

Notes for Reynolds, *Munich to Pearl Harbor*, Ch. 6

Chapter 6

After German attack on USSR, FDR waits to see if the Russian Army will survive the initial thrust. When it does, he offers aid (but does so in a low key manner).

FDR revisits his ideological portrait of the war. Rather than a “totalitarian” foe, the foe is imperial expansionism; the USSR is not a threat to attack the US, Germany is.

Also, USSR is moving away from revolution and establishing itself as a typical great power – motivated more by concerns about national security than ideological expansion.

To divert public attention from Soviet totalitarianism, FDR asserts that Russia is “tolerant” of religion

German invasion of USSR affects the Pacific War.

Japanese government had not been consulted (showing the hollowness of Tri-Partite Pact)

Japanese government debates whether to move north (toward USSR) or south (toward Dutch Indies). Decision is to go south, though simultaneously negotiations to avert war with the US continue.

US has broken Japanese code – “Magic” US policymakers now debate the role of oil & economic sanctions – deterrence or provocation. FDR prefers deterrence.

FDR supports limited sanctions and a reinforcement of the Philippines with new B-17 bombers. Hull negotiates a “modus vivendi” to stall for time so the bombers can be moved to the islands. Japanese see US deterrence as provocation.

Atlantic Charter – August 1941 The ideological piece of the Atlanticist strategy.

Axis overestimate the significance of the FDR-Churchill meeting; assume wartime plans rather than simply an ideological statement is the result of their meeting. Japanese feel surrounded and determine to continue their expansion south.

Japanese reaction to US-British meeting mirrors the US exaggeration of the Axis unity.

At Atlantic meeting, Churchill wants US declaration of war on Germany and agreement to declare war on Japan if British colonies are attacked. Instead, he gets a declaration of war aims, not all of which he finds to his liking (esp. anti-imperial tone).

FDR wants ideological clarity to bring to the US public, especially since the entrance of USSR into the war has jumbled the ideological narrative.

Greer incident on 9/11/41 enables FDR to expand definition of national security so that US will defend militarily the entire Atlantic within 400 miles of Scotland

Fall 1941

Competition for US resources between USSR, Brits, and US armed forces. FDR urges aid to USSR. Aid is minimal but does boost the morale of the Russian people.

FDR still reluctant to consider sending troops into a ground war in Europe. Wants to rely on bombing; first steps taken toward development of atomic bomb

Congress agrees to Lend Lease for USSR; agrees (by close margins) to amend 1939 neutrality act; US can now arm merchant ships; permit US ships to enter belligerent ports; and declare combat zones around belligerent countries

FDR hesitates to implement any new policies.

FDR fears if the US enters the war, the public will call for a cut in foreign aid to Britain and USSR and this would in fact put US national security in even more jeopardy.

FDR fears US entry into the war with Germany will trigger a declaration of war by Japan; policy is to avoid war with Japan; if there is war with Germany AND Japan, even more likely the public will call for cuts in foreign aid.

In negotiations with Japanese, Hull insists on their acceptance of Wilsonian principles and demands Japanese withdrawal from China and renunciation of Tri-Partite pact. This asks too much and Japan rejects it.

Hull tries for a *modus vivendi*, but China balks when Japanese withdrawal is not among the conditions. Hull knows Japan is preparing for war, so he gives up. FDR promise Brits they will receive US *military* support if their possessions in Asia are attacked. This is a new policy.

Attack on Pearl Harbor clarifies US policy – leading some to accuse FDR of allowing the attack to happen. Intelligence archives suggest intel failure, not conspiracy. US had underestimated the Japanese military capability.

Germany foolishly declares war on the US, enabling FDR to sell and pursue a Europe first strategy. Germany's declaration of war also confirms FDR's perception of the conflict as a "World War."

In fact, the Axis did not operate in tandem effectively; the Allies did and that helped them to win the war.