A Message from the Editors

In this issue of Perspectives, we have assembled three very stimulating and original essays. First, Abrutyn’s attempt to renew an evolutionary take on institutions and institutional change provides a renewed challenge to institutional analysis in sociology from what he effectively argues is a “forgotten” theoretical perspective. We hope that Abrutyn’s intervention opens up avenues of dialogue between one of the “oldest” traditions of institutional analysis and some of its more recent descendants.

Second, Mahler’s fascinating brief to “bring the passions back in” to our analysis of social action in fields of striving—and in particular his formulation of the passions as “modalities of engagement”—strikes us as one of the most productive formulations in the sociological theorizing of emotions and passions that we have come across recently. Mahler makes creative use of the work of Pierre Bourdieu, deftly showing how political sociology can move away from a sole concern with symbols and representation and toward a more well-rounded integration of passionate engagement in the pursuit of power and influence.

Finally, Collet provides a creative integration between two influential theories of social cognition that have surprisingly not been brought together yet: that provided by Bourdieu through his construct of habitus, and that developed by Herbert Simon through his own influential construct of bounded rationality. Collet shows that Bourdieu and Simon’s approaches differ in some fundamental respects, but can also be thought of as complementary. He goes on to demonstrate how a combined Bourdieu-Simon model can shed light on some analytical problems in contemporary theorizing in economic sociology regarding the dynamics of emergence and change in socio-political fields.

Enjoy!

—Dustin Kidd, Erika Summers-Effler & Omar Lizardo

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Letter to the Editors

On a Putative Paradigm

Christopher Porto, University of Virginia

Douglas A. Marshall has recently claimed (“The Dangers of Purity: On the Incompatibility of ‘Pure Sociology’ and Science,” Sociological Quarterly 49: 209-235) that the approach of prominent and well-known theorist Donald Black, called “pure sociology,” is inherently “unscientific” and “impossible.” Is it? Black’s work has been challenged from various points of view in the past, but Marshall’s arguments are surprising and seemingly more severe than others. Marshall develops some interesting criticisms of Black’s work, including that Black’s work is not entirely “pure” because it includes psychological terms and ideas, but none of Marshall’s criticisms demonstrate his central thesis. It is the view of the present author that Black’s work can and should be evaluated in scientific terms. I briefly address why.

If Douglas A. Marshall’s approach was applied to sociology and research endeavors outside of sociology, then a considerable amount of theory (including conceptual and classification systems) and research would be similarly deemed lacking in value from any scientific or empirical point of view. Would he similarly argue that ideas or research developed under other frameworks are inherently unscientific?

Phenomenology and the related framework of ethnomethodology are recognized to be agnostic if not hostile to science and scientific standards, and yet theory and research occurring within or derived from these frameworks are widely recognized as valuable to sociology and social science in general (see, e.g., Collins 1988). In addition, unlike the approach advocated by Douglas A. Marshall, Black (1981; see also interview in Justo, Singer, and Buoro 2002) questions the scientific orientation of anthropologists, including Max Gluckman and others, yet still finds the work of various anthropologists highly valuable for his purposes. Should the works of all of the above be considered lacking in...
Putting the “Institution” Back in Institutional Analysis: An Evolutionary Approach

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Introduction
The core of sociological theory has been rooted in institutional analysis since before the discipline became legitimated in university curricula. Comte and Spencer began their examination of the social world through the lens of institutions, realizing that these were the foundational blocks of human societies. More importantly, Durkheim, upon delineating the theoretical and methodological agenda of sociology in his Rules (1895), asserted that “sociology can be defined as the science of institutions, their genesis and their functioning” (45). Of course Marx’s model of social structure—base and superstructure—is predicated on the economic institution determining others such as polity and law. And finally, while Weber used the concept ‘social orders’ to discuss macro social structure, it is obvious orders and institutions are synonymous in meaning. Taken together, these works represent what I refer to as ‘classical institutional analysis’ or the classical tradition.

Undergirding the variation in the classical tradition are four shared elements of institutions. First, institutions are macro in the sense that they are constituted by congeries of individual and corporate actors. Second, institutions organize and orient actors’ behaviors and attitudes through socialization and enforcement of the ‘rules of the game’—that is, institutions have a system of authority complete with mechanisms of social control, be they instrumental, normative, and/or cognitive. Third, institutions coordinate and control the production, distribution, exchange, and consumption of certain resources, both material and symbolic. Thus, actors, rules, and resources comprise the heart of institutions. Fourth, institutions arrange actors in social space by providing a division of labor that is both horizontal, e.g. role positions, and vertical, e.g. status positions; the division of labor reveals the underlying structure of institutions and the distribution of resources, including those associated with the system of authority—i.e., power, prestige, and wealth.

Underlying these elements is a meta-theoretical aspect of the classical canon: a commitment to evolutionary theorizing—that is, the classical tradition applied historical-comparative methods—albeit unevenly and often unsuccessfully—in search of some general laws of sociocultural evolution that could explain how societies changed over time (for an excellent review, see Sanderson 2007). As the classical tradition took shape amidst the Darwinian revolution, it is not difficult to understand why evolutionary theory inspired their thinking. A closer look at the classical tradition’s work will highlight the fact that it wasn’t societies that were evolving en toto, but rather their institutions. Differentiation, the key process of functionalist change, was rooted in organismic adaptation to environmental pressures; the structures that grew more complex were, in large part, institutions. For Marx, it was the economic institution that changed in each evolutionary epic, reconfiguring the division of labor—and, therefore, social relationships. Weber, who would probably disagree with my assessment of his work, was concerned with one primary process of sociocultural evolution: rationalization. While he never explicitly argued in terms recognizable to evolutionists, it is clear that he felt the underlying force driving social change was rationality; and, while he never presented clear stages of rationalization, Weber did see growth in scale and complexity in macro social orders such as religious or political orders as being typical.

Institutions in post-classical Social Theory
While the classical tradition permeated our field’s history, something changed over the last 40 years. To be sure, sociologists like Jonathan Turner, Gerhard Lenski, and Niklas Luhmann have continued to expand and elaborate the classic tradition, updating and correcting it. But, it is not implausible to suggest that eclecticism and the rise of New Institutionalism (e.g., Meyer and Rowan 1977) has all but relegated the classical tradition to the furthest reaches of sociology, only to be mentioned in courses on Classical Theory, with little emphasis on the tradition and more focus on the divisions between, say, Marx and Durkheim. Without a doubt, many of the criticisms that pushed the classical tradition to the side were fair and correct. First, the so-called evolutionary theory posited by the classical tradition—and many others like William Sumner writing during that time—was shrouded in ethnocentrism, yet...
nocentric and misogynistic notions that prevailed in the 19th century; the dark side of social Darwinism, Eugenics, was inexorably linked to the thinking of Spencer and Sumner. Second, classificatory schemes—like Henry Morgan's ([1877] 1996), which used terms like ‘savage’ or ‘barbarian’ to describe 'uncivilized peoples'—were based on faulty and ideological notions of sociocultural 'progress'.

Finally, Parsons, whose grand theoretical scheme and general hold over sociological discourse cast a larger-than-life shadow over the classical tradition, arguably made matters worse as his thinking and the classical tradition became inextricably linked in many sociologists' eyes. For the classical theorists mentioned above, institutions were vibrant structural dimensions of social life; and, while one could plausibly argue Marx or Durkheim reified these structures, a closer look at their work reveals a concern for real humans doing real things, interacting with each other, and, ultimately, constructing the good and bad aspects of social life. With Parsons, the human side was perceptibly sucked out through abstracted models consisting of boxes within boxes. The relatively static nature of his model did not help either, as it ignored one of the key questions that the classical tradition asked: what evolutionary processes lead to social change? By the time Parsons (1964) sought to rectify this glaring mistake, it was too late: classic institutional analysis and evolutionary thinking had been pushed to the background and, I argue, the result has been detrimental to our science.

I must offer a caveat, lest I be misinterpreted: evolutionary theory and institutional analysis are not the only tools in the sociological toolbox. My argument, essentially, is that much of sociology has ignored the important theoretical and methodological contributions the classical tradition offers at our loss. Indeed, many exciting and important questions can neither be answered through institutional analysis, nor evolutionary theory. What the classical tradition offers, though, are strategies for pursuing a science of society, one that truly looks at all societies and not just American society in the late 20th-early 21st centuries; one that is willing to understand the family in contemporary capitalist societies in relation to families in hunter-gatherer or early state societies—explaining why some aspects are the same, and why some have changed. There is an excitement in the classical tradition borne out of the threads connecting all human societies and their institutions as much, if not more so, than the variations that lead one to wonder why sociocultural changes occur. For a discipline so impacted by the ‘holy trinity’ of Marx, Durkheim, and Weber we have strayed from their basic arguments: for Marx, it was cultivating and developing an historical consciousness; for Durkheim, it was beginning with institutions and understanding how and why they work; and for Weber, it was examining the way institutional orders impacted individual and corporate action, and vice versa.

In the remainder of this essay I would like to revisit the classical tradition, rehabbing it in such a way as to offer a potential strategy for future work in institutional analysis. In doing so, I hope to spark debate regarding the place and role of classical institutional analysis. Without question, there are other dimensions of institutional analysis that I cannot approach either because of my own interests or because of the limitations inherent in an essay like this. Moreover, I ask the reader to bear with me, as some aspects of my argument will have to be underdeveloped and saved for a format that is more suited to elaboration.

Defining Institutions

Let’s begin this discussion by returning to the shared elements proposed by the classic canon and offering a more formal definition of institutions. For my purposes, institutions are congees of nested corporate and individual actors organized by and organized around universal human concerns, who reveal a vertical and horizontal social and technical division of labor; whose actions, goals, and decisions are facilitated and constrained by the available material and symbolic resources; and the extent system of authority. Above, I briefly discussed the four elements that emerge out of the classical tradition; being that these elements’ meanings are widely shared, I will not elaborate upon them anymore than I already have. I have added, however, a fifth element requiring some elaboration—universal human concerns—that I believe connects the four elements constituting institutional space and is implicit to the classical tradition.

Universal human concerns are concerns that can and do motivate individuals and corporate actors to act in ways that potentially may restructure their environment. They are not societal concerns per se; rather they are individual concerns that can be shared by others in a group. And while these concerns are individual and/or corporate concerns, failure to address them may lead to the collapse or conquest of a society. Nevertheless, universal concerns are not synonymous with old functionalist needs or requisites. First, some concerns may be more salient than others in a given time and space. Second, even when salient (a) it is possible their importance is underestimated, (b) attempts to satisfy these concerns may or may not occur, (c) attempts may or may not be successful, and (d) societies and smaller social units can and do continue to exist even when some concerns are not fully satisfied. Third, there are universal institutional solutions to particular concerns—i.e., biological reproduction has historically organized and been organized by the kinship institution—but, the content of the institution is dependent upon environmental, historical, and social factors that contribute to the variation that we see across time and space. Fourth, in constructing or reconfiguring existing institutional domains, some segments of the population may not have adequate access to resources that satisfy their concerns because of structural or cultural obstacles; moreover, institutional domains are never guaranteed to do what they were originally invented to do, especially when new concerns are institutionalized within extant institutional domains. Thus, kinship may have been originally organized around biological reproduction, but could be easily reconfigured to reflect some kinship entrepreneur’s interest in power, prestige, and/or wealth, ultimately subverting or reorganizing the distribution of resources associated with bio-

continued on next page
logical reproduction. Finally, some concerns are universal because all people in all societies are capable of perceiving them, even if it is only once in their lifetime.

From the classical tradition’s standpoint, then, a primary difference between preliterate societies and modern societies is simply population size and density: the more people there are in smaller spaces, the more likely each concern will become salient. In a society of 20 people, problems of justice are not likely to occur very often or, possibly, at all. In a society of 300 million, the frequency with which laws or norms are violated will increase in scale and magnitude such that justice will be a constant salient human concern. Though not exhaustive, other universal concerns that come to mind are: defense (of cultural and physical boundaries); communication with the supramundane; collective decision-making; truth and knowledge; beauty; subsistence; cultural reproduction; physical and mental health; communication; and leisure.

If we agree on the premises of universal human concerns, a few interesting questions arise, guiding institutional analysis. What human concerns are the most basic to social organization—that is, are there any concerns that must be satisfied for a society to continue to exist? What makes some concerns more salient than others? How are universal concerns linked to differentiation and sociocultural evolution? Can new concerns emerge in different social contexts, and if so, how? Do some actors, based on the physical or cognitive location in social space experience some concerns more frequently than others? If so, why? The underlying point is that human concerns are the motivating factor driving social action, and, as Weber suggested, by understanding which concerns are most salient to which actors—especially, corporate actors—we can explain why certain lines of actions are chosen over others, which goals are most relevant and pursued over others, and which processes of decision-making have the most influence over others. Furthermore, as we shall see, making human concerns universal and adding an evolutionary framework to this argument allows us to compare societies across time and space, enriching the potential of institutional analysis and contributing greatly to a science of society.

What is being proposed is not entirely new, but rather being made explicit and, presumably in the future, made systematic and formalized in testable propositions. Luhmann’s (1982, 1984, 2004) work, for example, on human institutions hinges on problems arising because of external or internal exigencies that facing people and groups and, subsequently, the types of solutions that they attempt to employ in order to resolve these problems—with varying success, of course. For Luhmann, as well as Turner and Lenski, institutions are complex social structures meant to reduce external or environmental complexity. In a world full of seemingly unlimited possibilities, ontological security requires boundaries that reduce the number of possibilities and risks inherent in any given set of possibilities (Giddens 1984). I have given a name to the motivating force and have begun to draw some parameters around it. Moreover, by doing so, I am offering a clear definition of institutions—as cultivated from the classical tradition—that can allow sociologists to share some understanding and meaning when using the concept in debate and discourse. The final task of this essay will be to link evolutionary theory with the conceptualization of institutions posited above. By doing so, I hope to present some empirical and historical context to an otherwise abstract and seemingly static understanding of social structure.

Institutions as Evolutionary Adaptations

In evolutionary biology, the primary mechanism driving evolution is natural selection, with variation in genotypes and phenotypes being the material selected for or against. In sociology, it would be foolish to assume that random variation is at play in institutional evolution. Because societies consist of aggregates of conscious beings capable of making decisions and setting goals based on their subjective assessment of the biotic and social environment, we must acknowledge that intentions play an important role in sociocultural evolution. Likewise, we must supplant natural selection with social or group selection. It is posited, then, that social institutions evolve and grow more complex because individuals and/or corporate actors perceive pressures to adapt by selecting some solution that presumably can reduce the pressure. We can give some specificity to the term ‘pressures’ by thinking historically and noting the limited number of exigencies that all societies can potentially face. For example, population pressures are ubiquitous even in societies such as the U.S. where resource scarcity appears to not be problematic. Without a doubt, population pressures contribute to selection pressures that lead individuals and corporate actors to make decisions and seek solutions (Turner 1995). The solutions, when relatively successful and diffused throughout a social collective, become the foundations of institutions.

That is, when actors, resources, and rules emerge in the process of resolving selection pressures around some universal human concern—as well as the production, distribution, and consumption of material and symbolic resources associated with satisfying it—we can say that an institution has begun the process of differentiation. It is entirely possible that extant institutions can diversify by employing existing institutional actors and resources to solve new problems, but there are thresholds where old solutions and structures can no longer the logistical loads produced by problems that have increased in magnitude. For instance, in the face of a growing population and geographic circumscription preventing social segmentation, pressures emerge around integration—that is, how do we coordinate social activities in cooperative efforts—and collective decision-making—how do we fairly authorize certain actors to make binding social decisions? The solution has always been to differentiate political institutional actors, resources, and rules. Admittedly, I have simplified the process for arguments sake, but the point still stands: the same forces leading to the growth of chieftdoms in early societies are at play, as small associational groups become formal organizations under the pressure of population, integration, and collective decision-making.

All that remains is to link the macro forces pressuring societies and the micro forces leading to concerns becoming salient. Indeed, most individuals or groups, in selecting one solution over another, do not perceive something like population... continued on page 11
stands as one of the most obvious examples of the double-sided nature of action, there are many others to be found in the history of social thought. Other valuable considerations of the duality of action can be found in such diverse strands of social theory as the pragmatist thought of William James and John Dewey, the phenomenological insights of Michael Polanyi, and the psychoanalysis of Sigmund Freud. While Goffman, highlighted the visible/invisible layering of social interaction, James pointed to the dual nature of all perception and consciousness. For James, our senses are “organs of selection” so that “Accentuation and Emphasis are present in every perception we have” as they call attention to certain objects or stimuli while casting aside others (2000: 187). Similarly, Dewey argued against the dominance of the reflex-arc hypothesis in psychology that saw action as resulting from an external stimulus activating an organ of perception, which would in turn transfer a signal to the brain, and then ultimately trigger the appropriate behavior (1896). Instead, Dewey argued that actions themselves served as quasi-filters, determining which stimuli are important in a given setting and which others are overlooked as being superfluous.

Polanyi, meanwhile, asserted the embodied duality of all perception and action. He posited that meaning and knowledge were only possible in dis-attending from our bodies and their internal processes and attending to the objects of our action; it is only in attending to these objects that we are able to understand our own bodily processes, including our own senses (1966/1967: 14). If we focus too closely on a face that is familiar to us – if we focus too hard on what we are seeing and try to determine what the specific features of the face are that make it recognizable – we are no longer able to recognize the face, as it ceases to be recognizable as a face among faces and becomes simply a combination of disparate parts. But if we attend from the specific features of the face, to the face as a whole, it again becomes recognizable for us (10). Finally, the work of Freud can also be read as a running commentary on the dualistic nature of social life, as he illustrated that for every visible or recognizable expression of one’s consciousness, there is an invisible, repressed layer of meaning – which, for him, ultimately entailed unconscious wishes or desires. And for Freud, there was a necessity to this duality – a functional reason to divide psychic operations between a conscious and an unconscious level – which was of course to avoid the internal conflict and pain created by the conflicting demands of one’s id and super-ego formations.

Taken together, these theories present a compelling argument for the dualistic nature of action. Contrary to theories that see one’s self as being clearly delimited and housed within the confines of the physical body, such a dualistic theory of action explodes the falsely static categories of subject/object and brings into relief the ever-changing relationship between self and world. While the visible body may be distinctly bounded by flesh, there is always another phenomenal or lived body that is extending beyond the boundaries of our physical body and inhabiting the world – as in Polanyi’s formulations described above – just as the world can be said to be inhabiting us and allowing us to make sense of our inner bodily processes (again it is in attending from our body to the world that we are able to give meaning to what our senses continued on next page
are telling us). Moreover, this relationship between the visible and the invisible, as analyzed by Merleau-Ponty, is itself continually changing as there is no set way in which the chiasm between subject and object is intertwined (1969).

Concurrent with the changing figurations between subject/object, self/world, visible/invisible are the changing figurations within one’s self/psyche/or habitus. Beneath the artifice of one’s visible self or conscious knowledge, is another deeper layer, a self only revealed backstage, a desire repressed. Just as one’s relationship to the world is continually changing, the relationship between repressed or hidden meanings and one’s visible self is also continually evolving; a self kept backstage for one scene is now shown front-stage, and in showing itself front-stage, it pushes another version of self back-stage; new relationships give meaning to past desires, but they in turn involve their own psychic compromises.

Thus, although the tendency is to speak in terms of subject/object, consciousness/world there is never an autonomous transcendental subject acting upon a world of objects. At best there are changing constellations between both the various parts of one’s self and one’s self in relationship to the world. Passions, then, are one’s varying modalities of engagement with the world – ways of inhabiting the world that bring into relief certain objects within the actional field and in so doing, bring to the foreground specific parts of one’s self – just as bringing certain parts of one’s self to the foreground, necessarily propels one into the world in unique ways. To put it differently, it is in inhabiting the world in unique ways that it in turn provokes us to respond, calling forth parts of our selves otherwise hidden. As modalities of engagement, passions, then are inextricably a component of action in that one can never separate oneself from the world – one can never “turn off” the intertwining between self and world – one cannot but help to be passionate. The challenge of sociology, then, is to delineate, dissect, and understand the various ways in which this intertwining between self and world – this sensuous engagement – is accomplished, how it is accomplished as part of our ongoing practical achievements, and what its effects are.

Passions, Meaning, and the Problem of Intersubjectivity

As modalities of engagement, passions directly challenge existing modes of sociological analysis that most closely associate meaning with symbols. In contrast to this vein of thinking, meaning is not just a product of the symbols we employ, nor is it simply the product of our taking others into account. There is also a passionate aspect to meaning, as our bodily engagements and involvements with things continually draw boundaries between what is significant to us and what is not. Here the example of structural linguistics and structuralism, more broadly, are revealing in terms of what they have shown in regards to language and cultural systems; meaning is not to be found in the specific word or cultural object, but in its relation of difference to the complete system of symbols. The same goes for one’s varying forms of engagement with the world – or passions. Our passions have meaning for us not because of their supposed teleological nature – or because of the qualities of the object that we are said to be passionate about, including its otherness, as is presumed in many strands of philosophical thought – but also because of the differential qualities of these engagements. It is this differential quality of our passions – this aesthetic – in which we commit ourselves to certain lines of action, and in so doing, cast darkness on other lines of action which heretofore may have been bathed in the bright light of day – that characterizes action as distinctly sensuous and meaningful. As Ostrow puts it, “[W]e not only orient to the environment through conduct and consciousness; we also undergo it and are taken or repelled by it with varying degrees of intensity. The qualities of things are at once qualities of our involvements with them, which is to say, it is through experience that the material world matters personally” (Ostrow 1990: 3, emphasis mine).

Thus, the nature of our engagements with the world shapes our experiences of it. They determine whether a specific social world is experienced as something that is pulling us to it, or pushing us away from it – as something that is either familiar to us or foreign to us. Thus in contrast with how the problem of inter-subjectivity has generally been understood as the degree to which agents share the same mental schemata or perspectives on the world, as in Schutz’s famous essay, “Don Quixote and the Problem of Reality” (1962) – we must also recognize that our engagements with the world, or in a word, our passions, also affect the degree to which our experiences are otherworldly and the degree to which they are commensurate with the experiences of others.

On the Relational and Functional Nature of Passions

Because passions are modalities of engagement, ways in which agents inhabit the world, if one is to understand their genesis and functioning, one must focus not only on the varying states of the agent but also on the varying social worlds in which the agent is (or is not) engaged. To understand passions, then, is to understand them relationally. One must resist the temptation to speak of passion as a singular state, as though there was a singular transcendental passion that captures the essence of all passions, just as one must resist the temptation to view passions as the unique gifts, commitments or charismatic nature of the individual. Passions exist only in the relation between an agent (including his or her own inner relations) and a given social space or social world. The challenge for sociology is to construct a model that can take into account the diversity of modalities of engagements, the diversity of social worlds to which they are tied, and the ways in which the former are cause, consequence, and stake in the functioning of the later.

To construct such a model, the work of Pierre Bourdieu is incredibly instructive, particularly his analysis of group formation as laid out in Distinction (1984) and his seminal work on fields, The Rules of Art (1996). While agents are inevitably classified by their position in social space (based on both the amount and the relative proportion of the species of capital that they possess), they also struggle to impose classification schemes such as high/low, distinguished/vulgar, good/bad, pretty/ugly, etc. on the world in a strategic manner that ensures them the best possible positioning in that social space (1984). But for Bourdieu, these classification struggles cannot be properly understood if they are simply seen as the strategic efforts of individual agents alone, because these struggles are also fundamentally a product of the oppositional structures of fields themselves. Thus, struggles over the legitimacy of classification schemes are at the same time struggles over the legitimacy of the existing structures of fields. While Bourdieu generally focuses on schemata of perception, how they reflect one’s position within the field, and how they in turn lend themselves to struggles over the social
world, I would argue that the same could be said for passions – that they too function as classificatory schemas, albeit an embodied version, and that they too play a role in the struggle for legitimacy within fields.

For example, in my ethnographic research on professional politics (Mahler 2006), I have found that the passion of the politico is a central element to deciphering both the logic of political practice and to explaining the struggles of everyday political life. As a modality of engagement, there is no one variable that can be easily captured, parsed, or measured as an indicator of political passion. Instead, I examine and identify the passion of the politico through a variety of indicators including the way in which politicos relate to their own physical bodies; how they project their phenomenological bodies into actional scenes; how they frame interactions; and the symbolic strategies that they employ therein. Together, these elements help to comprise the unique passion of the politico, a modality of engagement in which the politico is continually reaching out, identifying the fatefulness pregnant in everyday encounters and events, and carving up new possibilities for action – possibilities for taking a stand, putting their being on-the-line, and constructing a transcendent universal self. In this sense, Weber was half right when he said that, “to take a stand, to be passionate—ira et studium—is the politician’s element, and above all the element of the political leader (1946/1958: 95). But taking a stand is only one side – the more visible side – of the passion of politicos.

While taking a stand, advocating a set of policies, positions, or ideals is indeed a central element to the passion of politicos, politicos also share a tacit appreciation that these stands are only made possible through an active engagement with the world. As a result, politicos believe that taking a stand is something that is hardly accidental, and instead understand it to be the product of an active effort to carve out the space into which they can deploy or insert these ideas. Ideas, then, according to the perspective of politicos, do not somehow simply manifest themselves – nor does the inherent truthfulness of ideas somehow emerge through the natural course of history. Nay, politicos share a tacit understanding that politics is the arena in which ideas are actively brought about – made manifest, made real – through the ongoing battles and struggles to bring them into fruition. But what such an appreciation necessarily implies for politicos is that everyone else is also playing the game, or as the metaphors used by politicos suggest – that everyone else is also fighting the war; thus, the passion of politicos is hardly a matter of a simple love for or respect for ideas. A contrario, the world of politics is centered on how ideas are articulated with history, or to put it differently, how they are successfully deployed in a given time and place.

Thus, while politics is manifestly about representation (ideas), the recognition by politicos’ will is intimately involved in making those ideas become real – that politics is about both will and representation to borrow the famous Schopenhauerian aphorism — inevitably leads to a degree of cynicism and/or suspicion about the ongoing routines and rituals of political life. Although politicos, on one hand, throw themselves into battles – willfully engaging in daily political struggles – even doing so with alacrity – they, on the other, also recognize that there is a degree of arbitrariness to their positions or ideas – that their positions are in a word, political – and are tied into ongoing struggles to wield and maintain power. Thus the passion of the politico is one characterized by great conflict – riven with both belief and cynicism. If we return to Bourdieu, then what distinguishes the politico of modern democracies is not just the mental schemata that they employ but their passion, their unique modality of engagement with the world and how ‘naturally’ they can hide this contradiction between belief and cynicism. As one operative put it, “In politics, words are meaningless. It isn’t what you say, but how you say it. Every aspect of the phrases a candidate spews forth are insignificant except for how he emotes them… if you didn’t personally believe what you were spinning, you’d damned well better work yourself into a lather until you looked and sounded like you did – that if you were ever to be a true political player, you had to indoctrinate yourself” (Raymond 2008: 13-14).

Conclusion

Marx’s diagnosis that the chief defect of materialism and idealism lay in their inability to fully appreciate the sensuous side of human activity remains true today, apropos of current modes of sociological thinking. One need only quickly peruse the dominant figures or models used to conceptualize social action in order to realize the degree to which an appreciation of human sensuality is still largely absent from social thought. While the limitations of this essay allow me to adumbrate only the most provisional of sketches on how one might study passions sociology, it is my hope that this essay might inspire other sociologists to take on the challenge of developing the range of theories and analytical instruments needed to properly treat passions as a social fact.

References


Competing ‘Models of Man’? Examining the Relationship between Simon’s ‘Bounded Rationality’ and Bourdieu’s Habitus

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Introduction
Herbert Alexander Simon’s notion of bounded rationality is often taken for granted in economic sociology and many other fields. The work of Bourdieu has also had considerable influence in economic sociology. He is recognized as one of the authors to consider when entering the field (Smelser and Swedberg 2005). But the concept of habitus is not considered mainstream and the two authors not frequently read together. I propose to compare Bourdieu’s and Simon’s analytical approaches to show how habitus can be a source of insight. In short, Bourdieu’s concept of habitus seems to be more fruitful when examining cases of disruptive events. The contrast between Bourdieu and Simon is most salient when agents face situations that challenge the structure of the field in which they are embedded.

The problematic around the concept habitus can be summarized as follows: It is an invitation to understand what influences the view that agents have of their own actions without reducing them to a model, and by doing so “doing away with the agent” (Bourdieu [1980] 1990). This issue may seem vague or easy to resolve when stated in general terms, but it has proven to be substantial in practice, as “the failure of armchair economics” shows (Simon 1997a). Bourdieu proposed habitus as a tool help to deal with this problem. By contrast, I find that Simon’s intuition/habit versus analytical thought framework, inherited from the early stages of the development of psychology (Camic 1986), leaves little room for unconscious action that is not reduced to the use of memory. This especially becomes a problem when analyzing periods of crisis in the agent’s environment.

The idea that Bourdieu is particularly suited for analyzing the different behavior of agents in a context of radical change might appear to run contrary to some analyses (Sewell 1992). But response to disruptive change is an important aspect of Bourdieu’s work starting with his early ethnographies of Algerian workers and farmers (Bourdieu 1979). I argue that Bourdieu’s habitus, in relation to the concept of field, is likely to yield very promising results for economic sociology as well as other field when analyzing the consequence of disruptive events.

Introduction to the notion of habitus: To what extent do agents take things for granted?

The concept of habitus helps to make sense of empirical observations. It is not the product of a purely theoretical reflection (Bourdieu 1985); however, it has deep theoretical foundations that can be contrasted with the roots Simon’s habit/analytical thought duality. The notion of habitus relies on the observation that in our most conscious thoughts we cannot but take some things for granted. This very basic insight might have the false appearance of a truism. But it goes against a number of historical traditions in philosophy and social sciences. The Cartesian ego is probably the most prominent example of a perspective that considers that our intellectual reflections guide our actions. But as Ryle (1949) points out, if for any operation to be intelligently executed, an intelligent theoretical operation had to be executed first, it would be logically impossible for anyone to act intelligently. Taken to its absurd conclusion, the subject would have to reflect on how to reflect. He would have to regress indefinitely to the criteria used to justify each judgment at each level – which would lead to complete stasis. If one is convinced by Ryle’s argument, one must conclude that our behavior always comprises an implicit component. The concept of habitus naturally stems from this view. According to Wacquant, Bourdieu’s conception of habitus relates to “lasting dispositions or trained capacities and structured propensities to think, feel, and act in determinate ways, which then guide [agents] in their creative responses to the constraints and solicitations of their extant milieu.” (Wacquant 2004).

The habitus of each agent is a product of his individual history and implies that he is able to follow rules without referring to them (Bourdieu [1997a] 2000; Bourdieu [2000] 2005). The view that agents have of the world and their actions tends to be framed by their past experience and their current position in social field. This is the case in part because agents develop, by necessity, a practical sense of orientation that guides them in their actions. The taken-for-granted character of this sense of orientation does not call for examination by the agents themselves because the choices that are the product of this practical sense seem self-evident, beyond questioning. Therefore agents appear to follow rules while at the same time retaining their agency. They are not pure free subjects, but they cannot be reduced to objects that apply rules automatically.

Having defined habitus, I now turn to Herbert Simon’s theory of action. His work has been immensely influential in economics, management, and organizational sociology. For this reason it constitutes a useful anchoring point from which to evaluate Bourdieu’s contribution, and to consider new insights into economic sociology research.

Herbert Simon’s Sciences of the Artificial

Overall, Simon’s framework contributes to a theory of a “boundedly rational” agent. Agents are boundedly rational in the sense that they are limited in their ability to retrieve, store, and process information. They attend to particular pieces of information, ignore others, and settle for “good-enough” or “satisficing” solutions to the problems they face, partly on the basis of their past experience. They do not face a menu of pre-established alternatives from which to choose, but have do find them through a work of exploration.

For Simon, human beings are simple systems whose behavior reflects the complexity of the environment they live in (see Simon 1996 p. 110)). Intuitive thinking, understanding, learning and discovering are not the product of some miracle but can be “decomposed” into simple components. Among these processes, intuition is the most proximate to the concept of habitus.

Simon viewed intuition or expertise (or “non-logical processes,” in Chester Barnard’s sense of the term (Barnard [1938] 1968), as “analyses frozen into continued on next page
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habits and into the capacity for rapid response through recognition” (Simon 1986; Simon 1987; Simon 1997b). Intuition is less time consuming than analytical thought and can be a substitute for it. It directs which stimuli we attend to and how we respond to these. As a result we may give greater weight to certain pieces of information or alternatives even when faced with a problem that lies outside of our particular domain of competence or our particular environment.

Some differences between Simon and Bourdieu relevant to habitus

*Intentional and unconscious behavior*

The duality “habit” versus “analytical thought” is a key difference between Bourdieu and Simon. For Simon, agents rely on their expert memory, and they do not do so consciously (Vera and Simon 1993). Moreover, the reliance of agents on intuition or “analyses frozen into habits” does not mean that they are entirely passive. An agent may have recourse to conscious attention when a habitual response is inappropriate. For example, a driver has to restrain herself from the habit of applying her brakes when she skids on an icy pavement (see Simon 1997b, p.99-100). By contrast, Bourdieu’s agents respond to such a disruptive event always with an unconscious component, their habitus, even when they think of their action as conscious. The habitus of Algerian farmers projected into a colonial capitalist economy (Bourdieu 1979) and the different habituses of university faculty members (Bourdieu 1988[1984]) guide their behavior in times of crisis. But this unconscious component does not mean that agents necessarily reproduce past behavior. Their responses take into account the evolution of the social fields in which there are embedded.

Bourdieu’s and Simon’s views on language are also indicative of their differences about the duality habit/intuition and analytical thought. Simon was interested in how complex language structures can be produced out of simple generative mechanisms, as in programming languages such as Lisp and Prolog. Agents make sense of a sentence using decomposition mechanisms, and link context to meaning through learned associations with nonlinguistic cues (Simon 1996). By using the concept of “habitus” instead of habit, Bourdieu reminded his readers that agents cannot be reduced to these rules (Bourdieu et al. 1991). The term is a warning about the problems inherent in the stimulus-response view of action that Simon’s cognitive approaches encourage.

*Bound rationality and the social*

Both Simon and Bourdieu believed that social environment influences perceptions and expectations. Environment conditions experience. This experience serves as a compass that orients future behavior. But the different way in which Simon and Bourdieu treat the social illustrates further how habitus differs from the bound rationality perspective.

For example, Simon placed a stronger emphasis on an analytical view of human action. He viewed habits as “frozen analyses.” By contrast, a habitus can be related to a component of an agent’s behavior that does not involve calculation or analysis. Habitus does not have to be about memory and pattern recognition. For example, a Kabyle farmer is shocked when his son asks for payment of a sum of money in proportion to the number of hours worked (Bourdieu 1979; Bourdieu [2000] 2005). It is not impossible to contend that a farmer’s rejection of rational calculations is an analysis frozen into habit, an act of recognition of a situation leading to a rational expectation. One could interpret his reaction as bounded rationality in a society in which family members are highly dependent on each other. In the same way, the lending of an animal in which the lender considers that he is obliged to the borrower despite a significant economic loss could be construed as a form of bounded rationality in relation to the rules of an agrarian society. But in these two cases the term bounded rationality is understood at a quite general level, and it is difficult to map it to the original memory and alternative search mechanisms described by Simon.

Second, while Simon did not neglect the social environment, his treatment differed from what is implied by the notion of habitus in relation to the concept of field. Bourdieu’s used the concept of field when investigating the habituses of the agents he observed. Each social agent incorporates the structure of the social world that surrounds her/him through habitus. It defines what his interest is and how it relates to others interests. Although Simon had a spatial view of the social (Simon 1996 see p. 199), this important relational component is missing in his work. I discuss this difference between Bourdieu and Simon in more concrete terms in the analysis of Fligstein’s political-cultural approach.

*Applying habitus to Fligstein’s “political-cultural approach”*

I propose to discuss Fligstein’s investigation of the rise of the shareholder value during the 1980s (Fligstein 2001b) to compare the analytical approaches inherent in the work of Simon and Bourdieu, and to show how habitus can be a source of insight. Fligstein is relevant for two reasons: First, he is an influential scholar of economic sociology who has contributed to our understanding of the formation and evolution of markets. Second, he has already incorporated in his work some of Bourdieu’s contributions. Examining his work is therefore a conservative test to evaluate how a comparative analysis of Simon and Bourdieu can help to bring new insights into empirical problems in economic sociology.

The 1980s saw a move toward a shareholder model of corporate governance that has had lasting effects on the functioning of the U.S. economy. Fligstein’s argument is that the financial control conception of the firm c suffered a crisis in the U.S during the 1970s, and was subsequently replaced by the shareholder value model. Financial control views a firm as a bundle of assets. The objective of managers is to increase the value of these assets as much as possible. By contrast in a shareholder view of the firm, the focal point of attention is the value of shares. Investors have control over management actions. Fligstein examines several hypotheses to explain this wave of reorganization: a) finance economics, b) manager, owner and bank control, c) political-cultural approach. For the sake of the argument developed here, I focus on the political-cultural approach.

*Bound rationality, habitus, and the rise of the shareholder system*

The perspectives taken by Simon and Bourdieu are congruent with Fligstein’s basic hypothesis. Through identification (Simon) or habitus (Bourdieu), CEOs with a financial background are more inclined to push for reorganization such as a merger for the following reason: These CEOs are more inclined than others to view the difficulties experienced by American corporations in the 1970s in financial terms. *continued on next page*
They think that reorganization such as a merger or divestiture would lead to profitability.

Simon and Bourdieu, however, differed in their perspective on several points. First, if one believes that the rise of shareholder value is so disruptive that CEOs consider prior experience to be irrelevant as a guide to action, Simon’s theory suggests that agents resort to generic search strategies, independent of their profiles. This should erase some of the differences between CEOs who have a financial background and those who do not.

Bourdieu’s approach points in a different direction. It suggests that CEOs with a financial background will have a greater inclination than other CEOs to frame their responses to the rise of shareholder value in financial terms. Second, these background differences between managers need to be considered in relation to the structure of the field in which they are embedded. For example, the distribution of CEO profiles within an industry is important. As Fligstein has suggested, if an industry is dominated by CEOs with financial backgrounds, a reorganization might appear to be the norm. But Bourdieu’s approach also suggests that a number of agents might use the instrument of governance reforms and reorganizations to defend and promote their positions. For example, if there is a rivalry between two types of profiles within an organization or an industry, a wave of governance reforms might be triggered as one group attempts to gain influence or defend its position. This emphasis on the relation between field and individual characteristics points to areas of Fligstein’s framework to which Bourdieu’s perspective can contribute.

Bourdieu’s and Fligstein’s political approach

Fligstein has embraced the notion of field with direct reference to Bourdieu, seeing field as a key tool to understand the working of markets. But in his empirical study, the relation between agent and field has been limited to the proportion of one type of agent, such as CEOs with a financial background. Fligstein has not examined how relative positions between different groups of actors can explain the behavior of agents in a market (Fligstein 2001a). By contrast, this approach is the centerpiece of Bourdieu’s analyses (see Bourdieu 2005 for an economic sociology example). As suggested in the previous section, this linkage between field structure and individual behavior is helpful in explaining how individuals with the same background might respond differently to the same event, depending on the structure of the field in which they are embedded and their positions in this field. The elaboration of this relational perspective could contribute to further the development of Fligstein’s political-cultural approach.

Second, Bourdieu’s theoretical perspective is a useful reminder that habitus does not necessarily work automatically in the best interest of agents. By contrast, Fligstein tends to focus on skilled actors. The actions of skilled actors are instrumental in the development, maintenance, and transformation of fields (Fligstein 2001c).

In his discussions (Fligstein 2001c), Fligstein has tended to assume that the cultural frames (compared to habitus) of skilled actors serve their best interests. There might, however, be a strong mismatch between field and habitus during a period of transition. Habitus can fundamentally misguide agents. The habitus of Algerian workers projected in a colonial capitalist economy is probably the most spectacular example of a mismatch between field and habitus (Bourdieu 1979). All actors involved in a field are exposed, including skilled actors. The political-cultural approach focuses on how markets emerge and how they evolve and respond to crises. A lack of fit between agents’ habitus and field is most likely to occur during these phases of transition. For this reason, it is worthwhile emphasizing that habitus can misfire during these phases, and examining the consequences of this lack of fit on transformation occurring in markets, taking into account agents other than skilled-actors.

Discussion and Conclusion

In the comparative analysis I have identified two main points of divergence. First, I showed that Simon’s perspective relies on a stimulus-response framework. Simon did not look into some of the implications of our unconscious modes of operating. By contrast, Bourdieu proposed that our unconscious mode of operating involves more than a process of recognition. I argued that this difference is likely to be observable in situations in which agents are projected into an environment that is significantly different from what they have been accustomed to.

Second, Simon embraced the idea that most of our knowledge should be viewed as a social process. However, he only referred to the inherent properties of the categories to which we belong and not how they relate to each other. In Bourdieu’s relational approach, each social agent incorporates the relational structure of social fields through habitus. Moreover, I noted that some rational behavior simply does not involve satisfying. Bourdieu’s Algerian farmers engaged in social practices that prohibited calculation.

Taking one example from economic sociology, I have argued that Bourdieu provides some useful ways to think about the behavior of agents in the face of highly uncertain and disruptive situations. I argued that the concept of habitus encourages us to think of the behavior of agents in relation to the overall structure of the field. I do not, however, assume that change always comes from outside, and that agents only respond to it. Struggles occurring between agents vying for dominant positions within a field (Fligstein 2001c) can also transform the social structure. Indeed, major transformation in the field may result from the actions of dominant players (Gomez and Gouty 2007). Second, although I focused on change and found that Bourdieu provides interesting insights on this topic, this does not discount the notion that habitus may be conducive to the reproduction of social structures. The realistic adjustment of agents’ expectations to their social milieu implies that they might consider as normal or fair situations that may seem unfair or unbearable to external observers, thereby contributing to the reproduction of social structures that run counter to their interests. Habitus can be an agent of social reproduction. But one of its attractive features as an idea in relation to the development of contemporary economic sociology is its ability to generate fresh insights into the behavior of agents in the face of disruptive changes, in contrast to Herbert Simon’s more mainstream bounded rationality.

References


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pressures as the root cause of their discomfort. Instead, the engine driving them to act emerges out of a real or perceived decline in their standard of living. Population pressures are the ultimate cause then, and declining standard of living—and the subsequent problems that arise—is the proxy cause of the process of selection. When a person’s solution is implemented, there is never a guarantee of short or long-term success, nor can we say that others will adopt the solution as presented or at all, meaning it may never change the existing social structure. But, when the organizational, technological, and/or symbolic solution is implemented throughout society—either in its pristine or in an altered form—we will see the evolution of institutions occur. With a change in institutional structure, the test of ‘fitness’ comes from whether or not the society continued to exist. To be sure, other analyses can examine the ‘darker’ sides of some solutions—i.e., increased inequality, repression, or environmental degradation; while space will not permit this type of analysis, I would argue a complete assessment of the evolutionary significance of institutions would incorporate the maladaptive consequences.

The update on classical institutional analysis was presented in hopes of sparking lively debate in an area that has long been central to sociological theory, but has recently become moribund. Again, I am not suggesting institutional analysis and evolutionary theory should constitute all of sociological inquiry; I fully embrace the various sub-fields within the discipline and celebrate the vibrant discussions they produce. Rather, I wanted to revisit the classical tradition in order to bring it back to the forefront of sociology because I feel it still has much to offer for a science of society. Much recent work has already been done in this area, but there remain a number of theoretical and methodological tasks left unaddressed; some of which I raised in the body of the essay and some of which will have to be left for future discussions.

References

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Notes
1. Here my thinking on the duality of action and particularly its corporeal nature has been profoundly influenced by the work of Jack Katz. For the best summation of his unique theory of social ontology, see “Start Here: Social Ontology and Research Strategy” (2002).
2. One might argue that gaffes — and the fact that they often become significant ‘issues’ that are fought over and used as evidence of the impurity of an opponent’s stance(s) — prove that taking a stand can indeed happen by accident. Upon closer examination, however, gaffes are merely exceptions that prove the rule: they become political issues read for public consumption only through the manipulation and mobilization of the machinery of politics (i.e. party surrogates expressing outrage over the utterance).
3. Here too, of course, the definition of success is largely a question of politics.

Special Announcement: ASA Section-in-Formation: Disability in Society

We are proud to announce a new Section-in-Formation of the ASA: Disability in Society. The sociological study of disability is expanding sociological theory in many ways. It examines classical and postmodern theories from new vantage points; highlights tensions, overlaps and contradictions in traditional approaches; and develops new approaches to critical areas such as the study of social inequality, identity, technology and the body, and many other areas. Additionally, by highlighting the importance of a disabling society, it raises new questions for the study of social movements, social exclusion, human rights, and identity politics. This new Section-in-Formation is a great place to network, engage with other scholars, discuss recent events, and pursue avenues for grants, teaching, research and service. The Disability section is also pleased to be offering FREE membership to 40 graduate students who are current members of ASA who would like to join the section. We encourage potential members to contact the chairs of the membership committee, Liat Ben Moshe: lbenmosh@maxwell.syr.edu or Mark Sherry: markdsherry@yahoo.com

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any scientific value? Black, for example, draws especially on Gluckman’s idea that the scope of the relationship between the offender and victim, its degree of “multiplexity,” influences legal outcomes. Gluckman showed that legal punishments are less severe and more conciliatory when the extent of the relationship between the offender or alleged offender and victim is more “multiplex” than not, i.e., if they are only weakly acquainted or strangers. Would Douglas A. Marshall question the scientific status of this idea? Black (1976) seeks to show that social closeness, including relational and other forms of social closeness such as cultural closeness, reduces the likelihood and severity of legal punishments. Are the patterns identified in Gluckman’s and Black’s work inherently “unscientific” in nature? Douglas Marshall suggests that they are.

What of ideas and research from belief systems and frameworks occurring outside of science? Even here, modern scientists, including biologists and chemists, regularly seek out shamans and other experts from hunter-gatherer, horticultural, agricultural, and other societies to learn from them about medicinal and other properties of flora and fauna in their areas. Further, in addition to their practical value, biologist Ernst Mayr (1988) considers the conceptual and classification systems of plants and animals by early and less complex societies to be of scientific and intellectual value and interest. Mayr argues that such classification systems often recapitulate the ideas and classification systems of modern biologists. On occasion, epistemology recapitulates ontology.

I agree with Douglas A. Marshall that Black’s “pure” or pristine sociology is not a revolutionary paradigm (compare Porto 2003), and that Black’s framework is contaminated with a degree of psychology and political value commitments that he does not admit. Even so, Marshall is wrong that Black’s work is inherently unscientific. Black’s “paradigm” of “pure sociology,” however, may need to be classified as something else (for an overview of ways of classifying types of science, including “official,” “normal,” and “revolutionary,” science, see Feuer 1982: 252-282).

References