Spring 2003
MWF 10:00-10:50
SH 224
Dr. Bonnie Paller
677-2746; 2757
bonnie.paller@csun.edu

    A central dogma in recent Philosophy of Science is that the main goal for W.V.O.Quine and Thomas Kuhn was to reject central features of Logical Positivism. According to the Positivist view of science, science uses theory-free data to justify its best theories and progresses rationally towards the truth. Presupposed in this view is that there is absolute truth to which we are progressing, observation is free of theory, rational theory choice is determined by the data, and it is the role of philosophy to describe the normative elements of rational methodolgy. Quine led the way to his own holistic views by arguing against the Positivists' radical empiricism and verifiability theory of meaning. Thomas Kuhn argued that a look at science fails to support these presuppositions. Not only is the notion of absolute truth indefensible, but so is the notion of progress to which it is conjoined. Observation is not free of theory, rational theory choice is not determined by the data, and there is no special normative role for philosophy. This thick relativist stew became the trademark by which Kuhnian and post-Kuhnian work came to be known. We will spend the first part of the semester tracing the emergence of relativism, and other post-Kuhnian positions. 
    But what, then, is a Philosopher to do? 
    Some philosophers currently are revisiting and re-examining Logical Positivism.  Their results are surprising. We will see that some philosophers now claim that a corrected understanding of central Positivists', such as Rudolph Carnap, shows interesting similarities with both Quine and Kuhn! Also, we will evaluate recent efforts to re-establish the claim that there are rational and objective standards for theory evaluation and that they are part of a re-newed and rationalist Philosophy of Science.

Robert Klee (ed.), Scientific Inquiry: Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 1999, Oxford University Press
Coursepack, Readings for Philosophy 495, available at Quick Copies
(some articles may be available online and will not be in the coursepack)
 
 
 

Course Outline (subject to revision):

Part I, The Positivist Model of Scientific Theories and its Problems
Section 1: Logic, Language, and the Observational/Theoretical Distinction

 

Week 1

1. Alexander Rosenberg, The Rise of Logical Positivism 2. Frederick Suppe, The Positivist Model of Scientific Theories

 

Week 2

3. Hilary Putnam, Problems with the Observational/Theoretical Distinction 4. Grover Maxwell, Theoretical Entities 5. Bas van Fraassen, A Defense of the Observational/Theoretical Distinction 6. Carl Hempel, A Critique of Operationalism

Section 2: The Underdetermination of Theory and Holism

 

Week 3

7. Pierre Duhem, Physical Theory and Experiment 8. Karl Popper, Falsificationism

Week 4

9. W.V.O.Quine, Holism, Part 1: Two Dogmas of Empiricism 10. W.V.O.Quine, Holism, Part 2: Posits and Reality 11. Larry Laudan, A Critique of Underdetermination

Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination

Week 5

Coursepack #1, W.V.O.Quine,"On Empirically Equivalent Systems of the World", Erkenntnis, 9, (1975), pp.313-328.     Coursepack #2, Larry Laudan,(1996), Chapter 3, Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination

Part II, Historicism and Its Aftermath

 

Week 6 3/3

19. Thomas Kuhn, The Nature of Normal Science 20. Thomas Kuhn, The Nature of Revolutionary Science 21. Ian Hacking, The Rationality of Science after Kuhn 22. Paul Feyerabend, An Argument Against Method

 

Week 7 3/10

Coursepack #3, Ernan McMullin, Rationality and Paradigm Change in Science

 

Week 8 3/17

Coursepack #4, Larry Laudan, (1996), Progress or Rationality? Coursepack #5, Larry Laudan, (1996) Normative Naturalism: Replies to Friendly Critics

Midterm Paper Due March 21, 2003

Section 5: Social Constructivism

 

Week 9 3/24

23. David Bloor, The Strong Programme in the Sociology of Science Coursepack #6, Barnes and Bloor, Relativism, Rationalism, and Sociology of Knowledge 25. James Robert Brown, A Critique of Social Constructivism

Part III: Reconsidering Logical Positivism

 No class March 28 (Friday) and March 31 (Ceser Chavez Day)

Week 10 4/2

Coursepack #7, Rudolph Carnap, "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology"

 

Week 11 4/7

Coursepack #10, George Reisch, "Did Kuhn Kill Logical Empiricism?"

Week 12 - Spring Recess April 14 - 18
 

Week 13 4/21

Coursepack #8, John Earman, 1993, "Carnap, Kuhn, and the Philosophy of Scientific Methodology" Coursepack #9, Michael Friedman, 1993, "Remarks on the History of Science and the History of Philosophy"

 

Week 14 4/28

Coursepack #11, Michael Friedman, selections from Reconsidering Logical Positivism (1999), Cambridge University Press Coursepack #12, Micheal Friedman, selections from Dynamics of Reason: the 1999 Kant Lectures (2001)

Week 15 5/5

Coursepack #13, Bas van Fraassen, selections from The Empirical Stance, 2002, Yale University Press

__________________________________________________________________________________________

Weekly schedule - On Monday and Wednesday of each week we will discuss the central claims and arguments in the week's readings. Most Fridays will consist of a presentation by the person assigned the Reading Summary for that week and group discussion of the material presented. If no person is in charge of a Reading Summary for a particular week, the group will continue as on Monday and Wednesday, or have a Short Writing. We will discuss the content of Short Writings and Reading Summaries in class.

Course requirements and grading:

One weekly Reading Summary and presentation......20%
Short writings.........................20%
Midterm and Final Paper.........................60%
    Expect your Midterm paper to be about 5 pages and your Final paper to be about 10 pages.

 
Final grades will use a plus/minus grading system.