

Jonathan Vogel's "Are There Counterexamples to the Closure Principle?"

- I. Zebra Case
 - a. As a counterexample to closure
 - b. Response: Our background knowledge, which is also necessary for knowing that this animal is a zebra, allows us to know that this animal isn't a cleverly disguised mule.
- II. Car Theft Cases
 - a. Similar to lottery cases in the following three respects:
 - i. It would not be abnormal (in some intuitive sense) for your car to be stolen (or for your ticket to be a winner)
 - ii. There is some statistical evidence in favor of a car's being stolen (or a ticket's being a winner).
 - iii. With respect to its chances of being stolen (or of being a winner), each car (or ticket) is indistinguishable from every other one. This means that it would be arbitrary to believe of some cars (or tickets) but not others that they will not be stolen (or that they will not be winners).
 - b. Cases like Car Theft Cases (and lottery cases) constitute a family of apparent counterexamples to the closure principle. "The essential feature of these examples is that they are cases in which the clear logical consequence of a known proposition is itself a lottery proposition meeting the [three] criteria [listed under II.a]" (p. 17).
 - c. "[W]hat the Car Theft Case really shows about the Closure Principle, if it shows anything at all. Is that that principle is invalid when the clear logical consequence involved is a lottery proposition *with the features mentioned above*" (p. 17).
 - d. "The advocate of closure can claim that the Closure Principle only appears to fail, as the result of an epistemically important switch that takes place in the course of our thinking about the [Car Theft Case]" (p. 20).