History 485

Devine

Fall 2015

 

Study Questions for Utley and Doenecke

 

Jonathan G. Utley, “The United States Enters World War II”

 

  1. As far as Washington was concerned, what was the difference between “undesirable” and “intolerable” expansion on the part of the Japanese and the Germans?

 

  1. What role did economics play in the US entry into World War II?  How were US economic concerns linked to American ideals?

 

  1. What were the economic and strategic reasons for the US entering the war in the Pacific?

 

  1. Why did both Britain and the US prefer a “Europe first” strategy?

 

  1. What were the pros and cons for negotiating a 3-month “modus-vivendi” with Japan?  Why did Hull ultimately decide against a modus viviendi?

 

  1. Why has talk arisen of a conspiracy involving FDR taking a “back door to war” regarding the attack on Pearl Harbor?

 

 

 

Justus D. Doenecke, “The Roosevelt Foreign Policy: An Ambiguous Legacy

 

  1. Why did some of FDR’s traits that helped him pass his domestic agenda not serve him well in foreign policy?

 

  1. How did FDR’s assessment of his country’s motives and his own abilities often undermine his conduct of foreign policy?

 

  1. Why does Doenecke disparage the quality of FDR’s appointments to foreign policy-related posts?  Why did FDR largely ignore the foreign policy bureaucracy and what were the ramifications of this approach?

 

  1. FDR’s rhetoric could occasionally be ardently anti-colonial. How did his handling of Indochina during World War II indicate that his commitment to anti-colonialism had limits?

 

  1. What, if anything, did FDR’s handling of the Palestine and the Jewish refugee issues reveal about his approach to foreign policy making?

 

  1. How did FDR’s vision for the UN differ from Wilson’s for the League of Nations?

 

  1. With regard to U.S. policy toward China, why does Doenecke conclude FDR “possessed a much weaker hand than he thought, and he played it poorly”? (65)

 

  1. Why did FDR support a policy of “unconditional surrender”?  Why does Doenecke argue that such a policy may not have been wise?

 

  1. How did FDR’s plans for Germany evolve over time?  Why did he eventually reject the Morgenthau plan to dismember and de-industrialize Germany?

 

  1. Why did each of the Big Three see the postwar fate of Poland as important (but for different reasons)?

 

  1. According to Doenecke, what were the drawbacks of FDR’s preference for “postponement and ambiguity”?  Why did his “positive spin” of Yalta prove unwise?

 

  1. Ultimately, did FDR’s poor health during the last years of his administration have any significant ramifications?

 

  1. In assessing FDR’s foreign policy, why does Doenecke conclude that he had an “ambiguous legacy”?