unwavering commitment to democracy and the League of Nations ultimately ended in political failure on the floor of the Senate in the U.S. Capitol. Article 10 of the League of Nations’ Charter obliged member nations to use force to defend each other’s sovereign territory. Consequently, many Senators saw this as unconstitutional; that is, America’s desire to use force is a political, vice legal, decision. Moreover, because Congress retains the power to declare war, the League of Nations could sap Congressional war powers -- threatening the Senate’s agency. Ultimately, the Senate rejected the Paris Peace Treaty; British Prime Minister David Lloyd George described the Senate’s blown opportunity: “The allies had offered America leadership of the world and the Senate threw the scepter into the sea.” (233) The Prime Minister’s observation also encapsulates Ferrell’s frustration with the senatorial politics that prevented Wilson’s “moral” vision from becoming reality. (158) In Chapter 11, Ferrell describes the domestic despair of many post-war Americans in 1919 – accentuated through influenza outbreaks, prohibition (i.e. the Volstead Act), and most notably, the shaky economy. As the cost of living increased, many American workers and farmers suffered. Twenty percent of all industrial workers, including many steel and coal workers, walked off the job in 1919. As violent strikes caused hundreds of deaths in America’s cities, farmers in America’s heartland were afflicted by dropping crop prices. By 1921, in addition to 450,000 farm foreclosures and 100,000 bankruptcies, 4.7 million Americans were out of work. (199)

Chapter 12 highlights President Wilson’s two-sided nature. As he preached democracy for the world, he actually limited freedom in America. As America entered the war, Wilson assigned George Creel to form the Committee on Public Information or CPI. Creel’s actions, which Wilson sanctioned, were intended to excite support for the war, but also crushed all opposition – through the law if applicable (i.e. the Alien and Sedition Acts), and through “coercion” if necessary. (204) Creel’s methods often drew on the services of 75,000 “Four Minute Men” who delivered collectively over 7.5 million propaganda speeches to a total audience of 314 million people. (202) Excited by this American jingoism, many “patriots” took to the streets and enacted “justice” on “Un-American” pacifists, socialists, international labor unions, and other groups or citizens opposed to the war. Their terror tactics often included beatings, tar and feathering, and even lynching those deemed “Un-American.” (204) Yet Ferrell, due to his respect for Wilson, seems to excuse the President’s arguably autocratic and tyrannical behavior. Indeed, Ferrell goes so far as to describe the America of CPI and vigilante justice as “a civil libertarian paradise . . . compared to the actions of Britain, France, and Germany.” (218) Yet, if Americans being “tarred and feathered” for exercising their First Amendment rights is representative of a civil libertarian paradise, Woodrow Wilson’s “Presbyterian soul” and “high morality” remain questionable at best.