Message from the Chair

Theory Section Mini-Conference: The Value of Theory

Linda D. Molm, University of Arizona

Mark your calendars: Theory Section Day at the 2003 ASA meetings in Atlanta is Monday, August 18. You won’t want to miss the Section’s program this year. The core of the program, a three-session mini-conference on “The Value of Theory,” will explore the value, functions, and contributions of three broad “schools” of theory represented by our membership and our discipline: classical theory, formal theory, and critical theory. That theory has value is surely a statement that all members of our section can agree upon. But why theory is valuable, how theory should be used, and what kinds of theoretical work contribute to our discipline, are topics that can (and often do) provoke sharp disagreement and lively debate. My own view is that many of our disagreements about what theory is and should be are related to differences in our scholarly objectives, and to the value of different kinds of theory in advancing those objectives. The purpose of the mini-conference is to explore, and potentially bridge, that divide.

In Praise of Unbounded Rationality

David Willer, University of South Carolina

It is a central insight of theories of network exchange that structure alone does not produce power exercise or the exchange ratios which indicate that exercise. In theory, the link between structure and power is through the model for the actor. Some time ago, Emerson (1972a&b) suggested an operant actor to link structure and power. More recently Markovsky (1995) developed simulations that employ backward looking actors who adjust offers up when included and down when excluded. Elementary Theory (Willer 1981, 1987, 1999) uses a rational actor model. Here I make three points about the rational actor model in social theory. First, that the rational actor model — what has at times been called ‘homo oeconomicus’ — is as essential to sociology’s theory of network exchange and arguably to theory across all of sociology as it is to economic theory. What I am suggesting is a radical change in point of view. Economists have long seen economic theory as based on the principle of rationality and sociological theory as not (cf. Samuelson 1947:90), while sociologists have long preferred homo sociologicus or “role playing man” to homo oeconomicus.
Call for Editor(s)

This is our next to last issues as co-editors of Perspectives. If you have any interest in becoming the next Perspectives’ editor(s), please contact one of the following people IMMEDIATELY:

Robin Stryker - stryker@atlas.socsci.umn.edu

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Candidates Nominated

ASA Elections Scheduled for May

Barbara Meeker, University of Maryland-College Park

The Nominations Committee has completed its work and forwarded to the ASA its slate of candidates for the Theory Section offices.

The two candidates for Chair-Elect are:

2. David Willer, Present Position: Professor of Sociology, University of South Carolina.

The four candidates for two positions on the Theory Section Council are:

1. Uta Gerhardt. Present Position: Professor of Sociology and Chair, Lehrstuhl für Soziologie II, University of Heidelberg, Germany.
2. J. David Knottnerus. Present Position: Professor of Sociology, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK.
3. Michael Lovaglia. Present Position: Associate Professor, University of Iowa, Ames, IA.
4. Name: Joachim J. Savelsberg. Associate Professor of Sociology, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

All candidates have agreed to serve and their biographical information has been forwarded to the ASA offices in Washington. Section members will receive a single ballot sometime in May for all ASA and section elections. Candidate profile will arrive with the ballot.

The Nominations Committee members were Barbara Meeker (Chair), Harry Dahms, Gary Alan Fine, Neil McLaughlin, and Richard Williams.

Perspectives is the newsletter of the Theory Section of the American Sociological Association. It is published quarterly in January, April, July, and October. The deadline for all submissions is the fifth day of the month before publication. We welcome news and commentary as well as announcements about conferences, journal information, calls for papers, position openings, and any other information of interest to section members.

Send submissions to: J. David Knottnerus and Jean Van Delinder, Department of Sociology, CLB 006, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74078-4062; fax (405) 744-5780; phone (405) 744-6106 (Knottnerus) or (405) 744-4613 (Van Delinder); e-mail jdk2307@okstate.edu or jivan@okstate.edu
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or “rational man” (Lindenberg 1990:728). My first point will be that network exchange theories should adopt, not just a rational actor model, but one that is not boundedly rational in Simon’s sense. My second point will be that adopting the rational actor model is a necessary first step toward investigating an array of other motives dear to the hearts of many sociologists. For my third point I will give reasons why the rational actor model is as necessary for all sociological theory as it is in network exchange.

It would be good to begin by showing how rationality is applied to exchange networks. The principle of rationality can be stated as: ALL SOCIAL ACTORS ACT TO MAXIMIZE THEIR EXPECTED PREFERENCE STATE ALTERATION (Willer 1999:30). It is a convention in network exchange to simulate exchange by placing a pool of valuable resources between each pair of actors. Then the actor’s preference state is enhanced by payoffs gained when a resource pool is divided. I now show how the rationality principle infers behavior in two exchange networks. For the examples, no actor can make more than one division and rationality asserts that none will accept a division for a zero payoff. 

Rationality In Two Networks
Consider first the A - B - C - D network where A and B can divide 20 resources as can C and D, but where B and C can divide 40. Keeping at least one resource, A will never offer more than 19 resources to B and similarly for D’s offer to C. Moreover, realizing that B and C can divide 40 between themselves, and seeking to avoid exclusion, A and D dare offer no less than 19. Thus, A’s and D’s offers of 19 to B and C respectively are uniquely determined by rationality and the structure. Now B and C can both do better only by dividing their pool 20 - 20. Said somewhat differently, only that division is rational for both because only it is better for both. As a result, B and C exchange while A and D are always excluded and never exchange.

Unlike rationality which is a theoretic principle, bounded rationality is at most an idea, perhaps only the negation of the idea of rationality.

Now consider a second A - B - C - D network, but now A and B divide 15 resources as do C and D, whereas B and C divide 60. Seeking to avoid exclusion, A offers 14 to B as does D to C. Now for B and C there is a range of rational resource divisions from 15 - 45 favoring B to 45 - 15 favoring C. Once again only B and C divide resources while A and D are always excluded and never exchange. But now rationality predicts, not a unique division, but that each of B and C will gain no less than 15 and no more than 45.

Rationality Bounded
Simon introduced the idea of ‘bounded rationality’ asserting that conditions necessary and sufficient for (unbounded) rationality are an ideal rarely if ever realized empirically. To drive his point home, the criteria he puts forward for rationality are highly restrictive. To Simon, rationality calls for knowledge of all alternatives that are open to choice. It calls for complete knowledge of, or ability to compute, the consequences that follow on each of the alternatives. It calls for certainty in the decision maker’s present and future evaluation of these consequences. It calls for the ability to compare consequences, no matter how diverse and heterogeneous, in terms of some consistent measure of utility (Simon 1979:500).

Were any of these conditions not satisfied, rationality would be bounded.

Nevertheless, exchange networks, including the two described above, easily satisfy Simon’s criteria. In both structures all actors knew all alternatives, both in number and in offers sent. For the first example B and C knew that A and D would make offers of 19 to them while in the second B and C knew that offers of 14 would be forthcoming. As already seen, in both structures, computation of the consequences that followed was straightforward. For the first structure, the offers of A and D fully determined the B - C resource division while in the second A and D offers determined the range in which all B - C agreements would occur. In both cases, B and C, as decision makers, were certain that they would exchange with each other and that A and D would be excluded then and in any future encounters. Finally, since all resource units are interchangeable, all decisions were measurable on a single, consistent utility scale. Q.E.D.

The points just made are not wholly hypothetical. Experiments on exchange networks that use ExNet 3.0 — an Internet-based electronic laboratory system — actually realize Simon’s conditions in the laboratory. Using mouse control, subjects seated at PCs in separate rooms send offers and make exchanges. Since they view the network being investigated on their screens, subjects know all alternatives open to choice. Consequences are calculable because all offers are given on the screen. Alternative offers are easily compared because each resource unit is worth exactly the same regardless of the node with which one exchanges. For these conditions, the rational actor model can be applied to predict experimental results.

By contrast, there are no conditions un-
Response to Why Postmodernism is Here to Stay

Charles Edgley's letter, "Why Postmodernism is Here to Stay: Or, The Mainstreaming of a (Semi-) Radical Idea," makes a good case for the achievements of many postmodernist writers, although it also succeeds in ignoring their failures. On the positive side, he counters negative and often erroneous stereotypes, such as postmodernism's supposed abandonment of truth and morality. Also, he reminds us of the importance of fundamental criticism for any discipline that sees itself as scientific. By deconstructing the assumption that the scientific method will inevitably yield truth, postmodernist thinkers have helped us to understand the limitations of that method. They have also helped us open up to the enormous complexity and change within human behavior. They alert us to relatively new phenomena, such as the world of virtual reality. And their questioning of the entire direction of modern society along with beliefs in progress is most understandable, given the horrors of the twentieth century.

On the negative side, I see a general failure to address constructively the very problems they have emphasized as well as a generally pessimistic view of modern society. To illustrate, Norman Denzin's review of my Beyond Sociology's Tower of Babel: Reconstructing the Scientific Method (NY: Aldine, 2001) in the November issue of Contemporary Sociology was a fair analysis of what I had attempted. But here is an excerpt from the last two paragraphs:

"... Mills and his followers all wear the clothes of the Enlightenment, desiring a positive science that will produce utopia. But this dream, as we know, turned out in the twentieth century to produce a nightmare, a series of nightmares, disasters, systems of knowledge that produced the ideologies of those in power. The scientific method, when taken on by the natural and social sciences, wrecked terrible, heart-wrenching havoc on the natural and social world. And we want more of this? Herein lies the poverty of Mills' vision, which Phillips tries so valiantly to preserve. Mills is dead."

By blaming the scientific method for the "havoc" of modern times, Denzin attempts to throw out the major tool we social scientists have to address the havoc of modern times. By blaming the Enlightenment dream for modern problems, Denzin takes on nothing less than the scientific method. By blaming the Enlightenment dream for modern problems, Denzin takes on nothing less than the scientific method. By blaming the Enlightenment dream for modern problems, Denzin takes on nothing less than the scientific method. By blaming the scientific method for the "havoc" of modern times, Denzin attempts to throw out the major tool we social scientists have to address the havoc of modern times. By blaming the Enlightenment dream for modern problems, Denzin takes on nothing less than the scientific method. By blaming the scientific method for the "havoc" of modern times, Denzin attempts to throw out the major tool we social scientists have to address the havoc of modern times. By blaming the Enlightenment dream for modern problems, Denzin takes on nothing less than the scientific method. By blaming the scientific method for the "havoc" of modern times, Denzin attempts to throw out the major tool we social scientists have to address the havoc of modern times.

Surely there is a place for the new insights that such concepts have yielded. But to what extent have older concepts that carry the weight of whatever sociologists have discovered correspondingly been ignored? I'm thinking here of structural concepts (like culture, social stratification, bureaucracy, social organization, norms, values, self image, social structure, social relationship, anomie, alienation, social class, group, ethnocentrism, racism, sexism and ageism), and also situational concepts (like conformity, deviance, definition of the situation, labeling, relative deprivation, and social interaction). Postmodernists might argue that such concepts are reifications that can safely be eliminated. Yet to what extent do their new concepts, such as those cited by Edgley, at least yield the insights of the old ones, and at best go beyond them?

My purpose here is by no means to continue the running battle between postmodernists and those who oppose them, for I do believe in the importance of their positive accomplishments. Neither do I wish to single out postmodernists as the only sociologists who are disenchanted with the achievements of the scientific method, of sociological theory and research, and of the viability of the Enlightenment dream of solving the fundamental problems of society. In my own view, the scientific method aims to balance the unearthing of problems with efforts to address those problems. For example, if

But there are many examples of new ideas unrelated to postmodernism that are being developed throughout the social sciences.
Response To Phillips

Charles Edgley, Oklahoma State University

Bernie Phillips’ response to my brief comments on “Why Postmodernism Is Here to Stay” (ASA Newsletter, Jan. 2003) was characteristic of all of Professor Phillips’ writings: rational, balanced, thoughtful, informative—and thoroughly committed to modernist assumptions. He criticizes my view of postmodernism’s accomplishments as one-sided and castigates me for embracing their “pessimistic view of modern society.”

Of course my piece was not intended to be a balanced view of postmodernism, but rather a handful of thoughts on how the perspective and its language and insights have been mainstreamed into the sociological lexicon, and for good reason: it provides a lens through which to view empirical reality in ways the classic canon does not. Rest assured that had I intended to deconstruct deconstructionism, or critique it’s allied points of view, there would have been more to lay bare than newsletter space allows.

Moreover, Professor Phillips uses the occasion to respond to Norman Denzin’s review of his own effort to retrieve positivism from the scrap heap to which much of postmodernism has relegated it (Phillips, 2001). But even as I admire Bernie’s valiant efforts at reconciliation, applaud his erudition, and understand his wistful desire to web us together in the face of the Tower of Babel that separates us, I’m afraid my sympathies on this issue side wholly with Norm’s. Phillips wants to hold positive science blameless for, as Denzin describes them “… a series of nightmares and disasters… that wrecked terrible, heart-wrenching havoc on the natural and social worlds,” as one regime after another produced ideologies of power that were buttressed and even abetted by social science and it’s engineers.

While Dr. Phillips says he does not intend to continue the “running battle between postmodernists and those who oppose them,” I’m afraid such battles are inevitable given the radically different assumptions on which each paradigm is based. It is, after all, difficult to reconcile the grand narratives of the era in which sociology was born: science, reason, enlightenment, and humanity; with new paradigms which are built on the counter proposition that such narratives have, as Lyotard notes (and empirical observation confirms) “collapsed into a pile of conflicting myths and stories.”

Finally, I’m not sure what kind of space one’s mind has to occupy to cling to the grand narrative of progress through science and technology; narratives that have, as Lyotard insists, “almost killed us” (Lyotard, 1979). Mills, who urged sociologists to be more reflective about their own work, would surely have counseled that we be far more alert to the possibilities.

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Anyone who has read the work of postmodernists knows the frustrations of attending to writings that are often full of inconsistencies, dense jargon, grandiose pronouncements, and an appalling absence of the sort of empirical conventions that ordinarily pass for evidence in sociological research. With few exceptions, and at their worst, they are tedious, obscure, and dismissive of things held sacred by theorists like Phillips who continue to rhapsodize about modernism and the utopian vision of the Enlightenment held by its architects and sacred icons such as Comte, Condorcet and Durkheim.

Theories of Social Order A Reader

Edited by Michael Hechter and Christine Horne

This collection of readings provides a compelling exploration of what arguably remains the single most important problem in sociological theory: the problem of social order. Contending that the purpose of theory in the social sciences lies in its ability to explain real-world phenomena, Theories of Social Order departs from the standard theory reader by presenting classical texts alongside contemporary theoretical extensions and recent empirical applications to explore this substantive theme. Its unique approach—focusing on theories rather than theorists and on one overarching question rather than a disparate array of issues—encourages students to compare various factors and mechanisms, seek common analytical themes, and develop a deeper theoretical understanding of the problem of social order. Further, by pairing theory with empirical research, the volume helps students appreciate the relevance of theory to their own lives, to the research enterprise, and to the development of better social policies.

Readings have been selected based on their relevance to classical theoretical issues and are all accessible to a non-technical audience. Editorial introductions to each section discuss the causal mechanisms in each theory and make explicit links between the classical and the modern texts.

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364 pages, 10 illustrations
Forthcoming
Stanford University Press
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order which bounded rationality can be applied to predict any outcomes. Unlike rationality which is a theoric principle, bounded rationality is at most an idea, perhaps only the negation of the idea of rationality. No one has ever applied the theory of bounded rationality to predict events because there is no theory of bounded rationality to apply. Would such a theory be useful? Perhaps. But until it is formulated, rationality and bounded rationality are not the same kinds of things. Rationality is an inferential principle. Bounded rationality is an idea devoid of inferential power.

Even worse, unlike rationality which is a single thing, bounded rationality is many things. From the Simon quote given earlier, four conditions are all necessary for rationality. Therefore, rationality is bounded when one or more of the four conditions is not present. Treating each condition as dichotomous, there are 15 kinds of bounded rationality. That there are suggests that a bounded rationality theory, were it ever developed, would necessarily be very complex.

Using Rationality to Test Motives

Finally to the second point of this essay. The rational actor model, as used in theory and realized experimentally, is essential to the investigation of non-rational motives. When motives such as equity (Cook and Emerson 1978) or status value (Thye 2000) are introduced into the simple social structures studied in network exchange, the strength of the motive is measured by derivation — by changes from a known baseline. For example, the strength of status value is measured by the extent to which experimental outcomes deviate from what would be expected for rationality and structure in the absence of status value effects. Here issues of calibration are central. Without the rational actor model as a baseline, the strength of status value or any other motive cannot be found. Rationality is also essential for replication for, only given an experimental design optimal for rationality, will the motive exhibit a given effect size across time and laboratories.

Unfortunately, there is a longstanding tradition of designing network exchange experiments to limit subject information, thus negating rational action. Once there was good reason for that limitation. When network exchange research was in its infancy, there was a need to show that experimental results actually did emerge from activity in structures — that results could not stem from subjects’ initial information. Because subjects did not know the network in which they were acting, artifacts stemming from that knowledge were blocked. But now the effects of structure are well established and yet designs that limit subject information still block serious attempts to replicate experimental results across laboratories.

The Big Picture

Now to the third point, albeit briefly. The larger field of sociology is not exempt from the need to use the rational actor model. Consider the following. In building his basic concepts, Weber defines social action as any action “oriented to the past, present, or expected future behavior of others” ([1917] 1967:22) and “social relationship as two or more mutually oriented social actions” (26). In any social relation inferring the future actions of others is essential. How do we conceptualize actors inferring the future behavior of others? Only the rational actor model has the inferential power needed so only it can take the central place among the tools we bring to these analyses.

References


Endnotes

1The terms in quotes are Lindenberg’s. Today the gender neutral “rational actor” is preferred.

2ET actors, like game theoretic actors and economic actors, have preference (value) systems and current states of their systems. The preference state is altered by events like exchanging or dividing resource pools. ET’s actor is intro-
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To that end, the mini-conference not only highlights the value and contributions of these three schools of theory, but employs a format designed to foster a direct exchange of views among the three. At each session, invited panelists will offer their perspectives on how one of the schools of theory — classical, formal, or critical — contributes to the discipline. I’ve asked Ira Cohen, Cecilia Ridgeway, and Charles Lemert to organize and preside at the three sessions, and as you can see, they’ve put together a splendid program that brings some of our most distinguished theorists, as well as some of our younger scholars, to speak on this topic. To integrate the three sessions, panelists’ talks will be followed by comments from representatives of the other two schools of theory — the organizers of the other two sessions. (Charles Lemert has invited Dorothy Parker to co-organize his session, and she will share his commentator duties). We envision a relatively informal exchange of views, one that engages the audience as well as the panelists and commentators. Our objective is to promote a dialogue among three branches of the section that don’t often speak with one another. The results should be both illuminating and provocative.

In addition to the mini-conference sessions, Jane Sell is organizing an open-submission session on “Recent Advances in Theory,” and Noah Mark is organizing our traditional roundtables. Our section reception (held jointly this year with the Culture section, on the evening of August 18th) will round out the events. While most events will be scheduled on section day, at least one event will have to be held on the following day, August 19. So, be sure to consider the full section program as you begin to make your travel plans.

Section on Theory Mini-conference: “The Value of Theory”
(Organized by Linda D. Molm, Ira J. Cohen, Cecilia L. Ridgeway, and Charles Lemert)

1. The Value of Theory: Classical Theory
Organizer/Presider:
Ira J. Cohen, Rutgers University

Panel:
Margaret Somers, The University of Michigan
Charles Tilly, Columbia University
Bryan Turner, The University of Cambridge
Eviatar Zerubavel, Rutgers University

Commentators:
Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Stanford University
Charles Lemert, Wesleyan University

II. The Value of Theory: Formal Theory
Organizer/Presider:
Cecilia L. Ridgeway, Stanford University

Panel:
Lynn Smith-Lovin, University of Arizona
Michael Hechter, University of Washington
Michael Macy, Cornell University

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many of the concepts that sociologists generally employ do not give sufficient emphasis to the complexity and dynamism of human behavior, then let us give greater emphasis to situational concepts while still retaining our structural concepts. The concepts introduced by postmodernists can indeed help us to become more critical, and the structural and situational concepts cited above that have weathered the test of time and research can help us to become more constructive.

As one illustration of efforts to be both critical and constructive, I might cite a conference open to everyone that is sponsored by the Sociological Imagination Group, to take place during the evenings of the ASA Atlanta meetings in one of the ASA hotels. We are attempting to examine the utility of an approach to the scientific method which might enable social scientists to achieve rapid cumulative development. The conference title is “Toward a Sociological Imagination: The Web Approach to Theory.” Its focus is on both presenting ideas of classical and contemporary theorists (like Marx, Weber, Spencer, Cooley, Parsons, Goffman and Mills) and then attempting to move beyond those insights with the aid of a broad approach to the scientific method. Among those presenting papers are Maria Antonopoulou, Hans Bakker, Martha DeWitt, Guillermina Jasso, James Kimberly, Harold Kincaid, Louis Kontos, Lauren Langman, myself, Thomas Scheff, Sandro Segre, Leo Semashko, Robert Stebbins and Jonathan Turner.

Book Announcement
Talcott Parsons: A n Intellectual Biography

The American sociologist Talcott Parsons was often accused of being an overly abstract, even apolitical thinker, remote in Harvard’s ivory tower. The controversial Parsons, in fact, emulated his mentor, the venerable Max Weber, in at least two respects: as a scholar he practised Wertfreiheit (scientific professionalism) and as a political activist he worked for the preservation and expansion of democracy. Uta Gerhardt traces this double commitment and links Parsons’s scholarship to his politics. Utilizing rich archival material, she examines four periods in Parsons’s intellectual life in the context of American history and society. From the New Deal and the rise of German fascism to the Second World War, through the McCarthy era & the Civil Rights movement, Parsons’s overriding agenda was to develop both a sociological understanding and a defense of the development of modern democracy.

ISBN: 0521810221, Hardback, 326 pages, 10 half-tones
Response to The Relevance of Honor in Sociology

Tom Scheff, Prof. Emeritus, UCSB

I am writing in response to “The Relevance of Honor in Sociology,” by Baxter and Margavio. It is true that the idea of honor no longer plays a part in national and world politics. It was important in the 19th and early part of the 20th century. One of the reasons given by the US press for the Spanish-American War was “the national honor.” It was certainly important in the origins of WWI, especially for France. For the French media from 1871 to 1914, a rematch with the Germans was seen as a way of removing the tarnish from national honor caused by their defeat in the Franco-Prussian War. The ideas of honor and glory figured prominently in the French military poetry and popular songs of the same period.

But these ideas died in the trenches of WWI. By the time Hitler came along, the word honor was little used in modern nations. Instead, Hitler used terms like regaining German prestige, rebuilding self-confidence, stopping other nations from ridiculing the weakness of the German people, and many other similar ideas. In my 1994 book, I argued that honor and the phrases Hitler used both refer to same underlying concepts: collective pride and shame. Individual and collective conflict have both material and emotional causes. In irrational and destructive conflict, such as the war that is now being promoted against Iraq, there is always an element of unacknowledged fear, grief and especially shame. I develop this idea at some length in my current paper on male emotions and violence, #20 of the linked articles on my website, address below.

Reference

http://www.soc.ucsb.edu/faculty/scheff/

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