Rethinking Race in Brazil*

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Introduction: the Repudiation of the Centenário

13 May 1988 was the 100th anniversary of the abolition of slavery in Brazil. In honour of that date, various official celebrations and commemorations of the centenário, organised by the Brazilian government, church groups and cultural organisations, took place throughout the country, even including a speech by President José Sarney.

This celebration of the emancipation was not, however, universal. Many Afro-Brazilian groups staged actions and marches, issued denunciations and organised cultural events repudiating the ‘farce of abolition’. These were unprecedented efforts to draw national and international attention to the extensive racial inequality and discrimination which Brazilian blacks – by far the largest concentration of people of African descent in any country in the western hemisphere – continue to confront. Particular interventions had such titles as ‘100 Years of Lies’, ‘One Hundred Years Without Abolition’, ‘March for the Real Liberation of the Race’, ‘Symbolic Burial of the 13th of May’, ‘March in Protest of the Farce of Abolition’, and ‘Discommemoration (Descomemoração) of the Centenary of Abolition’.¹ The repudiation of the centenário suggests that Brazilian racial dynamics, traditionally quiescent, are emerging with the rest of society from the extended twilight of military dictatorship. Racial conflict and mobilisation, long almost entirely absent from the Brazilian scene, are reappearing. New racial patterns and processes – political, cultural, economic, social and psychological – are emerging, while racial inequal-

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ties of course continue as well. How much do we know about race in contemporary Brazil? How effectively does the extensive literature explain the present situation?

In this article the main theories of race in Brazil are critically reviewed in the light of contemporary racial politics. I focus largely on postwar Brazilian racial theory, beginning with the pioneering UNESCO studies. This body of theory has exhibited considerable strengths in the past: it has been particularly effective in dismantling the myth of a non-racist national culture, in which ‘racial democracy’ flourished, and in challenging the role of various elites in maintaining these myths. These achievements, appreciable in the context of the analytical horizon imposed on critical social science by an anti-democratic (and indeed often dictatorial and brutal) regime, now exhibit some serious inadequacies when employed to explain current developments.

This article accepts many of the insights of the existing literature but rejects its limitations. Such a reinterpretation, I argue, sets the stage for a new approach, based on racial formation theory. This theory is outlined below, and it is suggested that it offers a more accurate view of the changing racial order in contemporary Brazil. Racial formation theory can respond both to ongoing racial inequalities and to the persistence of racial difference, as well as the new possibilities opened up by the transition to democracy; it can do this in ways in which the established approaches, despite their considerable merits, cannot.

**Theoretical perspectives: the debate thus far**

Until quite recently Brazil was seen as a country with a comparatively benign pattern of race relations. Only in the 1950s, when UNESCO sponsored a series of studies – looking particularly at Bahia and São Paulo – did the traditional theoretical approaches, which focused on the concept of ‘racial democracy’, come under sustained attack. The work of such

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2 Relevant examples here include Donald Pierson, *Negros in Brazil: A Study of Race Contact in Bahia* (Carbondale, IL, 1967 [1942]); Frank Tannenbaum, *Slave and Citizen: The Negro in the Americas* (New York, 1947); Gilberto Freyre, *New World in the Tropics: The Culture of Modern Brazil* (New York, 1959). For reasons of space this article focuses on contemporary issues of race. I do not discuss the origins or history of racial dynamics or ideas in Brazil. For good sources on these topics see Thomas E. Skidmore, *Black Into White: Race and Nationality in Brazilian Thought* (New York, 1974); Emilia Viotti da Costa, *Da Monarquia a República: Momentos Decisivos* (São Paulo, 1977); *Da Senzala a Colônia* (São Paulo, 2nd edn. 1982); and *The Brazilian Empire: Myths and Histories* (Chicago, 1981), esp. pp. 234–46.

3 Thales de Azevedo, Roger Bastide, Florestan Fernandes, Marvin Harris and Charles Wagley, among others, were associated with the UNESCO project. Charles Wagley (ed.), *Race and Class in Rural Brazil* (New York, 1972), is a convenient collection of papers from the rural phase of this research. The work of Bastide and Fernandes is the
UNESCO researchers as Thales de Azevedo, Roger Bastide, Florestan Fernandes and Marvin Harris documented as never before the prevalence of racial discrimination, and the persistence of the ideology of 'whitening', supposedly discredited in the 1930s and 1940s after the interventions of Gilberto Freyre and the advent of the more modern 'racial democracy' view. In sum, the UNESCO-sponsored research set new terms for debate, constituting (not without some disagreements) a new racial 'revisionism'.

Racial revisionism was full of insights into Brazilian racial dynamics, but it also had significant limitations. Chief among these was a tendency to reduce race to class, depriving racial dynamics of their own, autonomous significance. In the space available here, I offer only a summary critique of this perspective, concentrating on the leading members of the revisionist school.

In Florestan Fernandes' view, Brazil's 'racial dilemma' is a result of survivals from the days of slavery, which came into conflict with capitalist development and would be liquidated by a transition to modernity. 'The Brazilian racial dilemma', Fernandes writes, 'constitutes a pathological social phenomenon, which can only be corrected by processes which would remove the obstruction of racial inequality from the competitive social order'. Fernandes's work probably remains the most comprehensive sociology of race relations in Brazil. The greatness of his work lies in his recognition of the centrality of race in Brazil's development, not only in the past or even the present, but also in the future. However, race remains a 'dilemma', the 'resolution' of which will signify socio-political maturity. In other words, Fernandes still understands race as a problem, whose solution is integration. Implicitly there is a new stage to be achieved in Brazilian development, in which racial conflict will no longer present an obstacle or diversion from class conflict.

Fernandes at least recognised the continuing presence and significance of race; other revisionists tended to dismiss or minimise it. While

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4 Key works in this monumental series of studies include: Thales de Azevedo, Cultura e Situação Racial no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1966); Roger Bastide, 'A Imprensa Negra do Estado de São Paulo', in his Estudos Afro-Brasileiros (São Paulo, 1973), and The African Religions of Brazil: Toward a Sociology of the Interpenetration of Civilisations (Baltimore, 1978); Florestan Fernandes, A Integração do Negro na Sociedade de Classes, 2 vols. (São Paulo, 3rd edn., 1978); Roger Bastide and Florestan Fernandes, Brancos e Negros em São Paulo (São Paulo, 1919); Marvin Harris, Patterns of Race in the Americas (New York, 1964).

5 Gilberto Freyre, O Mundo Que o Portugues Criou (Rio de Janeiro, 1940); Skidmore, Black Into White.

Fernandes’ basic optimism was tempered by the question of whether the full modernisation of class society could be achieved, Thales de Azevedo saw evidence that this process was already far advanced: according to him class conflict was replacing racial conflict in Bahia. Marvin Harris, who worked closely with Azevedo, suggested that the Brazilian system of racial identification necessarily subordinated race to class. Comparing Brazilian and US racial dynamics, Harris argued that the absence of a ‘descent rule’ by which racial identity could be inherited, and the flexibility of racial meanings, led to a situation in which ‘[r]acial identity is a mild and wavering thing in Brazil, while in the United States it is for millions of people a passport to hell’.

Actually, there are various theoretical accounts of the process by which race is supposedly subordinated to class. For the original revisionists, the question was whether this process was a social fact, already in progress and perhaps even well advanced, or a mere possibility. For Azevedo, it was already well under way; for Fernandes, it was a tendency which might – tragically – never come to pass unless the Brazilian people exhibited enough political will to transcend the racial dilemma and modernise their social order.

Later work, such as that of Carl Degler and Amaury de Souza, suggested various ways in which racial dynamics could persist while still remaining subordinated to class conflicts. Degler, in a rich comparative analysis of Brazil and the United States, concluded that because Brazil distinguished mulattoes from blacks, and afforded them greater social

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7 Azevedo, *Cultura e Situação Racial*, pp. 30–43. Azevedo presents the process of transition as a shift from racially identified status or prestige groups to classes. Formerly, whites were identified as a superior status group and blacks, conversely, as an inferior group. Race served as an indicator of status, but the deeper, more ‘objective’ category of class is a matter of economics, not of colour or prestige. Thus race becomes less salient as class formation proceeds:

From this structure of two levels social classes are beginning to emerge, which may be identified from an economic point of view by property differences, income levels, consumption patterns, levels of education and rules of behaviour, and even by their incipient self-consciousness. The system of classes is organised in part by the older status groups and is still very much shaped by the old order. Its three elements are an upper class or elite, a middle class, and a lower class or the poor (ibid., p. 34; original emphasis). This view thus combines class reductionism (what is ultimately important about race is how it fits people into the economic system) with an implicit optimism about its transcendence in and by an emerging class system.

8 These arguments led Eugene Genovese to defend the admittedly conservative Gilberto Freyre (as well as Frank Tannenbaum and others) from the admittedly radical and ‘materialist’ attack of Harris. Genovese (correctly in my view) perceived in Freyre a far more complex and ‘totalizing’ view of the meaning of race in Brazil than he found in Harris (Eugene D. Genovese, *In Red and Black: Marxist Explorations in Southern and Afro-American History* (New York, 1971) pp. 41–3).

9 Harris, *Patterns of Race in the Americas*, p. 64.
mobility – the so-called ‘mulatto escape hatch’ – racial polarisation had been avoided there. Pointing to the same flexibility of racial categories that Harris had documented, Degler found ample evidence and logic for the ‘escape hatch’ in Brazilian racial history. If there was an ‘escape hatch’, then the United States pattern of growing racial solidarity would not occur; thus at least for some blacks (that is, mulattoes) questions of class would automatically take precedence over those of race. Other blacks, recognising that mobility was available to the lighter-skinned, would seek this possibility, if not for themselves then for their children.10

Besides tending to confirm the traditional wisdom about ‘whitening’ as the preferred solution to Brazil’s racial problems, this analysis also saw economic mobility (and thus, integration into class society) as the key question in Brazilian racial dynamics. Because the ‘escape hatch’ already provided this opportunity for the light-skinned blacks, the task was to extend it to blacks in general.

Amaury de Souza made a similar argument which had less recourse to historical data and instead focused on ‘whitening’ as a sort of rational choice model, in which blacks had to weigh the costs of individual mobility against those of racial solidarity; consequently a type of ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ confronted any effort to organise black political opposition.11

While the UNESCO studies offered an unprecedented wealth of empirical detail about Brazilian racial dynamics, the racial theory they employed was less innovative. They consistently practised reductionism; that is, they understood race epiphenomenally, as a manifestation of some other, supposedly more fundamental, social process or relationship. In the vast majority of studies, race was interpreted in terms of class. Racial dynamics were seen simply as supports for (or outcomes of) the process of capitalist development in Brazil.

While it is certainly not illegitimate to examine the linkage between race and class, reductionism occurs when the independence and depth of racial phenomena goes unrecognised. As a consequence of centuries of inscription in the social order, racial dynamics inevitably acquire their own autonomous logic, penetrating the fabric of social life and the cultural system at every level.12 Thus, they cannot be fully understood, in the manner of Fernandes, as ‘survivals’ of a plantation slavocracy in which capitalist social relationships had not yet developed. Such a perspective ultimately denies the linkages between racial phenomena and

10 Carl N. Degler, Neither Black Nor White: Slavery and Race Relations in Brazil and the United States (New York, 1971).
12 I return to this point below in discussing racial formation theory.
post-slavery society. There can be little doubt that since abolition the meaning of race has been significantly transformed; it has been extensively 'modernised' and reinterpreted. To grasp the depth of these changes, one has but to examine the intellectual or political history of the race concept itself. Late-nineteenth-century racial vocabularies and assumptions about white supremacy are as repugnant in contemporary Brazilian discourse as they would be in the present-day United States.\(^\text{13}\)

Nor is it tenable to suggest that in Brazil racial distinctions are ephemeral, mere adjuncts to class categories, as do Harris and Azevedo. Substantial racial inequality may be observed in levels of income, employment, and returns to schooling, in access to education and literary rates, in health care, in housing and, importantly, by region.\(^\text{14}\) In order to substantiate the thesis of 'transition from race to class', it would be necessary to demonstrate that inequality levels were tending to equalise across racial lines; the fact that 100 years after the end of slavery blacks are still overwhelmingly concentrated in the bottom strata certainly suggests that race is still a crucial determinant of economic success.

Degler's and de Souza's emphasis on the distinction between blacks and mulattoes – and the consequences of mobility for mulattoes – is more difficult to evaluate. On the one hand Nelson do Valle Silva's detailed study of racial stratification reveals no significant difference between black and mulatto mobility. Looking at a variety of indicators (income, returns to schooling, etc.), and using 1960 and 1976 census data which distinguish between blacks and mulattoes, Silva finds that 'blacks and mulattoes seem to display unexpectedly familiar profiles...'. Further, these results lead us to reject the two hypotheses advanced by the Brazilian sociological literature. Mulattoes do not behave differently from Blacks, nor does race play a negligible role in the process of income attainment. In fact it was found that Blacks and mulattoes are almost equally discriminated against... This clearly contradicts the idea of a 'mulatto escape-hatch' being the essence of Brazilian race relations.\(^\text{15}\)

On the other hand, the significance of this finding may be overstated,

\(^{13}\) For examples of this language, and analyses of its significance, see Celia Marinho de Azevedo, *Onda Negra, Medo Branco: O Negro no Imaginario das Elites – Século XIX* (Rio de Janeiro, 1987); see also Skidmore, *Black Into White*.

\(^{14}\) Thus, the impoverished northeast – the traditional locus of Brazilian poverty and underdevelopment, and the focus of Harris' and Azevedo's studies – is also disproportionately black, while the urbanised and industrialised southeast is disproportionately white. Manoel Augusto Costa (ed.), *O Segundo Brasil: Perspectivas Socio-Demográficas* (Rio de Janeiro, 1983); Charles H. Wood and José Alberto Magno de Carvalho, *The Demography of Inequality in Brazil* (New York, 1988).

\(^{15}\) Nelson do Valle Silva, 'Updating the Cost of Not Being White in Brazil', in Pierre-Michel Fontaine (ed.), *Race, Class, and Power in Brazil* (Los Angeles, 1985), pp. 54–5; *idem*, 'Cor e Processo de Realização Socioeconómica', *Dados*, vol. 24, no. 3 (1980).
vitiated by Afro-Brazilian practices of racial classification. For example, a recent black movement campaign, *Campanha Censo 90*, sought to counteract the tendency toward ‘auto-embranqecimento’ (‘self-whitening’) in responding to the national census questions on race.\(^\text{16}\) Thus, Silva’s claim that the traditional notion of mobility no longer holds may be statistically correct, but false in terms of Afro-Brazilian perceptions. The ‘mulatto escape hatch’, an absolutely central theme in Brazilian racial ideology, might thus retain an ambiguous, if weakened, relevance.

Perhaps the most striking limitation of the revisionist literature is its nearly exclusive focus on racial inequality. This is not to deny the importance of the economic dimensions of race. However, the preoccupation with inequality to the near total exclusion of any other aspect of race is a logical feature of approaches which treat racial dynamics as manifestations of more fundamental class relationships. These approaches tend to take the meaning of race for granted, and to see racial identities as relatively rigid and unchanging.\(^\text{17}\)

To summarise, despite their success at exposing racial inequalities in Brazil and thus destroying the ‘racial democracy’ myth, the revisionist approaches encountered difficulties when they had to explain transformations in racial dynamics after slavery, and particularly the persistence of racial inequality in a developing capitalist society. Their tendency to see the persistence of racial inequality as a manifestation of supposedly more fundamental class antagonisms (reductionism) resulted in an inability to see race as a theoretically flexible, as opposed to an *a priori*, category. In writing about racial dynamics the revisionists tended to ignore the changing socio-historical meaning of race in Brazil.\(^\text{18}\)

Beginning in the 1970s, and with greater frequency in later years, a ‘post-revisionist’ or structuralist approach to race in Brazil began to emerge. This perspective saw race as a central feature of Brazilian society. ‘Structuralist’ authors sharply refocused the problem of racial theory. They did not seek to explain how racism had survived in a supposedly ‘racial democracy’, nor how true integration might be achieved. Rather they looked at the way the Brazilian social order had maintained racial inequalities without encountering significant opposition and conflict.

\(^\text{16}\) ‘Campanha Censo 90’ was announced in July 1990 by a broad coalition of Afro-Brazilian organisations of various political and cultural tendencies. Its slogan was ‘Não deixe a sua cor passar em branco: responda com bom c/senso’ (‘Don’t let your colour be passed off as white: respond with good sense’, thus punning on ‘sense/census’).

\(^\text{17}\) Even Harris (*Patterns of Race in the Americas*), whose research was directed quite specifically at the problem of racial categorisation, is susceptible to this criticism.

\(^\text{18}\) This tendency is not confined to Brazil or to the United States; it is global, and only recently has come under sustained scrutiny. The recognition that the meaning of race is a significant political problem implies a racial formation perspective. See below.
In a brief essay originally published in 1971, Anani Dzidzienyo combined a critique of racial inequality with a discussion of both the macro- and micro-level cultural dynamics of race in Brazil. He challenged the ... bias which has been a hallmark of the much-vaunted Brazilian ‘racial democracy’ – the bias that white is best and black is worst and therefore the nearer one is to white, the better.

Further, he noted that

The hold which this view has on Brazilian society is all-pervasive and embraces a whole range of stereotypes, role-playing, job opportunities, life-styles, and, what is even more important, it serves as the cornerstone of the closely-observed ‘etiquette’ of race relations in Brazil.  

Here in embryo was a far more comprehensive critique of Brazilian racial dynamics. Dzidzienyo argued that racial inequalities were both structural and linked to a formidable racial ideology. This ‘official Brazilian ideology achieves without tension the same results as do overtly racist societies’. Structural inequality and the system of racial meanings were linked in a single racial order; each served to support the other. In this connection between structure and culture the structuralists saw a pattern of racial hegemony. But how was this hegemony attained and maintained, ‘without tension’?

In a contribution of great importance, Carlos Hasenbalg developed a new synthesis of race and class, building on but also departing from the work of Fernandes. Post-abolição racial dynamics, Hasenbalg argued, have been steadily transformed as Brazilian capitalism has evolved; thus, far from being outmoded, racial inequality remains necessary and functional for Brazilian capitalism. The essential problem, then, is not to account for the persistence of racism, but rather to explain the absence of serious racial opposition, what Hasenbalg calls ‘the smooth maintenance of racial inequalities’.

Both Dzidzienyo and Hasenbalg recognised that neither the powerful cultural complex of ‘whitening’ and ‘racial democracy’, nor the brutal

20 Ibid., p. 14; original emphasis.
21 My own critique of Fernandes draws on the one presented by Hasenbalg, which centres on Fernandes’ treatment of racial dynamics as survivals of slavery, of a pre-modern, pre-industrial epoch. See Carlos A. Hasenbalg, Discriminação e Desigualdades Raciais no Brasil (Rio de Janeiro, 1979), pp. 72–6.
22 This analysis has strong parallels with Pierre van den Berghe’s views on Brazil; van den Berghe argues that in the early post-abolição period racial dynamics were ‘paternalistic’, but later (as capitalism developed), became ‘competitive’. In other words there was a shift from a non-antagonistic pattern of racial inequality toward a more conflictual one. Pierre van den Berghe, Race and Racism: A Comparative Perspective (New York, 1967).
structural inequalities between black and white would have been sustainable on their own. Both writers analysed the racial order in Brazil in terms of the linkage between culture and structure, between ideology and inequality. In this sense, these writers adopted early versions of a racial formation perspective.

Yet their analyses still bore some of the marks of class reductionism. To be sure, Dzidzienyo and Hasenbalg granted Brazilian racial dynamics a significant degree of autonomy vis-à-vis class dynamics. But their structural approach was still limited by the one-dimensionality of a view which explained the shape of the Brazilian racial order almost entirely in terms of its ‘management’ by white elites. Few constraints are recognised as limiting white ‘management’, either in the form of social structures inherited from the past, or in the form of resistance on the part of the racially subordinated group. Inequality is ‘smoothly’ maintained by a combination of ideological manipulation and coercion, all with the objective of maximising elite (i.e. capitalist) control of the developing Brazilian economy.

In Hasenbalg’s view, for example, the crucial action which permitted the system of ‘smooth maintenance’ to evolve occurred when the elites decided to encourage massive European immigration, thus displacing black labour after abolição.\(^{23}\) Plentiful supplies of white labour prevented the emergence of a racially split labour market, such as developed in the U.S.A., and effectively defused racial antagonisms. The infusion of white labour ensured that class divisions among whites, rather than competition between whites and blacks, would shape the pattern of Brazilian capitalist development. It also fuelled the cultural/ideological complex of ‘whitening’, and later the ideology of ‘racial democracy’. Thus, the system of racial categorisation, as well as the ideological and political dynamics of race in general, were shaped by capitalist development in the post-abolição years.

This approach does not deviate very far from that of Fernandes. It simply assumes the primacy of capitalist development, and the secondary character of race. It does not take into account the fact that racial ideology was entirely present at the supposed foundations of Brazilian capitalist development. Indeed it was in part because of their fear of blacks that the Brazilian elite turned to European immigration in the first place.\(^{24}\) Hasenbalg recognises this empirical fact, but cannot incorporate it into his theory.

In fact, Hasenbalg’s argument would operate equally well in reverse; in place of his suggestion that capitalist development demanded the smooth

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maintenance of Brazilian racial inequality, it would be equally logical to
suggest that the course of development followed by Brazilian capitalism
was shaped in significant measure by pre-existing racial patterns.\footnote{This is close to Fernandes' argument, although his understanding of racism as a 'survival' antagonistic to full capitalist development limits his appreciation of the point. See Florestan Fernandes, 'The Weight of the Past' in J. H. Franklin (ed.), \textit{Color and Race} (Boston, 1969).}

However significant the absence of a split labour market was to the
development of Brazilian racial dynamics, it was clearly not determining;
at most it was one factor among others. Indeed the political authori-
tarianism – the coronelismo, paternalism, clientelism, etc., which charac-
terised elite–mass relationships in the first republic and beyond – was a
carry-over from slavery into the post-abolição framework in which
capitalist development began in earnest. Thus not only the framework of
Brazilian class relations, but also in large measure the traditional political
structure, may be said to have their origins in racial dynamics.\footnote{This reversibility in the structural argument suggests a certain residual functionalism. Certainly a measure of class reductionism survives in the structuralist perspective. In Hasenbalg's study the functionalist moment may be attributable to reliance on Poulantzas. Adopting the latter's approach to class formation, Hasenbalg writes: Race, as a socially elaborated attribute, is principally related to the subordinated aspect of the reproduction of social classes, that is, to the reproduction (formation – qualification – submission) and distribution of agents. Therefore, racial minorities are not outside the class structure of multiracial societies in which capitalist relations of production – or any other relations of production, in fact – are dominant. Likewise, racism, as an ideological construct incorporated in and realised through a pattern of material practices of racial discrimination, is the primary determinant of the position of non-whites, in the relations of production and distribution (Hasenbalg, \textit{Discriminação e Desigualdades}, p. 114).

Note how little autonomy racial dynamics are granted in this model. A series of functional requirements for the reproduction of the capitalist class structure sets the pattern of racial formation. The qualification 'or any other relations of production' is irrelevant, because in these other modes of production (slavery, feudalism?) racial minorities presumably will also be subordinated to class structures which are granted logical priority, as well as historical precedence, over racial dynamics. For a more recent statement of Hasenbalg's position, see Carlos Hasenbalg, untitled presentation, \textit{Estudos Afro-Asianos} 12 (Rio de Janeiro, August 1986), pp. 27–30.}
Furthermore, despite their recognition of important cultural dimensions in Brazilian racial politics, the structuralists still theorised these elements as strictly subordinate to those of inequality and discrimination. Their view was that Brazilian racial discourse largely served to mask inequality; they did not see the cultural dynamics – the racial ‘politics of identity’ – as conflictual, contested terrain. Perhaps this residue of class reductionism also limited their ability to recognise potential flexibility and changing patterns in Brazilian racial dynamics.

Summarizing once more, we can say that despite its considerable strengths, the literature on race in Brazil suffers from a series of debilitating problems, including a neglect of the discursive and cultural dimensions of race, an exaggerated belief in the omnipotence of elites where racial management is concerned, and a tendency to downplay the tensions and conflicts involved in Brazilian racial dynamics. These limitations largely derived from a deep-seated tradition of class reductionism, which is manifest in the classic studies of the early postwar period (the revisionists), but latent even in more recent work (the structuralists). Such criticisms point to the need for a new approach, one which would avoid treating race as a manifestation of some other, supposedly more basic, social relationship. I therefore propose an alternative in the form of racial formation theory.

Racial formation theory seems particularly well suited to deal with the complexities of Brazilian racial dynamics. Developed as a response to reductionism, this perspective understands race as a phenomenon whose meaning is contested throughout social life. In this account race is both a constituent of the individual psyche and of relationships among individuals, and an irreducible component of collective identities and social structures. Once it is recognised that race is not a ‘natural’ attribute but a socially and historically constructed one, it becomes possible to analyse the processes by which racial meanings are decided, and racial identities assigned, in a given society. These processes – those of ‘racial signification’ – are inherently discursive. They are variable, conflictual and contested at every level of society – from the intra-psychic to the supra-national. Inevitably, many interpretations of race, many racial discourses, exist at any given time. The political character of racial formation stems from this: elites, popular movements, state agencies, religions and intellectuals of all types develop racial projects, which interpret and reinterpret the meaning of race.

The theoretical concept of racial projects is a key element of racial formation theory. A project is simultaneously an explanation of racial

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dynamics and an effort to reorganise the social structure along particular racial lines. Every project is necessarily both a discursive or cultural initiative, an attempt at racial signification and identity formation on the one hand; and a political initiative, an attempt at organisation and redistribution on the other.28

The articulation and rearticulation of racial meanings is thus a multidimensional process, in which competing ‘projects’ intersect and clash. These projects are often explicitly, but always at least implicitly, political. ‘Subjective’ phenomena – racial identities, popular culture, ‘common sense’ – and social structural phenomena such as political movements and parties, state institutions and policies, market processes, etc., are all potential sources of racial projects.

Racial formation in contemporary Brazil: the impact of democratisation

When we ask why the Brazilian black movement is newly stirring after a relative absence of half a century, an important part of the answer must be the impact of democratisation. It was the abertura, the painfully slow re-emergence of civil society, which created the conditions under which black political opposition could reappear. At first tentative, and still marginalised relative to black movements in the United States and Europe, the black movement in Brazil now occupies a permanent place on the political stage. Of course the process of democratisation is still far from consolidated, and the room for manoeuvre available to an explicitly race-conscious movement remains quite limited. But as the various protests against the centenário showed, not since the days of the Frente Negra Brasileira in the 1920s and 1930s has so explicit a racial politics been possible.29

The reappearance of the black movement also demonstrates the limits of the various analyses of Brazilian racial dynamics which I have reviewed. Nothing about the current upsurge squares with either the revisionist or the structuralist accounts. From the revisionist perspective, one would have expected a diminution of racial conflict as Brazil became a more fully capitalist society, less characterised by the residues of its slave-holding past. The experience of rapid industrial growth under the military dictatorship, the ‘miracle’ which made Brazil the eighth largest national economy in the world (in terms of GNP) by 1985, should also have made

28 Only a brief statement of the racial formation framework is possible here. For a more extensive discussion, see Omi and Winant, Racial Formation in the United States. For more on racial projects, see Howard Winant, ‘Postmodern Racial Politics: Difference and Inequality’, Socialist Review 90/1 (Jan.–March, 1990).

29 The Frente was the most significant Afro-Brazilian organisation of the 1920s and 1930s. It was repressed by Getúlio Vargas in 1937 after transforming itself into a political party. See Fernandes, A Integração do Negro, vol. II, pp. 10–87.
race a less salient marker of political identity. In fact, the reverse occurred.

From the structuralist perspective, one would have expected the elite’s ‘smooth maintenance’ of racial inequality to be nowhere more efficiently carried out than under the military dictatorship. This was a system of elite rule par excellence, and one which managed quite ‘smoothly’ the excruciatingly slow return of democracy during the 1970s and 1980s;30 furthermore, the military had been at pains to deny, in quintessentially Brazilian style, the existence of racism in the country.31 Yet, not long after the abertura began in earnest (in 1974), the first attempts at national black movement-building were initiated by the Movimento Negro Unificado (MNU),32 and throughout the later transition period a slow but steady build-up of black opposition voices, actions and organisational initiatives was underway.

From a racial formation perspective, by contrast, these developments do make sense. The black upsurge was a combination of two factors: the re-emergence of civil society, which necessarily opened up political terrain for social movement activities, and the politicisation of racial identities upon that terrain.

The re-emergence of civil society

The abertura took place as a conflictual dialogue between democratic opposition forces and the military dictatorship. It was a gradual relaxation of repression both promoted by and fuelling opposition forces. The Brazilian democratic opposition, traditionally compromised and co-opted by elite control, coronelismo and corporatism, faced enormous difficulties in the atmosphere of military dictatorship. The decades-long process of military rule rendered ineffective many of the traditional sources of political opposition in Brazil; others it eliminated outright. Thus the popular strata had to adopt new forms of struggle. Here the new social movements – human rights groups, women’s groups, residential associations and, very importantly in the Brazilian context, ecclesiastical base committees (CEBs) – became important political actors.

The new social movements recreated civil society by expanding the

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30 See Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone (Princeton, 1988), for a detailed account of the military’s sophistication in handling the pace of the abertura.


terrain of politics. They addressed issues which had formerly been seen as personal or private—i.e. not legitimate themes for collective action—as public, social and legitimate areas for mobilisation. In these groups a range of radical democratic themes—religious, feminist, localist, but chiefly ‘humanistic’—were encountered in new ways (or for the first time). For many people, particularly those of humble origin whom the traditional political processes had always been able to ignore, the new social movements provided the first political experiences of their lives.33 For those of the middle classes—priests, journalists, lawyers, health workers, educators and others who shared explicit democratic and egalitarian aspirations—the new social movements offered a political alternative to leftist and populist traditions which the military dictatorship had effectively stalemated.34

Brazilian blacks were intimately involved in the quest for democracy.35 They were among the favelados, the landless boias frias, the metalworkers. In the early phases of the abertura they did not organise qua blacks, but the interrogation of social and political reality and the quest for citizenship emphasised in many movement activities placed a new focus on racial themes. By the later 1970s, with the consolidation of democratic opposition politics, a new generation of black movement organisations began to emerge.

It would be impossible to list all the political influences which blacks encountered in this process, nor can the variety of positions and currents within the nascent black movement be elaborated here. Certainly by participating in the panoply of opposition social movements which confronted the dictatorship, many blacks acquired fresh political skills and awareness. Among those mobilised were black activists in favela associations, in CEBs, and in rural struggles for land (especially in the

33 In no small measure due to the ideas popularised by the Brazilian educator and activist Paulo Freire, these primordial political experiences were in themselves acts of reinterpretation.


northeast), blacks who participated in strike activity (especially in the ABC region of São Paulo), blacks involved in cultural activities and organisations, black students, blacks concerned with issues of African liberation, black researchers and intellectuals involved in studying Afro-Brazilian history and culture, and black women involved in feminist activities.

Thus, as the *abertura* advanced and democratic opposition consolidated and expanded, blacks began to mobilise and organise as blacks. With the creation of the MNU in 1978 a national black political movement was brought into being. More recently still other black organisations have appeared, notably the *Grupo União e Consciência Negra*, which claims organisations in 14 Brazilian states, the *Centro de Articulação de Populações Marginalizadas* (CEAP), the *Centro de Referência Negromestica* (CERNE), the *Instituto Palmares de Direitos Humanos* (IPDH), and the publication *Jornal da Maioria Falante*. These are the means by which blacks are participating in the struggle to create democracy and social justice in Brazil.

A variety of political projects can be identified in the black movement upsurge that accompanied the *abertura*. ‘Entrism’ (the effort by marginalised groups to operate in the political mainstream), socialist positions, and ‘nationalist’ currents are all clearly in evidence. Strong debates and dissension characterised the development of the MNU. For

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36 Such as the Palmares group, *terreiros of candomblé, afoxes and blocos africanos*, etc. Cultural and religious groups are entirely central in black organisational efforts in Brazil, and in recent years have more frequently linked their traditional vocations with political themes. For example, *afxes* are groups of religious orientation, based in *Candomblé*. They dance and sing in African languages, and participate in Carnaval. Formerly outlawed, they were legalised in the late 1970s. In Salvador the *afxes* have formed *blocos* which are not only active in Carnaval, but also serve as ‘nationalist’ organisations, performing educational tasks (racial conscientização), organising *favelados* and *moradores* groups, etc.


38 As in the United States and many other countries, black women play a crucial role in many social movements in Brazil (Sueli Carneiro and Thereza Santos, *Mulher Negra*, São Paulo, 1985). They have challenged both sexism in the black movement and racism in the women’s movement. The topic of Afro-Brazilian women and feminism has generated much debate and several significant studies. The MNU included anti-sexist points in its statement of principles, for example. (See Gonzales, ‘The Unified Black Movement’, pp. 129–30.) On other aspects of these issues see Lucia Elena Garcia Oliveira, Rosa Maria Porcaro, and Tereza Cristina Nascimento Araujo, ‘Repensando o Lugar da Mulher Negra’, *Estudos Afro-Asiaticos*, 13 (Rio de Janeiro, March 1987); *idem*, *O Lugar do Negro na Força de Trabalho* (Rio de Janeiro, 1985); Carmen Barroso (ed.), *Mulher, Sociedade, e Estado no Brasil* (São Paulo, 1982).

39 The MNU was, however, riven by regional and ideological divisions, and was unable to maintain its cohesion at a national level. See Maria Ercilia do Nascimento, *A Estratégia da Desigualdade*, pp. 112–17.

example, major sectors of the organisation rejected Abdias do Nascimento’s project of Quilombismo:41 his effort to develop an ‘afrocentric’ ideology for the black movement. There have also been major debates about the role of feminism within the movement, and about the relationship of race, sex, and class in general.

Alongside such ‘nationalist’ currents as that of Quilombismo, ‘entrists’ in the movement, oriented both to mainstream and left parties, have urged greater organised black participation in trade unions and political parties. Nascimento himself has been a PDT (Democratic Workers’ Party) activist and served a term as a Federal Deputy from Rio, although he failed to win re-election. Many radical blacks have joined the PT (Workers Party); within that organisation they have created a Comissão de Negros which operates both at the national and regional levels. One of the few national black leaders, Benedita Souza da Silva, is a PT Federal Deputy.42 There are also blacks in the PMDB (Brazilian Democratic Movement Party), PSDB (Brazilian Social Democratic Party), and even rightist political parties such as the PDS (Social Democratic Party). Many blacks, however, even among those most committed to ‘entrism’, continue to criticise political parties, as well as unions and other popular organisations, for being insufficiently committed to racial equality.

Additionally, a pronounced tendency towards co-optation of movement activity exists, for which Brazilian politics is notorious. ‘Entrist’ groups are particularly susceptible to this. Whether effective or largely symbolic, various government entities have established mechanisms of liaison with the black community.43 At the national level, there is now an Assessoria para Assuntos Afro-Brasileiros in the Ministry of Culture. Several state governments, particularly those of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro, also have established agencies to foster cultural events and to investigate complaints of discrimination.


41 ‘Bene’ often combines her anti-racist polemic with defence of women’s rights. For a particularly strong statement, see Benedita Souza da Silva, ‘A identidade da Mulher Negra – a Identidade da Mulher India’, presented at the Conferência Nacional Saude e Direitos da Mulher, October 1986 (mimeo).

42 In the USA, black movement successes were met with sophisticated state strategies which I have elsewhere analysed in terms of ‘absorption’ and ‘insulation’ (Omi and Winant, Racial Formation, p. 81). Predictably, in Brazil there are big debates about the extent of service, versus the degree of co-optation, offered by such organisations. The state tendency to establish a bureaucracy when confronted by opposition is very strong.
Today the meaning of race and the complexities of racial identity are contested far more intensely than ever before in Brazil. We have only to look at the mobilisation against the centenário to see this debate in progress. To understand this point it is useful to contrast expressions of black identity articulated at the repressive peak of the military dictatorship and in the present climate of relatively free expansion. The ‘black soul’ upsurge of the 1960s is used here to exemplify the first period, and the development of the afoxes in the 1980s to illustrate the second. Although many examples of public discourse on the subject of black identity could be cited, these two are not arbitrarily chosen: they are the most important manifestations of black cultural politics in their respective epochs.

During the most repressive periods of military rule, when overt political mobilisation against racism was almost impossible, cultural movements sustained black awareness and challenged racial stereotypes, making use of ‘identity politics’. Probably the most effective (or controversial) of these currents was ‘black soul’, which flourished in the later 1960s, drawing inspiration from the black cultural and political upsurges then engulfing the U.S.A. ‘Black soul’ was a youth-oriented current; it had little appeal beyond the big cities (most notably Rio). To describe it as a movement probably overstates its political resonance.

Yet because it identified the interests of blacks in Brazil with those of blacks elsewhere, because it addressed issues of racial identity, ‘black soul’ drew considerable attention from the military, and from other official custodians of Brazilian racial ideology. For example, its obvious inspiration by cultural developments in the United States – where the black movement was entering its militant nationalist phase – prompted considerable unease. It was denounced as ‘un-Brazilian’, implicitly anti-nationalist. In terms of racial formation theory, this reaction can be understood as a conflict over the meaning of race prompted by the ‘black soul’ phenomenon. The fact that its rather superficial aspects (Afro hairstyles, dashikis, a taste for Motown and Stax/Volt records) became cause for official harassment indicates that, at least in the eyes of its opponents, ‘black soul’ represented a challenge to Afro-Brazilian isolation from the global assertion of black identity. By drawing attention to blacks qua blacks, this current echoed the sporadic efforts of previous

44 For surveys of debates about racial identity during the 1960s and 1970s, see Skidmore, ‘Race and Class in Brazil’; Mitchell, ‘Blacks and the Abertura Democrática’.
generations to highlight and discuss the nature of race in Brazil. Thus ‘black soul’ raised the same hackles that the Frente Negra Brasileira had done decades before, and that the Movimento Negro Unificado was to do a decade later. In this way it contributed to debate over the nature of black identity in Brazil, at a moment (the mid-1960s to early 1970s) when repression was increasing. ‘Black soul’ was important, then, in ways which transcended mere style or musical tastes. It was a transitional moment, a bridge between the limited but important black mobilisation taking place in the pre-dictatorship periods (I am thinking of such organisations as the Comité Democrático Afro-Brasileiro and the Congresso Brasileiro de Negro), and the activities of the MNU in the 1970s.

More recently, black identity has been stressed in the work of the groups known as afoxes. These are groups whose roots are religious, lying deep in the Afro-Brazilian traditions of Candomblé, in the West African language (Nago) that slaves of Yoruban origin spoke. Originally the afoxes acted largely through Carnaval, consciously seeking to accentuate and focus black awareness through the powerful (and frequently subversive) discursive framework offered by this annual popular festival. Largely because of their subversiveness, the afoxes were outlawed, and were legalised only under the impact of abertura in the late 1970s.

In the northeast, and particularly in Bahia, the ‘black capital’ of Brazil, afoxes are not only active in Carnaval, but also serve as political organisations, performing educational tasks (racial conscientização), organising favelados and moradores groups, etc. Salvador is also the home base of the group Olodum, which began as an afoxe, but has become an important ‘nationalist’ influence through its recordings. Olodum’s music is consciously and complexly Afrocentric, drawing on the afoxe tradition, addressing Afro-Brazilians about their history, their links to Africa and to blacks in the diaspora, and their collective racial identity. Not only in their lyrics, but also in their incorporation of musical forms such as reggae, Olodum presents a concept of black identity which radically challenges traditional concepts of race in Brazil. Its deliberate evocation of the African diaspora explicitly refuses the official Brazilian racial ideology in all its forms, from Freyre’s ‘Lusotropicalism’ to ‘racial democracy’. Acting through popular music, Olodum attempts to reinterpret the question of race, and to valorise black identity, in a manner which addresses millions of Brazilians. Certainly this rearticulation of black identity is not unprecedented. It bears important resemblances to the message of Abdias do Nascimento, for example; in its treatment of Zumbi, the hero of black resistance to slavery, it resonates with many other efforts at mobilisation and analysis. But what distinguishes the project of Olodum from those of many other Afro-Brazilian militants past and present is its immense appeal
to the masses of blacks. Because it is a popular musical group, indeed the black band in Brazil, Olodum has become a sort of national afroxe.46

Conclusion: rethinking race in Brazil

The issue of race is making a belated but inexorable entrance on to the Brazilian political stage. Because today there is – at long last and with all its warts – political democracy in Brazil, there is an upsurge of overt racial conflict. There are two major themes to this conflict: the first is about racial inequality, mobility and redistribution along lines of race, and racially based political action. The second is about the meaning of race, the nature of racial identity, the logic of racial categories, the centrality of the African currents in Brazilian culture and history, and the links between blacks in Brazil and elsewhere in the African diaspora.

Certainly none of these themes is absolutely new – how could it be? Nor do I mean to suggest that a radical transformation of Brazilian racial dynamics is about to take place. There are many reasons to think that a far more incremental process than that which occurred elsewhere in the Americas – in the U.S.A., say, or in the Caribbean – is at work. Many factors in Brazil’s history point to a more gradual politicisation of race than occurred, for example, in the U.S.A. In Brazil there has been no apocalyptic national conflict over racial slavery, such as the US civil war; there has been far less state-enforced racial segregation, so that race is inherently less politicised than elsewhere. Further, there are far fewer established and independent black institutions, such as universities or media. The fact that Brazil lacks a viable democratic tradition, capable of incremental extension to previously excluded groups, is also of great importance. This list could be extended, and of course the comparison has been made far more systematically in other literature. I simply offer it here to suggest that no explosive racial upheaval is to be expected in Brazil.

Still, while traditional patterns of race and racism have by no means been invalidated, a qualitative change is evident in the socio-political dynamics of race in Brazil. The many examples I have cited in this article demonstrate that this shift is underway: the protests against the centenário, the proliferation of black organisations, the attempts of established institutions – political parties, state agencies, unions, etc. – to address racial issues, and the arrival on the national cultural scene of black consciousness-raising efforts.

If indeed these changes are taking place at the socio-political level, they must be accompanied by changes in the theoretical and analytical tools with

46 Olodum’s intervention is not free from the limitations which traditionally afflict popular Afro-Brazilian figures however. The group’s appearance in 1990 on videos made for Paul Simon’s record Rhythm of the Saints has provoked criticisms for ‘selling out’.
which we view race in Brazil. Just as we can no longer accept the premodern biologistic racism of the nineteenth century, or the idyllic panorama of tropical racial harmonies imagined by Freyre in the 1930s, so we can no longer agree with the class reductionism which the UNESCO studies, for all their merits, generated in the 1950s and 60s. Brazilian racial dynamics cannot be understood as reflections of an underdeveloped political economy which failed to attain full capitalist status. No transition ‘from race to class’, however elaborate, is underway.

Nor can we accept the argument of the ‘structuralist school’ that racial politics are, in essence, permanently marginalised. While there can be no question that the diffusion and denial of racial conflict has operated as effectively in Brazil as anywhere in the world, the abertura and its aftermath are providing extensive evidence of the proliferation and deepening of racial conflict and racial consciousness. The argument that effective elite management of racial conflict could continue was refuted by the events of the abertura itself, an elite management scheme of unprecedented sophistication, which nevertheless resulted in the upsurge of racial opposition we have seen since the late 1970s.

Rethinking race in Brazil, then, means thinking about racial formation, about a process of permanently contested social institutions and permanently conflictual identities. Racial formation theory tells us that in Brazil the full range of racially salient socio-political and cultural dynamics has not yet even been identified. Language, geography, science, dress, farming, style, food, education, sports, media, literature, medicine, religion, the military – all these topics contain a wealth of hitherto unidentified racial dimensions, even those which have attracted significant research. Can anyone imagine that Bastide, as estimable a writer as he was, has exhausted the field of Afro-Brazilian religion? Or that Stephens’s excellent English dictionary of Afro-Brazilian Portuguese has completed etymological and socio-linguistic investigation? Academic research is driven by popular activity, cultural demands and political mobilisation. If democracy can truly take hold, the racial dimensions of many spheres of Brazilian life will be questioned and examined by those who must live them out. This is the heart of the racial formation process.