

# FEMINISM AND GEOGRAPHY

*The Limits of Geographical Knowledge*

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*University of Minnesota Press*  
*Minneapolis*

## WOMEN AND EVERYDAY SPACES

I think that this is a shared experience: many women participate uneasily in the academy. I didn't find a voice of my own when I was a student, and at university I felt a fraud much of the time, never quite as good as the confident bourgeois men (and often women) I studied with. Yet this didn't always bother me. A small voice always insisted (and still does) that the academy wasn't all it thought it was. Miller too suggests that women remain 'irritatingly unabsorbable'.<sup>52</sup> Lisa Jardine says that we master theory 'and if we don't actually enjoy it, at least we can fake it'.<sup>53</sup> Perhaps much of my motivation to write this book comes from the refusal of the university to deliver what it so seductively promised: I wonder if my focus here on the texts of my involvement in the academy is a kind of revenge on men who fail to keep promises. My first undergraduate tutorial, which delighted me by suggesting that geography involved more than just facts, and which was my first explicit introduction to theory, was a discussion of time-geography, the theme of the next chapter. My postgraduate thesis took the idea of local spatial divisions of labour as its starting point, and these reappear in chapter 6. I now teach cultural geography and its work on landscape, which forms chapter 5. Chapter 3 focuses in defiance on what was damned as worthless by my undergraduate teachers. And they never even mentioned the feminist critique examined in chapter 4...

So, because my writing style, my strategies of critique and my choice of geographies to discuss are all marked by my particular involvement in the academy, I want to insist that my book is read in this context as partial and strategic.

Feminists have long been aware of the importance of spatial structure in the production and reproduction of masculinist societies. A collection of essays gathered together by Ardener in 1981 was one of the earliest explicit discussions of the way in which the 'social map' of patriarchy was translated into 'ground rules' of spatial behaviour: in it, Ardener declared that '*behaviour and space are mutually dependent*'.<sup>1</sup> This chapter examines the spaces of the everyday and the maps that women's movements chart as they pursue their ordinary labours and pleasures across space and through time. For feminists, the everyday routines traced by women are never unimportant, because the seemingly banal and trivial events of the everyday are bound into the power structures which limit and confine women. The limits on women's everyday activities are structured by what society expects women to be and therefore to do. The everyday is the arena through which patriarchy is (re)created – and contested. In the words of Teresa de Lauretis, feminism 'remains very much a politics of everyday life. The edge is there: the sense of struggle, the weight of oppression and contradiction'.<sup>2</sup>

For white feminists, one of the most oppressive aspects of everyday spaces is the division between public space and private space. One of the earliest discussions of the public and the private was an essay by Kate Millet published in 1969, and her arguments show how many feminists have connected the public/private distinction with patriarchal power.<sup>3</sup> Millet's essay was a reading of one of the central manifestos of Victorian sexual politics: 'Of Queens' Gardens' was a lecture that John Ruskin delivered in Manchester Town Hall in 1864, and the

Feminism refracts the space of the everyday through an awareness of the distinction between public and private space; whereas time-geography, I will argue, does not. Instead, time-geography insists on a singular space; the space through which it traces people's paths claims to be universal. In other words, time-geography assumes that its space is exhaustive. There are suggestions, though, in the work of feminist geographers, that this universality in fact excludes some aspects of women's experiences. This chapter argues that the implicit claim to exhaustiveness made by time-geography conceals a specific kind of masculinism. Time-geography depends on a space associated with a particular masculinity, but claims that it is universal. In the third section I develop this argument by invoking the space most associated with the feminine by some kinds of white feminism – the private, the domestic – and the kind of sociality thought to occur there – emotional, relational and embodied – and contrast them with the space and sociality of time-geography. This tactical recovery of what seems to be missing from time-geography marks the supposedly universal space of time-geography as specific: as a particular kind of masculine. I will argue that part of the specificity of this masculinity is its whiteness: I therefore use the arguments of white feminism about the public and private strategically as a means of highlighting the whiteness of time-geography's masculinism. The final section of the chapter elaborates the intersection of power and knowledge in this particular masculinism, and labels it 'social-scientific masculinity'.

### The Spatiality of Everyday Life

The recovery of space by geographers in recent years has a complex theoretical history. The spatial geography with which this chapter is concerned – time-geography – was part of geography's recourse to social theory, mentioned in the previous chapter. In the early 1980s, many geographers were arguing that space was a universal feature of all social relations because 'spatial structure [was] seen not merely as an arena in which social life unfolds but as a medium through which social life is produced and reproduced'.<sup>9</sup> Geography was to become central to social theory as the importance of space as the setting for social interaction was elaborated: space was the medium of social processes as well as their outcome. Drawing on the work of a range of writers, including Pierre Bourdieu, Alain Touraine, Roy Bhaskar, Jürgen Habermas and Peter Berger with Thomas Luckmann, and especially inspired by the 'structurationism' of the English sociologist

'queens' of his title are the bourgeois women in his audience. In the lecture, Ruskin explained that the home was where women should stay, for only man could be the doer, the creator, the discoverer: in contrast, woman was passive, self-effacing, pious and graceful, and it was this natural perfection that prompted Ruskin to describe women as flowers. Their 'garden', bounded by its walls, was the home, which he described as a private, domestic, feminine space, quite separate from the male sphere of waged work and politics. Millett comments that, 'having through mere assertion "proven" that the sexes are complementary opposites, Ruskin then proceeds to map out their worlds, reserving the entire scope of human endeavour for the one, and a little hothouse for the other':<sup>4</sup> his metaphor of the garden indicates both the supposed naturalness of women's spiritual beauty and the boundaries to their existence. For Ruskin, wherever woman was became a home, a space endowed with special qualities, a haven of tranquility and love: although she was to be ruled by her lord, she could be his conscience and moral guide and so influence his actions in the wider world. Millett tartly remarks that this 'unctuous sludge' should be translated into its advocacy of women's total subordination to men:<sup>5</sup> 'it presupposes an ideal state of awed reverence toward virtuous womanhood while it temporizes hypocritically on the issue of status, idly pretending an eagerness to award a superior position to a group whom it in fact begrudges an egalitarian place'.<sup>6</sup> For Millett, the 'private' was an ideological prison: like many other feminists, she would agree with geographer David Harvey when he says that 'the assignment of place within a socio-spatial structure indicates distinctive roles, capacities for action, and access to power within the social order'.<sup>7</sup> Carole Pateman has even described feminism as a kind of spatial politics: 'the dichotomy between the private and the public is central to almost two centuries of feminist struggle; it is, ultimately, what the feminist movement is about'.<sup>8</sup>

This understanding of the distinction between public and private space as a debilitating one for women is clearly evident in the work of feminist geographers using time-geography. As the first section of this chapter shows, time-geography shares the feminist interest in the quotidian paths traced by people and, again like feminism, links such paths, by thinking about constraints, to the larger structures of society. The second section demonstrates how, in recording women's everyday experiences of spatial mobility, feminist time-geographers stress the extent to which women's movements in public space are constrained by the ideological claim that women's space is the private domestic arena. However, time-geography and feminism are not entirely congruent.

Tony Giddens, society was seen as a real spatial totality, constituted by the routine actions of human agency:

For any given area, over any given time, society may be defined as the agglomeration of all existing institutions, the activities (practices, or modes of behaviour) associated with the institutions, the people participating in the activities, and the structural relations occurring between the people as individuals or collectivities, between such people and the institutions, and between the institutions themselves.<sup>10</sup>

The stress was on theorizing the connectedness of social phenomena in space, and Giddens's particular contribution was to consider the role of human agency in reproducing this social structure. His project was introduced to geographers in 1981 by Gregory in these terms:

The central theorem of Giddens's scheme is the 'duality of structure', the claim that social life displays an essential 'recursiveness'. By this he means that in the reproduction of social life (through systems of interaction) actors routinely draw upon interpretative schemes, resources and norms which are made available by existing structures of signification, domination and legitimation, and that in doing so they thus immediately and necessarily reconstitute those structures: in short, 'the structural properties of social systems are both the medium and the outcome of the practices that constitute those systems'.<sup>11</sup>

Through their everyday interactions with people and objects, individuals develop certain kinds of knowledge – conscious, subconscious and ideological – and their subsequent actions based on these kinds of knowledge reproduce a social structure.<sup>12</sup> It was argued that this perspective would resolve a central problematic of modern social theory, that of agency and structure. The grand debate in social theory between those stressing the causal power of human subjectivity and meaning – represented in geography by humanists – and those who emphasized structure – marxists in geography – would be ended by the recognition that individual human agents knowledgeably undertaking everyday routine tasks through time and across space produced and reproduced the structures of society, the economy, the polity and culture. The detailed composition of this theoretical framework was developed in a series of key papers in the early 1980s, and consolidated in the collection of essays published in 1985 entitled *Social Relations and Spatial Structures*,<sup>13</sup> and its general claim is now commonplace among many geographers.

It was argued by Pred and by Thrift, and more cautiously by Gregory and Giddens, that structurationism could be represented diagrammatically by time-geography.<sup>14</sup> Time-geography is a perspective on the temporospatial structuring of social life developed by the Swedish geographer Törsten Hägerstrand. He describes the paths taken by individuals to fulfil their everyday tasks, or projects, using representations of three-dimensional time-space, such as that in Illustration 1. He argues that the interpretation of these maps requires an understanding of the constraints on an individual's mobility. Hägerstrand identified three general kinds of constraint: capability




Illustration 1 An example of a time-geography diagram.

constraints, which concern the physical limits to movement, including the inability to be in two places at once, the need to sleep and eat, and the type of transport available; coupling constraints, which compel people to come together at certain times and in locations such as factories or schools; and authority constraints, which are social rules banning or encouraging certain temporospatial behaviour, such as laws forbidding those under a certain age to enter bars.<sup>15</sup> For early structurationists, explication of specific constraints involved a reconstruction of humanist marxism and the determinate social relations of mediation between society and nature, although other structures, including patriarchy, were also mentioned. Time-space diagrams could then show how *'the details of social reproduction, individual socialization, and structuration are constantly spelled out by the intersection of particular individual paths with particular institutional projects occurring at specific temporal and spatial locations'*.<sup>16</sup> The recursiveness of agency and structure meant that 'for you and me, for society as a whole, history and everyday life incessantly penetrate one another'.<sup>17</sup> In the new perspective that time-geography (and structuration) offered to geography, both the constraints on human agency and its thinking consciousness were acknowledged in a manner which tried to avoid both the idealism of humanist geography as well as the often excessive structuralism of marxist geography.

The structurationist theorization of the production and reproduction of social structures by human agency is an ambitious project, and this chapter does not deal with it directly or fully. Instead, I focus on the intersection between structurationism and time-geography in studies of everyday time-space routines, because this is where feminist time-geography is located.

### Women's Time-Space Paths

Time-geography was adopted by some of the earliest feminist geographers, and it is not hard to see why: it recovers the everyday and the ordinary, and many feminists have argued that the mundane world of routine is the realm of women's social life in masculinist society. Examining the lives of women requires attention to the ordinary, to the unexceptional, because women are excluded from arenas of power and prestige; and time-geography, its proponents claim, is 'admirably suited to this type of "bottom-up" study', both theoretically and methodologically.<sup>18</sup> This section examines the relationship between feminism and time-geography.

### Time-geography and women: some case studies

An indication of the potential of time-geography for feminist geographers is given by Miller's series of papers on the time-geography of suburban life in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century USA. These began as an attempt to rectify geographers' previous exclusive focus on the male head of the household as the cause of the bourgeois family's migration to the suburbs in the mid-nineteenth century.<sup>19</sup> It was assumed that he was the one benefiting from improved mass transport, but Miller wanted to know about other members of the family and whether they too enjoyed greater mobility and freedom to travel. Guessing that the women of the household did not, Miller wondered what caused their relative spatial confinement: was it the socio-economic status of the family, the roles of family members, or the relative location of the family's residence? To answer this, Miller used census data as well as more qualitative sources to reconstruct five hypothetical households of mid-nineteenth century Philadelphia; those of a merchant, a physician, a carpenter, a broker and a phrenologist – and their wives, who did not work for wages. He also modelled the transport network and social geography of Philadelphia in 1850 and 1860, before and after the arrival of the horsecar. He then calculated the time-budgets of the women of each family, considering both capability and coupling constraints, and the social mores, or authority constraints, that would also have affected their lifestyles: for example, women could not go out at night without a chaperone. All the women were responsible for the unpaid domestic labour of the household, and Miller assumed that some would also spend time doing charity work and paying social visits. His conclusion was that women's free time to do what they wanted to was limited most severely by their responsibility for domestic work in the home. Differences between the women's mobility depended almost entirely on their family's ability to pay servants to undertake some of the wife's labour.<sup>20</sup> A second study by Miller focused on the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, and noted that the increasing size of US cities such as Philadelphia meant that servants became more and more reluctant to work in the increasingly distant suburban houses that their wealthy employers wanted to live in, and thus their middle-class mistresses became decreasingly able to travel into city centres to shop and socialize.<sup>21</sup> He discusses at some length how this problem was exacerbated by the increase in standards of domestic hygiene towards the end of the nineteenth century, and the way in which this compelled many women to work even harder in the home. The pressures placed on

women's activities by the role of 'experts' and advertising in the mass media is developed in Miller's third paper, on magazine advertisements in the early twentieth century.<sup>22</sup> Through his concern with the temporospatial constraints that structured women's lives, Miller ends up emphasizing the patriarchal 'unwritten rules and customs' about women's domestic role.<sup>23</sup>

The emphasis on women having to fit diverse domestic tasks into limited time-space resources continues in studies of contemporary women's time-geography. A prominent theme in contemporary studies, however, is the increased pressure that women face in combining domestic work with waged work. A recent study summarized the temporospatial impact of women's continuing responsibility for domestic labour on the geography of their waged work thus: 'due to their gender position, women tend to work closer to home, have limited car availability and use the bus more frequently than men'.<sup>24</sup> Jackie Tivers's large survey of women with children under five years old in south London detailed these constraints.<sup>25</sup> Tivers discovered that women often did want to work outside the home for wages, but that they were frequently prevented from doing so by the lack of local childcare facilities. Even shopping trips were not easy for them, as public transport and shopping centres were not designed for women carrying heavy bags and young children. Almost all of the women that she spoke to who did work for wages worked part-time and locally, in low-status jobs. Some women's options were widened if they had access to a car, but in one-car families, the husband usually had first use of it. Fortuijn and Karsten stressed the importance of different kinds of local labour markets in structuring women's time-geography.<sup>26</sup> They compared women's time-budgets in two towns in the Netherlands: Haarlem, a town with a range of services and work opportunities; and Grootslag, a fairly new dormitory town with few local jobs. They argued that in these two places there were three general types of time-budgets. They described the first, which dominated in Grootslag, as the traditional domestic type. This referred to women who had lots of time but little money; their poverty was caused by not having a job and therefore being unable to afford a car to drive to work elsewhere. The second type was described as the new local type, with a tight time-budget and a tight money-budget; they worked locally part-time and did their own domestic work, but valued their leisure time highly. The third type was the new mobile type, who had a restricted time-budget but ample money; these owned a car and often travelled a long way to good jobs, and they paid for domestic services. The latter two types dominated in Haarlem.

These studies stress the constraints placed on women because of

their domestic role, and argue that gender relations structure their time-space patterns; time-geography is being used to reveal the map of everyday patriarchy. However, Isabel Dyck's work suggests some ways in which women may resist the pressures involved in combining home and work.<sup>27</sup> Her ethnography of mothers' daily lives in an outer suburb of Vancouver places their experiences in the context of local economic restructuring and women's increasing participation in the waged labour force. She examines the guilt that many women feel about leaving their children in order to go out to work, but suggests that their very responsibility for mothering creates a spatially segregated social world in which women, as neighbours and friends bound by a shared concern for children, endow mothering with their own collectively negotiated meanings. To some extent, women rework the views of the 'experts' on what a good mother is, and Dyck argues that this allows them to ease the tension that they perceive between going out to work and remaining a good mother. Women are not just the victims of patriarchal constraints, then; they contest the ideological limits placed on what they are allowed to do.

These studies show that time-geography can access the way in which women are shaped by the changing masculinist definitions of femininity and domesticity. It can reveal the complex roles and tasks allotted to women, and demonstrate differences between women across places and classes. Time-geography can offer accurate descriptions of the spatial consequences of a masculinist (and classist) society, especially through its revelation of the time-space zoning in the home and neighbourhood of many women's domestic activities. It emphasizes the reproduction of patriarchy in the banal activities of everyday life. But its webs represent not only the complex outcome of constraint; they also evidence women's contestation of those limits. As Dyck's important work shows, time-geography can also highlight how women negotiate those pressures, and even contest them. Her work reinforces Miller's claim that in order 'to examine social change we should look at social practice as it grows out of the everyday activities of individuals, keeping in mind that the relationship between individuals and structure is dialectical one, materially continuous in time and space'.<sup>28</sup> Time-geography's nets of paths and projects can weave with clarity a story of women's routines and resistances.

#### *Time-geography and feminism: some doubts*

The point of locating women in the everyday, and using time-geography to elucidate the restrictions on women's lives, was to show that women's lives were different from men's. This was usually seen in

terms of differences in mobility, in movement through time-space, and in the constraints which caused this differential geography. However, it seems to me that this work, often only implicitly, also speaks about other kinds of differences, the implications of which are quite serious for time-geography's claim to represent social life and human agency as a whole. In particular, feminist work points to a kind of gendered subjectivity which produces a specific kind of feminine sociality.

Women's distinctiveness has often been associated by feminists with the maternal and the domestic, as noted in chapter 1. These associations have been made by a diverse range of feminists. Eco-feminists, for example, see housekeeping and child-rearing as the key experiences which teach women to be more caring and tender, and argue that this femininity is inevitable for all women because women mother. Mothering is argued to involve a strong sense of the bodily: 'it can mean the experiencing of one's own body and emotions in a powerful way'.<sup>29</sup> Others, rejecting such biological determinism, follow the work of Nancy Chodorow and argue that women's psychic relationship to mothering produces a different, more interrelational subjectivity than men's.<sup>30</sup> Anthropologist Michelle Rosaldo, for example, relied on Chodorow's arguments in a highly influential paper, published in 1974, on the distinction between the public and the domestic.<sup>31</sup> Rosaldo suggested that since, unlike boys, girls never have to distinguish themselves from their mothers, they continue to define themselves in terms of their relationships with other people; she then claimed that women's domestic sociality is interpersonal and particularistic. Still others, such as sociologist Dorothy Smith, agree about the nature of women's subjectivity, but argue that it is a consequence of women's specific role in the division of labour, not its cause. Smith argues that since under patriarchy women's everyday, local, particular experience of labour is that of work which services other people, women's consciousness will involve 'a subordination of attentiveness to self and a focus on others'.<sup>32</sup> Smith refers to both waged and unwaged labour, but suggests that the work of the 'housewife' exemplifies this focus on others. Aptheker also suggests that 'women's actual experiences' of domestic tasks create 'a consciousness of social reality that is different from that put forth by men',<sup>33</sup> and that this consciousness is one of nurturance and sustenance.

There are difficulties with each of these arguments: some are essentialist, others universalist; and all may neglect differences among women. Nevertheless, for the moment, I want strategically to agree with this feminist claim that women are different in these ways from men: that the routine work of mothering and domesticity does create a

specifically feminine kind of subjectivity and sociality. I provisionally agree *not* because I want to argue that all women are different in the same way from all men, but because I want to be able to ask: Can time-geography speak fully of this so-called womanly subjectivity, of this possible difference? There are hints in the literature examined in the last subsection that it cannot. None of the contemporary studies use their interview material to elaborate at any length on the emotional attachments between mothers and children, for example; Dyck's otherwise excellent ethnography seems oddly muted in this respect. Miller complains that, having used time-geography for its emphasis on human agency, he has nevertheless produced an account that is more structural than agential – women and their feelings somehow got lost.<sup>34</sup> It is as if feminist time-geographers refer to a world of nurturing and caring of which time-geography cannot quite let them speak. (The strictures on writing 'proper' geography discussed in the previous chapter are surely relevant here.) This impression is confirmed by feminist historian Mary Ryan. In her study of the formation of the middle class of Oneida County, New York, between 1790 and 1865, she undertakes a detailed case study explicitly in order to look at the full range of social relations in a place as they were made and remade by its inhabitants.<sup>35</sup> Although not a time-geography, she presents an implicitly structuralist account of 'an active arena where purposeful human agency jostles problematically with tendential social determinations to shape everyday activity, particularise social change, and etch into place the course of time and the making of history'.<sup>36</sup> Ryan describes the shift from an agrarian economy confined to the regional market, to an early form of industrial capitalism focused on the textile mills at New York Mills a few miles away; and finally, by 1850, to full integration with the national and international economy centred on New York City. Her account of the recursive relationship between this system integration and the lives and identities of Oneida inhabitants is rich and complex, partly because of her detailed use of the letters and diaries of local people, which pays special attention to gender. She shows how individual strategies were influenced by and in turn influenced the wider socio-economic system in which they were spatially and temporally positioned. A successful structuralist history? It would seem so. But towards the end of her book Ryan confesses to a certain unease with her text. She summarizes its overall argument thus:

The women's welfare system was but one element in a complex and gerrymandered women's sphere, part of a whole social geography of gender that meshed with its male complement to ensure the pro-

duction and reproduction of urban society. In its structure and operation, this system seems like a clever piece of social machinery, with multiple, interconnected parts, regularly oiled with a supportive ideology (both the myth of the self-made man and the cult of true womanhood) and functioning smoothly to meet social needs and guarantee social order.<sup>37</sup>

There are several possible causes of her text's over-coherence, one of which, for example, may be her desire to produce a more carefully specified account of the connection between the cult of domesticity and industrial capitalism than previous historians. But what makes Ryan unhappy are the exclusions produced by her text's overwhelming sense of order. The nature of these exclusions is revealed in her concluding discussion, almost a postscript, of what she had not until then found an appropriate moment to speak of: the personal pain of women who did not fit the system, the anguish of mothers who had lost children or women who could not have them, the grief of widows, and the biography of an Oneida County woman who became a feminist campaigner. In other words, Ryan's autocritique highlights exactly the same omissions as I have noted in relation to time-geography: the emotional, the passionate, the disruptive, and the feelings of relations with others.

When many feminists focus on the everyday they see a profound difference between the public and the private (and the masculine and the feminine) within the social, and they celebrate the emotions of mothering and the nurturing compassion they find in the domestic. However, despite its claims to exhaustive knowledge of the social, time-geography appears to find it difficult to acknowledge this domestic sociality. It is women and emotion which Ryan has to add in at the end of her study and which Miller feels are erased in some way; time-geography seems to neglect what many feminists have argued is women's difference from men. Women are somehow not quite addressed by time-geography; time-geography appears to erase a difference in the everyday which feminists associate with women. Yet if, as so many feminists have argued, the public/private distinction is central to particular constructions of masculinity and femininity, time-geography's ignorance of the domestic may mean that time-geography itself represents only public space. Its claims to exhaustiveness would then depend on repressing any differences from itself. In order to examine this possibility, the next section strategically elaborates all that is associated with the feminine and the domestic – the particular, the relational, the emotional, and also the bodily – in order to see if, in

contrast, the universal claims of time-geography turn into something rather more specific – the disembodied, the universal, the individualistic, the passionless, the masculine, the public.<sup>38</sup> It tactically recovers a repressed Other in order to mark the Same.

### Time-geography and Hegemonic Masculinity

For many feminists, both the nurturant sociality and the oppressiveness of the everyday is embodied. In her comments on the importance of the everyday to feminism, for example, de Lauretis argues that 'the stakes, for women, are rooted in the body'.<sup>39</sup> Feminism insists on the body as a site of struggle. 'Your body is a battleground', goes a recent pro-abortion slogan, and Adrienne Rich exhorts us to consider:

The politics of pregnancy and motherhood. The politics of orgasm. The politics of rape and incest, of abortion, birth control, forcible sterilization. Of prostitution and marital sex. Of what had been named sexual liberation. Of prescriptive heterosexuality. Of lesbian existence.<sup>40</sup>

This is a politics of struggle against the control of women's bodies by men, and against the entrapment of women through that control. Many feminists have argued that the body – the bleeding body, the pregnant body – is central to an understanding of women's oppression by and difference from men. This argument, like that about the everyday, can take different forms. It can be biologically determinist; but this chapter's tactical concern with the bodily follows de Lauretis's stress on the representation of the body. Her comment on the everyday that the stakes, for women, are rooted in the body continues, 'which is not to say that the body escapes representation, but quite the opposite'.<sup>41</sup> Her claim that bodies matter is a response to the crucial place of the body in Western masculinist culture. Although some feminists continue to invoke a brute body, its processes and reactions unmediated by cultural encodings of their significance, others such as de Lauretis are now exploring the meanings given to the body's materiality: in the words of Denise Riley, 'in a strong sense the body is a concept'.<sup>42</sup> In contrast to the commonsense understanding of the body as completely natural, in this literature bodies are understood as interpreted 'in a milieu of social meaning and value' which creates what Gatens calls the 'imaginary body': 'the imaginary body is developed, learnt, connected to the body-image of others and is not



static'.<sup>43</sup> The notion of the body as natural is seen as a cultural construction, and bodies matter to these feminist accounts because certain socially constituted relations and identities become naturalized when their source is claimed to be the body. The construction of different kinds of bodies – male and female, say – naturalizes social difference, with profound consequences. If women are 'naturally' less rational than men, for example, their exclusion from the academy becomes 'natural' too. The cultural meanings of bodies legitimate certain power relations. Yeatman challenges the naturalization of women's difference, of women's sociality, by problematizing the conflation of domestic sociality, women, childbirth, mothering and nature:

The critical point here is that this reproductive identity or role is no simple biological datum. It is a value-laden complex of meaning that is integrally bound up within a wider symbolic structure concerning who men and women are, and what parentage is.<sup>44</sup>

Yeatman refuses an essentialist account of difference while arguing that difference as it is presently constituted matters enormously. She thus simultaneously asserts that there is no brute biology underlying social relations, and makes a claim for the centrality of bodies to conceptions of social life.

Bodies also seem central to time-geography, because the routine actions of individual human agents in time and space, producing and reproducing social structures, are represented by the paths that their bodies follow. But it is these paths that define Hägerstrand's oddly minimalist account of the body. In reference to the body, he notes only that an individual cannot be in two places at once, and that certain constraints are imposed by the need to eat and sleep; comments so obvious as to be unobjectionable.<sup>45</sup> Movements of bodies which cannot be explained with reference to these inherent limits to a body's possibilities of locating itself in time-space are assumed to stem from social, cultural or economic causes. This, of course, is one reason for feminist geographers' use of time-geography to reveal the restrictions that women face on their mobility: it allows masculinism to reveal itself as an unnatural constraint on women's lives. However, when our attention is directed towards social constraints in this way, the body itself is rendered unproblematic. Indeed, it virtually disappears altogether, for the body in Hägerstrand's account becomes its path – it is reduced to its movement. As Hägerstrand says, 'people are not paths, but they cannot avoid drawing them in space-time'.<sup>46</sup> In this context, I can only echo Riley's comment that 'the queer neutrality of

the phrase "the body" in its strenuous colourlessness suggests that something is up'.<sup>47</sup> Time-geography tries to ignore the body; the next subsection rescues it from its invisibility.

### *Western bodies: possessed and repressed*

I can begin by noting that the body/path of time-geography is undifferentiated: all bodies are the same because no body is specified; and these bodies are any bodies, or so they claim. But their very lack of defining characteristics begins to specify them. They are literally colourless, for example; the trace that they leave does not tell whether the body is white or black. Skin does matter to these bodies though, since a corporeal boundary is assumed by time-geographers in their claim that external (to the body) social relations are internalized by human agents in the course of their life-path.<sup>48</sup> This sense of a bounded body has implications for its biology. This biology is a peculiarly selective one, since bodily processes which transgress the boundary between inside and outside the body – childbirth, say, or menstruation – are ignored as characteristics of the body when it is reduced to its path. To emphasize other ways of imagining the body, Iris Marion Young has described childbirth for women who have chosen to become pregnant and can give birth safely precisely in terms of bodily boundary confusions:

... the birthing process entails the most extreme suspension of the bodily distinction between inner and outer. As the months and weeks progress, increasingly I feel my insides, strained and pressed, and increasingly feel the movement of a body inside me. Through pain and blood and water this inside thing emerges between my legs, for a short while both inside and outside me.<sup>49</sup>

In contrast, the agency of time-geography is clearly delimited and bounded – its paths mesh but never merge, always individual. There is no bodily passion or desire.

But whose, then, is the minimalist, colourless, bounded body/path that represents human agency? Feminist historians offer an answer in the context of their arguments that two of the most important ways of encoding bodies now are through their gender and sexuality. Some of the historical shifts towards this interpretation of the body have been traced, and Riley claims that from the seventeenth century onwards it has become more and more difficult to speak of 'the' body, because since then bodies have become read more and more by masculinist

science through a bipolar understanding of gender and sexual orientation.<sup>50</sup> Poovey has drawn on the arguments of Laquer to suggest that the nineteenth century in particular witnessed an enormous amount of ideological work which strengthened the masculine/feminine dualism,<sup>51</sup> both establishing gender difference and assuming heterosexuality. Medical discourse in general, and gynaecology in particular, argued that women's spontaneous ovulation meant that they were dominated by their reproductive system. This particular reading of their bodies meant that women were represented as natural creatures, beyond culture and society, compelled to remain in the private domestic sphere by their natural maternal instinct. Victorian racism also legitimated its assertions about black sexuality and white superiority by citing biological difference.<sup>52</sup> Far from being natural, then, bodies are 'maps of power and identity',<sup>53</sup> or, rather, maps of the relation between power and identity.

However, the construction of imaginary bodies involves what Wolff describes as both the repression and possession of 'the' body.<sup>54</sup> While white bourgeois men classify others through oppressive interpretations of Others' embodiment (possession), they assume that they themselves are only contained by their body, not controlled by it (repression). As Simone de Beauvoir sardonically notes at the beginning of *The Second Sex*:

... there is an absolute human type, the masculine. Woman has ovaries, a uterus: these peculiarities imprison her in her subjectivity, circumscribe her within the limits of her own nature. It is often said that she thinks with her glands. Man superbly ignores the fact that his anatomy also includes glands, such as the testicles, and that they secrete hormones. He thinks of his body as a direct and normal connection with the world, which he believes he apprehends objectively, whereas he regards the body of woman as a hindrance, a prison, weighed down by everything peculiar to it.<sup>55</sup>

A history of the white masculine heterosexual bourgeois body in Euro-America can therefore be told in terms of a series of denials of its corporeality. Elias has traced that body's loss of vulgar and feminine orifices and excretions from the seventeenth century onwards, for example: the civilized body was one with limited and carefully controlled passages between its inside and outside.<sup>56</sup> This corporeality was merely a container for a consciousness capable of classifying others, for the Enlightened masculine mind was argued to be clearly separate

from and untainted by its body. This Enlightenment dualism between mind and body, which saw the mind as rational and the body as the place of emotion, passion and confusion, has been discussed by Bordo. She examines the importance of a 'complete intellectual transcendence of the bodily' in the work of Descartes.<sup>57</sup> The concern with clear boundaries is an expression of separation not only from Man's own body, then, but also from others represented as less able to overcome theirs. And, as Bordo has also argued, the denial of the body is still central to Western masculinity.<sup>58</sup>

The notation of the body in time-geography as a path which does not merge depends on this particular masculine repression of the bodily. This bounded body and its role as a neutral container of rationality both contribute to the idea that we are socialized by internalizing lessons which the 'outside' world teaches us when we act in it. This is the model of socialization used in time-geographic accounts, as we have seen. The unbroken border between inside and outside which this assumes is not only masculinist, however; it is also racist. It represents itself as colourless skin, but in racist discourse, 'the body could not be separated from its colour'.<sup>59</sup> Colour is a key signifier of difference, but only those seen as different from the master subject are designated 'coloured'. Whiteness retains its hegemonic position by denying its own colour and so becoming transparent to the critical gaze.<sup>60</sup> Critiques of whiteness stress the importance of absence to the representation of the 'white' body, an absence of colour. Yet in time-geography there are apparently colourless bodies. This white masculinist self-representation as a number of denials of its own embodiment accounts for the minimalism of time-geography's account of embodied agency: it is an effort to be limited in as few ways as possible by corporeality.

It is now possible to understand more fully why Ryan has to add the emotions and passions of the body on at the end of her account, instead of being able to integrate them within it. Her stories of women's anger and frustration, of the domestic grief of wives and mothers, speak of relations with others through love or maternity or desire. So do feminist geographers' accounts of mothers and their time-space zoning, with their implicit stories of childbirth and love: 'I'm very involved with my kids - they come first before anything else'.<sup>61</sup> It is these kinds of emotional and physical fusion between people which time-geography cannot admit in its reduction of human agency to a path and its consequent masculinist, bourgeois and racist repressions of the body. Ryan has to add these in almost as a postscript because the

agency of time-geography embodies masculinity to the exclusion of passion; as Judith Butler suggests, 'the denial of the body . . . reveals itself as nothing other than the embodiment of denial'.<sup>62</sup>

### *Public life, public space, public theory*

Time-geography embodies an agency that purports to be human but, as we have seen, this agency inhabits a masculine (no)body. This subsection considers whether the space that these agents travel through is also masculine.

Like the embodiment of its agency, there is little discussion in the time-geography literature about space itself: it is taken for granted as the medium of social life. However, a rare attempt to articulate its sense of space is revealing. It emphasizes space as infinitude and unboundedness, transparency; it is simply everywhere, and what is stressed above all is the liberty possible in this space: 'it is freedom to run, to leap, to stretch and reach out without bounds – and without constraint'.<sup>63</sup> And even though time-geography focuses on constraints, its language is untouched by the experiences of being constrained, by the feelings that come with the knowledge that spaces are not necessarily without constraint. Sexual attacks warn women every day that their bodies are not meant to be in certain spaces, and racist and homophobic violence delimits the spaces of black, lesbian and gay communities. Thinking about bodies and emotions against their repression by time-geography, then, does not only invoke the pleasures and desires, lovers and children, of the previous section. It can also invoke violence and horror, brutality and fear. In its erasure of these experiences, time-geography speaks the feeling of spatial freedom which only white heterosexual men usually enjoy.

Many feminists have looked at women's unease in and fear of public spaces, and many argue that 'women's sense of security in public spaces is profoundly shaped by our inability to secure an undisputed right to occupy that space'.<sup>64</sup> Feminist geographers Gill Valentine and Rachel Pain have examined the effects of women's fear of attack on their mobility.<sup>65</sup> June Jordan argues that there is:

... a universal experience for women, which is that physical mobility is circumscribed by our gender and by the enemies of our gender. This is one of the ways they seek to make us know their hatred and respect it. This holds throughout the world for women and literally we are not to move about in the world freely. If we do then we have to understand that we may have to pay for it with our bodies. That is

the threat. They don't ask you what you are doing in the street, they rape you and mutilate you bodily to let you remember your place. You have no rightful place in public.<sup>66</sup>

Following these arguments, the group of feminist designers called Matrix note that 'many men still perceive women's sexuality as partly defined by their location'.<sup>67</sup> Valentine has noted the connection between the public and the private which underlies this masculinist perception of women's place.<sup>68</sup> She argues that women are seen as properly belonging to the domestic sphere, and she notes how vulnerable to men's violence this makes women, both inside and outside the home: inside, it is no-one else's concern; outside, she deserved it.

The most sustained elaboration of the masculinity of public space is found in feminist critiques of arguments about the ability to undertake political action in the public sphere. Although, in political theory since Plato, 'the existence of a distinct sphere of private, family life, separated off from the realm of public life, leads to the exaggeration of women's biological differences from men, to the perception of women as primarily suited to fulfill special "female" functions within the home, and consequently to the justification of the monopoly by men of the whole outside world',<sup>69</sup> feminists have detected historical inflections in the justifications for the exclusion of women from politics. The key period in these discussions is the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and the development of ideologies of nationalism and individualism which allowed only certain people the ability to be active individuals in the national polity. The realm of the public and the political was constructed as one of rationality, individuality, self-control and hence masculinity, since only men could be fully rational individuals, free from passionate attachments. Citizenship, the ability to participate in politics and public life, was limited to (property-owning) men, and feminist geographer Sallie Marston has explored the political exclusions of such discourses in the context of citizenship in the USA.<sup>70</sup> The body politic was masculine, but this individualism did not preclude certain forms of collective action: indeed, the public is the sphere of collectivities, and Pateman has explored in detail the form that this collectivity takes in order not to lose the individualism of its components – the contract. Pateman focuses on the seventeenth-century contract theorists, and renames their social contract a 'fraternal social contract'.<sup>71</sup> The term 'fraternal' comes from her reading of Freud's story of the overthrow of the primal father by his sons, and she uses it to distinguish this 'new, specifically modern' form of patriarchy from the earlier political theory based on the powerful father. Both the

citizen and the contract are explicitly opposed in classical political philosophy to the particularistic bonds of the feminine family and private life; and both become meaningful through the exclusion of the domestic as the world of unreason:

The separation of 'paternal' from political rule, or the family from the public sphere, is also the separation of women from men through the subjection of women to men... the fraternal social contract creates a new, modern patriarchal social order that is presented as divided into two spheres: civil society, or the universal sphere of freedom, equality, individualism, reason, contract and impartial law – the realm of men or 'individuals'; and the private world of particularity, natural subjection, ties of blood, emotion, love and sexual passion – the world of women, in which men also rule.<sup>72</sup>

Riley notes too that femininity became 'intimate, particular, familial, pre-rational, extra-civic, soaked in its sexual being' from the late seventeenth century onwards.<sup>73</sup> Other writers such as Okin and Elshain focus on the eighteenth century, especially Rousseau's emphasis on women's innate domestic nature and its importance to affective rather than to public political life.<sup>74</sup> By 1785, when Jacques-Louis David painted the 'Oath of the Horatii', masculine and feminine bodies were starkly differentiated in relation to the public. On the left and in the centre of the canvas the men stand erect and rigid, caught in the act of swearing loyalty to the greater good of the state; their spoken oath binds them to action and battle. Citizenship, the formal right of entry into political discussion, is represented by the ideals of autonomy and selfhood which constitute masculinity and masculine bodies. In contrast to this bounded masculine body, on the right of the canvas swoon a group of women; silent, passive, grieving and intertwined, their softness, emotionality and marginality to the action embodies their exclusion from the masculine, public and political sphere.<sup>75</sup> Through the masculinization of the body politic, public space was also represented as a masculine arena.

This construction of public space as masculine does not go uncontested, nor is it without contradictions. Some women – from the Communist *cityennes* to Take Back the Night marches – have struggled to reconstruct public space by demanding equal rights in it for, as Jones remarks, a 'new claim on public space' also implies 'a new social form'.<sup>76</sup> Feminist geographers using time-geography offer a similar challenge to its space. Just as they implicitly challenge its disembodied human agent, so have they hinted that there are more

spaces than meets its eye. Dyck argues that the construction of motherhood through the everyday negotiation of meanings in particular spaces means that women's conceptions of space may alter; 'women generate definitions and understandings of appropriate modes of mothering and the spaces within which this takes place through the recurrent practices of mothering work beyond the immediate confines of the home'.<sup>77</sup> By watching their children playing in the street, women get to talk with other mothers – their neighbours – and networks develop which establish a safe place for their children beyond the confines of the home, as well as renegotiating the meaning of motherhood. Dyck is suggesting that the social constitution of different identities may also imply different kinds of space. This implies that everyday space is not only not self-evidently innocent, but also bound into various and diverse social and psychic dynamics of subjectivity and power. The possible contradictions created by this complexity have been the subject of several recent studies by feminist historians of the public/private distinction.<sup>78</sup>

Outram suggests that the masculine claim to public space is potentially fragile not only because of these contestations of its meaning, but also because what it excludes can erupt into it; moreover, its masculinization through a certain policing of bodies means that every new body requires disciplining in order to guarantee its reconstitution.<sup>79</sup> This policing can be violent. In her discussion of the costs of the fraternal contract, Pateman stresses that the military exemplifies fraternities in action, and espies 'the figure of the armed man in the shadows behind the civil individual'.<sup>80</sup> Thus she makes a link between the contract and the violence with which public spaces are kept as white masculine, heterosexual spaces. This bounded individualism, with its violence, remains as a condition of hegemonic masculinity and citizenship today, as Watney makes clear in his discussion of men with AIDS in the UK.<sup>81</sup> He argues that they are not seen as worthy of the same rights as full citizens because their sexuality transgresses the boundaries of acceptable, masculine behaviour; gay men too are victims of violence in the public streets of this masculine individual, of course.

To conclude this section: in Haraway's description of the individualism of masculine subjectivity, its particular geography is also revealed. She speaks of the "'West's'" escalating dominations of abstract individuation, an ultimate self untied at last from all dependency, a man in space'.<sup>82</sup> Haraway's 'space' is the outer space in which the male astronaut survives alone supported only by his technology, entirely distant from other people and from Mother Earth, and this is

precisely the space which Gould suggests is used in time-geography.<sup>83</sup> The space of time-geography, then, seems to be the dominant space of patriarchy: public, masculine space, which fully acknowledges only (repressed) white heterosexual bourgeois masculine bodies. The ability to act in the public sphere, as opposed to breed in the private, is a privilege violently reserved for men, and the human agency produced in time-geography also speaks only of this masculine sociality and its public spaces. Buttimer's description of time-geography as a *danse macabre* seems entirely appropriate.<sup>84</sup>

### The Constitution of a Masculinity Through Time-geography

This chapter has argued so far that both the human agency and the space through which it moves in time-geography are masculine; they are constructed in the image of the master subject. For all its claims to self-evident reality, to be 'anchored in certain basic facts of life',<sup>85</sup> and to represent those facts objectively, time-geography assumes unproblematic but in fact highly specific theorizations of society and space, and of the bodies which constitute human agency, and this specificity excludes other socialities, spaces and bodies from knowledge. Its notions of agency and space are taken for granted as universal, and other understandings are thereby refused. This is masculinism's false exhaustiveness of the Same. Although it is difficult to think of anywhere beyond the mapping capabilities of this kind of geographer, it is not impossible, as I have argued. There are other spaces, and other kinds of subjectivity. The erasure of such different subjectivities and socialities means that time-geography makes a claim to power through its knowledge. I now want to address this power/knowledge relation more directly. In particular, I want to suggest that this masculinism is not only an effect of a specific masculinity; it also constitutes that masculinity.

Geographers believe that space can always be known and mapped; space is understood as absolutely knowable. That is what its transparency, its innocence, signifies: it is infinitely knowable; there are no hidden corners into which time-geography cannot penetrate. This is a necessary consequence of its search for totality; for if the societies structured through space are understood as wholly visible, as they are in time-geography, then space must be wholly representable. It is real, natural and unproblematic: time-geography's space clearly presents no problem to its theorizers. The visual has always been central to masculinist claims to know, as chapter 5 here elaborates. Seeing was

certainly important to the emergence of the social sciences towards the end of the nineteenth century. Philanthropists, journalists, early social scientists and voyeurs of every sort then went into the city to gaze at its horrors and systematize its dreadful spaces:<sup>86</sup> they wanted to see completely and so to produce and control knowledge of urban social life. Contemporary cities are subjected to the same heroic feats of interpretation: Los Angeles is probably the best example of a city interpreted by great men from their lofty vantage points.<sup>87</sup>

Implicit in this claim to see all and know all are the subjectivity and compulsions of the bounded body that I have already described as the object of time-geography. I want to suggest that this imaginary body is also the author of time-geography. Remember that the construction of imaginary bodies involves both the repression and possession of the body. Fundamental to its construction and possession of other imaginary bodies is the masculinist denial of the male body; others are trapped in their brute materiality by the rational minds of white men. This erasure of his own specificity allows the master subject to assume that he can see everything. In our own time, Haraway has talked about the contemporary escalation of this 'unmarked category' through the proliferation of visual technologies: 'vision in this technological feast becomes unregulated gluttony; all perspective gives way to infinitely mobile vision, which no longer seems just mythically about the god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere, but to have put the myth into ordinary practice'.<sup>88</sup> As Ryan implies at the end of her representation of society as a piece of well-oiled machinery, no cog or gear snagging or grating, everything accounted for, time-geographers seem to be pulling the god-trick hard and fast. Their masculine consciousness peers into the world, denying its own positionality, mapping its spaces in the same manner in which Western white male bodies explored, recorded, surveyed and appropriated spaces from the sixteenth century onwards: from a disembodied location free from sexual attack or racist violence. Space for them is everywhere; nowhere is too threatening or too different for them to go. Time-geographers become the invisible observers of social life, tracing its patterns and making sense of it all, its reproduction, resistance and contradiction.

The contemporary character of this particular masculinity can be caught by paraphrasing Haraway: objects come to us simultaneously as indubitable recordings of what is simply there and as heroic feats of social-scientific production.<sup>89</sup> The heroism of being able to know what really exists both depends on a certain masculinity and constitutes it. Time-geographers' particular masculinity is established through their assumption that all space is white, bourgeois, heterosexual masculine

public space. They deny other possibilities, including an Other; the domestic is not addressed as the Other of public space – it is ignored. The costs of its claim to truth through privileged position and universalized categories have been summarized by Deutsche:

In the act of denying the discursive character of those objects, such depictions also disavow the condition of subjectivity as a partial and situated *position*, positing instead an autonomous subject who observes social conflicts from a privileged and unconflicted place. As this total vantage point can be converted from fantasy into reality only by denying the relational character of subjectivity and by relegating other viewpoints – different subjectivities – to invisible, subordinate, or competing positions, foundational totalizations are systems that seek to immunize themselves against uncertainty and difference.<sup>90</sup>

I will call this denial of the Other (as well as the claims of others) in order to establish a claim to know what is really there 'social-scientific masculinity'. Transparent space, as an expression of social-scientific masculinity's desire for total vision and knowledge, denies the possibility of different spaces being known by other subjects.

However, feminist geographers working with time-geography do refer to different spaces and other worlds; they focus on women's everyday world and the centrality of women's embodiment. This chapter has elaborated their implicit references to a feminized realm of mothering and bodies, of blood spilt for love and in violence, of passion, desire and hate, in order to reveal the specificity of time-geography. The aim of that elaboration of time-geography's repressed Other was to mark the unproblematic universal spaces and bodies of time-geography as masculine (and white and straight and middle-class), and to that extent my strategy succeeded, I think. But that strategy also has its risks, and these are examined in chapter 4. Meanwhile, chapter 3 elaborates another feminist tactic in response to another kind of masculinity.

## NO PLACE FOR WOMEN?

Place is one of geography's most fundamental concepts. Places differ one from another in that each is a specific set of interrelationships between environmental, economic, social, political and cultural processes – what Lukermann has called a 'bounded element complex'<sup>1</sup> – and geography has always been concerned with elucidating these complexes. Place is thus a central theme of the discipline, and its theoretical elaboration has been correspondingly diverse. The particular development examined in this chapter, however, is that of humanistic geography. Place was the geographical concept with which humanistic geographers mostly worked, and as a result they are responsible for much of its current connoitive baggage. They focused on the emotional response of people to places: places for them were locations which, through being experienced by ordinary people, became full of human significance. Humanistic geographers tried to recover the ways in which places were perceived, arguing that it was impossible to make sense of the social world unless academics listened to the interpretations of those who lived in it.

The humanistic conceptualization of place must be understood as a response to the positivism which dominated the discipline in the 1960s. Humanistic geographers characterized positivism as a form of scientific rationality, and they had two, related, criticisms of it. The first was that scientific rationality could not explain the causes of the patterns that it could model and correlate with such technical sophistication, because it was uninterested in the social and political processes in which spatial patterns were embedded. The second was a disbelief in the claims to objectivity and neutrality made by practitioners of

More recent work on landscape has begun to question the visuality of traditional cultural geography, however, as part of a wider critique of the latter's neglect of the power relations within which landscapes are embedded.<sup>6</sup> Some cultural geographers suggest that the discipline's visuality is not simple observation but, rather, is a sophisticated ideological device that enacts systematic erasures. They have begun to problematize the term 'landscape' as a reference to relations between society and the environment through contextual studies of the concept as it emerged and developed historically, and they have argued that it refers not only to the relationships between different objects caught in the fieldworker's gaze, but that it also implies a specific way of looking. They interpret landscape not as a material consequence of interactions between a society and an environment, observable in the field by the more-or-less objective gaze of the geographer, but rather as a gaze which itself helps to make sense of a particular relationship between society and land. They have stressed the importance of the look to the idea of landscape and have argued that landscape is a way of seeing which we learn; as a consequence, they argue that the gaze of the fieldworker is part of the problematic, not a tool of analysis. Indeed, they name this gaze at landscape a 'visual ideology', because it uncritically shows only the relationship of the powerful to their environment. This is an important critique of the unequal social relations implicit in one element of geographical epistemology, and the first section of this chapter examines these arguments.

Questions of gender and sexuality have not been raised by this newer work, however. This seems an important omission: the previous chapter cited Fitzsimmons's comment that cultural geography retained an interest in Nature, and also noted the feminization of Nature in geographical discourse. A consequence has been that, historically, in geographical discourse, landscapes are often seen in terms of the female body and the beauty of Nature. Here, for example, is one of the quotations from the previous chapter expanded to highlight the parallels that it makes between 'live, supple, sensitive, and active' Nature and a female body:

It is [in] the face and features of Mother-Earth that we geographers are mainly interested. We must know something of the general principles of geology, as painters have to know something of the anatomy of the human or animal body . . . the characteristic of the face and features of the Earth most worth learning about, knowing and understanding is their beauty.<sup>7</sup>

## 5 LOOKING AT LANDSCAPE: THE UNEASY PLEASURES OF POWER

Landscape is a central term in geographical studies because it refers to one of the discipline's most enduring interests: the relation between the natural environment and human society, or, to rephrase, between Nature and Culture. Landscape is a term especially associated with cultural geography, and although 'literally [the landscape] is the scene within the range of the observer's vision',<sup>1</sup> its conceptualization has changed through history. By the interwar period, for its leading exponents, such as Otto Schlüter in Germany, Jean Brunhes in France and Carl Sauer in the USA, the term 'landscape' was increasingly interpreted as a formulation of the dynamic relations between a society or culture and its environment: '*the process of human activity in time and area*'.<sup>2</sup> The interpretation of these processes depended in particular on fieldwork, and fieldwork is all about looking: 'the good geographers have first been to see, then they have stopped to think and to study the conclusions of others before finally recording their findings for us in maps and print'.<sup>3</sup> Just as fieldwork is central not only to cultural geography but also to the discipline as a whole, however, so too the visual is central to claims to geographical knowledge:<sup>4</sup> a president of the Association of American Geographers has argued that 'good regional geography, and I suspect most good geography of any stripe, begins by looking'.<sup>5</sup> The absence of knowledge, which is the condition for continuing to seek to know, is often metaphorically indicated in geographical discourse by an absence of insight, by mystery or by myopia; conversely, the desire for full knowledge is indicated by transparency, visibility and perception. Seeing and knowing are often conflated.

Stoddart's celebration of geography's exploration and fieldwork tradition similarly conflates the exploration of Nature with the body of Woman; for example, his frontispiece is an eighteenth-century engraving representing Europe, Africa and America as three naked women.<sup>8</sup> This feminization of what is looked at does matter, because it is one half of what Berger characterizes as the dominant visual regime of white heterosexual masculinism: 'women appear', he says, but 'men sexually and pleasurable, at women as objects. Now, Berger's comments refer to the female nude in Western art; but I will suggest in this chapter that the feminization of landscape in geography allows many of the arguments made about the masculinity of the gaze at the nude to work in the context of geography's landscape too, particularly in the context of geography's pleasure in landscape. The second section of this chapter suggests that geography's look at landscape draws on not only a complex discursive transcoding between Woman and Nature, as the previous chapter argued, but also on a specific masculine way of seeing: the men acting in the context of geography are the fieldworkers, and the Woman appearing is the landscape. This compelling figure of Woman both haunts a masculinist spectator of landscape and constitutes him.

The pleasures that geographers feel when they look at landscape are not innocent, then, but nor are they simple. The pleasure of the masculine gaze at beautiful Nature is tempered by geography's scientism, as the last chapter suggested. The gaze of the scientist has been described by Keller and Grontkowski as part of masculinist rationality,<sup>10</sup> and to admit an emotional response to Nature would destroy the anonymity on which that kind of scientific objectivity depends. Keller and Grontkowski trace the tradition of associating knowledge with vision back to Plato, and they argue that by the seventeenth century the equivalence of knowing with seeing was a commonplace of scientific discourse. It remains so today. But when Descartes discovered that the eye was a passive lens, in order to retain an understanding of the accession to knowledge as active he was forced to separate the seeing intellect from the seeing eye. This was one aspect of the split between the mind and the body so much associated with his work, and it rendered the objects of the gaze separate from the looking subject: 'Having made the eye purely passive, all intellectual activity is reserved to the "I", which, however, is radically separate from the body which houses it'.<sup>11</sup> Such disembodiment separated knowing from desire, and protected men's scientific neutrality from Woman's wild nature. For Keller, the scientific gaze is another

aspect of the distanced, disembodied objectivity of science. However, as chapter 4 described, geographers are constituted as sensitive artists as well as objective scientists in their approach to Nature and landscape. This contradiction produces a conflict between desire and fear in visual forms. It creates a tension between distance from the object of the gaze and merger with it, which is at work both in the conflict between knowledge and pleasure – a conflict between 'a highly individual response' and 'a disinterested search for evidence'<sup>12</sup> – and also within the pleased gaze. These complex contradictions between and within (social-)scientific objectivity and aesthetic sensitivity disrupt cultural geography's claim to know landscape, as the second section argues. These disruptions are elaborated there through the work of psychoanalytic feminists who suggest that 'the specificity of visual performance and address has... a privileged relation to issues of sexuality'.<sup>13</sup> This second section is adopting one of the tactics outlined in the previous chapter, then – finding contradictions in the Same. I argue that the structure of aesthetic masculinity which studies landscape is inherently unstable, subverted by its own desire for the pleasures that it fears.

The third section uses another tactic of critique, and looks at various attempts to re-present a different relation between subject and environment from other spectating positions. None draws on the structure which posits Woman as Nature in order to establish Man as Culture, and all stress differences between women. They begin to imagine different kinds of landscape.

### Landscape as Visual Ideology

Recent critiques of the landscape idea in geography insist that landscape is a form of representation and not an empirical object. As Daniels and Cosgrove remark, 'a landscape is a cultural image, a pictorial way of representing, structuring or symbolising surroundings'.<sup>14</sup> Whether written or painted, grown or built, a landscape's meanings draw on the cultural codes of the society for which it was made. These codes are embedded in social power structures, and theorization of the relationship between culture and society by these new cultural geographers has so far drawn on the humanist marxist tradition of Antonio Gramsci, Raymond Williams, E. P. Thompson and John Berger. All of these authors see the material and symbolic dimensions of the production and reproduction of society as inextricably intertwined.<sup>15</sup> Cosgrove,



one of the most prominent theorists of the new critique of the landscape idea, defines culture as:

... symbolisation, grounded in the material world as symbolically appropriated and produced. In class societies, where surplus production is appropriated by the dominant group, symbolic production is likewise seized as hegemonic class culture to be imposed on all classes.<sup>16</sup>

In his work, landscape becomes a part of that hegemonic culture, a concept which helps to order society into hierarchical class relations.

Cosgrove points out that landscape first emerged as a term in fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Italy, and he argues that it was bound up with both Renaissance theories of space and with the practical appropriation of space. Euclidean geometry was 'the guarantor of certainty in spatial conception, organisation and representation',<sup>17</sup> and its recovery paved the way for Alberti's explication of the technique of three-dimensional perspective in 1435. Other geometrical skills were being developed contemporaneously, especially by the urban merchant class, and these too involved the accurate representation of space: calculating the volume and thus the value of packaged commodities; map-making to guide the search for goods and markets; and surveying techniques to plot the estates that the bourgeoisie were buying in the countryside. All of these spatial techniques were implicated in relations of power and ownership. Cosgrove is particularly interested in Alberti because, using his manual, artists could render depth realistically, and so establish a particular viewpoint for the spectator in their painting – a single, fixed point of the bourgeois individual. (Cosgrove does remark that this individual was male, but does not develop the point.<sup>18</sup>) From this position, the spectator controlled the spatial organization of a composition, and Cosgrove argues that this was central to landscape images. Merchants often commissioned paintings of their newly acquired properties, and in these canvases, through perspective, they enjoyed perspectival as well as material control over their land. Cosgrove concludes that the idea of landscape is patrician because it is seen and understood from the social and visual position of the landowner. Other writers agree and emphasize the erasure of the waged labour relation in landscape painting. In the context of eighteenth-century English landscape painting, for example, Barrell notes that the labourers in these images are denied full humanity, and Bryson argues that the fine brushwork technique favoured in Western art until the late nineteenth century effaces the mark of the artist as

waged worker.<sup>19</sup> It is argued then that landscape is meaningful as a 'way of seeing' bound into class relations, and Cosgrove describes landscape as a 'visual ideology' in the sense that it represents only a partial world view.<sup>20</sup>

This is an extremely important critique of the ideologies implicit in geographical discourse. Its strengths are evident in the interpretation shared by cultural geographers of the mid-eighteenth-century double portrait of Mr and Mrs Andrews, by the English artist Thomas Gainsborough (Illustration 2).<sup>21</sup> In their discussions of this image, geographers concur that pleasure in the right-hand side of the canvas – those intense green fields, the heaviness of the sheaves of corn, the English sky threatening rain – is made problematic by the two figures on the left, Mr and Mrs Andrews. Berger, whose discussion of this painting geographers follow, insists that the fact that this couple owned the fields and trees about them is central to its creation and therefore to its meaning: 'they are landowners and their proprietary attitude towards what surrounds them is visible in their stance and their expressions'.<sup>22</sup> Their ownership of land is celebrated in the substantiality of the oil paints used to represent it, and in the vista opening up beyond them, which echoes in visual form the freedom to move over property which only landowners could enjoy. The absence in the painting's content of the people who work the fields, and the absence in its form of the signs of its production by an artist working for a fee on a commission, can be used to support Cosgrove's claim that landscape painting is a form of visual ideology: it denies the social relations of waged labour under capitalism. *Mr and Mrs Andrews*, then, is an image on which geographers are agreed: it is a symptom of the capitalist property relations that legitimate and are sanctioned by the visual sweep of a landscape prospect.

However, the painting of Mr and Mrs Andrews can also be read in other ways. In particular, it is possible to prise the couple – 'the landowners' – apart, and to differentiate between them. Although both figures are relaxed and share the sense of partnership so often found in eighteenth-century portraits of husband and wife, their unity is not entire: they are given rather different relationships to the land around them. Mr Andrews stands, gun on arm, ready to leave his pose and go shooting again; his hunting dog is at his feet, already urging him away. Meanwhile, Mrs Andrews sits impassively, rooted to her seat with its wrought iron branches and tendrils, her upright stance echoing that of the tree directly behind her. If Mr Andrews seems at any moment able to stride off into the vista, Mrs Andrews looks planted to the spot. This helps me to remember that, *contra* Berger, these two people are

not both landowners – only Mr Andrews owns the land. His potential for activity, his free movement over his property, is in stark contrast not only to the harsh penalties awaiting poachers daring the same freedom of movement over his land (as Berger notes), but also to the frozen stillness of Mrs Andrews. Moreover, the shadow of the oak tree over her refers to the family tree she was expected to propagate and nurture; like the fields she sits beside, her role was to reproduce, and this role is itself naturalized by the references to trees and fields.<sup>23</sup> As chapter 2 noted, this period saw the consolidation of an argument that women were more ‘natural’ than men. Medical, scientific, legal and political discourses concurred, and contextualize the image of Mr and Mrs Andrews in terms of a gendered difference in which the relationship to the land is a key signifier. Landscape painting then involves not only class relations, but also gender relations. Mr Andrews is represented as the owner of the land, while Mrs Andrews is painted almost as a part of that still and exquisite landscape: the tree and its roots bracketing her on one side, and the metal branches of her seat on the other.

Many feminist art historians have argued that heterosexual masculinism structures images of femininity: following that claim, my interpretation of the figure of Mrs Andrews stresses her representation as a natural mother. Obviously, her representation also draws on discourses of class and even nation. I emphasize her femininity, however, because there are feminist arguments which offer a critique not just of the discourses that pin Mrs Andrews to her seat, but also of the gaze that renders her as immobile, as natural, as productive and as decorative as the land. Such arguments consider the dynamics of a masculine gaze and its pleasures. The next subsection introduces their claim that more is involved in looking at landscape than property relations.

### *Woman, landscape and Nature*

This subsection begins to examine the gaze which sees landscapes, and it focuses on the construction of the landscape as feminine. I concentrate mainly on feminist interpretations of nineteenth-century landscape paintings in Europe and North America. The massive social, economic and political upheavals in those places during that period – upheavals which included the colonial explorations through which geography developed as a discipline – meant that many of the schema previously used by artists to represent the world seemed increasingly outmoded, and new iconographies were sought to articulate the




Illustration 2 Mr and Mrs Andrews, by Thomas Gainsborough.  
Reproduced by courtesy of the Trustees, The National Gallery, London.

changes producing and reproducing the lives of art's audience, the bourgeoisie. By the mid-nineteenth century, the emergence of this new public for paintings was fuelling a vigorous debate about the role of art: art was drawn into debates about social, political and moral standards which might structure the emerging modern world and, as feminists have remarked, central to these wider issues was the figure of Woman – fallen, pure, decadent, spiritual.<sup>24</sup> Parker and Pollock suggest that the very importance attached to Art in the realm of Culture reasserted the association of women with the natural:

... woman is body, is nature opposed to culture, which, in turn, is represented by the very act of transforming nature, that is, the female model or motif, into the ordered forms and colour of a cultural artefact, a *work of art*.<sup>25</sup>

Woman becomes Nature, and Nature Woman, and both can thus be burdened with men's meaning and invite interpretation by masculinist discourse: for example, chapter 3 has already discussed the way in which feminine figures can stand as symbols of places. It should be emphasized that the 'naturalization' of some women is asserted more directly than that of others: allegorical figures especially, but also, in bourgeois and racist society, working-class and black women.<sup>26</sup> Thus the visual encoding of nineteenth-century Western hegemonic masculinist constructions of femininity, sexuality, nature and property are at their most overtly intertwined in the landscapes with figures set in the colonies of Europe and America. To take an example relevant to one of geography's heroic self-images, Theweleit has suggested that the image of the South Sea maiden 'began to construct the body that would constitute a mysterious goal for men whose desires were armed for an imminent voyage, a body that was more enticing than all the world put together',<sup>27</sup> and perhaps the most well-known paintings which fuse beautiful, sexual, fertile, silent and mysterious Woman with a gorgeous, generous, lush Nature are Gauguin's paintings of Tahitian women. In perfect stillness, they offer the produce of their island to him in the same gesture as they offer themselves, their breasts painted like fruits and flowers.<sup>28</sup> The first French encounter with Tahiti is described by Stoddart as one of the founding moments of scientific geography, and the encounter that he chooses to elaborate is a sexual one. Tahitian women represent the enticing and inviting land to be explored, mapped, penetrated and known.<sup>29</sup> This subsection concentrates on the representation of female figures in landscapes, then, in order to examine one moment of the complex transcoding of

femininity and Nature in the field of vision. I suggest that, as well as contextualizing stories of geography's beginnings, the conflation of Woman and Nature can also say something about contemporary cultural geography's visual pleasure in landscape.

Lynda Nead has demonstrated the complexity of the social relations which were mediated in images of the landscapes at the heart of Empire, and she stresses the importance of gender relations to the representation of both class and nation. Nead suggests that, in the face of the transformations of the Victorian era, 'confirmation and reassurance... were two of the most important functions of nineteenth-century cultural discourse',<sup>30</sup> and one of the most resonant symbols in England was that of the village in the countryside. The social stability associated with the village – people and land in traditional harmony – was so strong that by the 1840s landscape painting was for many art critics a contender as the truly national art genre of England.<sup>31</sup> A contrast between the town and the country has a long tradition in English culture, of course, but by the mid-nineteenth century, despite the continuing arguments for the urban as the centre of civilization and progress, images of the countryside showed a rural idyll which gained much of its impact in opposition to representations of the city as polluted and depraved.<sup>32</sup> The fields and villages of England were painted as embodying all the virtues that the towns had lost – stability, morality and tranquility – and social harmony was fundamental to this discursive construction. The rural idyll was envisioned as a village community. Everyone knew their place, and the harmony of such a community was centrally represented through 'natural' gender differences. Ideas about natural order were epitomized in the 'natural' difference between men and women, with women naturally natural mothers. Nochlin stresses the importance of the rural working mother figure to the rhetoric of Nature and the natural in her discussion of nineteenth-century French paintings of peasant life: 'The peasant woman, as an elemental, untutored – hence eminently "natural" female – is the ideal signifier for the notion of beneficent maternity'.<sup>33</sup> And Nochlin describes how the stress on the naturalness of this role led to peasant women being equated directly with the land and animals they tend in many of these genre scenes – both were shown as essentially reproductive.

The supposed closeness of women to Nature was also explicit in other painting genres of the period, particularly those in which classical, fantastical or allegorical women appear surrounded by wild Nature. Dijkstra has catalogued these imaginary scenes in European and American nineteenth-century art.<sup>34</sup> Often nude, in England these

images of women required a classical gloss to withstand the puritanism of some critics, although bourgeois patrons adored them.<sup>35</sup> Elsewhere, in Europe and America, less excuse was needed to paint nudes: sleep was a popular allegory allowing scenes of women in unself-conscious abandon, oblivious to the spectator's gaze. In the eyes of nineteenth-century morality, such sexual potential brought these women excitingly close to Nature, and they are found in fields and woods throughout late nineteenth-century bourgeois art: 'Passive but fertile, they personify what had come to be a standard conception of woman as the infinitely receptive, seed-sheltering womb of a sweltering earth'.<sup>36</sup> As nymphs and dryads they entwined themselves in trees, or lay on the leaf-covered earth, languid and passive, so that, according to Dijkstra's somewhat over-empathetic account, 'we can almost hear them call to us like animals waiting to be fed'.<sup>37</sup> In a final iconographic twist, women became allegories of nature itself; for the seasons, for weather, for the time of day, for flowers.<sup>38</sup> In making such a parallel between Woman and Nature these paintings offered the possibility that women could be used as Nature was: 'did not the earth, nature herself, meekly permit her body to be plowed, seeded, stripped, and abused by man?'<sup>39</sup> Nature and Woman were equally vulnerable.

This equivalence between Woman and Nature leads Armstrong to compare the female nude in Western art directly to a landscape:

The female nude, when free of narrative situations, is most often constituted frontally and horizontally – as a kind of landscape, its significant part the torso, its limbs merely elongations of the line created by the supine, stretched-out torso.<sup>40</sup>

The female figure represents landscape, and landscape a female torso, visually in part through their pose: paintings of Woman and Nature often share the same topography of passivity and stillness. The comparison is also made through the association of both land and Woman with reproduction, fertility and sexuality, free from the constraints of Culture. Incorporating all of these associations, both Woman and Nature are vulnerable to the desires of men. Armstrong examines this vulnerability by arguing that if Art and the spectator constitute both Woman and Nature as what they work on and interpret, they do so especially by looking at both in a similar manner. Both are made to invite the same kind of observation. Rarely do the women in landscape images look out from the canvas at the viewer as an equal. Their gaze is often elsewhere: oblivious to their exposure, they offer no resistance to the regard of the spectator. Perhaps they will be looking in a mirror,

allowing the viewer to enjoy them as they apparently enjoy themselves. If they acknowledge the spectator/artist, they do so with a look of invitation. The viewer's eye can move over the canvas at will, just as it can wander across a landscape painting, with the same kind of sensual pleasure. Here is another parallel between Woman and landscape: the techniques of perspective used to record land-scapes were also used to map female nudes, and the art genre of naked women emerged in the same period as did landscape painting (Illustration 3).

One of the earliest discussions of this kind of visual power over the representation of women was Berger's.<sup>41</sup> Like his reading of *Mr and Mrs Andrews*, his arguments focus on the question of ownership. Speaking of the woman in a nude painting, he says that 'this nakedness is not, however, an expression of her own feelings; it is a sign of her submission to the owner's feelings or demands'.<sup>42</sup> Just as he argues that the painting of a landscape in oils was a sensuous celebration of land ownership, so he claims that the representation of a woman in oils turns her too into a commodity, passive and prostrate, able only to welcome the gaze of the owner of the canvas. Being an owner gives material and visual power over property, whether that be land or the image of a woman.

Feminist art historians have acknowledged the force of Berger's account, but they suggest that not only the commodification of art and sex (and land) is involved in 'the landscape of the reclining torso',<sup>43</sup> so too are the (hetero)sexual fantasies of both artist and spectator. It is the imagined and desired sexuality of the female nude that is offered to the (implicitly masculine) spectator. Nochlin was one of the first feminists to argue that the sexuality of the Western female nude was represented only through masculine desires:

As far as one knows, there simply exists no art, and certainly no high art, in the nineteenth century based upon women's erotic needs, wishes, or fantasies. Whether the erotic object be breasts or buttocks, shoes or corsets, a matter of pose or of prototype, the imagery of sexual delight or provocation has always been created about women for men's enjoyment, by men.<sup>44</sup>

This means that the sensual topography of land and skin is mapped by a gaze which is eroticized as masculine and heterosexual. This masculine gaze sees a feminine body which requires interpreting by the cultured knowledgeable look; something to own, and something to give pleasure. The same sense of visual power as well as pleasure is at

work as the eye traverses both field and flesh: the masculine gaze is of knowledge and desire.

This discussion of the visual representation of women and landscape has concentrated on the complex construction of images of 'natural' Woman as the objects of male desire. I have argued that Nature and Woman are represented through masculinist fantasies, and that makes looking pleasurable. Women are seen as closer to Nature than men because of the desirable sexuality given to them in these images and other discourses. In a rare and welcome discussion of pleasure in landscape images, Daniels reveals this desire at work.<sup>45</sup> Noting Berger's claim that painting has an energy which pulls the viewer further from the visible *status quo* than they could manage alone, he suggests that images of the countryside evoke deep and pleasurable emotional responses which can empower; and this pleasure is described in Berger's words, as 'a going further than he could have achieved alone, towards a prey, a Madonna, a sexual pleasure, a landscape, a face, a different world'.<sup>46</sup> This conflation of hunting, a virgin and the single male orgasm stands as a summary of the pleasure of landscape. Pleasure in landscape, it appears, is for straight men's eyes only.

#### *A blind spot in geographers' ways of seeing*

There is a great reluctance among geographers to engage critically with this masculine pleasure, even though pleasure in the landscapes encountered during fieldwork is, as the previous chapter commented, frequently admitted (even erotic pleasure is occasionally conceded). Daniels, for example, only prostrates himself before the aesthetic power of landscapes in speechless admiration: he seems to share Tuan's belief that, in confronting the mystic power of art, 'the proper response is silence'.<sup>47</sup> The critical evasion of a pleasure described as a fundamental human experience aligns this newer cultural geography with the discipline's aesthetic masculinity.

The refusal to address the pleasure which marks this cultural geography as masculinist is enabled in part by the ideological notion of Art as the ultimate form of human expression: its pleasure is assumed to be untainted by the specificity of social relations. It is also enabled by the use of the metaphor of landscape as text. The visual, new cultural geographers argue, can be interpreted only if it is understood as textual and then read.<sup>48</sup> Texts may include visual images – the techniques of geometry and perspective learnt from books, for example, in the Italian Renaissance – as well as written political, economic or cultural texts, and the metaphor has been detailed by Barnes and Duncan:



Illustration 3 A Draughtsman Drawing a Nude, by Albrecht Dürer.

... a landscape possesses a similar objective fixity to that of a written text. It also becomes detached from the intentions of its original authors, and in terms of social and psychological impact and material consequences the various readings of landscapes matter more than any authorial intentions. In addition, the landscape has an importance beyond the initial situation for which it was constructed, addressing a potentially wide range of readers. In short, landscapes are characterized by all those features that Ricoeur identifies as definitive of a text.<sup>49</sup>

The meaning of any landscape/text is open to interpretation and contestation, they imply: the author of the landscape/text is dead. But then I find their stress on the fixity of the landscape/text puzzling. Obviously most landscapes are physically solid, but this surely matters little to geographers so concerned with meaning and culture. But if meaning is not stable, what does 'objective fixity' mean? The 'concretization' of the landscape/text is not an uncommon claim, and Short, for example, suggests that texts 'are language made solid, conversations frozen in print and picture'.<sup>50</sup> I suggest that the notion of solidity is necessary in order to imply the possibility of certain knowledge about landscape. For in all of this work the only representations of landscape which seem able to retain their interpretive certainty (overtly at least) are those of the geographers themselves. The deflection of the notion of contested texts away from geographers' own writing is made explicitly by Barnes and Duncan when they remark that 'to understand critically *our own* representations, and also those of others, we must therefore know the kinds of factors bearing upon *an author* that makes an account come out the way it does'.<sup>51</sup> The move from a personalized 'our' to an abstract 'author' shifts the focus of this argument about the specificity of texts away from geographers and towards somebody else. This removes the geographer from the interpretive rules that he applies to the texts of others, and renders him invincible as an author – all-seeing and all-knowing. He can reveal the contestation over another landscape image, and in so doing establishes the acuity and insight of his own reading. As Burgess has remarked in the context of a discussion about postmodern built landscapes, 'the analyst remains in the dominant position of telling readers what these landscapes mean for the people who purchase and live in them'.<sup>52</sup> Removing himself also makes him invisible, because his texts then remain part of the anonymous voice of hegemonic geographical discourse. The texts of the new cultural geography remain, overtly at least, unmarked: (embodied) specificity is banished and distant authority put in its place. The metaphor of landscape as text works to establish an authoritative

reading, and to maintain that authority whenever emotion threatens to erupt and mark the author as a feeling subject. Knowledge/texts/evidence are asserted over and against emotion. Daniels himself uses text to staunch his own admission of desire: he repeats the quotation from Berger twice, almost like a talisman against the disruption of which it speaks. Those few words name that pleasure for Daniels, and their reiteration seems to stabilize it, delimit its impact, and ground it so that knowledgeable discussion can proceed around it. The textual metaphor aims to stabilize disruptions and demonstrate learning and sensitivity: landscape textualized renders geographers' knowledge exhaustive. It performs as another example of aesthetic masculinity in geography.

Textualizing landscape is an attempt to deny the phallogentrism of the geographic gaze, while also establishing a specific masculinity as the norm through which to access visual knowledge. The revelation of the masculinity of the gaze at landscape is thus highly disruptive to cultural geography's authoritative claims to interpret landscape, and within the dualistic structure of geographical knowledge it encourages a retreat back to a disinterested and therefore disembodied search for evidence and truth. This is geography's tense oscillation between knowledge and pleasure. Visual pleasure is seen as something disruptive, and its persistence leads to cultural geographers' suspicion of landscape as secretive, ambiguous, duplicitous, mysterious and Other – feminine again.<sup>53</sup> Their 'lust' for landscape dissipates, and this 'invariably prompt[s] the questions "Why did I read this?" "Why did I go there?" "Why did I desire her?"'.<sup>54</sup> But visual pleasure never ends, and has its own contradictions. Theorists of the visual argue that there is a specific logic of the gaze and that visual pleasure is deeply bound into the regulatory fictions of heterosexuality.<sup>55</sup> The next section addresses this pleasure and its repressions, and suggests that the retreat to a critical distance is no escape at all. Geographers are pursued by their internal enemy, which ensures the failure of their efforts to stabilize their knowledges.

### Sexuality in the Field of Vision

The recurring but uneasy pleasure that geography finds in landscape, acknowledged but never addressed, is a version of the discipline's aesthetic masculinity. This section examines the persistence of its visual pleasure, and emphasizes that pleasure's disruptions and contradictions in order to subvert that masculinism's claims to exhaustive-

ness. I will draw on the arguments of feminists working with Freud and with Lacan's re-reading of Freud, because several have focused on the contradictoriness of 'sexuality in the field of vision' through these forms of psychoanalysis.<sup>56</sup>

Clearly, there are many problems with any engagement between psychoanalysis and feminism. Many feminists argue that both Freud and Lacan take patriarchy for granted and do not theorize change – the latter problem epitomized by Freud's notorious claim that 'anatomy is destiny' – and Lacan has been criticized even by those feminists drawing on his work for his implicit phallocentrism.<sup>57</sup> Psychoanalysis has therefore been condemned as incapable of challenging the oppression of women.<sup>58</sup> Nonetheless, for writers such as Elizabeth Grosz, Juliet Mitchell, Laura Mulvey and Jacqueline Rose, all of whom I draw on here, a critique of the hold that ideologies have over our innermost psyches must inform any liberatory politics: further more, psychoanalysis, for all its problems, is the only elaborated theory available that takes the sexuality of the subject as its fundamental problematic. Their feminist appropriation of psychoanalysis stresses two themes; both of which, they argue, allow for failures in and resistances to ideology. The first is the unconscious. The unconscious is the location of powerful desires, impossible to satisfy, repressed by the conventions of society but constantly threatening to make themselves known, and they argue that it allows for the constant possibility of disruption to the norms of everyday life. The second is the stress in Lacan's work on the symbol and the image, which leads Rose to comment on the 'fictional nature of the sexual category to which every human subject is none the less assigned'.<sup>59</sup> Lacan insists on the difficulty of human identity and even on its failure. The feminist encounter with Lacanian psychoanalysis suggests that it is possible to undermine the relentless Sameness of masculinist codes of meaning by reading for the disruptive symptoms of its desires. With Grosz, I would argue that:

... feminists cannot afford to reject or accept [Lacan's] work. This ambivalence is not, however, a failure to 'make up one's mind'. Rather, from the present vantage point, it can be seen as a tactical position enabling feminists to use his work where it serves their interests without being committed to its more troublesome presumptions.<sup>60</sup>

This section will trace some of the contradictions and disruptions in geography's ambivalence towards landscape, for the insistence on the fragility of human identity also informs feminist psychoanalytic

interpretations of masculinist visual pleasure. In the work of both Freud and Lacan, a strong 'identificatory investment in images' is outlined, replete with difficulties and contradictions,<sup>61</sup> for when 'describing the child's difficult journey into adult sexual life, [Freud] would take as his model little scenarios, or the staging of events, which demonstrated the complexity of an essentially visual space, moments in which perception *founders*'.<sup>62</sup> The seen image is central to feminist psychoanalytic theory: the gaze is theorized as being eroticized, so that 'visual space [is] more than the domain of simple recognition'.<sup>63</sup> The gaze is eroticized through heterosexual desire. Its power in racist contexts also depends on the whiteness of the spectator, as Gaines has argued.<sup>64</sup> This section argues that these feminist psychoanalytic commentaries offer an eloquent critique of geography's white, heterosexual, masculine gaze, a gaze torn between pleasure and its repression.

Mulvey's account of the gaze and identity begins with scopophilia, pleasure in looking.<sup>65</sup> Mulvey argues that this pleasure is voyeuristic: it is curious, controlling and distanced. As the child enters subjectivity, this voyeurism shifts and is joined by other ways of looking. Especially important in this process is what Lacan called the 'mirror stage', which is the moment at which the child begins to realize, by seeing its image in a mirror or in the reactions to its actions by its mother or nurturer, that it is a bounded body. The child pleasures in this, too, and again and again affirms itself through the reflections of others. This recognition of self in images outside the self is narcissistic, and the tension between narcissism – identification with the image – and voyeurism – a distancing from the image – is central to the continuing dynamics of the gaze. This contradiction is there in the mirror stage itself, for the seen unity of the subject is in fact a fantasy. It is a coherence seen in a mirror from a distance: the unity perceived with the image depends on a split between the child and the mirror or its mother/nurturer, and this mirror/mother is what I have also been calling the Other. This moment of recognizing *oneself* is a moment of misrecognition: every look re-enacts the subject's split between its gaze and its image, itself and the external order. The gaze is then always torn between two conflicting impulses: on the one hand, a narcissistic identification with what it sees and through which it constitutes its identity; and on the other a voyeuristic distance from what is seen as Other to it.

Feminists argue that this contradictory gaze is not sexually neutral. As Mulvey argues, it constitutes:

Woman as image, man as bearer of the look . . . in a world ordered by sexual imbalance, pleasure in looking has been split between

active/male and passive/female. The determining male gaze projects its fantasy onto the female figure, which is styled accordingly.<sup>66</sup>

The (hetero)sexuality of the active gaze is structured as masculine in phallogentric cultures and societies, and feminists argue that it is central to the construction of sexual difference. Their arguments focus on the Oedipus/castration complex, through which boys are forced to repress their desire for their mother through the threat of castration. (This first repression forms the unconscious.) This threat marks the mother as the site of lack because she is seen as already castrated. It is important to note here how the mother comes to signify lack, because it is at this point that accusations of biological determinism are most often levelled at Freud and Lacan. Mitchell insists that 'in and of itself, the female body neither indicates nor initiates anything'.<sup>67</sup> She emphasizes the fictional, not biological, nature of identity: this must be an account of the formation of masculine and feminine positions; not, as in Mulvey's polemic, of men and women. Mitchell's remarks also stress the centrality of a certain vision to the constitution of Woman as lacking, since it is only through the sight of patriarchal law that the mother's genitalia come to signify lack or castration. As Grosz notes, 'the female can be construed as castrated, lacking a sexual organ, only on the information provided by vision'.<sup>68</sup> As in the mirror stage, the look is again central to subjectivity, and the active look which sees the mother as lacking rather than simply different is phallogentric. The active look is constituted as masculine, and to be looked at is the feminine position. But this is not a coherent look: narcissistic identification with the powerful, pre-Oedipal, phallic (m)Other and voyeuristic fascination with her lack remain, and so the look 'oscillates between memory of maternal plenitude and memory of lack'.<sup>69</sup>

These connections between identity and vision suggest why visual pleasure recurs in geographical discourse: it is a fundamental part of the masculine subjectivity which shapes and is constituted through that discourse. And geography's pleasure in landscape images can be interpreted through the psychoanalytic terms across which the gaze is made – loss, lack, desire and sexual difference. One possible reading follows. It is a supplement to the argument of the previous chapter about the ambivalence of geography towards Mother Nature. It is an insistence on the disruptions of the Other in the gaze of the geographic Same; it is a sustained attempt to undermine both the anonymity of the authoritative cultural geographer and the stability of his claims to knowledge.

I will begin with the mother. Pollock notes that there is 'a function

for the image as a means to regain visual access to the lost object', the lost object being the mother before her denial through the Oedipus/castration complex.<sup>70</sup> Images of women, of Nature, of Mother Nature and the 'maternal natural landscape', to quote Sauer again, can assuage the loss of the pre-Oedipal mother because they offer plenitude, passivity, lushness, nurturance and incorporation: this chapter and the last have already quoted geographers celebrating all these qualities in landscape. Pleasure in landscape comes partly from its seductively sexual vision of narcissistic reunion with the phallic mother. The work of Kolodny on the metaphors used by European male settlers of North America to describe the land that they were colonizing demonstrates just such a comforting elision between the land and Woman.<sup>71</sup> She argues that the earliest immigrants compared the continent to a Woman and developed the European pastoral tradition into:

... what is probably America's oldest and most cherished fantasy: a daily reality of harmony between man and nature based on an experience of the land as essentially feminine – that is, not simply the land as mother, but the land as woman, the total female principle of gratification – enclosing the individual in an environment of receptivity, repose, and painless and integral satisfaction.<sup>72</sup>

The metaphor of land-as-woman affected men's attitudes towards the environment in complex ways, and Kolodny locates this complexity in the conflict induced by the metaphor itself. The land was imagined as a mother, whose generosity and abundance were marvellous, Edenic, but which could overwhelm settlers and corrupt their efforts at self-sufficiency. To distance themselves from this possibility, men continued to work the land, to explore it and to penetrate its mysteries, and this invoked another aspect of land-as-woman, the land as irresistible temptress. 'Implicit in the metaphor of land-as-woman was both the regressive pull of maternal containment and the seductive invitation to sexual assertion'.<sup>73</sup> As the ownership and exploitation of territory for agriculture and for the raw materials of the new industries grew in the nineteenth century, this ambiguity led to increasing unease in North American male writers' relationship to their landscapes. Domination of the land began to be seen as both incest and rape, and the horror of this necessitated a psychological and emotional separation from the land and from woman. Kolodny argues that this separation, together with the indifferent land's refusal to be either Mother or Mistress, legitimated the degradation of the landscape then and continues to destroy it now.



Kolodny's work points to some of the contradictions involved in seeing the land as feminine, as both Mother and object of desire. She hints at a fear of Mother Earth, and this has been noticed by several commentators on white bourgeois masculinity. Wild and threatening landscapes haunted Victorian Europe, and colonialists' deep horror as well as their fascination with foreign lands can be understood through this. Fear of being unmanned by a too-generous landscape has been noted by Kolodny in the case of the European settlement of North America. Stott describes a different fear in her discussion of the novels of Rider Haggard, in which the horrors of the Africa imagined by white explorers are embodied in the overwhelming and ghastly figure of She.<sup>74</sup> Theweleit too pursues the theme of terrifying feminized landscapes in his study of the soldiers of the interwar German *Freikorps*: here, he argues that they saw threats to the land of Germany through images of deluge and engulfment, and Theweleit characterizes their horror as a fear of dissolution into the mother.<sup>75</sup> The powerful phallic mother can herself threaten in these different ways because, as Mulvey notes, 'the representation of the female form in a symbolic order ... speaks castration and nothing else'.<sup>76</sup> If images of women can disavow lack, they also necessarily represent it; 'as the place onto which lack is projected, and through which it is simultaneously disavowed, woman is "symptom" for the man'.<sup>77</sup> Landscape can then be not the welcoming topography of nurturing mother but terrifying maternal swamps, mountains, seas, inhabited by sphinxes and gorgons. These accounts of the desired and feared Mother, both phallic and castrated, suggest one interpretation of Stoddard's account of the encounter of the first scientific geographers with Tahiti.<sup>78</sup> He too tells of pleasure and horror, both embodied through Tahitian women. His story is of a crew member who is seduced by Tahitian women: this is the feminization of the land to be penetrated and known, already mentioned. But the man returns to the ship and says that whatever punishment the captain devises for him could not be worse than the women themselves. I wonder what part of his anatomy he feared for most. Perhaps it is no coincidence that Stoddard's is one of the finest accounts of the pleasures in the small details of landscape: a fetishized response to the fear of castration by Woman.

This fear also motivates the voyeuristic gaze which sustains a gap between the subject looking and what they see. The voyeuristic gaze is investigative and controlling, instituting a distance from and mastery over the image. Such a distance is established from both the (M)Other and the masculine self during the Oedipus/castration complex, and

through this self-denial of bodily pleasures and visualization of the self, the masculine body is erased. This has epistemological consequences:

The masculine is able to speak of and for women because it has emptied itself of any relation to the male body ... The establishment of the ego through its visual representation in the mirror-image forms the pre-conditions for the alienation required for language, in the first instance, and for knowledge and truth in the second. The evacuation of the male body is the condition required to create a space of reflection, of specul(ar)ization from which it can look at itself from the outside.<sup>79</sup>

This once again affirms that the disembodied gaze of knowledge is masculine. The disembodiment of the voyeur establishes the claim of the phallogocentric look to be transcendent, pure and universal. Moreover, that single viewpoint identified by Cosgrove as bourgeois also enacts a masculinist self-erasure, because 'the condensation of the gaze and the body of the viewer into another single point ... reflects the viewer back at himself in the form of invisibility'.<sup>80</sup> The inherent fears in geography's visual pleasures, its suspicion in its pleasure, produce its persistent refusal to problematize its pleasure - geographers are invisible to themselves.

However, as chapter 4 remarked, geography does have a tradition of celebrating its encounters with Nature: the self-erasure of the voyeuristic gaze is contradicted by the narcissistic assertion of self through what is seen. The heroic ethos of fieldwork can be contextualized through Mulvey's classic essay on Hollywood cinema, which suggests that the image of landscape as a perspectival space centred on the hero - geographer or movie star - is a necessary part of the grandeur and authority of masculinity.<sup>81</sup> Mulvey argues that our enjoyment of movies comes partly from our sheer pleasure in looking, but also that films re-enact our own mirror stage and force us, male or female, to identify with the self-certain he(ro). We see ourselves on the screen, ourselves as we would like to be - movies visualize the ego ideal in the form of their hero. The use of landscape structured through Renaissance perspective is central to this process:

... the active male figure (the ego ideal of the identification process) demands a three-dimensional space corresponding to that of the mirror recognition in which the alienated subject internalised his own representation of his imaginary existence.<sup>82</sup>

Here, Cosgrove's discussion of perspectival techniques is important for its insistence that it is not inevitable that 'the specular image positions the child within a (perspectively organised) spatial field':<sup>83</sup> perspective as a way of seeing is historically and culturally specific, and so must Muir's account be. However, if – contingently – heroes in landscapes correspond to the coherent, active subjects that we (mis)recognize in the mirror, this process surely accounts for some of the satisfaction of fieldwork for geographers. They see themselves as the ego-ideal hero in a landscape; they can assert and establish their manliness in the face of Nature. In other words, they can secure an identity for themselves through a visualized relation to the mirror/mother. And this narcissism, this attempted assertion of the self through the Other, also underpins the claim fully to know the land: it 'apprehends an objective reality which is wholly manifest and exists solely for him: he misses nothing'<sup>84</sup> – hence, once again, the authority of geographical knowledge of landscape.

The intersections of voyeurism and narcissism, then, structure geography's gaze at landscape. The gaze which identifies lack in the compelling vision of Nature as Woman maintains a voyeuristic distance from that which represents lack; but it is also compelled to gaze and gaze again through its desire to interpellate itself through the feminine. This produces contradictions in the gaze, and the above discussion implied at several points that these contradictions intersect with the tension that geographers themselves recognize between pleasure and knowledge. When desire becomes too persistent – when the Sirens sing too loudly – geography claims to revert to objective knowledge. However, the final suggestion of this section's efforts to mark the phallogocentric repressions of cultural geography is that, despite its fears and all its efforts, geographical knowledge is deeply complicit with its pleasures. Geographers try to repress their pleasure in landscape by stabilizing their interpretations as real; but that knowledge is, in its need for critical distance, implicated in the pleasures of voyeurism. They try to win knowledge through intimacy with the land, and their intimacy becomes narcissistic. Geography's opposition between pleasure and knowledge does not hold. Cultural geography is seduced despite itself by what it fears. As Cixous notes in her discussion of dualisms, 'the movement by which each opposition is set up to produce meaning is the movement by which the couple is destroyed'.<sup>85</sup> In the words of Irigaray, 'the quest for the "object" becomes a game of Chinese boxes. Ever receding'.<sup>86</sup> The quest for knowledge of aesthetic masculinity is a dynamic process constantly attempting closure and constantly failing; wherever it rests, its contradictory desires will allow no such com-

promise. Its desire for complete knowledge can never be satisfied. The unknowable feminine will recur. This is cultural geography's erotics of knowledge.

### I Won't Play Nature to Your Culture

This masculinity entails costs. In her critique of the gaze as it constitutes knowledge of the contemporary city, Deutsche asks:

What repressions enable the equation of voyeuristic models of knowledge with objectivity and adequacy? Whose subjectivities are the casualties of epistemologies that produce total beings? What violence is enacted by authors who speak and pretend that reality speaks for itself? Who signifies the threat of inadequacy so that others may be complete? Whose expulsion and absence does completion demand?<sup>87</sup>

The absence of a 'feminine' or 'black' or 'homosexual' position from which to look in the foregoing discussion provides the answer to this question. The particular dominant gaze constructs access to knowledge of geography as a white bourgeois heterosexual masculine privilege. And this gaze is not only the gaze at the land, although its dynamics are most clearly revealed there: it is also a gaze at what are constituted as objects of knowledge, whether environmental, social, political or cultural. Caught in the geographic landscape, people are looked at by a contradictory and exclusionary masculine gaze, which cannot see women because they are the social subjects most in the shadow of Woman, and puts even the men it can see in a feminized, subordinate position. And this in turn necessitates a further question:

If there is no more 'earth' to press down/repress, to work, to represent, but also and always to desire (for one's own), no opaque matter in which theory does not know herself, then what pedestal remains for the ex-sistence of the subject? If the earth turned and more especially turned upon herself, the erection of the subject might thereby be disconcerted and risk losing its elevation and penetration. For what would there be to rise up from and exercise his power over? And in?<sup>88</sup>

Irigaray's mischievous query invites some discussion of feminist efforts to dislodge the Mother Earth/Father Culture opposition, and this returns the discussion once again to the question of strategies of critique.

Mulvey's work has been criticized for the zero options that it offers the female spectator of cinema – either a sadistic identification with the male hero, or a masochistic identification with the passive heroine.<sup>89</sup> Mulvey addressed this difficulty in her later work by suggesting that the female spectator was 'restless in its transvestite clothes'.<sup>90</sup> She suggests that women can shift between the options of passivity or activity offered to them, and such shifts can become deliberate manipulations of position. This echoes the critical strategy of mobility with which the previous chapter ended, but specifies it in the visual field: as Doane remarks, such a mobility there produces a 'defamiliarisation of female iconography' which destabilizes the masculine structure of the look.<sup>91</sup> Other feminists prefer to emphasize the disruptive power of the unconscious as a radical contribution to a feminist critique of phallogentrism. In terms of the gaze, Lacanians argue that some kind of disturbance of its pleasure is unavoidable; because our identificatory moments are never wholly successful, 'the relationship between viewer and scene is always one of fracture, partial identification, pleasure and distrust'.<sup>92</sup> Following this stress on disruption and uncertainty, de Lauretis has suggested that the unconscious could be seen as a site of resistance against masculine and feminine identities.<sup>93</sup>

To conclude this chapter, this final short section examines some feminist work which occupies a spectating position that enacts neither the dominant masculine gaze nor an essentialist Womanly alternative. This work challenges the identification of Woman as natural and of Nature as Woman achieved through the gaze at landscape. It resists that transcoding not by offering a simple 'feminine' alternative to masculinist vision, because, as the previous chapter argued, that would simply be to invert an already existing opposition and to repeat its closures once more. Rather, this section focuses on challenges to the hegemonic masculine gaze which offer explicitly contingent alternatives to its voyeurism and narcissism even as they invoke 'women' and 'the feminine'. The authors here take up the position of a female spectator who, while working within a phallogentric economy of meaning, nonetheless refuses to sanction its codes: she contests them by manipulating them.

One continuing form of resistance against the fictional identities of phallogentrism has been the effort by feminists, as daughters, to re-imagine the mother as the subject of desire, and to explore motherhood as a symbol of a non-phallogentric mode of social relation. Given the powerful interpellation of Nature as Mother in Western culture, this effort has some implications for seeing the land. This is obviously a complex move and encompasses a wide range of feminist writers,

including the radical feminists discussed in the previous chapter. However, several non-essentialist feminists have argued that women see the environment differently from men; or, rather, that there is a feminine position from which to perceive the land. This claim can be based in psychoanalytic work. Irigaray, for example, insists that 'for girls, the mother is a subject who cannot readily be reduced to an object',<sup>94</sup> and the suggestion that women thinking through a position as mothers/daughters will have a more nurturing attitude towards Nature has already been made by many feminists drawing on the work of Chodorow. These include the geographers Janice Monk and Vera Norwood, who gathered together a collection of essays on the landscapes of the American South West which argue that many women have wanted to live in harmony with the environment there.<sup>95</sup> Unlike Chodorow, however, Monk and Norwood pay a good deal of attention to differences among women in the South West, contrasting Anglo, Hispanic and Native American women in order to avoid positing an essentially feminine relation to the land. They stress that different women have painted the southwestern desert, written about it, represented it in their craft work and photographed it, with rather different aims, motivations and results. Kolodny's work on the letters, diaries and novels of some women on the American frontier before 1850 insists on difference too, both social and historical.<sup>96</sup> Kolodny notes that the writers she looks at were all by definition educated and therefore middle-class; they were also white, and this shaped their relationship to the land. These women, like their fathers and husbands and sons, wanted to transform the wilderness they found themselves surrounded by in the east of North America. But they did not want to subdue and exploit it as men did; rather, they saw the frontier as a place in which to make gardens, a place where a landscape of harmony between soil and weather and plants and people was possible, a place in which relations among people would reflect the tenderness of caring for the land. Later, when women left the claustrophobic wooded regions of the east and moved west, the open prairies of Illinois and Texas were perceived as ready made gardens. Always, 'they dreamed... of locating a home and a familial human community within a cultivated garden', and this dream was part of their social location as white bourgeois women and the concomitant importance to them of the distinction between the public and the private.<sup>97</sup> Their relationship to the land was mediated by their particular domestic role. Geographer Jeanne Kay has written about similar women in the second half of the nineteenth century, and she also maps their imagined geography through their domestic spaces and relationships.<sup>98</sup>

She suggests that the social relations which developed from their concern with their gardens and domestic labour gave them a specific position from which to see the land. A network of interaction replaced the individualized and domineering view of the single point of the omniscient observer of landscape: they placed themselves in a contingent position defined in relation to friends and neighbours.

Other feminists have stressed not so much the position of the viewer of the land, but the focus of the gaze which re-presents the land. Susan Ford has also discussed gardens, those of late-Victorian England, and she argues that to do as gardens invite and focus on the details challenges the grand sweep of the masculinist gaze: she suggests that both in its design and in the small-scale pleasures that it affords, the garden constitutes one form of a non-phallogocentric look.<sup>99</sup> Pollock too has explored the specific spaces of the nineteenth-century bourgeois to find examples of an equal gaze between artist and subject, looking at the work of Cassatt and Morisot in the gardens and houses of Paris.<sup>100</sup> She suggests that in their paintings there is a tendency to abandon the wide and grand view and instead to represent a more confined space which both shows and reworks the limits placed on *avant-garde* women by their domestic position. She suggests that the reworking involves 'the rearticulation of traditional space so that it ceases to function primarily as the space of sight for a mastering gaze, but becomes the locus of relationships'.<sup>101</sup>

All of these accounts posit a feminine relationship to landscape, yet all refuse to see an essential femininity. They offer a 'feminine' resistance to hegemonic ways of seeing which dissolves the illusion of an unmarked, unitary, distanced, masculine spectator, but which also permits the expression of different ways of seeing among women. They suggest that strategies of position, scale and fragmentation are all important for challenging the particular structure of the gaze in the discipline of geography, but offer no single better alternative. Their accounts self-consciously manipulate the notion of femininity in order to subvert hegemonic ways of seeing without imposing an alternative which could only assert a specific femininity as universal in an equally repressive manner. Their task is to develop 'the conditions of representability of another social subject',<sup>102</sup> and it is a task which is addressed again in the next chapter.

## SPATIAL DIVISIONS AND OTHER SPACES: PRODUCTION, REPRODUCTION AND BEYOND

The previous chapter concluded with the work of some feminist geographers who were imagining landscapes beyond the compulsions and desires of geography's aesthetic masculinity. This chapter focuses on the work of feminist geographers who are addressing social and economic themes, in order to explore the possibility of a different kind of space beyond the exclusions of social-scientific masculinist space. I discuss feminist geography not so much in terms of its findings on the geography of women and on gender relations, but more in terms of the epistemological challenge that its work offers to the attempted closures of masculinism. The chapter interprets feminist geography as a critical form of knowledge struggling from within geographical discourse to escape the constraints of masculinist desire and power.

Feminists writing geography have an ambivalent relationship to the discipline; they share some things with geography but also feel excluded from it. On the one hand, they have worked with several geographical approaches. Chapter 2 examined their encounter with time-geography, for example; but perhaps their closest links have been with marxist geography. This chapter focuses on this intersection between marxist and feminist geography. Like marxist geographers, many feminist geographers have argued that unequal social relations are both expressed and constituted through spatial differentiation. While marxists examine the uneven development of capitalist production, feminists focus on the relationship between production and reproduction as part of capitalist patriarchy. Feminist work, then, has depended in part on concepts drawn from non-feminist radical geography. On the other hand, of course, feminist geographers have