Afghanistan

Located in a strategic position

19^th Century -- buffer between Russian and British empires

Controlled by the Durrani family since the 18^th century

Ethnically diverse, and no one gets along; even within the various ethnicities

Ethnic Breakdown:

Pashtuns (about 45%)

-- Nationalists want “Pashtunistan” à which encompasses part of Pakistan (Pakistanis not supportive of Pashtun independence)

-- Most Pashtuns are not nationalists; they are loyal only to their tribe and their family

Shia Moslems (about 20%)

-- sympathetic to Iran

-- ties to Iran concern the Soviets

Tajiks, Usbeks, Turkmens (30%)

-- same ethnic groups as in the Soviet republics to the North

-- Soviets worry about instability because these same groups could rebel in the USSR

After World War II, urbanization and education in Afghanistan promises to bring progress and a better life, but also destabilizes the old order

The Durrani family cedes some press and political freedom in the 1960s à

Afghanistan appears to be slowly headed toward some degree of modernity

Advances in education; universities open

BUT “progress” brings only more instability

As Afghans attend the new universities, Marxism and Islamic Fundamentalism (an import from Egypt) become the most prevalent intellectual traditions.

ORIGINS OF POLITICAL CRISIS

1973 Sardar Daoud, a junior member of the Durrani family, enlists leftist (Marxist) activists and politicians, and seizes power.

-- Immediately purges all the leftists

1978 Leftists purge Daoud

-- burst into the presidential palace and slaughter him along with 18 family members

1978 Leftists establish the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA)

-- PDPA is labeled “pro-Moscow” in the West because it is Marxist and has ties to the Soviet Union

Two factions of the PDPA emerge and begin feuding.

Babrak Karmal leads the gradualist urbanized reformers (non-Pashtun)

-- more educated, sophisticated, moderate

Hafizullah Amin leads the radical Pashtuns from rural areas

-- less educated, parochial, angry at being excluded from Afghan mainstream

(Amin had attended Columbia University in New York but had not passed his PhD exams and as a result he resented Americans. While studying in the US, he had been exposed to radical Marxist ideas and brought them back to Afghanistan.)

Though Karmal and Amin are heads of the respective factions of the PDPA, the party in fact is headed by an older man from the Amin faction: Nur Mohammad Taraki

-- Taraki is a self-educated writer with nomadic roots

-- Referred to by one historian as “celebrated, ruthless, and often drunk”

Taraki purges Karmal, leader of the more moderate Marxist faction.

Karmal flees to Moscow. (But he’ll be back.)

Taraki and Amin begin a “vulgar Marxist” revolution

-- secularize the countryside, land redistribution, female emancipation

-- Taraki’s radical Marxist policies alienate the entire country

March 1979 Uprising

-- in the Afghan city of Herat; local townspeople, Islamist guerrillas, and defectors from Afghani army unit attack members of PDPA.

The Islamist guerillas kill Soviet advisors and their families. One scholar refers to their behavior as the “ultimate primitive expression of contempt.”

Soviet advisors and Afghan army units take back city after four days.

Amin orders Soviet planes to destroy the city. Thousands killed.

Soviet politburo meets to discuss situation. March 17.

Central Question for Soviets: Who or what is behind the instability in Afghanistan?

1) Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs Andrei Gromyko is worried about Chinese, American, and Iranian interference in Afghanistan

Gromyko believes – incorrectly – that the West has caused the uprising in Herat. One thing is certain à All religious fanatics must be killed.

2) KGB Chief Yuri Andropov (soon to succeed Leonid Brezhnev as leader of the USSR) believes extremist elements from Pakistan are the problem. These Islamic radicals could incite the large Muslim population in the USSR.

3) Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin believes Amin and Taraki are “hiding the true state of affairs.” They can’t be trusted. Their policies are driving rebels into Muslim extremists arms.

Bezhnev decides à NO TROOPS yet. The Soviets will provide communist brothers in Afghanistan with arms, advisors, and money.

Meanwhile, Moscow tells Taraki to slow down, back up, and tone down the revolutionary rhetoric because the Soviets are worried that he will stir up a Moslem Fundamentalist backlash.

September 1979 à Governing coalition splits in Afghanistan

Policymakers in Moscow lose faith in Amin. Situation in Afghanistan is a mess.

Brezhnev and Gromyko meet with Taraki in Moscow. They tell him to arrest Amin and the Soviets will back him up. Taraki agrees.

Taraki gets “cold feet” and does not do it.

Amin gets angry, surrounds Presidential palace, Taraki arrested.

Soviets tell Amin to let Taraki go. Amin does not listen – Wild West shootout between the bodyguards of Taraki and Amin

Amin’s side captures Taraki; Amin has him thrown in jail and later suffocated with a pillow.

Soviet concern over Afghanistan

Moscow is exasperated. Carter seems to be turning against détente, and now it appears that Afghanistan, a volatile area potentially threatening to the Soviet Union, is becoming unstable.

If the Afghan civil war intensifies, Tajiks, Turkmens, Uzbeks in Afghanistan could become exiles, enter the Soviet Union to the north, and stir up trouble in the Central Asian republics of the USSR (Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan).

Even more frustrating, Brezhnev had invited Taraki to Moscow to celebrate him as a “key Soviet ally” only days before he was overthrown and killed.

Brezhnev exclaims:

“How should the world be able to believe what Brezhnev says if his words do not count in Afghanistan!”

KBG officials report Iran is trying to radicalize Afghan population.

Soviets fear that if the U.S. or other western nations gain a foothold in Afghanistan, they can put intelligence stations and missiles in the country. This would threat Soviet bases in region and missile stations in Kazakhstan, Siberia, etc.

Decision by Amin to kill Taraki set in motion Soviet plan for intervention.

Can Amin be trusted?

Soviet Army fears that Amin “might do a Sadat on us…wholesale defection to U.S. camp.” He must be killed.

Meanwhile, Karmal, who Amin’s faction had purged earlier, whispers in Brezhnev’s ear that Amin is tilting toward Washington.

The KGB had earlier planted such rumors to discredit Amin. Was Karmal repeating the KGB-generated rumors or did he have his own sources?

Now the KGB becomes concerned its own false rumors are true. Is Amin really CIA?

Answer: no, but the whole intelligence fiasco keeps the Soviets guessing.

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan takes shape

December 8- Andropov, KGB chief, tells Brezhnev, “a group of communists residing abroad has contacted us.” – He is referring to Karmal.

Soviets will install Karmal as new leader of Afghanistan.

Military and KGB claim 75,000 troops will be needed to secure borders with Iran and Pakistan in order to stop inflow of radical Islamist elements.

Brezhnev gives it the OK for now. Politburo must meet

December 12 - Politburo meets. All accept Andropov’s proposal

Incapacitated Brezhnev “added his name in quivering handwriting at end of document.”

Storm 333 begins- Soviets invade. Spetsnaz and Soviet forces attack Amin’s palace.

Moscow reluctantly invades Afghanistan to protect its security and its credibility.

Amin welcomes the troops hoping they’ll restore stability. Instead Soviet special agents murder him and most of his family.

Soviets install Karmal who they had already flown in from Moscow.

Moscow hopes that the Karmal faction and the “good” people in the other faction (Taraki supporters) will ally, create a broad coalition, and restore stability, so they can get their people out soon.

Instead the two factions are immediately at each other’s throats. The Afghan army disintegrates and riots break out in all the major cities and towns, and the government loses control of the countryside.

Frustrated, Soviet forces begin to kill anything that moves;

-- all crowds are suspicious and are decimated – including wedding parties;

-- villages razed

-- “fun” shootings at buses and into houses

Afghanistan looks like an archaeological site – ruins and graves

1/5 population flees the country – most into Pakistan

The US Response to the Soviet Invasion

Carter responds aggressively – feels personally betrayed by Brezhnev after warm meeting in Vienna.

He imposes a grain embargo and calls for an international boycott the 1980 Olympics in Moscow.

Competing misperceptions

Moscow worried that US, having been thrown out of Iran, is headed into Afghanistan;

US fears Moscow is headed to the Persian Gulf thinking the US is too weak to stop them since the US has already lost Iran.

Freedom Fighters vs Soviet imperialists

Over 900 guerilla groups in Afghanistan fighting the Soviets

Ahmad Massoud wins support of the West, but he’s Tajik and alienates the Pashtuns

Sunis are pro-Pakistan; Shia are pro-Iran and funded by Khomeini

-- Iran and Pakistan à both fiercely Islamic yet representing rival religious and ideological traditions

April 1988 – the Soviets agree to withdraw. 15,000 Soviet soldiers die; 1 million Afghans die