

COMP 424

Computer Security
Lecture 09 & 10

Protocol

- An orderly sequence of steps agreed upon by two or more parties in order to accomplish a task
- Characteristics of a good protocol
 - Established in advance
 - All parties agree on it
 - Easy to understand
 - Complete: covers all that needs to be covered.
 - Secure: Does not permit actions that should not be allowed.

Key Management Protocols

- Key Exchange
- Done with or without a neutral third party
- Key distribution
 - Uses a centralized key distributor (VeriSign)
- Key Escrow
 - Trusted agency holds copies of keys

Diffie-Hellman

- (does not require a third party
 - 1) A and B exchange two numbers p and g .
 - 2) Each chooses a 512-bit number, s_1 and s_2 , and keeps it secret
 - 3) Each raises g to its secret number mod p . ($g^{s_1} \bmod p$)
 - 4) They exchange these values and raise them to their secret numbers $(g^{s_1} \bmod p)^{s_2}$.
 - 5) They now have the same secret key with only one exchange.

Bucket brigade attack

- In intruder X can cause problems
 - A sends $g^{KA} \bmod p$ to B, but it is intercepted by X who sends $g^{KX} \bmod p$ to B.
 - B sends $g^{KB} \bmod p$ to A, but it is intercepted by X who sends $g^{KX} \bmod p$ to A.
 - X now shares a secret key with both A and B who are unaware of X
 - X now intercepts messages between A and B before passing them on (or not, or modifying them...)

Authentication with Digital Signatures

- A and B can use digital signatures to expose X.
 - A produces a hash, or fingerprint, of the message and encrypts it with A's private key.
 - B decrypts it with A's public key and can recompute the same hash on the message.
 - If it decrypts and has the same hash then
 - It must have been written by A
 - It could not have been changed since being written.

Properties of digital signatures

- Properties of Digital Signatures
 - Unforgeable
 - Authentic
 - Can't be modified once sent
 - Not reusable
 - Prevent repudiation

Key Distribution Protocols

- Key Distribution Center
- “Session” keys or long-term secret keys
- Session keys are for one session use only.
- Can use secret key (DH) or public key (RSA) protocols
- Can use authentication
- Kerberos

Key Escrow

- Encryption keys are *escrowed* to trustworthy agencies
- Requirements for a key escrow protocol
 - Encrypting source must be identified
 - The key is not identified
 - Key retrievable under *k* of *n* protocol

Clipper Encryption Protocol

- Strong public backlash
 - Loss of privacy from potential government intrusion
 - Unreleased algorithm
 - For Clipper $k = n = 2$
 - Skipjack algorithm uses an 80-bit key so is considered safe for at least 36 years.

Elections

- Necessary to have untraceable (anonymous), but legitimate communications
- Requirement for elections systems
 - Only authorized users
 - Each user can only vote once
 - Votes are private and secret
- Protocol uses public key encryption system