David & Warfield's "Six Possible Counterexamples to One or Two Epistemic Closure Principles"

The First Targeted Closure Principle

CLOSURE 1. If S knows P and knows that P entails Q and believes Q on the basis of deduction from these two bits of knowledge, then S knows Q.

> CE 1. Overdetermination
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> S knows P, knows that P entails Q and believes Q on the basis of inference from these two bits of knowledge. In addition to believing Q on the basis of this deduction, however, S also believes Q on the basis of terrible reasons and believes Q *most firmly* on the basis of these terrible reasons.

The Second Targeted Closure Principle

CLOSURE 2. If S knows P and knows that P entails Q and believes Q *solely* on the basis of deduction from these two bits of knowledge, then S knows Q.

> CE 2. Global Defeat
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> S satisfies the antecedent of CLOSURE 2 … but also occurently believes [perhaps because of misleading testimony from those S trusts most] that deduction is a horrible way (from the epistemic point of view) to go about adding to one's belief set.
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> CE 3. Local Defeat
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> S satisfies the antecedent of CLOSURE 2 but, in addition, S is in possession of an undefeated defeater for Q. The defeater for Q prevents S from knowing Q but … S satisfies the antecedent of CLOSURE 2 and so CLOSURE 2 is false.
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> CE 4. Defect
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> S satisfies the antecedent of CLOSURE 2 but in addition has a defective concept of entailment.
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> CE 5. Negation
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> S satisfies the antecedent of CLOSURE 2 but in addition believes ~Q [and hence, according to the authors' non-crazy epistemic principle, fails to know that Q].
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> CE 6. Paradox
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> Let L = It's not the case that L is true. Suppose, then, that S knows that if ~L, then L. And S knows that (if ~L then L) entails L. Now have S deduce that L solely from these two bits of knowledge. Does it follow that S knows that L? Of course not: the availability of the corresponding derivation of ~L [from the available proof that (if L then ~L) and the *a priori* knowable fact that this claim entails ~L] seems clearly sufficient to block knowledge that L in this case.