Reynolds, From Munich to Pearl Harbor

Chapter 5

Brits expect immediate aid in wake of FDR’s re-election, but pace is slower than expected. FDR must deal with abiding political opposition.

Churchill writes FDR highlighting 3 interrelated problems:

1) production (US must expand material output to meet British demand)

2) finance (Brits would soon need credits/loans as they ran out of gold and cash)

3) shipping (Brits would need US Navy to protect shipping lanes as it transported material)

In response, FDR proposes Lend-Lease (not a new idea – along the lines of proposals made two years earlier after Munich)

FDR see urgency, but emphasizes “national security,” not war so as not to stir up opposition.

Two arguments:

To enhance its own security, US must construct additional productive facilities – British orders would encourage US industry to galvanize the nation’s rearmament.

Leasing the Brits munitions would also further US national security

(lending your neighbor a hose when his house was on fire)

In selling Lend-Lease to the public, FDR acknowledges national security argument, but emphasizes the war as an ideological struggle between “American civilization” and totalitarianism.

He insists his goal is to “keep war away from our country and our people.”

Roosevelt doctrine à US will be the “arsenal of democracy” (combines ideological appeal with concrete measures)

In his 1941 State of the Union Address, FDR again warns against any “negotiated peace” (a signal to America First and to the British).

He articulates the Four Freedoms:

Freedom of speech

Freedom of worship

Freedom from want (securing prosperity for all nations)

Freedom from fear (reduction of armaments)

FDR sees Four Freedoms as attainable with victory, not a distant vision

Lend Lease debate

CDAAA supports administration; argument is narrowly focused on Axis aggression and threats to the hemisphere and immediate issues; avoids discussion about convoying.

American First – aims not to defeat Lend Lease but to raise doubts about FDR and his foreign policy. FDR has become too powerful and his power threatens US liberties; FDR policy will lead the nation into war.

FDR smears opponents as “crypto-fascists”

Lend Lease passes; ultimately it covered more than half of British balance-of-payments, allowing the Brits to focus on war production rather than exports to cover import needs.

Business is reluctant to convert to wartime production – consumer boom on the horizon; war could end at any moment leaving business unprepared; many fear war would lead to higher taxes and greater unionization and regulation.

Production is subject to politics and bureaucratic rivalry (government fears giving the impression that mobilization for war is going on – when that is exactly what is going on.)

Lend Lease ends the New Deal’s struggle with business.

Economies of scale are needed and business is in a position to insure production

Lend Lease lays the foundation for the postwar military-industrial complex.

British and US military secretly devise ABC-1 agreement to plan for joint military operations in the event of war.

Plan agrees that defeating Germany and Italy is the priority; plan for Asia is defense and deterrence.

Some disagreement over what course “deterrence” should take – US doesn’t want to be seen as fighting for British retention of its colonies.

US fleet stays in Pearl Harbor (and doesn’t move to Singapore) but US will move some ships to the Atlantic, enabling the Brits to move a fleet to Singapore.

This constitutes a strategic plan, but details are not filled in.

By 1941, the balance between Brits and Americans shifts to the US advantage

--Brits makes concessions on bases

--State Dept insists Brits must end Imperial Preference

FDR (and Luce) envision an internationalist America in the postwar period

--free trade

--disseminate US technical and artistic skills

--US provides food and relief to restore the nations of the world

--US spreads its ideals of freedom and justice

Spring 1941 – Bad news for Brits/Americans

Germans win a series of victories in North Africa and the Eastern Mediterranean

Blitz on British ports and cities continues

Shipping losses increase

Mid-Atlantic islands under threat

Churchill appears weak politically

US fears British appeasement or negotiated peace w/ Germany

Japanese conclude non-aggression pact with USSR and turn south

-- US can’t move ships out of Pearl Harbor to aid with convoying

Domestic opposition in US to convoying

New Atlanticism and new definitions of national security have a more expansive view of US hemispheric defenses – which now extend across the Atlantic

May 1941 – FDR articulates his view of national security in a well-received public address. He refers to a “Second World War.” Was he aware of the impeding German invasion of the USSR?

Chapter 6

After German attack on USSR, FDR waits to see if the Russian Army will survive the initial thrust. When it does, he offers aid (but does so in a low key manner).

FDR revisits his ideological portrait of the war. Rather than a “totalitarian” foe, the foe is imperial expansionism; the USSR is not a threat to attack the US, Germany is.

Also, USSR is moving away from revolution and establishing itself as a typical great power – motivated more by concerns about national security than ideological expansion.

To divert public attention from Soviet totalitarianism, FDR asserts that Russia is “tolerant” of religion

German invasion of USSR affects the Pacific War.

Japanese government had not been consulted (showing the hollowness of Tri-Partite Pact)

Japanese government debates whether to move north (toward USSR) or south (toward Dutch Indies). Decision is to go south, though simultaneously negotiations to avert war with the US continue.

US has broken Japanese code – “Magic” US policymakers now debate the role of oil & economic sanctions – deterrence or provocation. FDR prefers deterrence.

FDR supports limited sanctions and a reinforcement of the Philippines with new B-17 bombers. Hull negotiates a “modus vivendi” to stall for time so the bombers can be moved to the islands. Japanese see US deterrence as provocation.

Atlantic Charter – August 1941 The ideological piece of the Atlanticist strategy.

Axis overestimate the significance of the FDR-Churchill meeting; assume wartime plans rather than simply an ideological statement is the result of their meeting. Japanese feel surrounded and determine to continue their expansion south.

Japanese reaction to US-British meeting mirrors the US exaggeration of the Axis unity.

At Atlantic meeting, Churchill wants US declaration of war on Germany and agreement to declare war on Japan if British colonies are attacked. Instead, he gets a declaration of war aims, not all of which he finds to his liking (esp. anti-imperial tone).

FDR wants ideological clarity to bring to the US public, especially since the entrance of USSR into the war has jumbled the ideological narrative.

Greer incident on 9/11/41 enables FDR to expand definition of national security so that US will defend militarily the entire Atlantic within 400 miles of Scotland

Fall 1941

Competition for US resources between USSR, Brits, and US armed forces. FDR urges aid to USSR. Aid is minimal but does boost the morale of the Russian people.

FDR still reluctant to consider sending troops into a ground war in Europe. Wants to rely on bombing; first steps taken toward development of atomic bomb

Congress agrees to Lend Lease for USSR; agrees (by close margins) to amend 1939 neutrality act; US can now arm merchant ships; permit US ships to enter belligerent ports; and declare combat zones around belligerent countries

FDR hesitates to implement any new policies.

FDR fears if the US enters the war, the public will call for a cut in foreign aid to Britain and USSR and this would in fact put US national security in even more jeopardy.

FDR fears US entry into the war with Germany will trigger a declaration of war by Japan; policy is to avoid war with Japan; if there is war with Germany AND Japan, even more likely the public will call for cuts in foreign aid.

In negotiations with Japanese, Hull insists on their acceptance of Wilsonian principles and demands Japanese withdrawal from China and renunciation of Tri-Partite pact. This asks too much and Japan rejects it.

Hull tries for a modus vivendi, but China balks when Japanese withdrawal is not among the conditions. Hull knows Japan is preparing for war, so he gives up. FDR promise Brits they will receive US military support if their possessions in Asia are attacked. This is a new policy.

Attack on Pearl Harbor clarifies US policy – leading some to accuse FDR of allowing the attack to happen. Intelligence archives suggest intel failure, not conspiracy. US had underestimated the Japanese military capaibility.

Germany foolishly declares war on the US, enabling FDR to sell and pursue a Europe first strategy. Germany’s declaration of war also confirms FDR’s perception of the conflict as a “World War.”

In fact, the Axis did not operate in tandem effectively; the Allies did and that helped them to win the war.