History 485

Devine

Spring 2011

 

Study Questions for Michael H. Hunt, Lyndon Johnson’s War

 

 

  1. How did The Ugly American influence the ideas of American policy makers?  What model of the ideal “cold warrior” did it offer?

 

  1. How did the United States first become involved in Indochina?  What policy did the Roosevelt administration pursue?

 

  1. Why did the United States oppose independence for Indochina?  How did Cold War considerations contribute to this decision?

 

  1. Why did U.S. support for Ngo Dinh Diem prove problematic?

 

  1. What was Edward Lansdale’s approach to Vietnam?  What difficulties did he encounter in trying to implement his strategy?

 

  1. How did American preconceptions about Asians and other “brown people” shape our policy?  Why does Hunt choose the term “American paternalism” to describe American attitudes?

 

  1. Why is it important to be aware of Vietnam’s history when trying to comprehend that nation’s understanding of the conflict with the United States?

 

  1. Why did Ho Chi Minh embrace Leninism? Why did he believe that it was useful in the Vietnamese context?

 

  1. What was Ho’s populist program?  What were its goals its and tactics for achieving them?

 

  1. Why was the battle of Dien Bien Phu a significant turning point in the history of U.S. involvement in Vietnam?

 

  1. What was the NLF?  What role did it play in the Vietnamese struggle for unification and independence?

 

  1. Why was the battle of Ap Bac (pp 37-39) a sign of things to come?

 

  1. “American policy makers preoccupied with dominoes and monoliths,” Michael Hunt writes, “saw no reason to pay any attention to brocade bags.”  What does he mean? How did American leaders’ assumptions about the nature of Communism lead them to pursue ineffective policies in Vietnam?

 

  1. What are some of Hunt’s criticisms of the “learned academics on the Potomac?”  How did the “best and the brightest” mishandle the problem of Vietnam?

 

  1. How did broader Cold War concerns influence JFK’s Vietnamese policy?

 

  1. Why did some critics believe that Kennedy’s “pacification” policy and his support of Diem did more harm than good?  Were they right?

 

  1. How did Lyndon Johnson fundamentally change the nature of U.S. involvement in Vietnam? Was this, then, “Lyndon Johnson’s war?”

 

  1. In what ways were Johnson’s home grown bromides particularly inappropriate when applied to the situation in Vietnam?

 

  1. How did Johnson’s personality and background shape his Vietnam policies?

 

  1.  Beginning on page 78, Hunt discusses “four key decisions” Johnson made on Vietnam.  What were they and why were they significant?

 

  1. Beginning on page 99, Hunt reviews the four major criticisms of Johnson’s conduct of the war. What are they and to what extent are they justified?

 

  1. Why does Hunt say that the Vietnam War was also “America’s war?”  In what sense did it “emerge out of an American culture?” 

 

  1. Was the bombing of North and South Vietnam effective?  Why or why not?  How does one define “effective?”

 

  1. Why was the January 1968 Tet Offensive a significant benchmark in the war?

 

  1. What strategy did Nixon pursue in Vietnam?  Did it work?

 

  1. Why did the United States fail to achieve its objectives in Vietnam?

 

  1. The ancient Greeks defined tragedy as a good man brought to a bad end by the very quality or qualities that had allowed him to achieve greatness in the first place.  Apply this definition to the United States’ experience in Vietnam.

 

 

 

Study Questions for Gareth Porter, “Explaining the Vietnam War: Dominant and Contending Paradigms”

 

  1. According to Porter, what are the three “central assumptions” of the dominant “Cold War consensus” paradigm?  What evidence have historians used to defend these assumptions?

 

  1. Porter claims there are too many “anomalies” that undermine the legitimacy of the three dominant paradigms’ assumptions. What evidence does Porter provide in arguing that each of the three assumptions should be abandoned?

 

  1. How does Porter interpret Dulles’ strategy toward Vietnam and China in 1954-1955?  Why does he see it as more offensive (projecting US power) than defensive (reacting against communist expansion)?

 

  1. What evidence does Porter introduce to show that Kennedy and Johnson did not agree with policymakers who favored escalation of US military involvement in Vietnam?

 

  1. Porter argues that the primary goal of US policy in Asia was not containing communism in Southeast Asia (Vietnam) or stopping “falling dominos,” but rather keeping steady pressure on China. How effective is he at supporting this argument with specific evidence?

 

  1. How does Porter’s explanation of policy decisions in 1961 and 1964 show that the “dominant paradigm” regarding Vietnam needs to be re-examined?

 

  1. What are some of the assumptions behind Porter’s alternative “Power Imbalance Paradigm”?  Why does he suggest that historians should rethink not only the kind of documents they use in building their interpretations, but how they read them?

 

  1. To what extent do you think Porter’s criticisms of the “Cold War consensus” paradigm are persuasive?  Should historians abandon the assumptions of the dominant paradigm?