A Cross-National Consensus on a Unified Sociological Theory? Some Inter-Cultural Obstacles

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THE universal fragmentation today of Sociology as a discipline tempts sociological theorists in every nation to question whether a standard set of theories can be formulated that would command consensus across the globe. The discipline would benefit, it would seem, for then the common language shared by sociologists would facilitate communication across nations and among theorists and practitioners, enable the standardization of research methods and procedures, and minimize confusion among students new to the discipline. Are uniform theories at all possible in Sociology?

This query is addressed here in a preliminary manner. A skeptical position is adopted, although one that diverges from familiar arguments on this question. The formulation of consensus theories is rendered improbable, many commentators contend, owing to the penetration of Sociology’s boundaries by adjacent disciplines and the challenges posed by a variety of new approaches: Literary Studies, Cultural Studies, post-Modernism, and post-Structuralism. Even attempts to define the field clearly have been hindered to a great extent by these developments, the critics hold. The radical dispersal today of Sociology’s intellectual capital, they maintain, precludes all attempts to reach consensus.

Although arriving at the same conclusion, this investigation follows a different line of reasoning. Sociology, it will be argued, developed in the context of

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region-based and nation-specific knowledge communities, as well as delineated historical, political, religious, and social dynamics, and hence constitutes a project anchored to a significant extent in the singularity of the regions and nations of its birth. Modes and traditions of sociological analysis varied substantively, and the discipline’s journey was characterized in each region and nation by particular achievements, problems, tensions, dilemmas, and parameters. Moreover, certain approaches and schools in certain regions and nations more effectively withstood external homogenizing pressures. On the other hand, certain modes of analysis typically located deeply in a specific region or nation faded into oblivion as a consequence of international penetrations—only to be rejuvenated in a unique manner at a later point in time.

Sociology’s diverse points of departure and developmental trajectories have frequently hindered in-depth communication among sociologists from varying nations and erected a bulwark against a cross-nation standardization of theories. Indeed, a series of obstacles confronts any search for universal consensus. Even today, and despite the instantaneous communication of the Information Age and the frequent location of scholarship in international communities, pivotal differences remain and continue to anchor an array of nation-specific traditions, approaches, schools, and modes of analysis in sociological theory. All must be, to a great degree, surmounted if consensus in respect to theories is to be achieved.

A short overview of Sociology’s original contours and developmental route in the United States will demarcate its unique American parameters. A brief comparison to the discipline’s point of departure and subsequent pathways in Germany will then serve to delineate further the singularity of the American case. This preliminary rendering, in comparative perspective, of American Sociology’s origin and unfolding unveils a distinct “location” of sociological theory within the discipline and, it will be concluded, an array of obstacles to any linear, cross-nation transposition of theories.

The Contours and Trajectory of American Sociology I: The Pluralistic Foundation, Scientific Orientation, and Incorporation of Microsociology

The founding of Sociology in the United States contrasts most directly to the discipline’s original contours in France. Whereas a mighty Durkheimian pillar anchored Sociology until circa 1950 in France, a pluralism of competing approaches characterized the field in the United States. The works of the evolutionists Lester Ward (1883), Albion Small (1905; see Bernert 1982), William Graham Sumner (1906), Franklin Giddings (1902, 1922), and Edward Alsworth Ross (1901) outlined a macro Sociology (see Bierstedt 1981; Hinkle 1994; Vidich and Lyman 1985), the writings of Jane Addams (1964, 1965) charted an orientation toward social policy (see Cravens 1978, pp. 123-29), the urban Sociology of the Chicago School articulated a social ecology perspective (Park 1952, 1955; Park and Burgess 1921; Matthews 1977; Bulmer 1984; Abbott 1999), and a distinct microsociology was formulated by George Herbert Mead (1934, 1956, 1964) and Charles H. Cooley (1909, 1922). Although in some ways influenced by European theorists, each of these modes of analysis developed in a quintessentially American mode (see Hinkle 1994; Vidich and Lyman 1985; D. Ross 1979, 1991; Camic 1994).

Two central features in particular proved unique to early Sociology in the United States. Each would cast a deep imprint and distinguish the discipline’s original parameters and trajectory from its counterparts in France, England, and Germany. First, American sociologists widely agreed—much more than sociologists in Germany, England, and even France—that the uniqueness of their endeavor could be defined by reference to a particular set of methods. Sociology, it was argued, must distinguish itself from the Humanities and Social Work on the basis of its scientific procedures and a search for general laws (see Mayo-Smith 1895; Small 1916; D. Ross 1979, pp. 125-27; Camic 1995, pp. 1023-24). Hence, empirical observation, statistical methods, and experimental controls became central. Many sociologists sought to adopt natural science methods; an ideal of mathematical exactness and a search for the “laws of social life” became characteristic (see Giddings 1899, 1901; Bannister 1987; Turner and Turner 1990; Oberschall 1972).

Whereas a broadranging Methodenstreit accompanied the discipline’s youth in Germany, a “battle over methods” of comparable intensity and scope failed to crystallize in the early years of American Sociology. On the contrary, the assumption widely reigned that Sociology must constitute a rigorous science unequivocally separate from the Humanities. Among the founders, Giddings most forcefully articulated the scientistic position (1904, 1914).
Social changes occurring in the early decades of the twentieth century accelerated American Sociology's development toward methodologies commonly utilized in the natural sciences. Owing to massive European immigration between 1890 and 1920, the study of population distribution and growth became an important field of investigation. Moreover, unlike in Germany, England, and France, demography established itself firmly within Sociology. The outcome for the discipline was apparent: the push toward positivist approaches and quantitative methods became intensified. The appeal of statistical methods was further enhanced as a consequence of a strong orientation toward "social problems"—for the exact measurement of social tensions, it was believed, would unveil the appropriate policies to be pursued for their alleviation.7

For these reasons,8 American Sociology's early claim to be a rigorous science was further substantiated and its goal to articulate a domain separate from the Humanities became more attainable (see Dodd 1942; Lundgren 1947). The widespread acceptance of, and even enthusiasm for, a strictly law-oriented and statistically-based discipline in the United States implied a far more close embrace of experimental and natural science procedures and methods than occurred in Germany, England, and France. Yet American Sociology's early parameters and trajectory proved unique in a further manner.

Unlike in France, Germany, and England, microsociological modes of analysis acquired prestige from the outset (see Silver, 1990). Indeed, an unambivalent incorporation of microsociology bolstered the American discipline's legitimate claim—as long as microsociology remained distinct from Psychology—over an extended palette of research arenas that Sociology in Europe had excluded. The study of social interaction, socialization processes, and group social psychology all became recognized as appropriately belonging within Sociology. Whether more qualitative (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969; Goffman 1961) or quantitative (Thibault and Kelly 1959), delimited empirical studies in these arenas have been acknowledged over the last fifty years, to a far greater extent than has occurred in Germany or France in particular, as sociological by American psychologists, social workers, economists, historians, physicians, and political scientists. In addition, research grants from federal sources and large foundations for the conduct of empirical—often quantitative—studies, frequently on a massive scale, affirmed the location of these micro areas of research within Sociology and the rigor of their typical methodologies.

In sum, Sociology in the United States acquired in several ways a singular profile.8 On the one hand the discipline incorporated micro research to a far greater extent than occurred in France, England, or Germany, and on the other hand Sociology assumed a particular position in closer proximity to natural sciences models and methodologies—a location that erected barriers against attempts to integrate history, social philosophy, epistemology, and social theory into the discipline. Institutionalized tensions in respect to sociological theory became apparent. Despite upheaval in the 1960s, American Sociology’s parameters remained largely in place in the post-sixties decades.

The Contours and Trajectory of American Sociology II:

From Crisis to “the Cultural Turn”

A severe crisis shook the discipline to its core in the 1960s. The imprint of Parsons (and less so Merton) had been challenged even in the fifties by both conflict theory (see Dahrendorf 1959a; Coser 1956; Mills 1956) and the symbolic interactionism of Blumer (1954)10 and Goffman (1959). The relentless critique from the Left in the sixties and seventies (see Gouldner 1970), although directed explicitly against the “conservatism” of Parsonsian theorizing, also denigrated and weakened the Chicago School, demography, and microsociology in general—for all, it was argued, insufficiently took cognizance of the pervasive and debilitating effects of capitalism. The single American macrosociological school, Structural-functionalism, was pushed decidedly into a defensive position.11

Nonetheless, neo-Marxism, although it transformed the discipline in the sixties and seventies, was destined to plant only weak long-term roots on the American stage. Moreover, the overthrow of Parsonsianism and the consequent splintering of the discipline failed to lead to a longer-term convergence with European Sociology. Indeed, a singularly American tenor continued to characterize Sociology in the United States, and significant continuity with pre-crisis contours is evident. Three streams stand out.

First, the strong presence vis-a-vis adjacent fields of an expansive realm—“social problems,” whether involving the analysis of inequality, poverty, homelessness, immigration, minority
relations, dysfunctional families, wealth and income inequality, etc.—erected, as earlier, a major sustaining emphasis in the discipline which, in its intensity, distinguished the American enterprise from European Sociology. Second, one of the discipline’s further early cornerstones in the United States also survived the sixties unchanged: the scientific orientation to statistical procedures, experimental methods, and the formation of laws. Indeed, the overarching thrust toward empirical and quantitative research effectively served, throughout the eighties and nineties, to defend the discipline’s boundaries against many new fashions. Post-Modernism, post-Structuralism, Literary Studies, and Cultural Studies proposed theories and insights scarcely amenable to American Sociology’s self-defined core task: to construct empirically testable theories (see Oberschall 1972; Parsons 1937, p. 742). Third, two approaches located firmly within the American discipline’s traditional parameters blossomed forth in the eighties and became broadly influential: a reinvigorated Symbolic Interactionism (Goffman 1959, 1967; Farberman and Stone 1970; Manis and Meltzer 1972) and, largely in opposition to the structuralism of state-centered theory (Skocpol 1979; Evans, Skocpol, and Rueschemeyer, 1984) and the neo-Marxism of World Systems theory (see Wallerstein 1974, 1979, 1980), “cultural sociology” (see Swidler 1986; Lamont and Fournier 1992; Münch and Smelser, 1992). This approach aimed to inject a macro cultural — yet non-Parsonian — dimension into Symbolic Interactionism’s microsociology and, in general, to pull the discipline away alike from all materialist-utilitarian schools and any remaining legacies of Structural-functionalism (see Kalberg 1996, pp. 55-57). In pursuing its agenda, however, it avoided entirely all movement toward European-based phenomenological and epistemological approaches.13

This summary overview of American Sociology’s early contours and subsequent trajectory has sought, surely in an overly schematic and incomplete fashion, to isolate the many ways in which indigenous pathways largely characterized the unfolding of Sociology from the outset in the United States. The discipline’s longstanding orientations remained largely intact and, in the eighties and nineties, erected obstacles against modes of analysis and schools emanating from Europe. Highly influential European approaches grounded in the works of Elias, Baumann, Giddens, Habermas, Luhmann, Foucault, Bourdieau, Simmel, Marx, and Weber became visible on the American landscape only on the margins.14

Is the present divergence of American Sociology from the major tenor of Sociology in Europe significant from the point of view of our query? Does the location of sociological theory within the discipline vary across nations? Moreover, do sets of operating presuppositions unique to the American enterprise establish obstacles to communication with European sociologists following a less quantitative, less positivist, less presentist, and more macro theoretical style of sociological analysis? Have such obstacles erected a clear hindrance to cross-nation consensus-formation in respect to sociological theories? Preliminary answers will become apparent only after a further delineation of American Sociology’s boundaries—now undertaken by brief reference to a comparative case: Sociology in Germany.

A Contrast Case: The Pluralistic Foundation of German Sociology and its Internationalization

Similar to the United States and in contrast to France, a pluralism of competing schools and approaches characterized German Sociology’s original contours. However, its external form and internal substance, as well as developmental trajectory, diverged sharply from American Sociology.15

The founders of German Sociology formulated two distinct macro schools (Marx, Weber) and one micro approach (Simmel).16 While Simmel, as he himself predicted, would leave no direct heirs, the works of Marx and Weber echoed in a sustained manner, albeit in different decades and in uneven intensity, across twentieth century German Sociology to a broader and deeper extent than occurred in American Sociology.17 The post-war period must constitute our focus.

A vigorous interaction of internal and external influences characterizes German Sociology’s trajectory from 1950 to the present. In the wake of Hitler and the Holocaust, German social thought appeared to many scholars to carry responsibility for chaos, instability, and genocide. Thus, an intense pressure throughout the 1950s pushed the discipline away from its indigenous fathers, and a broad reception of American Sociology, which had thrived in a democratic society and hence appeared untainted, ensued. Structural-functionalism in particular was widely read, evaluated, and taught in the classroom (Hartmann 1967; Tenbruck
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1987; Dahrendorf 1959b), though so too were Chicago School interpreters and American stratification theory. Moreover, both following the American model and building upon a German and Austrian empirical tradition in the social sciences extending back to Weber (see Oberschall 1965; Lindenlaub 1967; Segre 2001), research in Germany began more widely to utilize quantitative methods (see Scheuch 2003). Many who studied and taught in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s would become distinguished and influential sociologists in the sixties, seventies, and eighties. Nonetheless, and although American Sociology continued to be widely received, a critique of perspectives emanating from the United States became intense in Germany in the mid-sixties and a prominent revival of indigenous approaches occurred. Neo-Marxism had acquired influential exponents with the resettling in the Federal Republic of several leading Frankfurt School theorists in the fifties, and Critical Theory’s pivotal players—Adorno, Horkheimer, Marcuse, and Habermas—broadly contested all American modes of analysis by the late sixties and early seventies. A renascence of Weber’s sociology then swept through the discipline in the late seventies (see Schluchter 1979, 1981; Tenbruck 1980; Kalberg 1979), and a Simmel revival—of lesser though still significant fervor—appeared in the eighties (Dahme and Rammstedt 1984). A cultivation of German sociological theory, now by a new generation and long after the end of World War II, could take place. Duelling against each other, powerful theorists—Habermas and Luhmann—reigned over the discipline from the mid-eighties to the mid-nineties.

As these giants began to fade over the last decade, German Sociology once again became penetrated deeply by international currents. Above all, the theoretical writings of Elias, Giddens, Baumann, and Bourdieu cast a broad imprint. The theorizing of all of these figures connected back to the discipline’s founders in more direct ways than has occurred in American theorizing in recent years.

Characteristic of the discipline in Germany is a far closer alliance of Sociology with History, Social Philosophy (as also in France), and epistemology, the rejection (as in France) since Weber of an overarching orientation to quantitative research and an American-style positivism (see Adorno 1976), and the absence (as in France) of a longstanding and uninterrupted microtradition. A “social problems” orientation is apparent, yet one far less expansive than its counterpart in the United States. This sketch of a few major thrusts of German post-war Sociology has aimed to isolate further the uniqueness of American Sociology’s main contours and trajectory. What do Sociology’s overarching parameters in the United States imply for the salience and substance of sociological theory today, as well as for its location within the discipline? Does cross-nation variation in this respect erect barriers to consensus sociological theories?

Theorizing in Sociology:
Some Inter-Cultural Obstacles to a Cross-National Consensus

Positioned earlier within tracks laid down by the founders, whether manifest in the works of Bellah (1957), Smelser (1976), Coser (1956), Merton (1949), Blumer (1969), or Parsons (1937), theory in the eighties and nineties in the United States arose increasingly from the countless empirical studies emanating from a broad spectrum of vigorous sub-disciplines. Area-specific, more modest, and less expansive theory moved to center stage—namely, a mode of theorizing that as a rule took the literature and problems of a specific sub-field as its major point of reference rather than the discipline as a whole, epistemological dilemmas, the large themes raised by the classics (bureaucratization, the rise of modern capitalism, the nature of capitalism, Gemeinschaft vs. Gesellschaft, mechanical solidarity vs. organic solidarity), or overarching theoretical questions (social order, agency—structure, the sociology of knowledge).

Contrasts to German sociological theory are apparent. Whereas American theorizing today remains far more anchored in the sub-disciplines, and hence oriented to their demarcated questions and empirical studies, theory in Germany has to a great extent retained, owing to its closer links back to the classical founders, an orientation to subfield-transcending questions and broad-ranging theoretical issues. Indeed, sub-disciplines in the United States have not only established higher intra-Sociology profiles than in Germany, but also received broader recognition from the adjacent social sciences; empirical studies conducted by sociologists on organizations, educational institutions, medical care, crime, deviant behavior, and family function and dysfunction, for example, are acknowledged by psychologists, economists, historians, and political scientists. This prestige legitimates a self-referential dynamic in the United States, an autonomy vis-a-vis the
classical theorists, and a relative neglect of discipline-wide issues, dilemmas, themes, and conundra.25 Foundation and government-based funding of large sub-area projects, which occurs to a far greater extent in the United States than in France or England in particular, has supported these trends.26 On the other hand, a comparable severing from the classical founders or discipline-wide questions has not occurred in Germany, despite a very high level of foundation funding.

Hence, if scrutinized through the lens of European and earlier American theorizing, a relocation of theory in American Sociology had become apparent by the early 1990s. Moreover, the traditional emphasis upon quantitative methods, general laws, experimental and statistical procedures, and empirical observation had remained strong and began to assume a position of heretofore unknown priority,27 in a number of the discipline’s subfields28—further dislocating theory from its traditional position and distinguishing American Sociology from its European counterpart. Will modest theory, as now formulated almost exclusively within the sub-disciplines, and thus rarely generalizable across them (for example, labeling theory, resource mobilization theory, the new Institutionalism), come to dominate American Sociology? Will modest theorizing build more upon the American micro or macro tradition?

This brief and preliminary investigation leads to the conclusion that theorizing in Sociology, as a consequence of nation-specific points of departure, parameters, and developmental pathways, may vary significantly. Indeed, longstanding, nation-based theoretical approaches may to a significant degree retain their trajectories despite the internet revolution and globalization—even to such an extent that contemporary orientations to sociological theory continue to diverge across nations, as do understandings of the particular tasks and significance of theory. In light of these variations, it would appear that any attempt to establish a viable cross-national consensus in respect to theories will confront clear obstacles.

Firm conclusions can be established only after the completion of further comparative research designed to isolate systematically the unique parameters and developmental pathways of the sociological enterprise in several countries. Explorations of Sociology’s points of departure and trajectories in France and England must in particular be undertaken. This endeavor, no less than the question of whether a unified theory would be at all realistic in an age of specialized research, must await a further essay.

### Notes

1. I would like to thank Alain Caille, Michael Kaern, William Outhwaite, Jennifer Platt, Renate Mayntz, Joachim Savelsberg, Sandro Segre, Ilana Silber, and Norbert Wiley for helpful comments on earlier drafts.

2. Of course this point could also be made on epistemological grounds. For Weber, for example, formulation of standardized concepts and theories is impossible owing to the “value-relevance” of knowledge. Social scientists never approach empirical reality in an “objective” manner, he argues; rather, they bring to it sets of questions and interests related to their values. Hence, every approach to “the data” is “perspectival”—all the more as every epoch defines in its own way, in accord with its predominant concerns and currents of thought, only certain aspects of empirical reality as “culturally significant.” And even though new fashions, themes, and concerns render heretofore occluded aspects of social reality visible, other aspects, by the same token, always remain in the shadows (see 1949).

3. Hence, exploration of the German case here serves exclusively an heuristic purpose: to cast the uniqueness of the American case into relief. A detailed portrait of the German case as such is not attempted.

4. Only the foundation of French Sociology follows these lines to anywhere near the same extent. See LePlay and Comte.

5. Important distinctions of degree must be made in respect to the three early major American departments of Sociology at The University of Chicago, Harvard University, and Columbia University. On this theme see Camic’s excellent study (1995). On the manner in which purely institutional forces—competition across departments within the same university and across universities—called forth an emphasis upon statistical methods in the Sociology Department at Columbia, see Camic and Xie (1994).

6. Even Parsons defined the task of sociology as formulating “analytical laws” (see 1937, p. 730). As Camic notes, “Parsons accepted the search for ‘uniform laws’ as the measure of science” (1995, p. 1026).

7. This point will be held to despite Chicago Sociology’s distinguished qualitative studies oriented to social problems (for example, the works of Wirth, Thrasher, Wm. White, Suttles, and Becker (see Platt 1983, 1992). Camic notes that “...even with regard to the statistical method, Chicago sociologists exhibited marked flexibility and openness” (1995, p. 1015). In this respect, however, regional and departmental distinctions (the South, the Mid-West, and West vs. the Chicago School and the Harvard Department) must be acknowledged.

8. Again, for analyses that call attention to important institutional causes, see Camic (1995); Camic and Xie (1994).

9. A more detailed analysis would have to offer a discussion of the various ways in which the Chicago School and Structural-functionalism were uniquely American, and further influenced the location of theory in the discipline.

10. Blumer’s criticisms were earlier and fundamental, attacking directly all claims that the discipline could constitute a rigorous science (see 1954). Although not shared by its Iowa and Illinois wings (see Kuhn and McPartland 1954), Symbolic Interactionism’s criticisms along these lines have continued to the present (see Charon 2001).

11. And has not recovered to this day. The attempt in the 1980s at revival—“Neo-functionalism”—has failed to establish, on the basis...
of the promised synthesis of micro and macro, a wide following. See Alexander 1985; Alexander et al. 1987.

12. The "natural" theoretical home for such a cultural sociology would seem to have been Weberian sociology. Few traces of his approach, however, are evident (see Kalberg 1996, pp. 55-57).

13. While significant in the sixties, the influence of Schutz (1967) and phenomenology (see Berger and Luckman 1966) had faded by the late seventies.

14. Arguably, recently, Bourdieu’s importance has been greatest. Even comparative-historical sociology, which flourished in the eighties and nineties in the United States, did not move prominently, with the exception of World Systems theory (see Wallerstein 1974, 1979, 1980), in a European direction (see Kalberg 1994, pp. 1-17, 193-205; 1996, pp. 52-67).

15. Again, it must be emphasized that this all-too-brief scrutiny of the German case serves a delineated heuristic purpose only; namely, to throw into relief, through contrasts, the uniqueness of the American case. A depiction of German sociology’s general contours and developmental pathways in the post-war period would require a far more differentiated discussion.

16. Because more formal and structural, Simmel’s microsociology diverges from the American micro tradition. See Nedelmann 1980.

17. Although the prominent reception of Weber in the United States in the forties and fifties itself contributed to the resurrection of his works in Germany in the sixties.

18. Notably, the American micro tradition was neglected.


20. As in the United States, Structural-functionalism in particular became targeted as conservative and oriented to the status quo.

21. Notably, this revival (which also crystallized powerfully in England and Holland) never appeared on American shores.


23. However, in recent decades ethnomethodology has developed significantly in France (see Latour and Woolgar 1986) and, in both France and Germany, the reception of Goffman has been broadening.

24. Whereas the parameters of Sociology in the post-1960 era in France became penetrated far more thoroughly than occurred in Germany or the United States by psychoanalysis (Lacan), anthropology (Levi-Strauss), History (Braudel), and Literary studies (Derrida), disciplinary boundaries were far more successfully defended in Germany and America (albeit for entirely different reasons) vis-a-vis these fields as well as other varieties of post-Modernism, Literary studies, and Cultural studies. See n. 26 below.

25. The recent effort in the United States to teach sociological theory only within the substantive area courses (e.g., deviance, political sociology, stratification, organizations, medical, etc.), rather than in theory courses as such, reveals a strong antipathy in the discipline in America, in my view, to any attempt to cultivate an in-depth continuity with the classics (see Kalberg 1997-98).

26. For all these reasons, Sociology in the United States seems not to be threatened with disintegration, de-legitimation, or an identity crisis (as some French sociologists see as occurring in France), despite a broad-based severing of the link back to the classics who legitimated the discipline. This remains the case even though the sociological theory created generally in the sub-disciplines over the last twenty-five years has been specialized theory of less explanatory range than Merton’s middle-range theory. Interestingly and ironically, Sociology in the United States appears more insulated (particularly than in France) against an identity crisis even though, in Europe, a greater connection to the founders exists and sociological theory retains a more prominent location in the discipline.

27. Not least owing to the availability of mass data sets from national and international organizations and foundations, and computer-based modes of data manipulation.

28. It must also be noted that Symbolic Interactionism has expanded in all microfields, and qualitative methods along with it.

References


Perspectives

Evans, Peter, Theda Skocpol and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds. 1984. Bringing the State Back In. New York: Cambridge.
LET me begin with the obvious. A huge new enterprise has developed called “cognitive science” or (tellingly) “cognitive neuroscience” which has had dramatic effects on disciplines like psychology and social psychology that used to be allied with sociology. If one reads a “state of the field” edited collection in these fields, one will find an article (or more) which deals with the question of what, at the neurological level, does, for example, the concept of attitude or a “rational choice” really amount to in terms of fundamental cognitive processes? These essays are where the “theory” is. Although these fields often go on as before, with their experiments and applications, intellectually they have become hollowed out. They no longer regard themselves, as they used to do, as a domain of autonomous theory in which such a thing as an attitude was a theoretical entity about which one could construct generalizations and measure, as though it was like the atom in the early days of atomic theory. Instead, it is accepted that the “real” thing to which such concepts refer is to be located in the brain, and that questions about what is real aren’t to be answered by fancy references to philosophy of science and complicated defenses of the status of the real science – psychology as a science, but by reference to physical facts and mechanisms that are still poorly understood, but which are indubitably the real stuff that produces the effects psychologists observe. And what holds for psychology holds for related fields. Aging studies used to be primarily “social gerontology”; now the field is more concerned with the aging brain.

Four Kinds of Social Theory

So what does this have to do with social theory? Sociology still thinks of itself as autonomous, and, in truth, cognitive science is irrelevant to much of what passes for social theory. But it is important to reflect on why this is the case, and retrace the history that made it the case. Start with some rough distinctions. Here are four kinds of social theory: Emancipatory theory, whose aim is the empowerment of disadvantaged groups, or everyone (a category that would include everything from Habermas and Bourdieu to feminism and Judith Butler); Theory that has the form of science (a category which would include axiomatic theorists and others who think that they have experimental evidence for basic principles about, say, power, rational choice theorists, and even old fashioned Parsonsians, who think that society can be studied like a biological system); Cultural Sociology (about which I will say

more below); and theories which attempt to understand social life in a way that is continuous with (consistent with, and attentive to) the findings or best claims of science about human beings, the brain, biology, and so forth.

Emancipatory theory (on the model of Marxism and especially Lukacs) can ignore the issue. Theorizing for emancipatory thinkers is essentially a practical (political) activity of building solidarity and discrediting repressive ideologies. Assertions about truth and objectivity are themselves part and parcel of and relative to this practical activity. Other theories are ideological constructions that are obstacles to emancipation, forms of misrecognition. Truth is important to emancipatory theory, but only, so to speak, at the end of the process of emancipation, when the correct view is arrived at through the defeat of its ideological enemies.

Theory that has the form of “science” (call this approach “imitationism”) can ignore it as well. The relation between data and theory is a closed circle, and the claim to validity of these theories is based entirely on the fact of predictive success and empirical adequacy, or whatever other features of real science they claim to be modeling. These theories look like science, but do not depend on or connect to the rest of science: they are domains of autonomous objects with their own laws.

Cultural sociology can ignore it too, to the extent that cultural sociology operates by looking at cultural artifacts (such as episodes of Gilligan’s Island) and infers collective mental structures (culture) from them, it is a perfectly closed system. But of course there is a small problem about the status of the supposed mental structures. If all we know about them is what we can infer from the cultural artifacts, the whole enterprise is circular: the evidence for the explainer, culture, is the same as the stuff that is explained. So nothing is added by this enterprise but a pseudo-explanatory vocabulary based on the supposition that collective mental structures can be inferred from artifacts.

The fourth variant of social theory, of course, embraces the idea that social theory is continuous with the substance of science and therefore cognitive science, and is open to whatever “continuous” turns out to mean (and it might mean getting right with Darwin). Determining that, together with criticizing those forms of social theory that operate with bad models of mind, is necessarily on the top of the agenda for this variant. Looking at social theory through this lens produces some interesting ironies. Herbert Spencer (a classic “continuist” in his approach to making sociology a science) can be found on dozens of websites as a precursor to cognitive science (for his ideas on cultural evolution). Weber was also a continuist: when he looked at Methodist Church services, for example, he didn’t see the quest for meaning, he saw an activity dominated by pre-rational, biological urges, and he always believed that the rational and meaningful constituted only a small portion of the causal background of action. Weber even did fatigue studies.

From Parsons to Cultural Sociology:

The Problem of Mechanism

So how did theory in sociology come to be dominated by cultural sociology, and how did continuism wind up as the position of the tiniest of minorities? The answer to both questions is to be found in the same history. When Parsons moved from the action perspective of The Structure of Social Action to the systemic perspective of The Social System, he carried over the central idea of the structure of social action, namely that action is always normative or has a normative dimension, and attempted to develop an account of the character of social system values, the so-called central value system of a society, which involved system level choices between commitments along the lines and at the level of the pattern variables. In order for this collective commitment model to reconnect with the action level of description there had to be some sort of mechanism that enabled what Parsons now understood as the central values of a society to get into the heads of the members of that society so that they could have their distinctive consequences for the actions of individuals. “Socialization” was the mechanism.

So how does this relate to such things as contemporary cultural sociology? Cultural sociology derives, to be very short about it, from the radicalization of Parsons produced by Clifford Geertz in 1971 in The Interpretation of Cultures in which he transformed the central values hypothesis into the “mind full of presuppositions” hypothesis, in effect drawing on the neo Kantian side of the Durkheimian heritage, and placed culture in a quite different explanatory role, one in which ordinary activities were imbued in culture, which was in turn conceived as the stuff in presupposition-filled minds.
Perspectives

Models of Mind

Parsons thought he had an acceptable model of mind: Freud’s. Bourdieu, Habermas, and cultural sociologists don’t think they need one, Habermas because he thinks he can get by with a Kantian notion of reason, Bourdieu because whatever the reality of, say, dispositions is, he doesn’t think it would undermine his theories, and cultural sociologists because they think that the language of the mind full of presuppositions is safe as well. Is this insouciance justified? Can other social theorists join it?

Most of the work on these topics focuses on offbeat psychological phenomena: autism, persistent illusions, and such things as “anarchic hand syndrome,” where a person can be aware of their actions and the purposes of the actions but not recognize the actions as theirs. So the actual topics don’t seem to affect social theory directly. And it is also true that what is known about the brain/mind today is very limited, that models are very abstract, and there are many unsolved problems and many conflicting approaches, and that whatever is finally discovered will comport with common sense to a large extent.

But a few things are already clear that do affect social theory. One is that thinking now appears to be mostly unconscious, complex, and inaccessible to us (bad news for Habermas, who thinks we can “thematize” our presuppositions, meaning reveal them through reflection, and for phenomenology, but also for cultural sociology, which thinks they can be confidently inferred from artifacts). A second is that we are bad at telling what we are thinking. A third is that some of our commonsense ideas, for example of agency, aren’t as solid as they appear. A fourth is that the “knowledge of other minds” necessary for interaction is a topic full of interesting cognitive features, that inferences about other minds come late in the child’s development. A fifth is that the axioms of rational choice are a poor model for decision-making.

The cognitive science revolution hasn’t arrived in sociology. But sociologists and social theorists, even emancipatory ones, do rely on ideas about mind. Social theory used to get them from the cutting edge. But the edge has moved on, and the ideas of mind in social theory haven’t. For continuists, this loss of connection to the rest of science is a bad thing. And the failures of imitationism, the difficulty in making emancipatory theory more than ideology, and the circularity of cultural sociology point to continuism as a serious alternative. Perhaps the revolution will never arrive in sociology. But a few minutes of intelligent googling will be enough to convince you that it is getting closer. Punch in Spencer, and you can answer Parsons infamous jibe, “who now reads Spencer?” And if you look at the wonderful Mead project of Brock University, you will see a section called Basic Baldwin, on a thinker that Mead worked from (and against). Then punch in “Baldwin effect,” and watch the cognitive science sites pop up. And if you want to know what all this might have to do with social theory, one can hardly do better than to track down a gem of a paper by American sociology’s arch-continuist, Charles Ellwood, “Social Philosophy of James Mark Baldwin, in the Journal of Social Philosophy in 1936 (2:55-68).

Artificial Intelligence and Social Theory: A One-Way Street?

Sun-Ki Chai, University of Hawai‘i

IN recent years, there has been a relatively small but increasingly influential set of research projects that import and adapt artificial intelligence models and techniques into sociology, most notably through the use of agent-based social simulations (see Bainbridge et al, 1994; Macy and Willer 2002 for overviews). This is a natural and welcome joining of two different disciplinary approaches to the modeling of human thought and behavior. However, for the most part, the flow of knowledge has unidirectional rather than reciprocal. While there have been a few notable papers that integrate mainstream social theory ideas with AI-style models (e.g. Carley 1991), there has been little attempt to export general social theories into artificial intelligence, either in the design of abstract software architectures or in the generation of practical working systems.

In many ways this is quite puzzling, since artificial intelligence has always been an area of research that has been centrally concerned with its theoretical foundations, which are meant to reflect deeper structures of human cognition and motivation. Furthermore, AI has readily adopted theoretical concepts and assumptions from other disciplines, including the social sciences. This dates from its earliest days, when it incorporated rules of inference and resolution from formal logic into the production rules of expert systems, and adopted structural and transformational grammars from linguistics not only
into natural language processing systems, but also into the analysis of computing languages. Furthermore, throughout the years, there has been extensive sharing and collaboration between artificial intelligence and cognitive psychology communities on the theoretical foundations of perception and information processing.

Indeed, it is ironic that social simulation is perhaps the area of artificial intelligence that is thinnest in its theoretical foundations. While it does utilize certain distinctive formalisms, most famously the cellular automata, assumptions about the bases for agent behavior within such simulations tend to be ad hoc. Agents are treated as extremely simple entities following a few fixed strategies, which in turn are not based upon any underlying general model of human nature and society. For the most part, social simulations within sociology, rather than drawing on general social theory for their assumptions, have seemed to largely follow existing approaches from AI.

Admittedly, such approaches can reveal very interesting emergent properties, as simple strategies may lead to complex and counterintuitive outcomes at the macro level. Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to raise the question of how outcomes might be different if agents were endowed with the arguably richer and more apparently human qualities found in micro-level social theories. Indeed, if we take the social theory enterprise seriously as a source for prediction, it follows that incorporating general social theory content into social simulations should allow artificial societies to better emulate real ones. By doing so, it should also likely render sociological work on simulation more relevant for the development of practical AI systems.

As an illustration of how such incorporation can occur, and without making any claims to definitiveness, I will discuss a project that I am working on in collaboration with the software company 21st Century Systems, Inc., under an Office of Naval Research grant. The objective of this project is to build a software module for the analysis of cultural differences. The module is designed for incorporation into a decision-support environment in which real world actors with whom the user is interacting are “avatarized” into agents whose movements appear within a graphical user interface. The purpose of the module is to help members of multinational coalitions operate better by helping them to predict the behaviors of their team members under realtime conditions of uncertainty.

In order for the environment to be useful, it is clear that the agents in the system must be endowed with cultural characteristics that closely mimic those of their human counterparts. At the same time, they must be modeled in such a way as to provide fairly decisive predictions about their behavior. Such systematic ways of representing culture do not appear in the artificial intelligence literature, hence they were adapted for this project from three different sources in social theory, taken from various social science disciplines. First of all, the representational framework for culture has been taken from the grid-group typology used in cultural anthropology and political science (Douglas 1970, Thompson, et al. 1990). Propositions about cultural change have been adopted from my own “coherence” model, which in turn formalizes propositions from social psychological theories of attitude formation and social constructionist ideas from sociology (Chai 2001). Finally, the theory of action is drawn from rational choice theory, but is one in which the preferences and beliefs that drive the actions of individuals are not uniform, but rather seen as individual-level mappings of cultural differences. Without wholesale integration of ideas from social theories, it would frankly be difficult to envision a system with much predictive value.

Besides social simulation, another possible avenue for fruitful application of social theory to AI might be natural language processing, where an understanding of the social context of language is increasingly seen as key not only to unlocking semantics, but even syntax. Yet another is the design of user-modeling computer interfaces, since human-computer interaction are increasingly viewed as a form of social processes. In both of these areas, of course, a certain amount of formalization of sociological concepts will be necessary before they are ready for use in AI systems. On the other hand, one body of social theory that is already highly mathematical, social network theory, is more easily adaptable and indeed is already the subject of a number of applied projects that may in the future lead to working AI systems. In one of these, 21st Century Systems and I are involved in work on intelligent software agents to automatically identify and analyze virtual communities on the web, in part through the use of network theory constructs.
Perspectives

Whatever the realm, the potential uses of social theory to design intelligent software are numerous and remain largely untapped. For the immediate future, I would argue that artificial intelligence needs social theory as much or more than social theory needs artificial intelligence.


Cognition and Social Theory

Roy D’Andrade, University of Connecticut

ACCORDING to both the folk and academic models of the mind, the five upper level categories are perception, cognition, sensation (including emotion), motivation, and intention. It would be nice if the parts of the mind that have strong causal powers fit neatly under these categories. There is a tendency to think that this is so - that understanding why people do things can best be done by finding out what people perceive, what people think, what people feel, what people want, and what people aim to do. But, when we do research we typically discover the pieces of mind stuff that show strong effects are attitudes, values, prejudices, ideals, interests, commitments, goals, preferences, defenses, orientations, and the like. All of these are complex organizations of cognitions, emotions, and motivations. For example, it is standard in textbooks to say that attitudes are not just ideas, but have affective and motivational qualities. Much the same thing is said about values, prejudices, ideals, interests, etc. Thought and feeling and desire are intertwined in these parts of our theoretic vocabulary.

It is, however, possible to study cognition pure and simple, untainted by affect or motive. This kind of cognition has been called cool or cold cognition, in contrast to hot cognition, where affect and motivation are involved. Terms like script, recipe, trope, proposition, schema, grammar, feature, and the like can be used to talk about how people think without dragging in the heat of emotion and desire. Such terms make it possible to describe with some precision how people organize their thoughts in certain domains for certain purposes.

The problem is that the terms that make up cool cognition are exactly the terms that have the least immediate causal power. Of course, thought, pure and simple, does have some causal power. One goes to the hardware store to buy nails because one thinks that nails can be found in hardware stores. It would be incoherent to go to a hardware store to buy nails if one thought otherwise, whatever one’s motives or feelings. Thought here is a necessary, not a sufficient cause.

There are all kinds of necessary causes - gunpowder is necessary for a pistol to fire a bullet, gasoline is necessary to make a car to go, and so on. Necessary causes tend to be far back in the chain of events - one among many background causal processes. To steal an example, if someone throws a match in a wastebasket and the fire burns the building down, it is hard to blame the accident on the fact that there is oxygen in the air, or that gravity pulled the match in one particular arc, or that paper is combustible at relatively low degrees Fahrenheit, or that the cleaner did not come earlier and empty the paper from the basket. We understand that the fire would not have happened otherwise. But even for a simple event there are too many necessary causes for anyone to understand them all. So it is not surprising that both ordinary people and social scientists tend to focus on causes that are more like sufficient causes (although there may be no purely sufficient causes in human life - something else is always required for the event to happen) in being further forward in the causal chain of events.

As someone who has worked on understanding human cognition - always partly a cultural phenomenon - I have found it frustrating that cognition is so far back in the causal chain. It is easier to show how human cognition is
influenced by culture and experience than to show how cognition influences behavior. Others have found much the same thing. One implication of this putative fact is that the definition of culture as purely ideational - purely cognitive - results in the construction of a category that is so far back in the causal chain that it is hard to discover whether or not it influences anything. It is generally agreed that for ideas to influence behavior they must be internalized, or arouse strong feelings, or do something more than just be ideas. Then the interesting causal processes become internalization, or arousal, or whatever, not the idea itself. Of course, there is explanation by word magic, in which one simply holds, without further specification, that actions, or societies, or institutions, or identities, or whatever, are culturally constituted. The truth of this may be apparent to the believer but remains insubstantial to the agnostic.

So, in social theory, it is notoriously hard to get from the idea to the act. Most theorists develop a vocabulary with amalgam-like mental stuffs - attitudes, values, prejudices, ideals, goals, interests, sentiments, orientations, etc. Such amalgams, there is some reason to believe, actually correspond to organized neural structures (or should they be called structurations?). In any case, this makes for two different strategies of doing theory. One is to start from cool and pure cognition and try to trace the thread through the maze of emotions and motivations to see if the idea can be eventually connected to the act. This seems to be the approach of the strong cultural agenda. The other method is start in the middle, with mental hybrids like interests and values and goals and such, and work one’s way forward to the act and backward to the necessary cognitions. My own history has been a slow shift from the first strategy to the second, anyhow at least in theory.
The ASA website has recently begun advertising an ‘online store’ where members can purchase merchandise with the ASA’s traditional or centennial logos (http://www.cafepress.com/asoca). According to a September 2004 email from the ASA executive office, the online store ‘allows ASA to offer multiple promotional items (primarily clothing) with no upfront expense beyond a small hosting fee. These items are of very high quality, and make great rewards and gifts for students and colleagues.’ I beg to differ a lot and theorize a little.

The ASA online store contains such items as t-shirts, tote bags, baseball caps, mousepads, infant creepers, bibs, and dog t-shirts, all embroidered with the ASA logos. Perhaps the ASA administration sees the store as a way to raise money for the Association. But there are many different ways to raise money, and alternatives might have far fewer unintended consequences. For instance, the ASA administration could have found more appropriate ventures, such as a book sale or a new series of publications (e.g., textbooks with papers drawn from ASA journals). I hear that books make great gifts for students. The ASA might even decide to increase the membership dues should additional revenue be needed. If we are members of the ASA, and the Association’s work costs money, then we ought to be good citizens about it and pay for what we want. But what is the message that is sent by having an online store with silly and offensive merchandise? Does it suggest that ASA members do not want to give money to the ASA unless they get a t-shirt or a bib in return? Is that really so? Or will that be so once we let this commercialization go on? And if so, does the ASA contribute to make ASA members consumers rather than intellectuals?

The broader issue that is involved in this matter is indeed, as Durkheim reminded us, not an economic but a moral problem. The ASA online store is one more sign of the managerialization of the ASA administration, which is now hopelessly divorced from the members and the profession, not to mention our scholarship. Maybe we are all paying the price for having let these matters once get out of our hands. But we can do more now than just sit idly by.

A little theory. In Suicide, in the preface to the second edition of The Division of Labor in Society, and in the posthumously published Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, Emile Durkheim made a strong case for the professional group or corporation as potentially providing the moral authority that is needed to curtail the normative problems characteristic of modern life. Durkheim reckoned that the professional group might supply the necessary regulative force that is needed in a world where one’s profession has increasingly gained in importance, especially in the context of an unbridled market that is of more than a local character.

Durkheim realized that the existing corporations did not fulfill this role and that they would have to be reformed to move beyond the sheer utilitarian functions of the ancient order of the guild in order to become a moral force that can impress itself upon the economy rather than merely be its servant. Question: Is the ASA a guild? I invite Section members to offer their thoughts on these matters — or to inform the ASA executive office, should they so desire.
Perspectives

Applying Sociological Theory to International Relations

Amitai Etzioni, George Washington University

THIS is a request to my colleagues to join me and in so doing follow in the footsteps of many others who have previously attempted to apply theoretical sociological concepts and propositions to the study of international relations. The main purpose of this project is not to enrich theory but rather to enhance people’s understanding and treatment of international relations. In the following lines I provide some preliminary examples of such an endeavor by drawing on what I said in my recent book From Empire to Community: A New Approach to International Relations.¹ My purpose here is to ask for guidance: Who else is working along these lines and who would be willing to join what should be a much larger undertaking beyond the work of just one scholar or even a small few?

The time might be particularly ripe for sociological analysis of international relations because international relationships are acquiring features that have been traditionally associated with individual societies. Hence, the frequent references to a “global civil society” or even an “international community.” Many sociologists may correctly view these uses of sociological terms as rhetorical excesses. However, if one treats the factors involved not as dichotomous variables but as a continuum, then one finds that international relations are developing some societal and even communal attributes. Hence there is merit in the idea of applying appropriate sociological theoretical approaches to this subject. The development of the European Union provides a case in point.

In contrast, the study of international relations has historically focused on relations among nation-states, whether they are engaged in diplomatic give and take, war, or trade. None of these relationships has communal features. Even when nation-states are members of international organizations, these organizations are not considered to have communal attributes but rather structures in which various nation-states collaborate in-line with their respective national interests, which are controlled by national representatives. Hence, in these intergovernmental organizations the member states’ concern for the common good—to the extent that it serves no one member state in particular or requires sacrifices for the long-term well-being of all member states—is typically very low.

Community Defined

Before I can point to some indications that transnational communities are developing, I must define communities. This is important given that major scholars have argued that the concept of community is so vague that it can hardly be used.² However, one can translate the meaning of the term community in common parlance into a reasonably precise sociological term. Namely, communities have two attributes. One is commonly recognized: Members of a community are involved in a web of criss-crossing, affective bonds (as distinct from one-on-one bonds that characterize friendships). The other attribute is less often mentioned: Communities share a moral culture, a set of values and norms.

Transnational Bonds

Several recent studies have pointed to the rise of transnational, interpersonal bonds.³ These studies find that people who hold citizenship in more than one country have interpersonal ties and a sense of loyalty to two or more nations, which in turn dampens their commitment to any one nation and fosters some transnational bonding. True, in some cases, multi-citizenship merely serves a strictly utilitarian purpose such as easing travel or avoiding military service. However, in many instances, holding multiple citizenship reflects a lack of willingness to be fully involved in the community of one nation or another. This is a reason why many Mexicans in the United States do not seek to become American citizens and many Turks who live in Germany send their children to be educated in Turkey during their teen years and so on.

The growth of the Internet and transnational travel are also contributing to the formation of transnational bonds among people who share some sociological attributes. This has been the case, for example, with Jewish, Roma (gypsies), and gay and lesbian transnational communities.

There also has been an explosive growth in transnational voluntary associations since the end of the Cold War.⁴ They now number in the many thousands and they include organizations as different as Amnesty International, the International Red Cross, Doctors without Borders, and Transparency International. In these associations, citizens from many nations work together in ways that are similar to...
how they work within their own national societies and local communities.5

Transnational, Shared Understandings of the Good

Shared values that develop on a transnational level may promote a willingness to resolve differences in a peaceful manner. They may also foster decisions that require substantial sacrifices from people of other nations—that is, transnational shared values may contribute to the formation of the second defining attribute of a community. Progress on this front is being made among the nation-states that are part of the European Union. Member nation-states are committed not to war on one another and they have made sizeable monetary contributions to other member states, especially Greece, which they would be unwilling to make for nonmember states.

Beyond just Europe, there are also some shared norms are developing on a wider, global level. Probably the best example of a set of norms (which, when taken together reflect the sharing of a basic value) is the respect for human rights. True, there are great differences in the scope of rights to which homage is paid (e.g., are socioeconomic rights included?) and in the interpretation of specific rights. However, more and more leaders, opinion makers, and citizens of various nations acknowledge their validity.6

Other specific norms that are gaining in worldwide respect are women’s rights and the environment. Mentioning the Kyoto Protocol is enough to bring to mind how widespread the normative commitment to the environment has become in recent years. There are also much narrower norms that seem to have gained a transnational following, including the need to limit the hunting of whales, a ban on the ivory trade, and opposition to land mines, among others. Similarly, there has been an almost worldwide rejection of the Bush doctrine of unilateral and preemptive interventions. Although there are great variations in the strength of the transnational commitments to these norms, they are not vacuous because they do have some behavioral consequences.7 In short, not only is the second defining attribute of community (i.e., a shared moral culture, a set of values and norms) met in the transnational realm, albeit on a low level, but that level seems to be rising.

Conclusion

There are other sociological approaches that are currently being applied to international relations, for instance the work on world systems by Immanuel Wallerstein and his colleagues. Here I only mentioned the approach that I usually use, which is a communitarian approach. I am looking for other scholars who work along these lines either independently or in concert with others. With some help, I hope to bring sociological theoretical approaches to bare on international relations in order to both understand them better and to better them.

Endnotes

7. For some preliminary evidence, the Australian government, based on the obligations that it had undertaken as a signatory of the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women, instituted laws to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace. See Leila Rassekh Milani, ed., Human Rights for All (Washington,

**Book Announcement**


The book unearths a countercurrent in Western social theory that uses juxtaposition to a non-Western other in order to critically interpret the modern social order. This ethnological imagination is traced in the work of key figures, whose writings are thus reread through the prism of cultural alterity: Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Émile Durkheim, Claude Lévi-Strauss, and Michel Foucault. The book claims that this kind of intercultural thinking offers little justification for two of the most prevalent claims about Western social theory: the wholesale ‘postmodern’ dismissal of the enterprise because of its supposedly intractable ethnocentrism, or, on the other hand, the traditionalist revival of a canon stripped of its cross-cultural foundations. Moreover, the book defends a cultural perspectivism that eschews both the false universalism of ‘end of history’ scenarios and the radical particularism embodied in the vision of ‘the clash of civilizations.’ As such, the ethnological imagination can invigorate critical social theory by informing its response to an increasingly global and multicultural world – a response that calls for a reconsideration of the identity and boundaries of the West as well of modernity itself.
PRIZES from p. 1

 procedures for selecting the winner, including the option of awarding no prize if suitable work has not been nominated. This year the Shils-Coleman Award includes an award of $750.00 for reimbursement of travel expenses for attending the annual ASA meeting. Nominations, including six copies of the nominated work, should be sent to the Chair of the Committee. Submission Deadline: March 1, 2005.

Professor Lisa Troyer, Chair
Shils-Coleman Award Committee
Department of Sociology
University of Iowa
Iowa City, IA 52242

The Theory Prize. The Theory Prize recognizes outstanding work in theory, communicates the principle that theory is plural and broadly defined, and promotes the interests of the Theory Section. This year’s Theory Prize will be given for an article, book chapter, or published or publicly presented paper. (The Prize is given for a book in even-numbered years.) Only titles from the four years prior to the award year (that is, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004, and 2005) are eligible for the Theory Prize. At its discretion, the Theory Prize Committee may also award Honorable Mentions. The Chair of the Award Committee has latitude in determining procedures for selection of the winner, including the option of withholding the Award in a year when the Committee deems no nominated work is suitable for the prize. Nominations, including six copies of the nominated work, should be sent to the Chair of the Committee. Submission Deadline: March 1, 2005.

Professor Jack Goldstone, Chair
Theory Prize Committee
Department of Sociology
George Mason University
Fairfax VA 22030

The Lewis A. Coser Award for Theoretical Agenda-Setting. The Coser Award recognizes a mid-career sociologist whose work, in the opinion of the Committee, holds great promise for setting the agenda in the field of sociology. While the award winner need not be a theorist, his or her work must exemplify the sociological ideals Coser represented. Eligible candidates must be sociologists or do work that is of crucial importance to sociology. They must have received a Ph.D. no less than five and no more than twenty years before their candidacy. Nomination letters should make a strong substantive case for the nominee’s selection and should discuss the nominee’s work and his or her anticipated future trajectory. No self-nominations are allowed. Committee members may nominate candidates. After nomination, the Committee will solicit additional information from nominees and others for those candidates they consider appropriate for consideration, including published works and at least two additional letters of support from third parties. The Committee may decide in any given year that no nominee warrants the award, in which case it will not be awarded that year. Nominations should be sent to the Chair of the Committee. Submission Deadline: February 1, 2005.

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