History 271
Devine
Spring 2015
World War II
Origins in Europe, 1936-1941
The
origins and unfolding of the Second World War had very little to do with the
United States. The World War II memorial in Washington, DC gives the dates of
the war as “1941-1945.” Though those were the years of direct U.S.
participation in the military conflict, the war in Europe was well underway
long before the U.S. was even a factor.
Contrary
to Hollywood-generated mythology that presents the war as almost solely an
American triumph, the Soviet Union bore the brunt of the Nazi war machine, and
its armed forces – assisted by U.S. Lend Lease aid – deserve much of the credit
for breaking the back of the Third Reich.
In many
respects the Second World War was simply a continuation of the First World War.
The
Treaty of Versailles (1919) may have ended hostilities, but it did not entirely
resolve the underlying sources of conflict.
German resentment over the Treaty in part set the stage for the
emergence of Adolf Hitler. (Similarly, Japanese resentment of the Treaty terms
partially explain the origins of the war in Asia.)
Hitler
and his National Socialist (Nazi) Party stoked feelings of resentment among
many in the German middle classes who had suffered economically and
psychologically in the wake of World War I. He rode this resentment to power in
1933.
Hitler also
co-opted the Allies’ “self-determination” rhetoric to make the case for mobilizing
German military power and expanding the German borders (seeking “lebensraum”).
Citing U.S. President Woodrow Wilson who had preached that all peoples should
have a government of their own choosing that represented the people’s interests,
Hitler set his sights on gathering all German speakers under the sovereignty of
the German government.
This
began with the re-occupation of the Rhineland in March 1936. Hitler demanded
that French and British troops withdraw and allow the Germans who lived in this
region full sovereignty.
Determined
to avoid another conflict and preoccupied with domestic economic problems, London
and Paris agreed to withdraw. Hitler soon began to use the natural and
industrial resources now back under German control to fuel his military
machine.
Two years
later, in March 1938, Hitler negotiated the “Anschluss” (“Connection”) between
Germany and Austria. This move, he claimed, was not aggressive or expansionist
but merely made legal the cultural reality – the Austrians and the Germans were
one people (or so Hitler believed).
The West
registered only a muted protest since Hitler justified his actions based on the
self-determination ideology that the Western nations themselves had embraced.
Many
Austrians (though certainly not all) welcomed the Anschluss, believing that
they would benefit from German protection. Jews, of course, were the notable
exception. It soon became clear that the Nazis were a threat to them since they
did not consider them “German,” but rather of some inferior race whose
influence had to be curbed, if not eliminated.
Six
months later, Hitler met with the leaders of France, Great Britain, and Italy
in Munich. There, he promised them that his goals were limited – to bring
German speaking peoples under German control. Once he had achieved this, he
would forego any further expansion.
The
governments of France and England chose to “appease” Hitler, not because they
trusted his word, but because they knew they were in no position to defeat the
Germans in a war. First, the Germans were stronger militarily; and second,
public opinion was so anti-war that even attempts to mobilize for a potential
war could get the ruling parties voted out of office.
Less than
a month after the Munich Agreement, Hitler’s forces moved into the Sudetenland –
a region of Czechoslovakia in which German speakers were numerous (but also a
region in which some non-German speakers resided.) Again, Hitler justified his
move in terms of “self-determination” – the German speakers had a right to be
ruled by a German government.
A look at
the map, however (See Powerpoint slide), shows that Hitler was positioning his
troops to take over all of Czechoslovakia. The Czechs saw the writing on the
wall and desperately appealed to Great Britain and France to protect them. They
got no response.
All the
while, Stalin in the Soviet Union was watching the unfolding of events. He
urged the Western governments to join the Soviet Union in pursuing a policy of “Collective
Security” in opposition to Hitler. London and Paris showed little interest in
Stalin’s strategy.
Stalin
concluded the Western governments were weak and would do (and could do) nothing
to stop Hitler. He also suspected he was being set up – by “appeasing” the
German leader as he cast his eyes toward the east, the West (or so Stalin
believed) was indirectly urging Hitler to attack the Soviet Union.
By
mid-1939 Stalin abandoned his efforts to join with the West in Collective
Security and was looking for other options.
Meanwhile,
Hitler was laying out his plans. Determined not to fight a two-front war, he
indicated his willingness to sign a non-aggression pact with the Soviets,
despite the fact that the Soviet Union had been ardently anti-Nazi in its
rhetoric (and Hitler had been ardently anti-communist in his rhetoric).
Putting
aside ideological differences for military and strategic considerations, the
Germans and the Russians sign the Nazi-Soviet
pact in August 1939.
This
agreement immediately puts Poland in jeopardy. (Russia in the East; Germany in
the West – see map on the Powerpoint slides – both threatened to invade.) The
French and British governments announce that if Germany attacks Poland, this
will force them to declare war on Germany. Germany is not intimidated. Hitler’s
armies invade Poland on September 1, 1939.
Additionally,
Soviet troops moved to occupy the eastern half of Poland (in part to expand
Soviet influence but also to create a fortified buffer zone between the German
army and Soviet territory.)
The Poles
fought valiantly but were quickly vanquished by the superior German forces.
(That the Poles sent men armed with sabers on horseback into the teeth of the
German tanks is actually a myth, but the fact remains that the Poles were no
match for Hitler’s Blitzkrieg.)
Having
conquered the western half of Poland and insured that the Soviets would not
move against German forces from the east, Hitler turns his attention once again
to the west.
In 1940,
his troops rapidly defeat the armed forces of Belgium, the Netherlands, Norway,
and Luxemburg. Next in his path is France, which falls in June 1940. The world
sees the grim images of Nazi troops marching down Paris’s Champs Elysees.
The
French had a substantial and well-equipped army, so the French defeat at the
hands of the Nazis came as a great shock – particularly given how quickly it
occurred.
British
troops sent to supplement the French forces beat a hasty retreat after the
battle of Dunkirk in northern France. Most made it safely back across the
English Channel insuring the British would survive to fight another day, but
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (who replaced Neville Chamberlain in
1940) reminds his people that “wars are not won by evacuations.”
Hitler,
pressing his advantage, begins an aerial bombardment of British cities
(especially London). The British Royal Air Force outfought the German Luftwaffe
and Hitler paused his attack. The Germans come close, but they are unable to
deliver a knock out blow to the British.
At this
point, Hitler makes the first of two colossal blunders that will ultimately
lose him the war. Rather than continuing to focus on defeating the British, he
assumes that they are so close to defeat that he can finish them off later.
Instead, he mobilizes his forces to attack the Soviet Union.
Churchill
and U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt warn Stalin that the Germans are
preparing to invade his country. Stalin, wary of the deceptive ways of “capitalists
and imperialists,” ignores the warnings….until it is too late.
Even
worse, during the previous year Stalin had conducted a ferocious purge of
Soviet generals and other senior officers. At the very moment when war against
Germany loomed, Stalin was decimating the upper ranks of his military.
On June
22, 1941 German troops crossed into Soviet territory. Unprepared and
ill-equipped, Soviet troops were no match for heavily armed, mechanized German
tank divisions. The Soviets, some fighting with broom sticks, were mercilessly
slaughtered. Wave after wave of Soviet infantry are thrown at the advancing
German line. Over the next two years, the Germans march relentlessly across
Soviet territory (the same distance as if they had landed on the east coast of
the U.S. and marched as far as Chicago). Those Soviet troops who try to retreat
are shot down by the Soviet secret police (NKVD). By the end of the war, the
NKVD had killed a million Soviet citizens who tried to flee the German
advances. Overall, the Soviets lose more than 20 million people.
In time,
however, Hitler’s forces would fall victim to the same Russian winter that had
thwarted Napoleon Bonaparte’s ill-fated invasion more than a century before.
The tide would turn and the Soviets would go on the offensive, not stopping
until they had marched all the way to Berlin – where they arrived in the summer
of 1945.
THE U.S. ROLE?
Since the
Munich Agreement of 1938, President Franklin D. Roosevelt suspected that the
approaching conflict in Europe would likely draw in the United States. He could
not say so publicly since public opinion was adamantly opposed to the nation involving
itself in yet another “European war.”
Roosevelt,
however, recognized long before most Americans the threat that Nazi Germany
posed to U.S. national interests. If Hitler were to gain control of the entire
European continent and then neutralize the British navy (or, even worse, put
the British navy in the service of Germany), the U.S. would be cut off from its
main trading partners and be vulnerable to a trans-Atlantic attack. This
represented both an economic threat and a military threat.
Though
Roosevelt would have liked to have begun mobilizing the U.S. for war against
Germany in 1938, he knew this was politically impossible. Once he decided to
run for a third term in 1940, he realized he could not give any indication that
he believed war with Germany was inevitable. Instead, he repeatedly assured the
American public that under no circumstances would “their boys” be fighting in
any foreign wars. Though he knew this was a lie, it was a lie the public wanted
to hear and therefore was a lie he needed to tell if he was to be re-elected.
Safely
re-elected in November, 1940, Roosevelt could afford to be a bit more honest
with the people. He tried to “educate” them on events in Europe and to make the
case for why all-out U.S. support for Great Britain was necessary. Roosevelt
insisted that only by helping Britain to defeat the Nazis could the U.S. itself
avoid being drawn into the war. Those who supported the President’s views
became known as “interventionists.”
Still,
Roosevelt faced opposition from non-interventionists who argued that if Germany
posed such a significant threat to the U.S. (as Roosevelt claimed), then U.S.
policy should be to throw all available resources into defending the nation’s
coastline from German attack. Sending military supplies to Great Britain was
unwise since the U.S. needed those supplies (weapons, ships, ammunition, etc.)
for its own defenses. Moreover, if Germany defeated Britain (which seemed
likely in 1940 and early 1941), those supplies would fall into German hands and
could conceivably be used against the United States.
Many
Americans found the non-interventionists’ arguments persuasive, so Roosevelt had
to develop a more compelling case for his views.
He landed
on the policy of “Lend Lease.” Britain needed supplies (particularly ships,
oil, food, and ammunition) if it was to continue fighting against the Germans.
Roosevelt proposed “lending” the British these supplies in exchange for “leases”
on military bases that belonged to the British where the U.S. would be
permitted to station its ships and troops. That way, the U.S. itself would not
join the war, but it would do everything it could to insure the Germans did not
defeat the British. And, if war came, the U.S. could project its power by
making use of the military bases it leased from the British.
Roosevelt,
as he often did, explained his policy to the people in the form of a story
taken from everyday life: “If your neighbor’s house is on fire, you don’t keep
your hose from him; you lend him the hose so that he can put out the fire
before it spreads to your house.” This argument began to make inroads by 1941
and Congress passed the Lend Lease legislation in March 1941. Even so, it was clear to Roosevelt that the
nation was still opposed to any U.S. declaration of war on Germany.
THE WAR IN ASIA
Meanwhile,
the Japanese empire had been aggressively expanding since 1931, invading China,
French Indochina (Vietnam), Korea, and chains of islands colonized by the
western powers (Britain, the Netherlands, etc.). The Japanese sought access to
natural resources and raw materials needed to fuel their industrial and
military machine. In particular, they needed steady access to oil.
Ironically,
much of Japan’s military and industrial expansion had been funded by U.S. bankers
who during the 1920s and 1930s saw Japan as a lucrative investment – in
particular the Japanese seemed like a better investment than the Chinese. American oil companies also kept the oil
flowing steadily to Japan – because the Japanese paid, and paid on time.
As
Japanese militarism began to worry the U.S. government, Washington rethought
the wisdom of allowing private companies to invest in and supply the Japanese
military. By 1940, the Roosevelt administration had decided to use access to
American oil as diplomatic leverage against the Japanese. The U.S. would only
permit continued oil exports to Japan if the Japanese government promised to
end its expansionist and aggressive policies. The Japanese tried to reassure
Washington that it would curb its expansion, but it soon became clear such
assurances were insincere.
In 1941,
the U.S. severely limited Japan’s access to U.S. oil. Ironically, this policy
did not stop Japanese expansion; rather it made the Japanese even more
aggressive. Unable to rely on U.S. oil, the Japanese had to find alternative
sources closer to home. They set their sites on conquering the oil-rich Dutch
East Indies.
Also, the
Japanese military considered the U.S. a weak and inferior society. They
remained convinced that a sudden and devastating attack on the U.S. military base
in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii would so frighten the American public that the people
would demand U.S. withdrawal from Hawaii and the Japanese would then have a
free hand to expand at will in Asia without fear of the U.S. launching a
military attack on them from Hawaii.
Some
Japanese politicians questioned the wisdom of such a move. They pointed out
that if the Americans, rather than retreating out of the Pacific, instead
declared war on Japan in response to an attack on Pearl Harbor, the Japanese
would have no chance against the Americans, whose economy was exponentially
larger than that of Japan.
On the
other hand, American officials, succumbing to racist notions that the Japanese,
an “inferior race,” could never summon the courage or the know how to project
their military power all the way to Pearl Harbor, left the U.S. military base
wide open to attack. Planes were lined up wing to wing in the air fields; ships
sat side by side like sitting ducks in the harbor. The Americans, fearing
sabotage rather than a full scale attack, believed it wise to cluster its
forces so as to keep an eye on them.
As a
result, when the Japanese attack came on December 7, 1941, the U.S. military
was taken entirely by surprise and the U.S. navy suffered considerable losses.
That
said, however, the Japanese hardly achieved their goal. The U.S. did not
retreat; it declared war. The fears of the Japanese politicians would prove
correct. By 1945 the Japanese empire, and Japan itself, lay in ruins. But there
would be hundreds of thousands of casualties on both sides before then.
The
attack on Pearl Harbor brought the U.S. into World War II, but not in the way
Roosevelt would have liked. He knew the real danger was losing the war in
Europe and that the U.S. must pursue a “Europe first” strategy. After Pearl
Harbor, however, most Americans were fixated on achieving revenge against the
Japanese. The “Europe first” strategy would have been a tough sell. Luckily for
Roosevelt – and he was indeed the luckiest of politicians – Hitler handed him a
gift.
On
December 11, 1941, Germany declared war on the United States. Though allied
with Japan, Germany had no treaty obligation to do so. This decision was Hitler’s
second monumentally stupid mistake (the first being his invasion of the Soviet
Union the previous June). Hitler’s declaration of war enabled Roosevelt to make
a convincing case to the public that winning in Europe was equally (if not
more) important than winning the war in the Pacific. This meant that the
Germans would soon face the military might of the United States.
It would
take time, however, to mobilize the U.S. armed forces. Though Roosevelt had
done all he could to pursue a campaign of preparedness between 1938 and 1941,
public opinion had limited his efforts. The army was ill-equipped; the soldiers
were poorly trained; the navy lacked ships; available weapons and ammunition
fell well short of what was needed.
Eventually, the U.S. mobilization would be one of the great success
stories of the war, but in early 1942, this was a long way off.
U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY AND THE DELAY OF THE “SECOND
FRONT”
More than
anything else, Roosevelt sought to limit U.S. casualties in the war. In 1942, he
well knew the U.S. army was in no condition to confront the Nazis head on in
France – if such a strategy was pursued, it would be a bloodbath, and an
unnecessary one. He hoped to delay that direct conflict until such point as the
U.S. could realistically expect victory.
Stalin,
however, insisted that the U.S. open a “Second Front” in France as soon as
possible. From his perspective, this demand made perfect sense. If the German
forces faced attacks on two fronts, they would have to reposition some of their
soldiers – drawing them from the eastern front where they were fighting Soviet
forces, to the western front where they would face American and British forces.
Implying
that his new ally was engaging in treachery, Stalin suggested to U.S. diplomats
that the Americans seemed to be deliberately pursuing a strategy that would
bleed out the Soviets and save their own forces. But Stalin also understood
that the U.S. wasn’t prepared for war in France and so he privately
acknowledged to his top aides that the Americans were simply exercising caution.
Nonetheless, he instructed Soviet officials to keep insisting that the U.S.
open the second front since, once the war was over, the Americans, feeling
guilty that they had delayed action and cost the Soviets lives, might be
willing to make concessions that would be useful to Stalin.
As it
happened, the first U.S. offensive occurred in North Africa where American
troops, in league with the British, fought to keep the Germans from securing
the Suez Canal in Egypt. Had the Germans seized the canal, the most efficient
sea route to India, the chief British colony, would have been blocked. In
short, by fighting in Africa, the U.S. was doing more to save the British Empire
than it was doing to defeat the Germans – thus explaining why Churchill had
insisted on the strategy in the first place.
By 1944,
the plans for opening a second front in France were complete. The invasion
would be launched from the south coast of England. American and British forces
would travel across the channel and land in Normandy – the largest and most
complicated amphibious (i.e. from sea to land) invasion in the history of the
world. The invasion, under the command of General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme
Allied Commander, commenced on June 6, 1944 (D-Day). In the face of fierce
German resistance, it succeeded. From this point, Germany’s defeat was only a
matter of time.
Within a
year, Soviet and American/British forces met in Berlin and the Third Reich,
proclaimed to last for a thousand years, fell abruptly in its 12th year.
THE PACIFIC WAR…IN BRIEF
After
Pearl Harbor, the U.S. suffered a series of defeats and, most notably, had to
abandon its bases on the Philippine Islands. After the Battle of Midway,
however, the tide began to turn. The U.S. economy, far more powerful than the
Japanese economy, was now fully mobilized. In a war of attrition, then, the
Japanese were doomed (just as their own civilian leadership had tried to tell
the army officers years before.)
In a
strategy of “island hopping” U.S. forces slowly advanced toward the Japanese
home islands, suffering horrific casualties all the while (as did the
retreating Japanese). The long term plan was to land on the main islands in a
massive invasion which promised hundreds of thousands more U.S. deaths (not to
mention even more Japanese deaths.)
The
dropping of the two atomic bombs, however, brought the war to a close without
the need for such a full-scale invasion. At the time, most Americans did not
pause to consider the ramifications of the atomic bomb. They were simply glad
the war was over. Many saw the atomic bombings as “revenge” or “pay back” for
Pearl Harbor – not taking into account that the Japanese suffered
disproportionately more deaths.
The U.S. government
declared the bombings had saved American lives (one might add that despite the
devastation in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the bombs likely saved just as many
Japanese lives since most Japanese were ready to fight to the death to repel an
American invasion). Moreover, more Japanese had died in the fire-bombing of
Tokyo than died (at least immediately) in Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
One commentator
explained the lack of horror or revulsion in Americans’ reactions to the
dropping of the atomic bombs as the result of a “moral numbing” that the Second
World War had produced. There was simply so much death and destruction and so
many atrocities on all sides that any “moral accounting” seemed absurd.
The
bombings, then, seemed only part of a larger orgy of violence and not
qualitatively different than more convention bombings. This view would change
in the coming years as people became more familiar with the destructive potential
that had been unleashed and the effects of radiation and fallout.
It seems,
however, that the Japanese surrendered in August 1945 not only because of the
atomic bombs, but because they so feared a postwar occupation by the Soviet
Union. Much preferring to surrender to the Americans, the Japanese government
asked only that the nation be able to retain its emperor, the symbol of the
Japanese people and culture. When the Americans agreed, the Japanese
surrendered and avoided prolonging the war.
Had they
not surrendered when they did, the Soviets might have been able to make a more
compelling case that they deserved to be included in the postwar occupation of
Japan. As it was, the new U.S. President, Harry Truman (Roosevelt had died in
April 1945), excluded the Soviets from any role in the postwar reconstruction
of Japan. In the years to come, Japan would become the U.S.’s most reliable
Cold War ally in Asia.
In fact,
shortly after the Japanese surrender in August 1945, early signs were emerging that
in the years to come the Soviets, and not a reconstructed Japan or Germany,
would be the primary threat to U.S. interests.