A recent special issue of Ethnic and Racial Studies (Vol. 35 No. 4 April 2012) is dedicated to a symposium on ‘Race and Reflexivity.’ The lead article, by Mustafa Emirbayer (University of Wisconsin at Madison) and Matthew Desmond (Harvard University), is followed by a series of commentaries by leading, contemporary race scholars: Howard Winant, Sudhir Venkatesh, Mary Pattillo, John Jackson, Jr., Kimberly DaCosta, Wendy Leo Moore, and Stephen Steinberg. To highlight the important topic covered in this symposium, Perspectives asked esteemed University Professor at the University of Sydney, Raewyn Connell, to provide “10 Questions” about the symposium’s theme. What follows are the “10 Questions” and Emirbayer and Desmond’s responses.

Donald N. Levine, University of Chicago

In his recent “Notes from the Chair” [Perspectives, Vol. 33, Issue 2 (November 2011)], Philip Gorski beckons us to revisit our philosophical antecedents and current assumptions. If I follow him aright, he makes four large claims: (1) social theories are ill advised to base their frameworks on a notion of ‘action’; (2) the tendency to do so stems from Kant’s conception of action as appropriated and transmitted through Max Weber; 3) that conception reflects their common indebtedness to Protestant doctrines; and 4) a more edifying notion is ‘praxis,’ with its antecedents in Aristotle and subsequent work by Catholic philosophers, including Thomas Aquinas and Alasdair MacIntyre.

One can only applaud the challenge for social theorists to dialogue about their assumptions and become more cognizant of their philosophical antecedents. My own efforts to do so share with Gorski a deep appreciation for Aristotle’s organization of knowledge and his perspective on praxis. In such work, however, I reconstruct the narrative of our philosophical antecedents in ways that differ from what Gorski presents.

To begin with, I broaden the discourse to include philosophical ancestors with arguably greater impact on sociological notions of action than Kant, including Hobbes, Smith, Rousseau, Bentham, Hegel, Marx, and Mead, as the space limits of his piece may have kept him from acknowledging. However, I see no grounds for tracing (continued on page 11)

John Levi Martin, University of Chicago

In response to the critique of Donald Levine, whom I acknowledge to know a heck of a lot more about all this than do I, I wish to defend Philip Gorski’s fundamental points, namely that our theoretical grammar for action is justly called Kantian (despite the abhorrence and confusion that would characterize Kant’s reaction to our work, should he look down from heaven), that our generation has had a sense that there is a flaw in this grammar, and that there is increasing interest in solutions that would reasonably be called Neo-Aristotelian if not Neo-Scholastic. Space constraints led Gorski’s original sally and my defense to be compressed, exaggerated, simplistic and hence vulnerable to critique; my arguments will be defended in greater depth in a work in progress on the rise and fall of the Kantian grammar of action. Here I will focus on one key issue, whether Weber’s approach to action can be called Kantian.

First, we must admit that our understanding of Kant has been tendentious; when German theorists cried “Back to Kant!,” the Kant they went back to was the Kant they severally needed, a selectively remembered and somewhat distorted Kant—the rigorous, clockwork, abstemious and aged Kant (and not that rather likable younger fellow who loved to have dinner parties). For what defined the neo-Kantianism that Weber embraced as Kantian was the focus on lawfulness, and on formality and universality as the keys to a critique of knowledge and ethics; indeed, for such thinkers, there was no longer any way to understand the universal apart from the formal. (continued on page 13)
Emirbayer and Desmond, continued

1. Can you tell us what prompted you to write the article “Race and Reflexivity”? Was there a triggering event, or experience, that made you think this issue had become critical?

Reflexivity is a fundamental theoretical practice. It should be proactive not reactive. That having been said, it is important to acknowledge that our discussion does come from intellectual and professional experiences we have undergone. To some extent, the impulse to think about reflexivity is widely shared; we all sense the need for this conversation. It is expressed informally over drinks at academic conferences and in knowing glances between audience members during lectures. But as for ourselves, we began to feel the need systematically to think about reflexivity when writing our undergraduate textbook on race, Racial Progress, Racial Domination: The Sociology of Race in America. We devoted the first major part of that work to exploring how racial enterprises. That is why we believe that the importance of honest interracial discussions that did not come into this world African or European or Asian but that the world came into them. We also stress, in the textbook and in the essay itself, that introduced to the history of race, even in brief, they begin to understand that racial divisions are neither natural nor eternal—they are modern inventions—and that racism did not flow naturally from systems of racial classification but the other way around. And students begin to see that they neither natural nor eternal perspective. When students are introduced to the history of race, even in brief, they begin to understand that racial divisions are modern inventions—and that racism did not flow naturally from systems of racial classification but the other way around. And students begin to see that they did not come into this world African or European or Asian but that the world came into them. We also stress, in the textbook and in the essay itself, that reflexivity is a fundamentally collective enterprise. That is why we believe that the importance of honest interracial discussions that grapple with the complexities of race cannot be overstated. For many students, the first time they participate in such discussions is in high school or college classrooms. (continued on page 6)

2. Academics from other countries don’t have a common-sense reference for the term “race scholars” as used in the USA. Could you describe the group you have in mind here? Specifically, do you mean people working in research-oriented universities, writing in academic journals, or do you include people teaching about race questions in non-research universities, community colleges, technical education, and high schools?

By “race scholars,” we primarily have in mind those contributing to our knowledge of race and ethnicity through teaching and research. These include scholars working throughout the academic universe: those teaching in liberal arts colleges, those occupying research posts, and, indeed, those standing in front of high school classrooms. At the same time, we recognize that artists, journalists, poets, business leaders, and many others also contribute mightily to the international conversation about race, and we believe our paper has something for them as well. Reflexivity is essential for advancing ideas about racial inequality and multiculturalism today, whether those ideas come from professors or playwrights, pundits or politicians. And, as we emphasized in our essay, despite our focus on problems that repeatedly come up in race scholarship, our investigation into race and reflexivity is meant to serve as a response also to challenges arising more generally, whether in respect to race itself or any other principle of division, such as gender, class, religion, or sexuality. The difficulties encountered in these terrains—and the possible ways of overcoming them—all are very similar.

3. If the latter, what would you say are the implications of “reflexivity” for mass education? Would you see this as part of the curriculum in any education about race? Can you suggest ways for teachers to introduce reflexivity questions to students?

As authors of a textbook on race, we have given this question a good deal of thought. As mentioned earlier, our textbook includes a major opening section in which we emphasize that reflexivity is not only personal (the stuff of identity and past experiences) but also institutional and historical. To be reflexive requires adopting a historical perspective. When students are introduced to the history of race, even in brief, they begin to understand that racial divisions are neither natural nor eternal—they are modern inventions—and that racism did not flow naturally from systems of racial classification but the other way around. And students begin to see that they did not come into this world African or European or Asian but that the world came into them. We also stress, in the textbook and in the essay itself, that reflexivity is a fundamentally collective enterprise. That is why we believe that the importance of honest interracial discussions that grapple with the complexities of race cannot be overstated. For many students, the first time they participate in such discussions is in high school or college classrooms. (continued on page 6)
Sociology between Ideology and Utopia

Emanuel Smilku

American Social Indicators

Social theories become increasingly obsolete and irrelevant with the passage of time. That includes the works of sociological classics. Yet we keep using their conceptual language, the only common professional language learned by every new generation of sociologists. There can be no firmly established truths in social sciences, only certain generalizations valid for limited periods of time and for local conditions. What, then, do we value in the sociological classics? If it is not their substantive theories, then it must be the methods they used in producing those theories as well as their central concepts. Having to do with the overall process of developing new social-scientific knowledge rather than with its products, these methods form the bedrock on which substantive social theories and conceptual schemes rest. It was in this broad sense of the word that Simmel and Durkheim spoke of sociology as a distinct social science characterized by its own method. The method of sociological deconstruction and reconstruction represents all phases of our thought processes – from the de-objectifying understanding of classic authorities to their de-subjectifying interpretation, and on to their re-subjectifying conceptualization, and re-objectifying modeling and measuring.¹

The structure of this method can also be helpful in a reflexive representation of the relationship between sociological theory and research in general. Let us recall C. Wright Mills’ critique of the disconnect between what he called Grand Theory and Abstract Empiricism. These two notions remain by and large applicable to sociology today. To do justice to Parsons, it must be said that The Social System against which C. Wright Mills’ critique of Grand Theory was directed had a strong hermeneutic foundation in The Structure of Social Action.² The notion of Grand Theory is more applicable to the classic authorities whose ideas Parsons reinterpreted and then reconceptualized in his subsequent works. It can be applied to Parsons’ work itself only if we use it for our own reinterpretation and reconceptualization. The same can be said of Marx even though his voluminous Theories of Surplus-Value was written after The Capital. But when today we take Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and Parsons as classic authorities, when we recognize them all as the undisputed foundation for our sociological work and use their works as material for our own hermeneutic reinterpretation and reconceptualization, they can all be legitimately called Grand Theories.

The intellectual legacies of these four recognized sociological classics can be easily associated with the (Weberian, Durkheimian) liberal-humanitarian, (Parsonian) conservative, and (Marxist) socialist-communist ideologies that Mannheim identified as also having their parallels in utopian mentality. According to Mannheim, all these ideologies are forms of false consciousness when adopted separately and uncritically – unless they are consistently fused together in a verstehende reinterpretation and reconceptualization oriented to empirical research relevant to contemporary social concerns. The ideologies of Grand Theories become utopias when they are treated as describing objective reality and when attempts are made to build or promote social movements aimed at institutionalizing such utopias rather than material for de-objectifying hermeneutic understanding and de-subjectifying interpretation followed by a synthesizing re-conceptualization. “Real utopias,” especially the extreme ones of either left or right, substitute ready-made ideology for the laborious but necessary methods of social sciences. They can be dangerous. As the history of the 20th century shows, in times of crisis utopias can and have been made real by seductive demagogical leaders putting them into practice by force.

The falsehoods of ideology and utopia can be avoided in what Mannheim called a quest for reality. And as political reality can only be found in a synthesis of conflicting partisan positions, so must sociology synthesize its particular ideological conceptions that must, in turn, be subjected to new, revised syntheses as time goes on. “The continuously revised and renewed synthesis of the existing particular viewpoints becomes all the more possible because the attempts at synthesis have no less a tradition than has the knowledge founded on partisanship,” wrote Mannheim.³ By synthesizing Grand Theories in (continuously revised) conceptual frameworks we can create two mediating forms of this social science between Grand Theories and social research practices – hermeneutic reinterpretations and conceptual schemes necessary for building theoretical models. True sociological consciousness can find reality only in critical amalgamations of classic conceptual legacies. Such reinterpretation and reconceptualization of classic authorities does not have to take several volumes or even one thick volume. It can be done in a few short chapters.

While any understanding and interpretation needs an ontological frame of reference, in a sense this relationship holds the other way, too. Any ontological presupposition can only be expressed in, justified by, and based upon an understanding and interpretation of their meanings that are substantive and concrete in some other, extraneous context. This is what Heidegger described as the hermeneutic circle of understanding. This circle can be broken and avoided when the task of semantic understanding and interpretation proper is separated from the reflexive critique of prevailing misunderstandings and misinterpretations as well as from the critical analysis of pertinent literary material. In a similar structural process Saus-sure insisted on separating observed collective phenomena of humans speaking (langage) and individual acts of communi-cation (parole) from language proper (langue) as consisting of evaluated syn-tagmatic and (continued on page 8)
Weber’s Oscillation Thesis: Patrimonial Prebendalism and Feudalism

J.I. (Hans) Bakkar, University of Guelph

Patronymy (Latin, patrimonium)

While standard aspects of Weber's oeuvre can be found in every introductory textbook, the one major topic frequently ignored is Weber's Ideal Type Model (ITM) of "Patrimonialism" as the essence of traditional rule. Weber's theory of political structure, legitimate authority and coercive power (Herrschaft) is often applied to modern societies, particularly modern goal-rational bureaucracies, but his views on traditional domination are frequently ignored. Yet use of Weberian models can be heuristic. For example, Henry Kissinger's recent book (2011) On China does not utilize Weber's ideas (even though he does reference authors who do). Kissinger works with a vague use of the concept of "feudalism" even though the literature on Patrimonialism in China is extensive. By not focusing on the importance of traditional Patrimonial rulership, Kissinger ignores a central aspect of the nation-state we call the People's Republic of China, with its oligarchy of nine rulers, the Politburo. In China the ideological justification for rule is not based on Post-Hegelian, Left-Marxist modernism. As Kissinger correctly indicates, there are many vestiges of pre-modern, Non-Western thinking. Yet when foreign officials negotiate, they forget some of the fundamental differences. Kissinger pays attention to them, but does not develop a general theoretical understanding of why they exist. Instead, he chooses to essentialize the "Chinese," as if they are unified by more than a historical legacy and a very powerful, quasi-traditional bureaucracy.

Weber's discussion of traditional authority was summarized by Reinhard Bendix (1962). Bendix's summary misleads slightly by contrasting "Patrimonialism" with "Feudalism." A wordier but more accurate synopsis involves the ITM of Patrimonial-prebendalism as contrasted with the ITM of Patrimonial-feudalism. Weber's notion of the feudal era in Western Europe is that it is to a large extent similar to the Patrimonial general form but differs in terms of the existence of independent landed estates, the feudal domains. Feudal lords are quite different from prebendal officials, but the evolution of feudalism in Western Europe depended on a unique set of circumstances related to the power divide between the Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire and the Pope of the Holy Roman Catholic Church. Weber analyzes the Occidental city as a product of the existence of Patrimonial-feudal systems of domination. The analysis in Economy and Society (Weber 1968) starts with "Patriarchy," which he interprets in a more historically-specific sense as similar to what some anthropologists might call Big Man Systems. Patriarchy is a "pure type" of traditional domination. But nevertheless most sociologists pay little attention to Weber on Patriarchy. It is also common to ignore Weber on Patrimonialism. Baologh (1990) calls attention to Weber as a "masculine" thinker, but she treats his ideas on Patrimonialism as incidental to her critique of Weber as a "patriarchal" thinker, comparing him to Freud in that respect. Baologh's critique is one-sidedly Feminist; but, it also deflects attention away from the valuable core of Weber's work on Patrimonialism. The limited patriarchal household is not an adequate basis for further development. It does not allow for the construction of a theory of hegemony. Yet such a theory in support of hegemonic power is necessary for the development of an ideology of legitimate authority. For example, such a theoretical formulation is necessary in a large, bureaucratically-run, traditional empire.

Recently Julia Adams and Mounira Charrad (2011) have edited a set of papers on Patrimonial Power in the Modern World, and those papers are well worth examining. Some of the contributions do not tackle Weber's views so much as provide creative re-interpretations of Weber's ITMs. At times the flexible use of terminology gets confusing, particularly in the paper by Randall Collins (2011) when he contrasts "patrimonialism" to "bureaucracy" in order to discuss a contemporary "[neo-] patrimonial" aspect of criminal gangs and the Mafia. (In Collins' chapter the term "bureaucracy" should be read as "modern bureaucracy.") Traditional legitimate authority, based on the world religions, stressed post-patriarchical, post-tribal divine forces and utilized traditional bureaucracies involving various kinds of traditional, prebendal officials (Bakker 2010). The paper by Wang and Adams (2011) concerns Manchu dominated Qing China (1644-1911) and is more in keeping with the thrust of Weber's original use of the ideal types involved in the study of pre-modern authority before the nation-state principle had been widely accepted. The use of bondsmen by the Qing Manchus during the later phases of the dynasty was an important additional patrimonial layer that was added to the patrimonial prebendal traditional bureaucracy of earlier dynasties. The Adams and Charrad (2011) collection of papers points in the right direction: a serious, scholarly attempt to re-examine Weber's important work on Patrimonialism. But it also more or less leaves aside important arguments. Those arguments concern: the transitions that took place over hundreds of years (in some cases indigenously) from Patrimonial-prebendal to Patrimonial-feudalism, and then from Patrimonial-feudalism to Modern Capitalism and modern bureaucracy.

The key point about Patrimonial-prebendalism and Patrimonial-feudalism is that the two principles tend to oscillate in the history of any civilization. In Middle Eastern, Sinitic (East Asian) and Indic (South Asian and Southeast Asian) Civilizations there has been an oscillation of the centralizing and the de-centralizing tendencies. But centripetal and centrifugal trends have also characterized Western European civilization, especially during the approximately one thousand years of the Holy Roman Empire (800-1800). The emergence of full-blown Patrimonial-feudalism is not so much due to a Feudal Mode of Production as it is a significant change in the Means of Coercion and the elite structure of societies. In a prebendal system there is no right to inheritance of office and there cannot be any legitimate offspring. The main reason for celibacy in the Roman Catholic Church has to do with inheritance, not sexual intercourse per se. No priest could have legitimate offspring; but, many priests – and even bishops and cardinals – did have illegitimate children whom they recognized. (continued on page 9)
The Big Picture: How a General Framework Can Facilitate Teaching, Learning, and Using Sociological Theory

Debbie Kasper, Hiram College

To claim the existence of a general sociological theory, it seems, is one of the most radical things a sociologist can do. Although I don’t consider myself radical, I’ll take it one step further. Not only do I maintain that there is a general theoretical framework within which other theories can be situated, I propose that it provides a means for more effectively teaching, learning, and using sociological theory.

As a big picture person I have always derived great satisfaction from reading and thinking about big ideas. Without others’ efforts to articulate and share their ideas through sociological theory writings, my own thinking would surely be greatly impoverished. I am, however, also critical of the state of theory in sociology. While I appreciate the diversity of ideas and perspectives, I remain frustrated by the disarray. New theoretical works are continually added to the mix, but not meaningfully integrated; there’s nowhere to put them. And the practice, at least in some textbooks, of jamming them into one of the “three perspectives” (or creating new ones when that doesn’t work) is just not helpful. As a result, it is difficult to know what to include in a semester-long class and how to best organize it. Consequently, theory training is exceptionally inconsistent, contributing to a widespread sense that theory is largely irrelevant to actually doing sociology.

There are decades of consistent criticisms on these points. I remember feeling validated upon discovering them, and equally disappointed to have had to discover them on my own. As far as I can tell, open discussion of the problems in sociological theory is not standard fare in sociology training. This is unsettling given that the problems recognized in sociological theory pervade the discipline. Research into introductory sociology, for example, has found great inconsistencies in term usage (Babchuk and Keith 1995; Eckstein, Schoenike, and Delaney 1995) and that different courses provide different versions of the discipline (Keith 2000; Keith and Ender 2004).

Through my continued explorations into the state of sociological theory (as both graduate student and sociology professor), I found important common ground underlying efforts to shift sociology’s focus from static entities to dynamic relations. Eventually, I encountered writings that echoed similar insights. I began to consider ways that the themes of relations and process could provide a suitable basis for re-organizing theory courses—emphasizing convergences in ideas rather than considering individual authors’ ideas separately. While this would be an advancement, it would not provide students with a sense of how to use theory in practical ways, much less think and talk about social processes with a unified and consistent vocabulary (like the way, for example, that biologists can easily converse about mutation, natural selection, and other mechanisms involved in biological evolution). We can do better.

More than just highlighting salient themes, we can derive an overall theoretical framework from these complementary efforts, one that provides a sound basis for teaching and scholarship. In particular, aspects of Norbert Elias’ work, supplemented by Bourdieu’s explication of habitus and recent discoveries across the human sciences, lend themselves to fruitful synthesis and provide the makings of a general sociological theory and a common vocabulary with which to talk about it. Notable about Elias’ work is the thoughtful situating of sociology’s (relatively autonomous) subject matter in and among that of other sciences, highlighting the relevance of other disciplinary knowledge for sociology. Beginning with verifiable scientific knowledge—rather than esoteric ontologies invented especially for sociology—provides much-needed organizing principles, one being that humans are inherently social and always embedded in relations of functional interdependence.

The orderly assembly of these key contributions generates a birds-eye-view of the “parts” and processes that generally comprise human social life. As such, it can bring meaningful order to the current assortment of theories, and render them more useful along the way. The result is a sort of map of human social processes revealing figuration (Elias’ term for patterns of interdependent relations) and habitus as core concepts and units of analysis. Figurations are observable through direct and indirect bonds of functional interdependence; habitus—developing within figurations—are observable via the practices, products, and overall lifestyles they produce. And these dynamic processes are embedded in the broader conditions of the biophysical world. This figure is a simplified version of an initial attempt to communicate the framework (see Kasper 2011 for an elaboration). Much can be done to improve the means for conveying it (calling all graphic designers!) and to develop ways to realize its enormous potential for facilitating the teaching, learning, and using of sociological theory.

Though some may question the utility of a theory at this level of abstraction, I argue that it (continued on page 9)
4. The social position of academics, and its influence on their outlook, used to be fiercely discussed in social movements – the labour movement and the women’s movement as well as movements for racial equality – but the connection with social movements is not a prominent issue in your paper. Do you think this is an important consideration for race scholars, and if so, how would you connect it to reflexivity?

In our essay, we argue that common-sense assumptions preconstruct our objects of inquiry at three distinct levels, each more deeply hidden than the last. The first level concerns our social unconscious, our race, class, gender, education, religion, and so on. The second concerns our disciplinary unconscious, how our training as sociologists, anthropologists, and so forth profoundly shapes what we see or fail to see. The third concerns the scholastic unconscious, the collection of unspoken presuppositions that accompany the intellectual’s privilege “to withdraw from the world so as to think it,” to quote Bourdieu. While we agree that race scholars have much to learn from engaging with social movements, such an emphasis only considers the first level of reflexivity. Along with social movements, then, we need also to consider how intellectual movements influence our thinking. Since the eclipse of the Civil Rights Movement, the latter arguably have exercised much more influence on ideas about race than the former, what with the return of culture of poverty debates, the rise of research on intersectionality, and the efflorescence of work on multiculturalism in literature and philosophy—alongside a stalled and atrophied anti-racism movement. And with respect to the third level of reflexivity, that which attends to the limitations of scholastic thought, race scholars additionally should devote attention to a resurgent ethnographic movement sweeping across the social sciences. At its best, ethnography directs attention to the everyday practices that perpetuate the racial order. Rather than withdraw from the world so as to think it, the ethnographer engages with the world so as to know it intimately, thereby rejecting scholasticism by reincorporating into theory the all-important moment of primary experience.

5. I’m surprised that you would choose so conservative a social theory as Bourdieu’s – centrally, an ironic theory of social reproduction within the global metropole - to frame a discussion dealing with problems of oppression, resistance and social transformation. Did you consider other ways of thinking about intellectuals, knowledge and social relations? Do you think race scholars would find significant help from, say, German critical theory, or the debates about intellectuals in postcolonial development?

In general, labels like “conservative” are unreflexive and unhelpful, being so powerful, seemingly natural, and discussion-ending. But, as applied to Bourdieu, the designation “conservative” is especially wrongheaded, a lingering trace of the one-sided critical reception of his work that emerged in the Anglo-American scholarly world during the 1970s and 80s. A closer look shows him to be a sociologist profoundly concerned with social and political change and with “problems of oppression, resistance, and social transformation.” It is true that other social thinkers also have much to add, but none has explored so systematically the themes of reflexivity, relationality, and social and political reconstruction. We ask skeptics to examine more carefully the extensive scholarship on Bourdieu since his death a decade ago, a literature that now is correcting the initial misinterpretation of him as a mere theorist of reproduction. In our own forthcoming book on The Racial Order, we seek to build on the insights of this literature by examining, in ways deeply informed by Bourdieu’s historical and critical sensibility, how social and cultural structures, practical logics, and symbolic domination operate together in the shaping of racial life.

6. You mention feminist ideas and writers, but most of the people you cite, and all those you highlight, are men. I would have thought gender relations and sexuality are very important for understanding race as social process, and therefore this would be an important issue for reflexivity in this field. Can you comment on this?

We do not deny the significance of “gender relations and sexuality . . . for understanding race as social process.” We affirm completely the positive contributions of those who long have stressed social positionality, including in the study of sexuality and gender. Several of the scholars we cite in prominent fashion are important women scholars; we speak as well (in highly positive ways) about women of color feminism. However, we try also to move the conversation forward onto new terrain. The question above ignores the two deeper levels of reflexivity we seek also to highlight; in the final two-thirds of our paper, we shift our focus of attention from the social unconscious to the disciplinary and scholastic unconscious.

7. Forgive me for saying this – it’s a bee in my bonnet – but the story of the “great figures” of the “classical generation” in sociology that you invoke is a disciplinary myth invented a couple of generations later. Looking at the texts of late nineteenth century sociology as a group, they were from the start very much concerned with race. Racial, especially colonial, difference was a formative issue for the discipline, though this is now mostly forgotten. If we are going to be reflexive about race as sociologists, doesn’t this imply a foundational critique of sociology, as such?

If a critical reader wishes to use our categories—and one of the most important is that of the disciplinary unconscious—to suggest that we ourselves have been less than fully reflexive (e.g., about the origins, development, and current self-understanding of sociology), then even when we disagree, as we do here, we only can applaud the effort.”  

(continued on page 7)
Emirbayer and Desmond, continued

But instead of debating the specific question of the “classical generation of sociology—our paper’s reference to it merely was a lead-in to our main argument—perhaps it would be more useful to make a general point about reflexivity and what often is called “critical sociology.” There is no intellectual canon that is not a “disciplinary myth,” and canonical alternatives are no less myths than their more established rivals. To accept as one’s intellectual ancestors the usual suspects or unsung heroes, as one’s founding texts famous works or long forgotten pages yellowed by neglect, typically is not an innocent intellectual decision but one motivated by a desire to shape the field to bolster one’s position within it. Which is to say: both the acceptance of disciplinary convention and the rejection of it require reflexive consideration. (Indeed, the act of making a “foundational critique” itself is ripe for reflexive analysis.) While certainly it is true that many of us uncritically valorize certain works out of disciplinary habit or tradition, “anti-establishment” positions and reflexivity are not one and the same.

8. It is unfortunately a problem in U.S. social science that too little attention is paid to scholarship from other parts of the world (except for canonical European theory). Perhaps, rather than race scholars in the U.S. paying closer attention to their own situation, it would be more helpful to spend their time reading theory and research coming from India (about race and caste), from sub-Saharan Africa (such as the post-Apartheid debates in South Africa), and from Latin America (e.g. the decolonial literature). Would this be a useful alternative strategy for reflexivity?

We heartily agree that reading literature and scholarship from outside one’s country—and especially from the developing world—is an extremely useful reflexive exercise. Of course, many scholars today, at least in the U.S., are so narrow in focus that simply reading across sub-disciplines within sociology—let alone across disciplines; and let alone across continents!—would be a radical departure from the status quo. Perhaps the most unfortunate consequence of the triumph of specialization and fragmentation within the social sciences in general, and race scholarship in particular, has been a gradual descent into inert uniformity. A kind of mental inertia has set in, where we find ourselves pursuing relatively similar questions and generating important facts but rarely new ideas. Reading widely not only would push forward our knowledge about race in an international perspective, it also would reveal alternative intellectual possibilities by showing what race scholarship looks like in Ecuador, India, or South Africa. This could help objectify and challenge intellectual customs that have come to define race studies in our own U.S. context. Notable examples of such an exercise are found in Professor Connell’s own recent, provocative writings on “Northern Theory.”

9. I find it hard to think about race (or any other structure) in U.S. society without thinking about the position of the USA in the wider world, i.e. global social relations, and the position of the USA in the history of global social relations, i.e. the story of modern imperialism. “Race” is, after all, a product of imperialism and its violence, and “whiteness” arguably originates as the consciousness of the ruling group in European global empire (taking peculiar forms in colonies of settlement). I wonder if there is some tension between the kind of reflexivity you recommend, and a fully historical analysis of race?

There is no tension between the kind of reflexivity promoted in our essay and a historical analysis of race because the former necessitates the latter. To think reflexively about race, we have argued, is to think historically about it. As we wrote in our essay, “reflexivity is a matter not of plumbing the subjective depths and reconstructing intimate lived experience—narrating, for example, one’s own or others’ life-histories—but of engaging in rigorous institutional analyses of the social and historical structures that condition one’s thinking and inner experience.” Seeing another person, or yourself, as black or Korean or white is nothing short of seeing hundreds of years of history, ugly and shamefaced, unravel before you. Near the end of his 1961 preface to The Wretched of the Earth, Sartre remarked that “whenever two Frenchmen meet, there is a dead body between them. And did I say one …?” To twist the old phrase, the personal is the historical. The project of exploring the history of race is one of reflexively examining ourselves.

10. Finally—a question I ask myself about my own work, as a sort of reflexivity about the collective side of intellectual life— who are the ideal readers of your paper, and how would you like to see your paper used by them?

Today we find ourselves in a remarkable historical moment, attempting to make sense of an America tossed about violently by the push-pull of racial domination and racial progress. In this context, we often find ourselves without a clear conceptual language for discussing race. It is our hope that “Race and Reflexivity” will contribute to developing a more effective way of thinking and talking about—and intelligently addressing—the problems of race in today’s society. And not problems of race alone, for we believe that those engaged with other social issues—e.g., those of religion, class, gender, nationality, education, or sexuality—need also to think critically and reflexively about the social, disciplinary, and scholastic prenstitutions that distort inquiry. So our ideal audience is very broad indeed! And if readers wind up pointing out the blind spots in our own thinking, then so much the better. That is precisely how societal discourse as a reflexive enterprise unfolds and develops.
The heart of the problem is not in the values we use in evaluating the past and the present. No one-dimensional record of social development can provide standards of social values however, since it is always involved with one partisan interest or another. The classics of sociology saw standards of social justice in the historic interplay of macro- and micro-social realities. They explained conflicts between status groups and classes, their rise and fall by structural inconsistencies between them. And they endeavored to reconstruct this two-dimensional view of social development in their efforts to learn from the past and help build a better future.

In building new conceptual schemes and objectifying them in quantitative models it is imperative that we distinguish between the ideas of status group and social class which are still routinely used as interchangeable in American sociological literature. Following Marx, Weber and Sorokin, it can be shown that they stand for two different if interrelated, orthogonal realms of social relations. Any status group can be differentiated by class, and any class can be differentiated by status groups as well as by their institutional domains. It is these structures of deep-seated class interests that are the big secrets hiding behind misleading and self-serving ideologies that social scientists have historically tried to debunk. The major types of social classes - settlement, property, occupational, and management - are defined by their respective historic processes of class formation in differential urbanization, capital accumulation, professionalization, and bureaucratization. This is what economists reify as factors of production - land, labor, capital, and entrepreneurship. Confusions of social class with social status stem from flattening the micro-foundational relationship between status groups and their class interests. It can be shown that groups of achieved family, cultural, economic, and political status, on the one hand, and structures of their shared property, settlement, occupation, and management class interests, on the other, can be successfully modeled in sociology, and that standards of distributive justice can be measured and used to evaluate current social trends.

Neither the macroscopic reality of institutional social systems, nor the microscopic reality of human consciousness is real in the full sense of the word. Both of them are scientific abstractions from the more concrete reality of particular status groups and their class interests - the only social reality that lends itself to direct participatory experience and control. By conceptualizing social structures as resulting at once from impersonal social practices and from conscious value-rational social action, we can capture these two complementary facets of social reality. The knowledge of processes going on at the macro-social and micro-social levels provides a necessary background for deepening our knowledge of the meso-level relations between status groups and shared class interests, but in itself it is always deficient. Macro-social structures register outcomes of social action; they are finished social products as it were. But their research inevitably retreats into the infinite questions of global human society and world history. The study of individual consciousness is also bound to retreat into the infinite depths of the human mind and its reflexivity. Only limited by the practical urgency and concreteness of achieving social justice and sustainable social development can these important studies acquire their proper place and meaningful anchorage.

As with any other value, rationality judgments presume certain normative standards, and such standards are not unproblematic. Philosophers, ever since Hume, have debated the question of whether it is possible to derive “ought” from “is,” and they have answered it in the negative. Yet, people have always found “ought” by adjusting their experience to aspirations for the future. Apparently, in the course of the debate the distinction between “is” and “ought” was replaced with one between facts and values. However, if “is” indeed refers to facts, “ought” refers to prescriptions such as of conduct or public policy that are always based on evaluations of facts. Evaluations of facts can only be based on certain accepted standards of values rather than on values themselves. In the context of social science, “ought” can be conceived as a reversal of evaluated facts’ deviations – especially excessive ones - from standards of social justice. Unlike preliterate societies, Western civilization carries along with it the history of all that proved valuable in the past as well as a record of its failures. It preserves its history as accumulated developmental experience, and uses it to learn from successes and failures of the past. The heart of the problem is not in the values themselves but in the standards of values we use in evaluating the past and the present. No one-dimensional record of social development can provide standards of social values however, since it is always involved with one partisan interest or another. The classics of sociology saw standards of social justice in the historic interplay of macro- and micro-social realities. They explained conflicts between status groups and classes, their rise and fall by structural inconsistencies between them. And they endeavored to reconstruct this two-dimensional view of social development in their efforts to learn from the past and help build a better future.

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1. As used here, the term reconstruction is intended in juxtaposition to preliminary hermeneutic deconstruction as its necessary methodological as well as terminological complement. It has nothing to do with Habermas’ (1976, 1979) notion of “reconstructive science” that is thoroughly individualistic modeled as it is on Freud’s psychoanalysis, Piaget’s concept of child development, and Chomsky’s concept of linguistic competence. To numerous critics of this idea, Habermas responded by modifying or qualifying his claims and conclusions that were based, nevertheless, on the (continued on page 10)
Bakkar, continued

The eunuch system in Imperial Chinese Dynasties had the same sociological function. In my own Comparative Historical Sociological study of the archipelago of Indonesia, I used Weber's ITM of Patrimonial-prebendalism in my analysis of the pre-colonial "Hinduized states" like Srivijaya (with the Sailendras in Java), Majapahit throughout the archipelago (Munoz 2006), and Patrimonial "princedoms" in Bali (Geertz 1980: 124-135). One weakness of Geertz's (1980) work on Bali is that he does not seriously confront Weber's arguments concerning traditional authority and real power (Schulte Nordholt 1981: 476). Geertz's symbolic and interpretive anthropology is often linked to Weber's verstehende Soziologie, but Geertz relies too heavily on an abstracted notion of free-floating "symbols." He tries to make too much of the system of pomp ("theatre state") and not enough of "legitimate authority" (which include Balinese theatre, music and dance), while also diminishing the continued relevance of caste and Macht (i.e. coercive use of raw physical power for domination in the narrow sense). Geertz does not confront the relevance of Weber's ITM of Patrimonialism for Java and Bali. Weber's ITM's are heuristic devices and do not fully describe all of the realities of any specific empire or nation-state. But ignoring Weber's ITM's of traditional authority results in the kinds of mistakes that even a Geertz can make.

The study of Patrimonialism and vestiges of Patrimonialism (sometimes called "Neo-Patrimonialism") is worthwhile. It is pragmatically useful theory (Bakker 2011). The sociology of the economic sphere, the political sphere and the civil sphere can benefit from a deeper appreciation of the traditional Patrimonial background in many settings around the world. Political sociology, economic sociology and civic sphere sociology have suffered from a curious failure to incorporate Weber's broader insights about traditional Modes of Coercion. The ITM of Patrimonial-prebendalism is relevant for Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan and many other Middle Eastern countries. A fuller understanding of modern and postmodern aspects of globalized capitalism will benefit from the use of Weber's primary ideal types of premodern, traditional authority: Patrimonial-prebendalism and Patrimonial-feudalism. The comparative study of world religions and fundamentalist movements would benefit from a deeper appreciation of the fundamentally patriarchal-patrimonial nature of those religions. Those religious belief systems and ideologies have provided sources of almost unquestioned legitimacy authority; yet, the authority structure is fundamentally patriarchal in the household and patrimonial in the state.

For example, the amazing success of the democratization process in Indonesia needs to be studied more carefully in order to clarify the ways in which the Republic of Indonesia, a "secular state," has managed to maintain balance among the various religious and secular factions and promote a high level of democratization and economic growth. Similar studies could be done in East and Southeast Asia. Patrimonialist traditional rulership has been important world-wide. We can also take the kernel of the idea of patriarchal patrimonialism to gain insights like those found in Collins (2011), but in our efforts at being current and up to date we should not ignore the sweep of Comparative Historical Sociology (CHS) writ large. In our efforts to analyze contemporary social, political and economic relations, we should remain rooted in a Comparative Historical Sociological framework and in particular we should recognize the epistemological value of Weber's heuristic use of Ideal Type Models of Legitimate Authority. One key distinction is the one Weber made between prebendalism and feudalism. The internal oscillation of prebendal and feudal aspects of patrimonialism has been neglected; yet, it is a powerful, empirically-grounded theoretical insight with great practical applicability in the world today.

References


Kasper, continued

is precisely what sociology has been missing. Just as awareness of the general mechanisms of biological evolution, for example, guides inquiry into particular instances of it, so too must a general but accurate understanding of human social processes direct particular sociological investigations. That understanding, as portrayed in the proposed framework, suggests the following sequence of general and overlapping questions (to be adapted to a given sociological topic): What kinds of lifestyles are discernible? What practices and works comprise them? What types of habitus produce certain practices and works? What figuredational conditions foster the development of certain types of habitus? How have overall biophysical conditions affected the development of figurations? And, coming full circle, how are biophysical conditions influenced by certain kinds of lifestyles?

These questions, and the overarching framework they represent, anchor the diverse writings that usually comprise a theory course. While authors have particular and distinct interests, recognizing the larger categories within which their questions fit helps to clarify and connect them in meaningful ways. When situated in this general framework, it becomes clear that Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, for example, are largely concerned about figurations. In their own ways, their works focus on rapidly changing relations of interdependence in a modernizing world (and the cascade of transformative effects on habitus development, what people do, how they live, and the physical world around them). Rather than having to rely solely on their memory of the many discrete concepts and arguments particular to the readings selected for a course, this framework provides students with a means of categorizing and connecting their understandings of the specific issues addressed across theory writings.

So far, I have piloted this framework in four classes (theory, stratification, and intro twice). Overall, students have most appreciated the way it provides a coherent foundation for understanding social processes, grounds sociology in biophysical reality, and helps them to locate specific theories within the framework thus seeing better how they relate to one another. Most of all, though, the categories of questions, at multiple levels of analysis, help guide their research on specific topics. With the big picture in mind and a sense of the big questions at hand, students can better identify how and where their particular interests fit within other contexts.

The scope of this essay does not allow for the kind of elaboration that some of the above claims clearly demand. For now, I will conclude by saying that in my own experience, employing this framework has greatly enhanced the teaching and learning of sociological theory (and sociology, in general), and I look forward to finding ways to use it more effectively. To that end, I have a little fantasy in which sociology professors from across the U.S. collaborate in a widespread experiment to test the usefulness of this framework.

Anyone game?

References


4. See www.socialindicators.org

References


Levine, continued

Weber’s use of ‘action’ to Kant, when the term figured as a commonplace notion among French and Austrian as well as German economists when Weber was studying economic history.

What troubles me more is Gorski’s claim that that “the influence of Kant’s ethics on social theory is especially evident in the work of Max Weber,” since for Weber “the highest and purest types of action are ‘instrumentally rational’”—when Kant demotes pragmatic imperatives for being tied to natural desires and finds the “highest and purest” type of action to be conduct pursued in accord with freely legislated moral laws. To my mind, nothing could be further from Weber’s straightforward definition of Handeln as goal-oriented behavior than Kant’s usage, which circled around the notion of moral action and centered on his ringing imperative: Handle so, dass die Maxime deines Willens jederzeit zugleich als Prinzip einter allgemeinen Gesetzgebung gelten könne —“so act, that the maxim of your Will can always serve as the principle of a universal law.”

Apart from that problematic conflation of Kant and Weber, it is hard to grasp why Gorski, who otherwise has taught us so much about the sociological significance of the Protestant Ethic, glosses Kant’s Ethics as Protestant, when Kant espouses secular human autonomy rather than obedience to the will of a Deity. On the other hand, it is questionable to contrast a supposed Weberian notion of action with that of Aristotle on the grounds that the latter embodies an “art,” when Aristotle contrasted the notion of art (techne) with that of action (praxis)—not to mention that finding of Weber scholar Wilhelm Hennis, who traces in Weber a lifelong neo-Aristotelian quest to understand how different kinds of social order affect the formation of character.

From the foregoing, you can see why I would be troubled by the claim that Talcott Parsons, foremost critic of economic action theory in the world in the mid-20th century, follows an imputed instrumentalist conception of action inherited from Kant [sic] via Weber [sic], not to mention the point that major interpreters of Parsons have found his perspective more aligned with Durkheim than with Weber. And finally, I do not see how anyone after Weber can think that utility-maximizing action is not itself action in accord with certain values, or that that simply using the term means committing someone to a “value-free” conception of the mission of social science.

Surely, the social theory domain stands to profit by continued conversation about the many ways of representing action/praxis, including the array of articulations from scholars such as Simmel, Merleau-Ponty, Joas, and Bellah, each of whom points to kinds of action not represented either by Weberian, Parsonian, or Foucauldian postulations. Indeed, it may be the beginning of wisdom in such discourse to keep in mind the fact that both terms, ‘action’ and ‘praxis,’ are essentially contested concepts. (For a brilliant elucidation of those terms, see Nicholas Lobkowicz’s still valuable tome, Theory and Practice [1967]). In such conversations, let us strive to articulate the precise meanings and connections among the various takes on those terms as we rumble along.

And for sure, let us acknowledge Kant’s historic role, but understand it rather as a prompt against which virtually every major founding figure of modern social science reacted. Marx started as an ardent Kantian liberal, then moved to dismiss Kant in a sequence of shifts to Hegelianism, French socialism, and British economics (Levine 1995, ch. 10). Durkheim flatly rejected both Kant’s methodology as well as his ethics, for being 1) super-empirical, 2) ahistorical, and 3) tied to the deeds of individuals rather than collective normation (Ibid., ch. 8). Simmel spent his life wrestling with Kant, delivering one of the most forceful philosophical rejections of Kantian ethics ever mounted (Simmel 1997; Levine 2012). With Kant’s categorical imperative in mind, Weber personally rejected a Gesinnungsethik of acting in accord with a transcendent ideal in favor of a Verantwortungsethik oriented to the pragmatics of consequences, as Gorski himself understands. Peirce and James, far from disavowing Kant ab initio, took the name pragmatism from Kant’s use of pragmatic in the Critique of Pure Reason. Dewey studied with Peirce at John Hopkins and wrote a dissertation on Kant as founder of modern philosophic method, but later chided all philosophers who were obsessed with the quest for certainty (Levine 1995, ch 11).

Gorski fingers Kant as the thinker who shattered the Aristotelian conception of praxis, but it’s easy to show that the demolition took place 150 years earlier, in an episode that forms the point of departure for a more complex reconstruction, which I presented in Visions of the Sociological Tradition (1995): the Aristotelian synthesis was displaced as a plausible foundation for modern social science by Thomas Hobbes, not by Kant. Hobbes’s robust outline of the paradigm of atomic naturalism prompted a series of continuing reactions—in Scotland and England, France, Germany, international Marxism, Italy, and the United States—to restore pieces of the Aristotelian synthesis that had been fragmented (see Figure 1 below).

Is Gorski right to see Weber as in some sense a neo-Kantian? For sure, as a self-confessed follower of Rickert’s epistemology and Simmel’s methodology of Verstehen. Is he right to claim that “the biological and psychological constitution of the human animal sets certain parameters for individual well-being and human sociality which can and should be studied and reflected on. And the results of these experiences and reflections can and should be preserved and passed on via moral education and tradition”? I certainly believe so. Might social science do well to return to an Aristotelian notion of virtue rather than an economistic notion of utility-maximizing action as its fundament, as Gorski holds? Absolutely! At the very least, it affords an important alternative worth cultivating. (continued on page 12)
This intervention brings to mind a review essay I wrote three decades ago, in a critique of Alasdair MacIntyre’s *After Virtue*, which faulted his numerous misrepresentations of Weber. Nevertheless, my essay concluded:

At the heart of any sociology after MacIntyre must be a research program informed by a neo-Aristotelian, post-Durkheimian vision: one that seeks to identify the social and cultural functions proper to particular historical settings, to delineate the external resources and internal practices needed to realize them, and to show ways of establishing conditions that both sustain us in the quest for the good and furnish us increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the good. That this is not an entirely fanciful proposal is implicit, after all, in MacIntyre’s allusion to the man whom earlier generations often cited as the "first sociologist," Adam Ferguson. "It is Ferguson's type of sociology," writes MacIntyre, "which is the empirical counterpart of the conceptual account of the virtues which I have given, a sociology which aspires to lay bare the empirical, causal connection between virtues, practices and institutions" (Levine 1983, 182).

Referencias
Martin, continued

(While Scholastics following Aquinas might also equate the universal with the formal, what this latter meant, and what “law” meant, had changed greatly.)

Given this, let us consider the homology between Weber’s two classes of actions (rational ones that can be understood as part of a rational complex, whether goal-oriented or value-oriented, and non-rational ones that must be understood sympathetically, whether affectual or traditional/habitual) and Kant’s two grounds of action, motives as opposed to drives. Kant’s two classes of actions (rational ones that can be understood as laws, and non-rational ones that can be understood as motives) correspond to these化工学的，whether affectual or traditional/habitual) and Kant’s two grounds of action, motives as opposed to drives. The question, then, is whether any of Kant’s system carries through to Weber’s.

Our answer must be that in many ways it does not; indeed, key linkages have been reversed. Yet that was exactly the state of the branch of neo-Kantianism that influenced Weber—intelligibility and objectivity becoming aligned with empirically observable causal relations of stuff, with subjectivity denoting either irrationality or freedom or both. Most important to this school, as Levine has noted (in Visions), was the fundamental hiatus between fact and value (hence when Stammler attempted to fuse the two, an exasperated Weber considered Stammler to have placed himself outside the Kantian pale and become unworthy of the name).

Further, Weber completely rejected Kant’s idea that there is a fundamental distinction between the way in which we explain human action and the way in which we explain other phenomena, accepting a universal causality more like that of the Epicureans Gorski mentions. One cannot deny that in some sense, Weber’s idea of the will is closer to that of Augustine (who emphasized that an action may be determined and yet be voluntary, which Kant did not accept). So why is Gorski right to say that there is something fundamentally Kantian in Weber’s using rational action as the pivot? It is not simply that it corresponds to Kant’s “motives” (which may be good, while drives can never be good), for one might argue that it corresponds just as well to Aquinas’s idea that the seat of action must be in the rational appetite as opposed to the animal appetite (rational here often implying a connection between means and ends, or to other oppositions of teleological and causal understandings of action before Kant.

For there was something specifically Kantian (and not, say, Stoic) in Weber’s famous statement, “We associate the highest measure of an empirical ‘feeling of freedom’ with those actions which we are conscious of performing rationally—i.e., in the absence of physical and psychic ‘coercion,’ emotional ‘affects’ and ‘accidental’ disturbances of the clarity of judgment, in which we pursue a clearly perceived end by means, which are the most adequate in accordance with empirical rules” (and recall that Parsons used a related statement of Weber’s as the epigraph to Structure). And this is because the means-ends connections are understood as laws (in either a causal or Newtonian sense) of the empirical world that can be produced by the intellect (or “understanding”), the capacity for mentally encompassing empirically experienced particularities using concepts.

This neo-Kantian idea of the operations of the intellect was quite different from that of Kant himself. Kant re-opened the Scholastic question of how universal, intelligible forms become united with particular sense impressions. His own answer involved the faculty of the imagination, but neo-Kantians like Rickert avoided this terminology and freighted the intellectual mind (at least that of the scientist) with the implausible task of forming intersubjectively valid concepts that would uncover actual lawful relations of the objective world. (This implied that scientific engagement with the world required a willful process of concept formation.) And so to Weber, action was reasonable not when its goal was substantively reasonable (or if universally form, the universal “form” being God, as in Aquinas), but when the formal connection between action and consequence was in harmony with empirical knowledge and with logic.

This sort of colonization of the will might not be distinctively Kantian; as Arendt has said, intellectuals tend to write the philosophy, while willful people tend to be out doing things. Hence our philosophy does a better job of analyzing the intellect than the will. But the intellect’s capacity to treat the general was understood by Rickert in a more universalistically formal manner than it otherwise might. One of the many puzzles that this caused for the Kantians was how, if knowledge was demonstrated to be “only” human knowledge of the phenomenal world, its empirical regularities could be treated as fixed enough to guide, or even bind, human action. This was not the problem of whether the will itself had preceding determinants (a problem for Kant, but one that he solved), but whether regularities produced by the intellect could be of any use to a free will (a problem that arises with this solution).

Kant’s own thought was that his system required attention to the faculty of reflective judgment, whereby we can attach general predicates to particulars without using rules of the intellect; further, he believed that such a capacity was necessary for us to develop into moral beings. The neo-Kantian solution that impressed Weber ignored Kant’s work here—though they did not ignore aesthetics, perhaps a generation schooled in Bismarckian bluster could not imagine making it a crucial link in a scientific system—and this led to a general instability that formal systems produce when they attempt to ground themselves.

The problems with the neo-Kantian resolution were seen at the time, and, as Stephen Turner and Regis Factor have emphasized, were recognized to be relevant for Weber’s work. The importation, sanitation and sanctification of Weber in the US left these critiques behind, and it seems that they have only slowly emerged to discourage an increasing number of would-be Weberians from proceeding any further down the path of action theory.

Weber was a Kantian, then, not because his thought was derived from a close reading of Kant (continued on page 14)
Martin, continued

(he actually seemed rather unfamiliar with the details of Kant’s work as an adult), nor because the concept of action could only be derived from a Kantian source. It is, as I think Gorksi is highlighting, that the connection between ethics and science that Weber assumed gave a crucial place to his social science was one that Weber saw as defensible given the work of contemporary neo-Kantians, mainly Rickert.

In sum, I cannot deny the force of Levine’s arguments on particulars, and I recognize that I am in a sense defending simplification “because everybody else does it.” But Gorski’s diagnoses of our current problems are about what everybody does, and what we ourselves should do. Certainly, his account points to the possibility of neo-Aristotelian approaches (again, using the Aristotle we need in contrast to other possibilities; no one is interested in the cautious, empirical Aristotle, since we have more than enough of that in the journals!). Another possibility would of course be to go back to Kant, and to reconsider arguments previously ignored by sociologists, most importantly the role of reflective judgment (admittedly, one could retrieve this also from Aquinas). That is a possibility worth taking seriously, although it is not yet clear whether there is any path from Kant’s Third Critique that would not recapitulate Gadamer’s development of hermeneutics. But perhaps we are overhasty in reaching for Aristotle; perhaps we may counter Kantianism by, once again, returning to Kant?

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**Theory at the Forum in Buenos Aires**

Members may find interest in theory sessions sponsored at the International Sociological Association Forum in Buenos Aires, Aug. 1-4, 2012, by the Research Committee of Future Research (RC07) and meant to provide an open platform for debating new developments in how futures and values are being conceptualized in social theory, empirical studies, and policy research. Some of the key questions are: How is the future conceptualized in different strands of sociological theory on micro, meso or macro levels? How is it related to concepts such as structure, agency, power, experience, and imagination? How could theories that avoided the future be modified? What methodological innovations are available for future-oriented research? What role can ‘utopias’ play in critical sociology? What assumptions inform definitions of possible, probable, or preferable futures?

Organizers: **Elisa REIS**, UFRJ, Brazil, epreis@alternex.com.br and **Markus S. SCHULZ**, University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, USA, isarc07@gmail.com

**Futures, values, and sociological theory - Part I**

On “habitus”, “forms of sociation” and the future
**Natàlia CANTÓ-MILÀ**, Open University of Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain

Roadmaps for social transformation: Arab spring
**Jacqueline GIBBONS**, York University, Toronto, Canada

Is mass society a threat to representative democracy? Revisiting David Riesman's theory of the other-directed character
**Pekka SULKUNEN**, Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland

Protentions as structures of selection in social systems: The role of anticipated futures in the case of a scientific innovation
**Robert J. SCHMIDT**, Technical University Berlin, Germany

Hope, vision and social mobilization (distributed paper)
**Natalie HABER**, Loyola University of Chicago, USA

Sociedades de control y subjetividades contemporáneas (distributed paper)
**Camilo Enrique RIOS ROZO**, Grupo de Investigación ‘Gobierno, Subjetividades y Prácticas de Sí’, Bogotá, Colombia

**Futures, values, and sociological theory - Part II**

Communicating power: Technological innovation and social change in the past, present and futures
**James DATOR**, John SWEENEY and **Aubrey YEE**, University of Hawaii at Manoa

Race, re-spatialization and the struggle over the iconography of the global city
**Cameron MCCARTHY**, University of Illinois, USA

Disrupted modernities: The dissipation of the present as a utopian future of the industrial past
**Timothy W. LUKE**, Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University

Institutionalizing democracy, strengthening state: Bangladesh experience
**Habibul H. KHONDKER**, Zayed University, UAE, United Arab Emirates

Imagining the future of Greenland (distributed paper)
**Sanne VAMMEN LARSEN**, Aalborg University, Denmark and **Anne MERRILD HANSEN**, Aalborg University, Denmark

To whom belongs the future? Prospective thinking and climate change (distributed paper)
**Jose Luis CASANOVA** and **Maria CARVALHO**, Centro Investigação e Estudos de Sociologia, Lisbon, Portugal
ASA 2012 Events for Theory Section Members

**Roundtables** are Monday, August 20th from 12:30-1:30

**Theory Business Meeting**, Monday August 20, 1:30-2:10

**Theory Reception (Joint with History of Sociology)**, Saturday, August 19th, 6:30-8:30pm

The **2012 Junior Theorists Symposium** will take place on Thursday, August 16th at the University of Colorado, Denver. See separate announcement for details.

The annually organized **Lewis A. Coser Award for Theoretical Agenda-Setting** recognizes a mid-career sociologist whose work holds great promise for setting the agenda in the field of sociology. This year’s award winner is Philip S. Gorski (Yale University) who will deliver a lecture tentatively entitled: “Beyond the Fact/Value Distinction? Moral Realism and the Social Sciences” at this year’s ASA (time and place to be announced).

**Theory Section Invited Session. Agency or Personhood?**
Sun, Aug 19 - 10:30am - 12:10pm
Session Organizer: Philip S. Gorski (Yale University)
Presider: Julia Adams (Yale University)
Panelist: Andreas Glaeser (University of Chicago)
Panelist: Steven Hitlin (University of Iowa)
Panelist: Margarita A. Mooney (University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill)
Panelist: Nicolette Denise Manglos (University of Texas-Austin)
Panelist: Karen A. Cerulo (State University of New Jersey-Rutgers)

**Theory Section Invited Session. Realism and Sociology**, Sun, Aug 19 - 2:30pm - 4:10pm
Session Organizer: Philip S. Gorski (Yale University)
Presider: Omar A. Lizardo (University of Notre Dame)
Panelist: James Mahoney (Northwestern University)
Panelist: Isaac Ariail Reed (University of Colorado-Boulder)
Panelist: George Steinmetz (University of Michigan)

**Theory in Action**, Monday August 20, 2:30-4:10
Session Organizer: Elizabeth A. Armstrong (University of Michigan)
Presider: Elizabeth A. Armstrong (University of Michigan)
Ana Velitchkova (University of Notre Dame): “Differentiated Habitus and Field, and High-risk Political Participation”
Adam Isaiah Green (University of Toronto): “Erotic Capital”: Thinking with and against Bourdieu and Hakim”
Jeremy Markham Schulz (Cornell University): “Tiered Social Orders, Micro-transitions, and the Social Landscapes of Coleman, Luhmann, and Bourdieu”

**Beyond the Fact/Value Distinction**, Sunday, August 19, 8:30-10:10
Session Organizers: Richard Westerman (University of Alberta) and Reha Kadakal (University of Chicago)
Presiders: Richard Westerman (University of Alberta) and Reha Kadakal (University of Chicago)
Roland Paulsen (Uppsala University): “Counterfactual Theorizing: Towards an Imaginative Sociology”
Timothy McGettigan (California State University-Pueblo): “Good Science for Rebels”
Amanda E. Maull (Pennsylvania State University): “Science as Praxis and the Entanglement of Fact and Value”
Discussant: Andrew Abbott (University of Chicago)

**Regular Social Theory session**, Monday, August 20th, 2:30-4:10
Session Organizer: Mucahit Bilici (City University of New York-John Jay College)
James J. Dowd (University of Georgia): “Bloody Durkheim”
Matthew Rowe (University of California-Berkeley): “Practice with Purpose: A Comparative Analysis of American Pragmatism, Goffman, and Bourdieu”
John Holmwood (University of Nottingham): “Reflexivity as Situated Problem-solving: A Pragmatist Alternative to General Theory”
Matthew Norton (Yale University): “The Structure of Situations”

**Critical Theory regular session**, Saturday, August 18, 12:30-2:10
Session Organizer: Nancy Weiss Hanrahan (George Mason University)
Presider: Nancy Weiss Hanrahan (George Mason University)
Onur Kapdan (University of California-Santa Barbara): “Building Utopias for Better Struggles: The Significance of the Zapatistas for Feasible Alternatives”
Alexander M. Stoner (University of Tennessee-Knoxville): “Contours of Sociobiophysicality and the Necessity of Critical Theory”
Sarah S. Amsler (Kingston University): “Ethnographies of Possibility: Criticalizing Cultural Practice in Everyday Life”
Discussant: Nancy Weiss Hanrahan (George Mason University)
6th Junior Theorists Symposium – Denver, Colorado 2012

The conference will take place on August the 16th, a day before the ASA officially begins, at the University of Colorado, Denver.

Conference Organizers:
Stephanie Lee Mudge (UC Davis)
Iddo Tavory (The New School for Social Research)

Program Schedule:

8:30 – 9:00 Coffee and Bagels

9:00 – 10:50 Theorizing Political Formations
  Adam Slez and Nicholas H. Wilson (Princeton and UC Berkeley) “How Empires Fall: From Networks to Fields in Political Orders”
  Ethan Fosse (Harvard University) “On the Duality of Statistics and Theory: The Case for Bayesian Multilevel Reality”
  Discussant: Phil Gorski (Yale University)

10:50 – 11:00 Coffee

11:00 – 12:50 Group Formation and the Moral
  Fiona Rose-Greenland (University of Michigan) “Mimesis and Nemesis in Nationhood Construction: A Critical Reappraisal of Sociological Theories of Imitation”
  Christina Simko (University of Virginia) “Rhetorics of Suffering: September 11 Commemorations as Theodicy”
  Discussant: Richard Swedberg (Cornell University)

12:50 – 2:00 Lunch

2:00 – 3:50 Meaning and Temporality
  Benjamin H. Snyder (University of Virginia) “Working with Time in Time: A Rhythmic Approach to the Problem of Time Pressure”
  Neha Gondal (Rutgers University) “Locating Culture in Less-Institutionalized Structure”
  Tod Van Gunten (University of Wisconsin, Madison) “Rethinking Bureaucratic Agency in the State: Networks, Reputation and Career Strategies in Professional Fields”
  Discussant: Ann Swidler (UC Berkeley)

4:00 – 5:30 After-panel: A Conversation about Theory
  Robert Jansen (University of Michigan)
  Monika Krause (Goldsmiths College, University of London)
  Omar Lizardo (University of Notre Dame)
  Isaac Reed (University of Colorado, Boulder)

5:30 – and until the last theorist drops
  Reception

Where: The conference will take place at room NC 1130, in the North Classroom Building on the University of Colorado, Denver campus--10 min. walk from the convention center where ASA registration will be (and in front of the conference hotel Hyatt Regency)

RSVP: If you would like to be sent the presenters’ papers ahead of time, RSVP by sending an e-mail to Stephanie-Lee Mudge (mudge@ucdavis.edu) and Iddo Tavory (tavoryi@newschool.edu) indicating that you are planning to come.

REGISTRATION: In order to ensure the longevity of the JTS, conference attendees will be asked to pay a small registration fee at the door: $20.00 for faculty, $10.00 for graduate students.

We would like to thank Akihiko Hirose (University of Colorado, Denver) for his kind help, and for the grad students of the UC-Denver sociology department for offering their assistance throughout the day.
Announcing the American Journal of Cultural Sociology

Editors:
Jeffrey C. Alexander, Department of Sociology, Yale University, USA
Ronald N. Jacobs, Department of Sociology, University at Albany, State University of New York, USA
Philip Smith, Department of Sociology, Yale University, USA

From modernity’s onset, social theorists have been announcing the death of meaning, at the hands of market forces, impersonal power, scientific expertise, and the pervasive forces of rationalization and industrialization. Yet, cultural structures and processes have proved surprisingly resilient. Relatively autonomous patterns of meaning – sweeping narratives and dividing codes, redolent if elusive symbols, fervent demands for purity and cringing fears of pollution – continue to exert extraordinary effects on action and institutions. They affect structures of inequality, racism and marginality, gender and sexuality, crime and punishment, social movements, market success and citizen incorporation. New and old new media project continuous symbolic reconstructions of private and public life.

As contemporary sociology registered the continuing robustness of cultural power, the new discipline of cultural sociology was born. How should these complex cultural processes be conceptualized? What are the best empirical ways to study social meaning? Even as debates rage around these field-specific theoretical and methodological questions, a broadly cultural sensibility has spread into every arena of sociological study, illuminating how struggles over meaning affect the most disparate processes of contemporary social life.

Bringing together the best of these studies and debates, the American Journal of Cultural Sociology publicly crystallizes the cultural turn in contemporary sociology. By providing a common forum for the many voices engaged in meaning-centered social inquiry, the AJCS will facilitate communication, sharpen contrasts, sustain clarity, and allow for periodic condensation and synthesis of different perspectives. The journal aims to provide a single space where cultural sociologists can follow the latest developments and debates within the field.

We welcome high quality submissions of varied length and focus: contemporary and historical studies, macro and micro, institutional and symbolic, ethnographic and statistical, philosophical and methodological. Contemporary cultural sociology has developed from European and American roots, and today is an international field. The AJCS will publish rigorous, meaning-centered sociology whatever its origins and focus, and will distribute it around the world.

Our first issue will publish in the first quarter of 2013 but accepted articles will appear earlier online. Submissions will be anonymously reviewed.

For more information about AJCS, and to access our online submission system, please visit our website at www.palgrave-

Members’ News and Notes

New Publications

Articles


Books


