History 485A

Devine

Fall 2011

 

Study Questions Week #3

 

Stein Tonnesson, “Franklin Roosevelt, Trusteeship, and Indochina: A Reassessment”

 

  1. How have historians’ explanations of FDR’s Indochinese policy changed over the years?  What pieces of evidence seem to have been significant in supporting or undermining these historians’ interpretations?

 

  1. How were FDR’s China and Indochina policies related?  Why didn’t things work out the way FDR had hoped?

 

  1. On what grounds did the U.S. military and the State Department oppose FDR’s desire to launch an invasion of Indochina?

 

  1. On March 9, 1945 the Japanese military overthrew the French colonial administration in Indochina.  Why did the Japanese carry out this coup?  Why does Tonnesson believe the coup was significant in the shaping of US Indochinese policy?

 

  1. What three kinds of territories did the proposed system of international trusteeships apply to? (see p. 63)  In interpreting FDR’s Indochina policy, why does Tonnesson play such close attention to these conditions? 

 

  1. According to Tonnesson, how does the shift in US Indochina policy between April and June 1945 demonstrate “how a bureaucracy can exploit a change at the top to carry out its own subdued wishes”? (p 68)

 

  1. Why, according to Tonnesson, did Wedemeyer and Hurley continue to operate “in the shadow of FDR”? (p 70)  What does he mean by this?

 

  1. Why was there a shift in US Indochina policy from support for trusteeship to support for French sovereignty?

 

  1. Consider the various players in this drama – individuals, groups, and nations.  What was in it for each of them?  What factors helped and hurt them as they each pursued their agenda?

 

 

Mark Atwood Lawrence, “Explaining the Early Decisions: The United States and the French War, 1945-1954” 

 

  1. What three moments do scholars consider most important in the evolution of US Vietnamese policy?  Why are these three moments significant?
  2. Tonnesson suggests bureaucratic manipulation of Truman may explain the shift in US Indochinese policy.  Why do other historians say economics and cultural prejudices may be just as important?

 

  1. To what extent did the Americans know what they were getting into when Washington decided to back the French in Indochina? 

 

  1. According to Lawrence, there are five lines interpretation that explain why the United States came to support the French against the Vietminh in 1950. Identify and briefly summarize those five interpretations.  Which reason(s) do you find most persuasive and why?

 

  1. What three “key assumptions” underpinned US policy in Vietnam after 1954?  What was the connection between these assumptions and the policies Washington pursued?

 

  1. How have historians interpreted Eisenhower’s policies toward Vietnam?  What factors have helped shape these interpretations?  How does Lawrence show that one’s interpretation can be determined by the sources one chooses to believe?

 

  1. According to Lawrence, why did Eisenhower’s refusal to intervene militarily at Dien Bien Phu mark only a “momentary flash of understanding” and not a fundamental shift from the Vietnam policies of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations?