History 485

Devine

Fall 2015

 

David Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor

 

Chapter 5

 

  1. Why did “cash and carry” became unworkable by early 1941?  How did FDR solve the “cash” problem and then address the “carry” problem?

 

  1. How did British orders for war materials also spur American preparedness?

 

  1. What was the significance of FDR’s “four freedoms”?  Why did he announce them?  Why, unlike Wilson, did he desire a “peace with victory”?

 

  1. What arguments did the America First committee make in opposing Lend Lease and, more broadly, FDR’s overall interventionist foreign policy?  To what extent were their arguments sound?

 

  1. How did FDR answer his critics?  How would you assess his methods?

 

  1. Initially, why did both business and the military impede lend-lease production?

 

  1. In negotiating the terms of lend-lease with the British, the US did not want Britain’s colonies. What did it want in exchange from the British?

 

  1. Why were Churchill and FDR concerned about the battle of the Atlantic? How did this concern lead to formulating the concepts of “Atlanticism” and “national security”?  In what ways did this new conception of US national security have significance beyond World War II?

 

Chapter 6

 

  1. How did FDR react to the USSR’s entrance into the war against Germany? What factors shaped his reaction?  How did the Soviet presence in the war shape US strategy?

 

  1. How did US policymakers differ regarding the proper response to Japanese expansion in the Pacific?  How did advances in US air power begin affect policymakers’ calculations?

 

  1. Though FDR considered the British allies, on what issues – strategic, economic, and geopolitical – did he want the British to make concessions?  How did FDR use the Atlantic Charter to exact these concessions? 

 

  1. What concessions did Churchill want FDR to make regarding both the war in Europe and the war in the Pacific?

 

  1. Why were the Greer incident and the oil embargo on Japan significant in drawing the US closer to war in Europe and in the Pacific respectively?

 

  1. Reynolds notes (pp. 156-158) that FDR was determined not to rush into formal war during 1941.  What reasons did FDR have for adhering to this position?

 

  1. Why did the differences between Japan and the US prove irreconcilable?  What would the US not agree to?  What would Japan not agree to?

 

  1. How does Reynolds assess the popular conspiracy theory that FDR had advance notice of the attack on Pearl Harbor?

 

  1. Why did Hitler declare war on the US after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor?

 

 

Chapter 7

 

  1. Why does Reynolds believe that Roosevelt himself was central and determinative in US policy making in the years from Munich to Pearl Harbor? What evidence does he introduce in making the case for FDR’s centrality?

 

  1. What does Reynolds mean when he says that FDR’s foreign policy was founded on geopolitics and ideology?  How did FDR redefine US “national security”? How did he propose to ensure it without turning the nation into a garrison state?

 

  1. According to Reynolds, what “key concepts” had been formed during the lead up to World War II that would continue to be influential once the Cold War began?

 

  1. Why does Reynolds argue that the “Imperial Presidency” and the “national security state” originated with FDR?