

Newsletter
Spring/Summer
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From the Chair's Desk

Dawn Robinson
University of Georgia

Spring is here already and I am delighted to report that the Sociology of Emotion section is bustling with activity. The committees have been hard at work generating election slates, awarding honors, developing what looks to be a very exciting program at the annual meetings, and engaging in exceptional scholarship. We have lots of news.

The intellectual vitality of emotions scholarship is evident throughout the newsletter. Section members have published several new books on emotions. In addition, there are conferences dealing with emotions taking place all over the world this year. Please take a look at new work by Amy Kroska presented in our "Emotions Research" column, edited by Alison Bianchi.

The nominations committee (Thomas Scheff, Amy Wharton, Martha Copp, Michael Lovaglia), chaired by David Franks, put together a dynamite slate of candidates for this year's election. Jan Stets and James Jasper have agreed to stand for Section Chair-Elect; Doyle McCarthy agreed to stand for Council; Alicia Cast and Melinda Milligan agreed to stand for Secretary-Treasurer. Please remember to vote.

It is with a mixture of great pleasure and poignance that I get to announce the winner of this year's Sociology of Emotions Section Lifetime Achievement Award: *Spencer Cahill, University of South Florida, was selected as this year's recipient of our section's highest honor.* The members of the Distinguished Award



Committee were Lynn Smith-Lovin, Duke University, Peggy Thoits, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, and Doyle McCarthy, Fordham University. Spencer contributed a tremendous amount to our intellectual livelihood as a former Chair of the Section, as editor of the top journal in our field, and as an exemplary scholar of emotions. We miss him greatly. We will have a few opportunities to honor Spencer Cahill at the New York meetings. There will be a special memorial session in honor of Spencer co-sponsored by the Social Psychology Section, the Sociology of Emotions Section and the Society for the Study of Symbolic Interaction. Stay tuned for more information about that session in the coming weeks. In addition, as is our usual custom, we will be honoring Spencer as this year's recipient of the Lifetime Achievement Award at

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our regular business meeting.

We also will be honoring this year's recipients of our Outstanding Recent Contribution Award. The honoree's are: Robin W. Simon, Florida State University and Leda E. Nath, University of Wisconsin-Whitewater, for their paper "Gender and Emotion in the United States: Do Men and Women Differ in Self-Reports of Feelings and Expressive Behavior." This article appeared in 2004 in the *American Journal of Sociology*. This year's committee included Jonathan Turner and Richard Serpe and was headed up by Lisa Rashotte Walker. Please be sure to come to the business meeting to see these honors being bestowed - along with our graduate student paper award, whose winner should be announced soon.

In addition to section business, there will be section scholarship and section festivities to enjoy in New York. Section day will be Monday, August 13. Jody Clay-Warner and Ellen Granberg, the Program Co-Chairs, have organized an outstanding section program. This year's program highlights the vitality of emotions scholarship both within and outside of the section. A panel of wonderful scholars – Verta Taylor, Cecilia Ridgeway, Robin Simon, and Robin Stryker has agreed to assemble and discuss the various ways that emotion scholarship is emerging in important ways throughout the discipline. There will also be a terrific session of new emotions research. Details about these sessions appear in this newsletter. Our roundtables this year are combined with Social Psychology, so make sure to check out the Social Psychology section roundtables for some exciting new emotion research as well. In addition to the three section-sponsored sessions above, there is an abundance of emotions scholarship being presented elsewhere on the ASA program. Carolyn Ellis organized this year's regular session on Sociology of Emotions. Another section member, Erica Summers-Effler, organized the regular sessions on Microsociologies this year. Stay tuned for postings of non-section sponsored emotions related programming later this summer.

Finally, as requested by the membership at last year's business meeting, we will be having a joint reception with the Social Psychology Section this year on our section day - Monday, August 13. So, please come and celebrate year with friends and colleagues.

Current Research Notes

Amy Kroska
Kent State University

In my current research I have been investigating hypotheses derived from the modified labeling theory of mental illness (e.g., Link 1987; Link et al. 1989) using two data sources: three waves of semantic differential and demographic data from patients and their network members in the Indianapolis Network Mental Health Study (INMHS) and college student semantic differential data that I collected in the fall of 2004. Much of this work has been done in collaboration with Sarah Harkness, a former Kent State M.A. student who is now a Ph.D. student at Stanford. In a forthcoming *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Sarah and I investigate three issues related to labeling processes. First, we assess the construct validity of a new operationalization of the cultural conceptions of the mentally ill: the affective meanings (evaluation, potency, and activity) associated with the cultural category "a mentally ill person." We term these meanings *stigma sentiments*. Evaluation (good vs. bad), potency (powerful vs. weak), and activity (active vs. inactive) (EPA) are the three universal dimensions of meaning identified by Osgood and his colleagues in their cross-cultural research (e.g., Osgood, May, and Miron 1975). We find consistent support for the validity of the evaluation and potency components as measures of these conceptions. We show, for example, that stigma sentiments are related negatively to stigma beliefs as measured by Link's devaluation-discrimination index (Link 1987; Link et al. 1997).

Second, we assess the construct validity of self-meanings measures that are new to the labeling theory literature: the affective meanings associated with individuals' self-identities ("myself as I really am") and their reflected appraisals ("myself as others see me"). Using a known groups technique, our findings suggest that the evaluation, potency, and activity of both self-constructs are valid indicators of self-meanings among both non-patients and patients.

Finally, we use these new measures to test the modified labeling theory hypothesis that cultural conceptions of the mentally ill become personally relevant to individuals who have been diagnosed with a mental disorder. We predicted that stigma

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sentiments would be positively related to the corresponding dimensions (evaluation, potency, or activity) of psychiatric patients' self-identities and reflected appraisals. Among non-patients, by contrast, we predicted that stigma sentiments and self-meanings would be unrelated. We also predicted that the slopes for the relationship between stigma sentiments and self-meanings would be significantly different for patients and non-patients. We find support for 13 of the 18 components to these hypotheses. We also find three cross-dimensional results that were not anticipated. We find, for example, that the potency of "a mentally ill person" is positively related to both the evaluation in patients' self-identity and the evaluation in patients' reflected appraisals. Overall, the results suggest that the cultural conceptions of the mentally ill do become personally relevant to individuals who have been diagnosed with a mental disorder, but the connection is sometimes more complex than a one-to-one relationship between a stigma sentiment and its corresponding dimension of self-meaning.

Currently, Sarah and I are doing research that extends the findings of the forthcoming *SPQ*. We show that patients' diagnostic category (affective, schizophrenic, or adjustment disorder) moderates the relationship between stigma sentiments and self-meaning. More specifically, we find that stigma sentiments are positively related to self-meanings among patients with an affective diagnosis. But, among patients with an adjustment or a schizophrenic diagnosis, the relationship is sometimes non-significant or negative.

In related work, we use *Interact*, a computer program that simulates social interactions according to the principles of affect control theory, to investigate the modified labeling theory proposition that negative cultural conceptions of the mentally ill increase patients' use of three coping behaviors: withdrawing from social interaction, concealing treatment history, and educating others about mental illness. More specifically, we examine the likelihood (based on the deflection scores) of patients with high and low stigma sentiments repeatedly directing coping behaviors at a variety of object persons. We generated our patient EPA profiles for these simulations using the predicted self-evaluation, self-potency, and self-activity for pa

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Graduate Student Profile

**Allison Wisecup
Duke University**

Allison Wisecup is a Ph.D. candidate in sociology at Duke University. Her research interests are self, identity and interaction. She has explored identity ambiguity as a status characteristic, and has a paper that analyzes the identity bases of specific and global self-esteem.

In previous research at the University of Iowa (under the direction of Dawn Robinson) and at Duke (with Lynn Smith-Lovin and Miller McPherson), she experimentally explored the effects of androgyny on reaction time while classifying words and pictures. The results indicate that the time required for classifying a physically androgynous picture is nearly three times that of non-androgynous pictures. Further, the presence of an androgynous individual continues to delay decision-making on a word task even after respondents account for individual by classifying them as either male or female. Future research will explore whether the effects of physical androgyny also apply to other characteristics (like race or age). She also plans to study whether status ambiguity is a status characteristic.

Allison is currently exploring the tension between abstract and situational self-identity meanings and gender differences in the meanings men and women associate with their self-identities. This project uses survey and experiential data to compare abstract affective ratings of self-identities (survey data) with the situational affective ratings of self-identities (experiential data). Preliminary results suggest there is considerable divergence between the ratings individuals provide in the abstract and those collected in naturally occurring situations. The results also indicate men's transient impressions resulting from naturally occurring situations are more positively evaluated and more potent than women's transient self-identity impressions. These results suggest that future research should explore the extent to which gender disparity in transient impressions serve to generate a gender disparity in emotions.

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tients in each diagnostic category and, when significant, with high and low stigma sentiments; this produces six different patient EPA profiles. We generated object person EPA profiles by using different combinations of moderately low (-1.5), neutral (0), and moderately high (1.5) on evaluation, potency, and activity; this produces 27 different object person identities. We produced EPA profiles for the three coping behaviors by averaging college students' EPA ratings of two to three behaviors that fit into each coping behavior category. For example, for "concealing treatment history" we averaged the EPA ratings of "to keep one's own serious mental illness a secret from someone," "to keep one's own psychiatric treatment a secret from someone," and "to keep one's own medical treatment a secret from someone." In short, we use various patient self-meanings, coping behaviors, and object persons to generate deflection scores for hundreds of simulations.

Our goal for this latest project is to assess the likelihood of different types of patients using these three coping behaviors. Although the analyses are not complete, the preliminary findings suggest that the modified labeling theory proposition regarding coping behaviors holds for patients with affective and adjustment diagnoses; that is, as affective and adjustment patients' stigma sentiments become less positive, less powerful, and less active the likelihood that the patients will use these coping behaviors increases. But, among patients with a schizophrenic diagnosis, the proposition is not consistently supported. In fact, the preliminary results suggest that schizophrenic patients may be less likely to use these coping behaviors as their stigma sentiments decline.

In the next year or so, we plan to use the patient and network panel data in the INMHS to investigate if and how individuals in patients' network influence patients' self-meanings. We plan to develop propositions for this project by drawing on Friedkin and Johnsen's work (Friedkin and Johnsen 2003), which combines affect control theory, expectations states, and social influence network theory.

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Student Profile continued from page 3

Allison's dissertation work will use a stratified community-based sample drawn from Durham, North Carolina, to examine the validity of the consensus assumption in affect control theory. She hypothesizes that there is systematic variation in the transient sentiments associated with social and non-social concepts and that this variation is a function of position in socio-demographic space and the network transmission processes that these positions imply. The processes that generate variation in affective meaning may also contribute to the systematic variation in emotions across socio-demographic space.

Personal Statement:

Historically, elucidating the complex relationship between self, identity, interaction and emotion has been an important endeavor of emotion scholars. This rich and vast tradition is fertile ground for cross-fertilization and interpenetration of research areas within and outside the sociological disciplinary boundaries. I believe that research in this tradition can and will contribute to more nuanced understandings of the patterning of self-esteem and depression.

Emotion Section Awards

Spencer Cahill Receives Lifetime Achievement Award

Each year, the Sociology of Emotion section presents the Lifetime Achievement Award to one of its members with “a record of several years of scholarly work (books and/or articles) of exceptional merit that has developed and extended the sociology of emotions empirically, theoretically, or methodologically.” This year’s winner is Spencer Cahill. Sadly, we lost Spencer Cahill this past August. Please be sure to come to the award presentation ceremony at this year’s business meeting on Monday, August 13th in New York where we will have an opportunity to honor his contributions to the field.

Robin A. Simon and Leda E. Nath receive Outstanding Recent Contribution Award

Each year, the Sociology of Emotion section presents the Outstanding Recent Contribution Award to a section member (or members) who author(s) “the most outstanding book or most outstanding article published in the preceding three years that advances the sociology of emotions empirically, theoretically, or methodologically.” The award alternates biennially between a book award and an article award. This year, the winners were Robin A. Simon and Leda E. Nath for their article, “Gender and Emotion in the United States: Do Men and Women Differ in Self-Reports of Feelings and Expressive Behavior.” This article appeared in the *American Journal of Sociology* in March, 2004.

Lifetime Achievement Award Winners (First Call Fall 1999)

- 2007 Spencer Cahill (University of South Florida)
- 2006 Peggy A. Thoits (University of North Carolina)
- 2005 Lynn Smith-Lovin (Duke University)
- 2004 Randall Collins (University of Pennsylvania)
- 2003 Theodore D. Kemper (St. John’s University)
- 2002 David R. Heise (Indiana University)
- 2001 Arlie Hochschild (University of California – Berkeley)
- 2000 Thomas J. Scheff (University of California – Santa Barbara)

Outstanding Recent Contribution Award (First Call Fall 1999)

- 2005 Kathryn Lively (Dartmouth College) and David Heise (Indiana University) (Article) “Sociological Realms of Emotional Experience” *American Journal of Sociology* (2004)
- 2004 Randall Collins (Book) *Interaction Ritual Chains* (2004)
- 2003 Rebecca J. Erickson and Christian Ritt (Article) Emotional Labor, Burnout, and Inauthenticity: Does Gender Matter?” *Social Psychology Quarterly* (2001)
- 2002 Jonathan Turner (Book) *On the Origins of Human Emotion: A Sociological Inquiry Into the Evolution of Human Affect.* (2000)
- 2001 Guobin Young (Article) “Achieving Emotions in Collective Action: Emotional Processes and Movement Mobilization in the 1989 Chinese Student Movement.” *The Sociological Quarterly* (2000)
- 2000 Candace Clark (Book) *Misery and Company: Sympathy and Everyday Life* (1997)

Shooting Rampages and Feeling Traps: What Can be Done?

**Thomas J. Scheff
Professor Emeritus
Dept of Sociology, UCSB, Santa Barbara**

This essay seeks to explain shooting rampages in schools and other organizations, and a step that might be taken toward avoiding them. Most of the discussions have noted that the shooters were loners who had been harassed and ostracized to the point of complete isolation. Most people who are harassed and isolated don't shoot anyone. How can we understand the extraordinarily high levels of emotion that these rampages imply?

In her groundbreaking 1971 study, Helen B. Lewis, a research psychologist and psychoanalyst, used a systematic method to locate the occurrence of emotions in psychotherapy sessions. She found that shame/embarrassment was by far the most frequent of the emotions, although seldom mentioned by patient or therapist. She called these many instances "unacknowledged shame."

She went on to note that when shame occurs but goes unacknowledged, it usually leads to silence or withdrawal. She reasoned that these instances suggested a "feeling trap:" one becomes ashamed of feeling ashamed in a way that feelings are caught up in a self-perpetuating feedback loop. One becomes lost in a cloud of shame about shame.

Lewis also noted another, much less frequent path that unacknowledged shame can take: a loop involving shame and anger. One becomes angry that one is ashamed, and ashamed that one is angry, and so on. She went on to suggest that there is no natural limit to the length and intensity of such spirals: one can continue to the point of being completely lost in shame/anger. She called the result "humiliated fury."

It is still too early to get a clear picture of the Virginia Tech rampage, but the shooters in all the earlier ones seem to fit Lewis's idea. They were in

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Shame as Social Pain

**Johan Goudsblom
Professor of Sociology Emeritus
University of Amsterdam**

Summary

This paper offers a sociological discussion of shame elaborating on Norbert Elias's theory of human beings and their emotions. Successively examined are the manifestations by which shame is recognized, the occasions at which it occurs, its functions, and the possibility that those manifestations, occasions, and functions have changed over time. The central thesis is based on the observation that the manifestations of shame are contradictory: in showing shame people voluntarily or involuntarily draw attention to themselves by gestures indicating a wish to hide themselves. In order to explain this contradiction shame is regarded as a signal of 'social pain'. It is suggested that all normal children are born with a natural capacity for learning to experience shame, to express shame, and to inflict shame upon others.

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When Professor Ademir Gebara invited me to contribute a paper to the symposium on emotions and violence in the light of Norbert Elias's theory of the civilizing process, I suggested two possible themes: 'shame', and 'encounters with Norbert Elias'. In both themes I thought I would be able to mix sociology and autobiography. On second thought, it turned out that the two themes lent themselves very well for a combined discussion in one paper.

My first encounter with Elias was not a random discovery. As a student of social psychology in the early 1950s I came across his name through two different channels – both Dutch, but running through separate social networks: one was sociology as taught at the university, the other was literary criticism that I read for pleasure. Since in both contexts Elias's book was highly recommended by persons whom I respected, I decided to borrow it from the library, and started reading. It did not take me long to realize that I had made an excellent choice. I was hooked for a lifetime.

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Emotion Scholarship around the World

Current Management Thinking: Drawing from Social Sciences and Humanities to Address Contemporary Challenges

European Academy of Management

May 16-19

Paris, France

[http://www.euram2007.org/r/default.asp?
ild=GKELI](http://www.euram2007.org/r/default.asp?ild=GKELI)

Management may be viewed as the art of collective action. As a relatively new field in the academic arena, it is a young science, still under construction, borrowing from Economics, Sociology, Psychology, History and many other long established fields. The Paris 2007 EURAM conference will aim at revisiting the complex and controversial relationships that Management has had with Social Sciences and Humanity. Researchers in management are invited to join us in Paris to reflect on the roots of Management, both as a scientific discipline and as a practice. In particular, Management's focus on organisational performance is one of the critical underpinnings that transform the discipline's borrowings from established social sciences into an autonomous field of academic investigation. This raises questions about the degree of subordination vs. emancipation of Management vis-B-vis the basic disciplines from which it draws. At stake in this discussion are the perspectives Management research can bring to such currently controversial topics as economic and corporate patriotism, the profitability of sustainable development, the fleeting or sustainable nature of competitive advantage, or the seemingly unstoppable trend toward globalisation and its consequences.

Join us in Paris in 2007 to address the intellectual challenges of contemporary issues in management in a forum where management and social sciences will exchange their views.

International Society for Research on Emotion (ISRE)

**Annual Conference
Sunshine Coast, Australia
July 11-15**

<http://www.bel.uq.edu.au/isre/2007/>

Twenty-three years of ISRE conferences, with their emphasis on multi-disciplinarity and showcasing emerging areas of research, have done much to integrate what once were a dozen pockets of research interest tucked away in the corners of various disciplines into a prominent research field. Interest in the emotions continues to grow in disciplines including philosophy, sociology, anthropology, linguistics, and cognitive neuroscience, as well as several fields of psychology, and ISRE conferences continue to perform this vital integrative function. ISRE conferences attract not only established leaders in emotion research, but many promising early-career researchers.

Fourth International Conference on The (Non)Expression of Emotions in Health and Disease

October 22 - 24 2007

Tilburg, The Netherlands

[www.tilburguniversity.nl/faculties/fsw/
emotions2007](http://www.tilburguniversity.nl/faculties/fsw/emotions2007)

This three-day-conference again aims to offer a broad scope of topics related to the way people express their feelings and factors inhibiting the display of emotions. In addition, the psychological and physiological effects of expression and inhibition will be critically evaluated. The conference is of interest for behavioral scientists involved in fundamental research as well as for professionals active in clinical settings.

The emphasis will be on research relevant for clinical practice and on applications in health psychology, behavioral medicine, psychiatry, and psychosomatics. The program will include plenary sessions featuring international experts in the field, workshops, symposia and poster sessions.

Emotion Scholarship around the World

Moral Emotions about Risky Technologies

In memory of Robert Solomon

May 3-4, 2007

Philosophy Department, Faculty of Technology,
Policy and Management
Delft University of Technology
[www.ethicsandtechnology.eu/
moral_emotions.html](http://www.ethicsandtechnology.eu/moral_emotions.html)

Speakers

Paul Slovic (Decision Research, Oregon)
Ross Buck (University of Connecticut)
Peter Goldie (University of Manchester)
Jodi Halpern (University of California, Berkeley)
Margaret Little (Georgetown University)
Robert C. Roberts (Baylor University)
Ronald de Sousa (University of Toronto)
James McAllister (Leiden University)
Simone van der Burg (Twente University)
Mark Coeckelbergh (Maastricht University)
Sabine Döring (Hamburg University, University of Manchester)
Mariëtte Willemsen (Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam)
Marcel Zeelenberg (Tilburg University)
Sabine Roeser (Delft University of Technology)

Theme

Pioneering empirical research by Paul Slovic and his colleagues has shown that people rely on emotions in making judgments concerning risky technologies (Slovic 1999, Finucane et.al. 2000). Examples of technological risks that spark heated and emotional debates are cloning, GM-foods, and nuclear energy. Many people are afraid of the possible unwanted consequences of such technologies. However, this does not as yet answer the following normative question and the main question of this conference: do we need emotions in order to be able to judge whether a technology and its concomitant risks are morally acceptable? This question has direct practical implications: should engineers, scientists and policy makers involved in developing risk regulation take the emotions of the public seriously or not?

In answer to these questions, Kantians would argue that the emotions of the public should be ignored because they are subjective and irrational. On the other hand, Humeans would argue that even though emotions are subjective and irrational (or a-rational), they should be a part of the decision making process since they show us our

preferences.

Most moral philosophers think that we have to choose between the two horns of the Hume-Kant-dilemma: either take emotions seriously but forfeit claims to rationality and objectivity, or reject emotions as being a threat to rationality and objectivity. In a similar vein, empirical psychologists rely on Dual Process Theory and argue that emotions about risks are heuristics but biases that have to be corrected by rational and analytic procedures (e.g. Slovic et al. 2004, Loewenstein et al. 2001; Sunstein 2005).

However, based on recent theories of emotions, we can reject this dichotomy between emotions and rationality as a false dilemma. According to recent developments in neurobiology, psychology and the philosophy of emotions, emotions and rationality are not mutually exclusive, but rather, in order to be practically rational, we need to have emotions (for example, de Sousa 1987, Solomon 1993, Damasio 1994, Little 1995, Goldie 2000, Nussbaum 2001, Halpern 2001, Roberts 2003). This can lead to an alternative view about the role of emotions in risk assessment: emotions can be a normative guide in making judgments about morally acceptable risks (Roeser 2006).

Aim

Despite the fact that there is a lot of empirical research about emotions about risky technologies, as to now there is almost no philosophical research done in which moral emotions about risky technologies are studied. The aim of this conference is to set the stage for research into moral emotions about risky technologies, by bringing together scholars who study moral emotions and/or ethical aspects of risk and asking them to reflect on the issue of moral emotions about risky technologies.

Location

Faculty of Technology, Policy and Management,
Delft University of Technology

Contact information:

For more information, please get in touch with us through: riskemotion-tbm@tudelft.nl

Conference chair:

Dr. Sabine Roeser E: S.Roeser@tudelft.nl

Shooting Rampage continued from page 6

shame states but were unable to acknowledge them. They seemed to have been lost in runaway shame/anger spirals.

In her 2004 book, *Rampage*, the sociologist Katherine Newman analyzed 25 school shootings that took place in the U.S. between 1974 and 2002. The 27 shooters all had been marginalized in their schools. That is, they had been harassed and ostracized to the point that they were completely isolated. Although Newman did not mention shame or shaming in every case, her descriptions suggest that the shooters would have been in a state of shame prior to their rampage.

The following description, which comes from a 2005 case, shows indications of unacknowledged shame in the writings of the shooter. At the Red Lake Senior High School, in Minnesota, Jeff Weise killed 7 people and himself. He was a very obese (6 feet, 250 lbs.) 16-year-old, whose father had committed suicide ten years earlier. His mother, driving drunk, was brain damaged in an accident in 1999. According to Jeff's online posting, since her accident, she had been beating him mercilessly, and he never stood up to her.

In another posting, he stated "I have friends, but I'm basically a loner in a group of loners. Most of my friends don't know the real me. I've never shared my past with anyone, and I've never talked about it with anyone. I'm excluded from anything and everything they do, I'm never invited, I don't even know why they consider me a friend or I them."
(Santa Barbara News-Press, March 25, 2005).

This boy was obviously without a single secure bond, rejected continually and relentlessly by everyone around him, including his mother and his so-called friends. It is little wonder that he seemed to be drowning in shame, as indicated in another of his postings: "I really must be fucking worthless."

All of the cases so far have involved shooters who were male. Female shooters are so rare that it usually takes effort to find examples like this one. Last year a woman who had been fired from the Goleta, California post office came back on a shooting spree, killing 6 employees and herself. Even so she was perhaps only one out of a hun-

dred. Perhaps men are less likely to acknowledge shame than women, since most men learn early in their lives that most emotions are not considered manly.

If Lewis's theory of shame/anger spirals is true, what remedy might it offer? One direction would be to offer classes to children and young adults that encourage them to notice and acknowledge their emotions. I have been teaching such a class to college freshmen for many years. Because my intention was to help male students particularly, I noticed early on that if the title has the word emotion in it, male students wouldn't enroll. So I call it "Communicating." In the class, the male students are a little slower on the uptake than the women, but by the end of ten weeks, most have them have caught on as well as the women. It's a start.

Conference on Law and Emotions

The conference on Law and the Emotions: New Directions in Scholarship was held in Berkeley, California, on February 8th and 9th, 2007. The conference aimed to move the emerging field of law and the emotions forward by fostering interdisciplinary conversation and collaboration among scholars, particularly in newer areas of analysis. Keynote speakers Arlie Hochschild and Dacher Keltner explored important connections with sociology and psychology. A series of panels addressed cutting-edge issues in the mind sciences, humanities, and social sciences. The conference highlighted work analyzing emotions as relational and dynamic players in the context of legal institutions. It attracted a large, diverse and highly engaged audience, from legal practice and academia, psychology, medicine and other disciplines, and from as far away as Switzerland, Japan and Australia.

Please visit the website at https://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/cs/slslawemotion_conference/welcome.html to see the abstracts and papers presented, other important work in the field, and a photo journal of the conference.

When I first read *The Civilizing Process* I was particularly struck by the passages on shame and embarrassment. I already knew shame all too well from personal experience. I now discovered that it was an emotion with a history. People in different periods (say, the Middle Ages or the nineteenth century) had experienced shame in different ways. Moreover, the way shame was experienced within each period varied between social classes.

As a student of social psychology I was greatly impressed by some experiments in that field that had been carried out in the United States. The results of those experiments all pointed to one undeniable conclusion: human beings are sensitive to group pressures. Often unwittingly, they let their own judgments and actions be influenced by what other people, their peers or their superiors, say and do.

This was a very interesting finding, and it was confirmed again and again. But it was always confirmed in the same setting: a psychological laboratory where students were given tasks to perform under experimental conditions which were, inevitably, somewhat artificial. Nevertheless, the results were presented as if they were valid for all human beings, under all conceivable conditions, at all times.

After a while I began to sense that, while the experimental design had yielded some intriguing and irrefutable insights, there was something thoroughly unsatisfactory about its universalistic claims. What I found lacking was the real world, with situations that have a history – whereas the experimental situations seemed to have no history at all: people without common group experiences were brought together for the duration of one experiment, and then went their own separate ways again. The experimental groups had neither a past nor, for that matter, a future. Moreover, if the experiment triggered emotions, those emotions usually fell beyond the experimental design and were not reported.

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Among the emotions that were rarely mentioned in the literature of social psychology was shame. I knew shame as a strong emotion – that made me regret things I had done and even prevented me from doing things that I very much wanted to do,

like talking to a girl with whom I was in love.

My studies did not help me much in understanding this awkward emotion. I cannot remember having come across the subject of shame in the literature of social psychology. (When preparing this lecture I checked it again in my textbook, the *Readings in Social Psychology*, edited by Newcomb and Hartley, and found that the Index makes no reference to shame. Shamanism is mentioned, and sibling rivalry; but not shame.) Only much later, in the famous Milgram experiments about obedience, did shame clearly emerge; but those experiments were not published until the late 1960s, long after I finished my studies at the University of Amsterdam in 1958.

But then, in my second year as a student, I read *The Civilizing Process* and found to my great surprise some very perceptive and illuminating passages about shame. They helped me to gain a better understanding of this strange, unpleasant and seemingly unfathomable feeling that inhibited me from doing and saying some of the things I would like to do and say most of all.

At the same time, those passages about shame also helped me toward a better understanding of sociology. They showed me that the divide between sociology and psychology is largely artificial. Both deal with human beings as social individuals; the fact that sociologists and psychologists usually work in separate departments at our universities should not blind us to the fact that they are actually concerned with the same human world. (The separation between sociology and psychology is just as artificial and fundamentally misleading as the separation of sociology and history. Both separations occurred in the second half of the nineteenth century when the major boundaries between academic disciplines were drawn and consolidated. One of the charms of the subject of shame is that it invites us to transgress those boundaries.)

3

I have to admit that when I first read *The Civilizing Process* I was not fully aware of its far-reaching theoretical implications. Even Elias himself had not yet fully elaborated those implications. Thus, it was only in 1987 (almost 50 years after the original publication of *The Civilizing Process*) that he

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published his essay on 'Human Beings and Their Emotions', which contains the most explicit discussion of his ideas about emotions at a very high level of synthesis.

Although he does not mention shame as such in this essay, the general model he develops there is highly relevant to our subject. It can also serve as a backdrop to many other discussions in the symposium on emotions and violence, because it clearly states the basic principles of a processual sociological approach to human emotions. In the natural sciences, Elias says in this essay, there is a strong tendency to regard human beings from a viewpoint that is monistic and reductionist: everything that humans do, say, feel or think is seen as part of one and the same natural world that we share with all other things, living and non-living; no allowance is made for anything that may be uniquely human. In the humanities, on the other hand, there are strong tendencies in the opposite direction: to concentrate on that which is uniquely human and to regard ourselves and our culture from a viewpoint that is dualistic and isolationist, as if there is a sphere of human thought and feeling that is utterly beyond the pale of the natural world. A processual sociological approach, Elias says, can overcome this stale opposition because it brings out both the continuities and the innovations in the processes of human evolution and socio-cultural development.

Two points made by Elias in 'Human Beings and Their Emotions' are particularly important for a better understanding of shame. The first point concerns learning. Human beings can and must learn more than any other species. Other animals also learn; maybe even plants have some capacity for learning. But there is no other animal that has to rely on learning so heavily as a human being. This clearly pertains to our cognitive capacities, to what we know and how we think. But it also pertains to our emotions. As Elias says, no emotion of a grown up human person is ever an entirely unlearned, genetically fixed reaction pattern.

The second point in 'Human Beings and Their Emotions' to which I draw your attention is that human emotions have a behavioural, a physiological, and an affective (a feeling) component. All three components are clearly present in shame. Together, can serve to define the manifestations of shame.

So let me now focus shame. One of many things I have learned from Elias is always to start out with a problem. In this paper I shall address a set of four interrelated problems.

The first problem concerns the question how we recognize shame. Shame is a common word. Intuitively we assume that we know how to recognize what the word stands for – even though we are aware that no two shame experiences are exactly the same and each experience is in its own way unique. We may even acknowledge that the words for 'shame' in different languages may carry slightly different connotations, like *vergonha* in Portuguese and *schaamte* in Dutch. The very fact that there are so many variations makes it all the more imperative to begin with the problem: how do we recognize shame, what are its distinctive manifestations?

The second problem I shall raise is: when does shame occur? What sorts of occasions are causes for shame?

Thirdly, as we all know shame is unpleasant. Yet most people have experiences of shame. Why can that be? What are the functions of shame?

All these questions are framed in the present tense, in a seemingly timeless fashion. But we shall have to address, certainly in a symposium dedicated to the work of Norbert Elias, another question as well: have the manifestations of shame, and the occasions that cause it, and the functions it may serve always been the same? Or have there been changes? If so, how are these changes related to civilizing processes?

These are four basic problems underlying the rest of my paper. They are closely interrelated, and I shall not be able to keep them neatly apart all the time. But bearing them in mind may be helpful in following my argument which, again, is an attempt to apply the general ideas developed by Elias in 'Human Beings and Their Emotions' to one specific emotion, shame.

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5

Manifestations

Before entering into a description of the manifestations of shame I must make one preliminary remark. My time is limited, and so is my knowledge. I shall therefore restrict myself to those manifestations of shame that may be called 'normal', and refrain from discussing those extreme 'pathological' cases, where shame is truly paralyzing leading to chronic apathy and depression. My subject is 'normal' shame, felt and expressed by people who actively participate in routines of social life, and who are occasionally overcome by momentary flashes of shame. In a word, the shame that is familiar to all of us.

One of the reasons that makes shame such an interesting topic is the variety of ways in which it is manifested. It can be observed in involuntary bodily changes – the most spectacular of which is blushing. This is an almost completely uncontrolled and unlearned reaction at the level of physiology; I am not sure whether even professional stage actors can learn to make it occur at will. Then, there are a number of behavioural reactions such as hiding one's face behind one's hand, or bowing one's head down, which may be highly spontaneous but which are also susceptible of learning, controlling, ritualizing. Thomas Scheff has recorded many of such reactions displayed by persons who had been fooled in candid camera shows on television. The reactions turned out to be highly stereotyped; they probably represented a mixture of largely unlearned biogenetically programmed behavioural patterns and culturally moulded gestures.

In addition to the visible clues by which we are able to recognize shame most of us (and perhaps all of us) also know it through introspection. We have all been there, in shameland. We carry the memories with us, as long as we live. And we can share other people's memories, by interviewing them and by reading autobiographical and even fictional reports.

From these written accounts, and especially from the psychiatric literature, we can also learn that shame can be so painful to persons who suffer from it that they hide it from themselves. If unac-

knowledged and hidden shame grows rampant, it may have enormous consequences at the levels both of the individual personality and society at large. In this paper, however, I shall confine myself to the directly visible manifestations of shame.

An intriguing aspect of those manifestations is their ambiguity. People who express shame, whether they do so involuntarily or voluntarily, apparently emit contradictory messages. On the one hand, their gestures convey that they do not want to be seen any more, they make themselves small, they bow to the ground, they hide their faces. But then, on the other hand, all these bodily gestures are made in a conspicuous manner; in expressing their shame people are not just trying to hide but are at the same time drawing attention to themselves. This is most evident in what is usually regarded as the surest sign of shame: blushing. (Blushing is a double bind signal: look at me, don't look at me. It also occurs when a person is praised, or in love. The stakes are high when someone blushes. And the stakes are always social.)

Before entering into the problem of what may be the functions of this contradictory display of feeling miserable, I shall take a closer look at the occasions that give rise to shame.

6

Occasions

As I said, my subject is 'normal' shame, experienced by all of us occasionally. What then are the specific occasions that make us blush, that give cause to shame?

I shall address this question too at a high level of generality, to see how it fits into the theoretical model sketched by Elias in his essay.

Generally speaking, the occasions for shame are situations of social interaction to which a person looks back with regret because he feels he has been 'caught' doing (or not doing) something that he thinks he should (or should not) have done. In his (or her) own opinion, the individual in question has lived not up to his (or her) reputation as a normal or a superior person.

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There is always a social dimension to occasions for shame. Even if people report that they feel most ashamed when they are all alone, it is the memory of something they have done, or failed to do, in a previous situation of social interaction that makes them feel so disturbingly ashamed that it keeps them awake at night.

Thomas Scheff calls shame the master emotion. He is an expert, but I think here he is exaggerating. I don't think shame is more fundamental than love or fear, than joy or sorrow. It is derived from fear – fear for loss of the two most precious premiums of social life, respect and affection. (And as I shall suggest toward the end of my paper, it is even arguable that anger may be more basic than shame.)

In any case, shame is – more than almost any other emotion – an exclusively social emotion. It arises in social interaction. And it functions in social interaction, even if the person who is ashamed is not aware of either the social origins or the social meanings of his shame.

In this respect shame resembles envy or jealousy. These are also exclusively social emotions, aroused by and directed at other people. A person is not envious or jealous of a dog or a cat, even if the dog and the cat can do things we cannot do. Nor do we feel ashamed toward our pets; if we feel ashamed about what we do to them, the shame is felt by ourselves, toward ourselves, and toward other people of whom we hope they did not see what we did to our dog.

It is people, and especially people who matter to us, who make us ashamed because we feel we have damaged their respect or affection for us. By doing something untoward we have put our social position in jeopardy. We feel that we deserve humiliation or perhaps even exclusion, and we show how we feel: small and not worth seeing – but we show it. Here again we meet the ambiguity of shame; and this leads us to a discussion of its

7

Functions

There is only one way in which human beings can

grow up and survive: in groups. From the earliest times on, groups have been for humans, as Elias noted, their survival units.

In all human groups we can distinguish two dimensions which may be represented as a horizontal and a vertical axis: solidarity and hierarchy. Hierarchy is the dimension of respect and contempt, while solidarity is the dimension of affection and enmity. Understanding the links with solidarity and hierarchy clarifies the functions of shame, from an evolutionary viewpoint.

Neither 'solidarity' nor 'hierarchy' is a completely neutral term; both words can evoke strong positive or negative feelings. They strike at the heart of all social relations, and all social relations are by their very nature emotive, just as most individual emotions are intrinsically social.

Shame occurs when ties of solidarity and hierarchy are impaired. This is always unpleasant, painful. Physical pain occurs when there is something wrong with the body; it is a signal (a warning) that the body is hurt. In a similar sense, shame is a signal that there is something wrong in a social figuration.

Social pain differs from physical pain in that it involves two-way traffic. In the act of shaming, messages of pain are exchanged. Others actively 'shame' someone. That person realizes that he has harmed his own position; he is in danger of humiliation and expulsion, and he lets it be known to the others that he acknowledges this. The inner awareness is as it were the 'domestic policy' of shame, the outward display its 'foreign policy' aspect.

The social pain is social in a double sense: it is inflicted socially by the people who 'shame' (as punishment), and it is demonstrated socially by the person who is ashamed (as atonement).

8

Changes

Until now my discussion of shame has been rather limited in scope. Limited in two respects: thus far, the emphasis has been on social situations where one individual is ashamed by a number of others.

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This is the sort of situation that we find most convenient to imagine and discuss. However, a sociological discussion of shame – and in fact any discussion of shame – would be badly incomplete if it failed to consider the fact that shame often occurs as a collective phenomenon. Groups of people, social classes, religious communities, nations, may suffer from social pain, from lack of affection and respect.

A second limitation in the scope of my argument till now has been that I have spoken almost exclusively in the present tense: as if there is no need to distinguish between shame in the past and shame in our present world.

Even in the individual life histories of people, the manifestations and the occasions for shame vary. Undoubtedly children are born with a natural capacity for learning to feel shame, to express shame, and to inflict shame upon others. In each of these three respects, they go through a learning process in the course of which they acquire a certain standard of shame, they learn to adapt to the shame regime prevailing in the social world of which they take part. They cannot easily go through life shamelessly, nor with an excessive proclivity toward shame. The balance of absence and excess has to be found by learning.

Many young children also take pleasure in teasing and shaming other children. If left to themselves they may go to extremes in mocking and humiliating some of their playmates. Here, too, training and learning are indispensable in restraining these tendencies.

Children in our societies today can be quite cruel by adult standards. They exhibit forms of shaming that are banned from public life among grownups. They can refuse other children to let them join in play. If they give reasons for their rejection, insult is added to injury.

A similar harshness in comparison to conventional public adult standards today is exhibited when shaming is practiced as a crude mechanism of social control. Physical harassment and ridicule used to be a part of the initiation rites in which a boy's manliness was tested in many societies, and they still occur in modern armies and other settings marked by great differences in power.

Clearly, shame and shaming have a history. I have never seen a book with the title *The History of Shame*, but it could be fascinating to trace the long history of shaming and shame, ever since our early ancestors began to organize their lives with the aid of communication by means of symbols (i.e. when they became, not as it is sometimes called a 'symbolic species', but a symbol-making and symbol-using species). Interestingly, the importance of the differentiation between humans and other animals is reflected in the fact that some of the most commonly used invectives by which people scold and deride other people are the names of certain domesticated animals: cow, pig, goat, dog.

In *The Civilizing Process* Elias discussed a specific episode in the history of shame and showed its relevance for the civilizing process in Europe in the early-modern and modern era. In the royal courts that emerged in the newly arising monarchic states, the non-violent competition for the favour of the king among nobles generated an increasing concern for matters of etiquette and, inevitably, infringements upon etiquette. In this context, Elias said, the 'thresholds' or 'frontiers' of shame and embarrassment 'shifted' and 'advanced'.

The word threshold has caused confusion among some of his readers who thought that those thresholds were 'rising'. That, however, is a misunderstanding. Elias meant that there was a process of extension in which increasingly more spheres of action became social 'danger zones' in which one could lapse into gestures or expressions that were liable to give cause to shame.

Actually Elias was more explicit about changes in the causes for shame than in its manifestations. In later writings he added more elaborate concepts to explain the increasing preoccupations with etiquette. Among those concepts is the pair of 'Group Charisma and Group Disgrace'. The court nobility at the palace of Versailles was engaged in maintaining its share in the collective charisma of a ruling stratum. Breaches of etiquette undermined this symbolic mainstay of distinction and power and were causes for shame.

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The counterpart to group charisma is group disgrace. Falling into disgrace may be experienced more poignantly as a painful social fate than living in disgrace from generation to generation. Such a fall may happen to a family, an ethnic group, a social stratum, a nation.

In its most brutish form, group disgrace can lead beyond humiliation and expulsion, to complete annihilation – known nowadays as ethnic cleansing or genocide. You may find this a bridge too far, from shame to mass murder. But I think Norbert Elias also knew that there is a connection, and that both shaming as a social activity, and shame as an individual experience are potentially destructive.

Shame is an emotion that is not to be treated lightly, even if we do not regard it as the master emotion. To return once more to blushing; according to psychological experts, this is still an unexplained and enigmatic reaction pattern. Why should a person turn red when he wants to make himself unseen? But then we have to remember that there is a very differently classified emotion that also can make people turn red in their faces (except that we don't call this blushing any more), and that emotion is anger. Helen Lewis and Thomas Scheff have shown that hidden shame may turn into terrible anger but it may well be that the connection goes even deeper, and even further back into evolutionary history: just as there is an immediate link between fear and aggression, as two possible responses to danger, there is a link between shame and anger as alternative responses to social threats. (Following this line of reasoning, we might even conclude that the origins of shame lie in repressed anger; but for the moment this is mere speculation.)

There are many aspects of shame that I have had to leave untouched in this survey of its manifestations, causes, and functions. One such aspect is the relationship between shame and guilt. I think that this relationship has too often been made into an object of mystification. If we consider it from a developmental sociological perspective, we can see that a process of differentiation has taken place, in the course of which a number of causes for shame were gradually brought under the control of more centralized institutions, the state and the church. Part of the burden of shame was con-

verted into guilt by virtue of those institutions which developed special branches for meting out punishment. Other institutions, especially the family, adjusted to this penal pattern. In society at large, it was the state and the church that created guilt-generating forms of punishment. In doing so, both state and church have strengthened the processes of conscience formation. The confessional and the courtroom were the material reflections of the effort to replace shaming rituals by more rational forms of accusation, allowing the victims (be they 'culprits' or 'sinners') the possibility of appeal according to written rules.

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**Section on Sociology of Emotions, Financial Report
For the Period Ended December 31, 2006**

	1st Quarter Actual	2nd Quarter Actual	3rd Quarter Actual	4th Quarter Actual	Year to Date	Acct #
INCOME & EXPENSE						
<i>Income</i>						
<i>Dues Income</i>	\$85	\$100	\$105	\$98	\$388	37200
<i>Section Budget Allocation</i>	1,334	0	0	0	1,334	37250
<i>Total Income</i>	1,419	100	105	98	1,722	
<i>Expenses</i>						
<i>AM Reception Expenses</i>	0	0	243	0	243	37300
<i>Award Expenses</i>	0	0	0	607	607	37360
<i>Total Expenses</i>	0	0	243	607	850	
<i>Increase/(Decrease) in Net Assets</i>	\$1,419	\$100	\$138	\$509	\$872	

NET ASSETS						
<i>Net Assets - Beginning Balance</i>	\$2,007	\$3,426	\$3,526	\$3,388	\$2,007	
<i>Increase/(Decrease) in Net Assets</i>	1,419	100	138	509	872	
<i>Net Assets - Ending Balance</i>	\$3,426	\$3,526	\$3,388	\$2,879	\$2,879	

Sociology of Emotions Programming at ASA

Paper Session
Sociology of Emotions

Organizer and Discussant: Jody Clay-Warner,
University of Georgia

President: Tiffani J. Everett, University of Georgia

Presenters:

Shira Offer, Bar-Ilan University and Barbara
Schneider, Michigan State University

The emotional dimensions of family time
and their implications for work-family balance

Gregory Kordsmeier, University of Wisconsin

The Importance of Seeming Earnest: Stage
Managers and Emotion Work

Kathryn Lively, Dartmouth College

Gender Indifference?: Re-examining Gen-
der Differences in Emotion within a U.S.
Sample

Chien-Juh Gu, Northern Illinois University
Transnational Struggles at Home: Taiwan-
ese Immigrant Women's Family Relations
and Mental Distress

Invited Panel

*The contribution of emotions to theoretical ad-
vances in sociology:*

Are emotions becoming mainstream?

Organizer: Ellen Granberg, Clemson University

President: Dawn T. Robinson, University of Georgia

Panelists:

Cecelia L. Ridgeway, Lucie Stern Professor in the
Social Sciences, Stanford University

Robin W. Simon, Florida State University

Robin Stryker, University of Minnesota

Verta Taylor, University of California, Santa Bar-

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