

- Theory Sector Miniconference
- Publishing in *Sociological Theory*
- Election to be held in May

- Sociology and Human Nature
- Revisiting the Masters
- Theory Training

THE ASA
THEORY
SECTION
NEWSLETTER

Perspectives

April 2001

VOLUME 23, NUMBER 2

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Message from the Chair

Theory Section Miniconference: Sociology and its Neighbors

by Douglas Heckathorn, Cornell University

The Theory Section Miniconference at the Anaheim meetings in 2001, titled, "Sociology and Neighboring Disciplines: Current Developments and Future Prospects," will examine the implications of the evolving relationship between theory in sociology and theory in neighboring disciplines.

Interdisciplinary work has been growing, and the effects are complex. What can sociologists learn from theorists in other fields and what can other disciplines learn from us? Can this lead to deeper insights into the phenomena of traditional concern to sociologists or are traditional areas of investigation being neglected? Though interdisciplinary involvement increases the richness and diversity of the theoretic enterprises to which sociologists contribute, it also risks increasing the cognitive distance separating them as they gravitate increasingly toward different disciplines. Alternatively, if work in these diverse areas continues to reflect traditional sociological preoccupations, such as a focus on the structural influences on behavior, the role of social norms, social inequality, and social identity, new bases for dialogue may be created.

See MINICONFERENCE on Page 2

Sociological Theory: Editor's Report

Jonathan Turner, University of California-Riverside

I am now a bit over half way through my term as editor of *Sociological Theory*. At this juncture, let me share some of my reactions and concerns about the journal, and its future. As I indicated when I took over the editorship, I hoped to make the journal a quarterly. This goal has proven much more difficult than I had thought would be the case. The main problem is that the journal simply does not receive enough submissions to justify a quarterly. I have tried to get submissions up to one hundred and fifty per year, but in fact, the journal receives only around one hundred or less (during the last year, we received only about eighty five submissions). Thus, I cannot make a compelling case without more submissions; and so, I urge members in

See REPORT on page 2

MINICONFERENCE from page 1

The miniconference will bring together scholars from Anthropology, Philosophy, Political Science, and Sociology to examine these and other issues. It will consist of sessions focusing on sociology's relationship to the humanities, to the other social sciences, and to emerging disciplines such as cognitive science.

Sociology and Neighboring Disciplines: Current Developments and Future Prospects**Session 1: Sociology and Other Disciplines: Social Science & Social Theory**

Organizer and Presider: Robert Antonio, University of Kansas

Papers:

Sandra Harding, UCLA

Difference, Theories of Democracy, & Epistemology: Issues for Social Theory

Douglas Kellner, UCLA

New Technologies, New Literacies, and Democracy in the New Millennium

Charles Lemert, Wesleyan University

Social Studies in the Space Formally Known as Sociology

Stephen Turner, University of South Florida

Its Over: Social Theory After Sociology

Session 2: Sociology and Other Disciplines: Sociology and the Other Social Sciences

Organizer and Presider: Phillip Bonacich, University of California-Los Angeles

Panel:

Phillip Bonacich, University of California-Los Angeles

Susanne Lohmann, University of California-Los Angeles

Dwight Read, University of California-Los Angeles

Mathew O. Jackson, California Institute of Technology

Session 3: Sociology and Other Disciplines: Sociology and the Sciences of Complexity

Organizer and Presider: Michael Macy, Cornell University

Panel:

John Padgett, University of Chicago

Duncan Watts, Columbia University

John Skvoretz, University of South Carolina

Robert Boyd, University of California at Los Angeles

Michael Macy, Cornell University

REPORT from page 1

the section to submit their articles to the journal. We have room for good work, unlike so many other journals.

I have not been surprised with the nature of the submissions. For a long time, my impression is that a great deal of what is called "sociological theory" is not explanatory but expository. Theory tends to be about itself more than about the empirical world. Most of the submissions that I have received fall into several broad categories: 1) analyses/critics/comments on another theorist, with Pierre Bourdieu, Jurgen Habermas, and Anthony Giddens being the favorites, 2) history of ideas, either of an important figure in sociology's past or of figures who have been ignored and should now be given more attention, 3) programmatic statements about areas where sociologists should theorize (feminist issues being the most prominent statements along these lines), 4) conceptual analysis where ideas of one theorist are analyzed with the concepts of another or where concepts are blended in some manner, 5) epistemological assertions about the virtues or problems of pursuing a particular view of how to conduct sociological inquiry (positivism, feminism, critical theory being the most talked about), 6) methodologies of theorizing, or how to do theory when and if one ever gets around to theorizing, and finally, 7) actual efforts to theorize about a property or process in the world. Some papers are really off the wall, although I must confess that I have found these both amusing and interesting in their craziness (these are usually returned without review since they will not stand up to the review process). These seven general types of papers are listed in order of their numbers, with analyses/criticisms/comments on theorists being the most frequent submission and with explanations about the world being the least common.

I have not published papers that reflect the distribution of submissions, for several reasons. One obvious reason is my own biases which favor explanations, but

See REPORT on page 7

Perspectives is the newsletter of the Theory Section of the American Sociological Association. It is published quarterly in January, April, July, and October. The deadline for all submissions is the fifth day of the month before publication. We welcome news and commentary as well as announcements about conferences, journal information, calls for papers, position openings, and any other information of interest to section members.

Send submissions to: J. David Knottnerus and Jean Van Delinder, Department of Sociology, CLB 006, Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, OK 74078-4062; fax (405) 744-5780; phone (405) 744-6106 (Knottnerus) or (405) 744-4613 (Van Delinder); e-mail jdk2307@okstate.edu or jlvan@okstate.edu

The Masters Revisited and Revised

Julie Harms Cannon, Texas Tech University

If you pick up an introductory sociology textbook today you are likely to read about several of the early women founders such as Harriet Martineau, Jane Addams, or maybe even Charlotte Perkins Gilman. Yet, interestingly, although not surprisingly, there is no real integration of their works throughout—while this is progress, it is not equality. Typically, the works of the “masters” (read men) is presented at the beginning and then further explicated throughout the more substantive chapters. This indicates the significance and impact these scholars have had and continue to have on the discipline.

Yet, that is just the more rudimentary introductory texts, right? What about our classical theory texts? Surely these are better. Shockingly, these texts are most times not as inclusive as the introductory texts. If you select a classical sociological theory text you are not likely to read about any of the founding women. The exceptions to this are George Ritzer’s *Classical Sociological Theory* (2000) and Patricia Madoo Lengermann and Jill Niebrugge-Brantley’s *The Women Founders* (1998). While these works are clearly an improvement over the entirely male-dominated texts, they are not without their problems. More specifically, *The Women Founders* presents a “woman only” discussion of sociological theory that does not include chapters on any of the male founders (although as an early text on women this is justified). Further, *Classical Sociological Theory* includes only one chapter on six of the early women founders (authored by Lengermann and Niebrugge-Brantley) in conjunction with the eleven chapters (authored by Ritzer) on individual male theorists. Again, this is progress. However, these are not the ideal models for our students. We need texts that more equitably

address the theoretical contributions of the male and female founders. A better model in this regard is Charles Lemert’s *Social Theory* (1999), which includes biographical sketches of the theorists as well as brief excerpts from their works. However, while this text is gender inclusive (in addition to being racially/ethnically inclusive), it does not allow for a thorough examination of these works (one hundred plus theorists).

Although women’s lives and works are beginning to be acknowledged within the discipline, instructors do not yet have available to them the type of text necessary to teach a gender inclusive classical sociological theory course. Instructors attempting to teach their students about women’s theories of society are often forced to turn to original works of the women founders or to feminist theory texts in which their works are not examined from a specifically sociological approach. We still do not have a work that addresses the contributions of men and women equally. Given the androcentric bias of the discipline it is likely that men had more impact and influence, but is it not time to revisit and revise our history? What would sociology have looked like if women’s work was widely studied or included? What message are we sending to our students by consistently excluding the work of the early women sociologists? What does this say about our discipline? How far have we progressed? Where do we want to go?

These types of questions force us to consider how seriously we take our inclusion of women in the discipline. Are we willing to move beyond the “add women and stir” model (Ollenburger & Moore 1998) or will we settle for being politically correct in our mentioning of women’s contributions? It seems that a true consideration of women’s roles in the founding of the discipline must move beyond mere mention and to a more explicit discussion of how their inclusion alters or should alter the existing canon.

While I do not contend that such a di-

Candidates Nominated ASA Elections Scheduled for May

Thomas Fararo, University of Pittsburgh

The Nominations Committee has completed its work and forwarded to the ASA its slate of candidates for the Theory Section offices. The two candidates for chair are Michael Hechter and Linda Molm.

The four candidates for two positions on the council of the Theory Section are Edward Lawler, Michael Macy, Michael Lovaglia and Robin Stryker.

All candidates have agreed to serve and their biographical information has been forwarded to the ASA offices in Washington. Section members will receive a single ballot sometime in May for all ASA and section elections. Candidate profiles will arrive with the ballot.

The Nominations Committee members were Thomas Fararo (Chair), Karen Cook, Jack Goldstone, David Wagner, and Morris Zelditch.

verse pool of scholars such as those reading *Perspectives* will consider each theorist equally valuable, I do believe that a more accurate depiction of classical theory necessitates the inclusion of a more diverse pool of theorists. But what does this mean? We argue over who can be considered a classical scholar, whether or not theorists had enough stature or influence, whether formal training in sociology is necessary, etc. I suspect these debates will rage on. But I wonder what we stand to lose from the true integration of women’s ideas. Is there a fear of feminism or that sociology will not be taken as seriously?

Perhaps the lack of inclusion stems from more practical considerations such as how to do so in a meaningful and accurate way.

See MASTERS on page 7

Sociology and the Rediscovery of Human Nature

David Rubinstein, University of Illinois at Chicago

'No creature can learn that which his heart has no shape to hold'
All the Pretty Horses Cormac McCarthy

The evolutionary psychologists John Tooby and Leda Cosmides (1992) are not far off in describing the "standard social science model" as rejecting the idea of human nature and considering persons to be entirely products of their social environment. While grounded in important intellectual claims, this view has been fed by professional turf wars as well as various ideological motives.

The definition of the environment that controls action varies considerably. The main theoretical split in sociology is between those who look to cultural training to explain behavior and those who focus on the environment of costs and benefits. The former approach, drawing - selectively - on Durkheim and Parsons, considers norms to be the foundation of social order and explains individual behavior in terms of socialization. This position has been reenergized by the post-modernist insistence on the social construction of everything that matters, a view nicely expressed in Richard Rorty's widely quoted aphorism that 'socialization goes all the way down' (1985:189).

In contrast, the 'instrumentalist' tradition adopts some variant of homo economicus by arguing that the dominant influence on behavior is social structure, a notoriously vague term that is usually specified as the structure of opportunity. In structural sociology, norms are seen as irrelevant, epiphenomenal, or adaptive and hence not the 'ultimate' source of behavior. This understanding of action is explicit in rational choice and network

theory. But Prendergast and Knottnerus argue that rational choice has become the "common sense psychology for structural theorizing" (1994:9). Those who doubt this might consider how closely Gary Becker's understanding of crime parallels Robert Merton's emphasis on *opportunity structures*: "some persons become 'criminals'...not because their basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but because their benefits and costs differ" (Becker 1976:46).

But the differences between instrumentalist and normative views of action are bridged with a shared view of the actor as having no ingrained behavioral dispositions. In the former view, opportunities control behavior while in the latter actors are filled with culture. But in both, the actor is a *tabula rasa*.

In recent years some cracks have appeared in the resistance to the idea that humans carry ingrained dispositions: that there is a human nature. Dennis Wrong has reiterated his early critique of the "oversocialized" concept of man with the claim that "there is a huge gaping hole" in sociological explanations that leave out the "wants, feelings and impulses that undergird and set in motion the whole process of human interaction" (1994:59). Emirbayer and Goodwin fault sociology for failing to incorporate "psychical structures" (1994:970, n.5).

This view has filtered into empirical work. The study of emotions is a recognized subfield in sociology and while some consider them to be artifacts of culture, others, like Theodore Kemper (1978), believe that humans are naturally endowed with various 'primary' emotions. Richard Herrnstein and James Q. Wilson's (1985) claim that genetics play a role in crime has not been ruled out of court. Christopher Jencks (1992:97) suggests that "Men are 5 to 10 times more likely than women to commit almost every crime on which American society keeps records...[and] in all other societies that keep records." For this reason he believes there exist fundamental differences in the temperaments

of men and women.

An especially sharp challenge to the *tabula rasa* of standard sociology appeared last June in - no less - the *American Sociological Review*. J. Udry argues, contrary to "social constructionist models of gender" (2000:445), that there are "constraints imposed on socialization effects by the biological processes that determine the gendered predispositions of individuals" (2000:444). His data show that females exposed to high levels of testosterone in utero express different values about marriage, children, work, etc. in later life. He concludes by placing biology at the center-stage of sociological analysis: "Humans form their social structures around gender because males and females have different and biologically influenced behavioral dispositions. Gendered social structure is a universal accommodation to this biological fact" (2000:454).

Former devotees of 'the official position' have found a variety of paths to the idea of human nature. The role of genetics in alcoholism and mental illness is now widely accepted. Recent findings on the similarities of identical twins - 'they are almost as alike when they are reared apart as when they are reared together' (Pinker 1997:20) - strongly suggests a genetic component in behavior. The universality of various social practices and institutions also belies the doctrine that 'socialization goes all the way down,' insofar as common practices suggest common natures. While there are disputes at the margins, there is evidence that all societies have rules about property, regulate violence, institutionalize sexual relations, etc. The natural law philosopher John Finnis cites anthropological literature showing that no society fails to 'treat the bodies of dead members of the group in some traditional and ritual fashion different from their procedures for rubbish disposal' (1980: 83). None of this should be surprising. Animal ethology provides countless examples of complex natural behaviors and inborn temperaments and to argue that only humans - genetically so close to the
See NATURE on page 6

What is being taught in the name of “theory” to graduate students in sociology? How do instructors really feel about training in classical theory? Contemporary theory? Theory construction? Science? What messages about theory are they passing down to the next generation of scholars in our discipline? We spoke with 71 instructors of required graduate theory courses in the nation’s top 50 departments of sociology, asking these and other questions. Some of the raw results from our interviews will appear, with little or no commentary, in a series of short articles in this and future newsletters. The project was supported by a small grant from the American Sociological Association, and assistance was provided by Christopher Barnum, Cynthia Estep, Will Kalkhoff, John Knapp and C. Wesley Younts. Readers are encouraged to send comments to the editors and/or to the author at barry-markovsky@uiowa.edu

THEORY TRAINING IN SOCIOLOGY

Barry Markovsky, University of Iowa

Part 2: Instructors’ Attitudes Toward Categories of Theorizing and Theory Training

The first installment in this series presented data on sample characteristics and on instructors’ perceptions of their own graduate training in theory. In the first table below, we provide information on instructors’ attitudes toward different categories of theoretical work—classical theory, contemporary theory and formal theory. Not coincidentally, these categories also correspond to the three most frequent types of required theory courses in the programs we contacted. The second table summarizes the instructors’ perceptions of the quality of graduate training in classical theory, contemporary theory, theory construction and formal logic.

“Relative to Other Sociologists, How Do You Feel About...”

	Classical Theory	Contemporary Theory	Formal Theory
More Favorable	73.2%	46.8%	19.7%
About Average	15.5%	27.4%	38.0%
Less Favorable	7.0%	19.4%	32.4%
No Answer	1.4%	3.2%	4.2%
Don’t Know	2.8%	3.2%	5.6%

“How do you rate the quality of graduate training in . . .”

Excellent = 5 Very Good = 4 Good = 3 Fair = 2 Poor = 1

	Classical Theory	Contemporary Theory	Theory Construction	Formal Logic
Own Department				
Mean	3.61	3.70	3.16	2.13
sd	1.55	1.79	1.55	1.29
n	65	58	64	63
don’t know	3	1	2	5
no answer	3	2	5	3
omitted	0	10	0	0
Nationwide				
Mean	2.52	2.55	2.01	1.81
sd	1.39	1.43	1.18	1.13
n	46	44	44	42
don’t know	22	14	25	24
no answer	2	2	2	2
omitted	1	11	0	3

The next installment in this series will summarize what instructors believe to be the most important messages about theory which they impart to their students.

NATURE from page 4

higher apes - lack such traits approaches a theory of divine creation.

The 'rediscovery of human nature' is most fully developed in evolutionary psychology. Under the assumption that brains, like other organs, are subject to adaptive pressures this field explains emotions, behavioral dispositions, etc. in terms of adaptive value. For example, Robert Wright (1994:25) argues that animals "with an ounce of extra love for their offspring, love that translates into slightly more assiduous nurturing," have a reproductive advantage over rivals. Aggression can confer advantages, as can the ability - sparked by sympathy and gratitude - to cooperate.

What is needed now is a way to incorporate the idea of human nature in sociological explanation. This implies a 'multidimensional' sociology that expands the efforts of Alexander (1984) to encompass norms and instrumental reason. But typically, a multidimensional approach is 'additive.' While many, including Alexander, advocate a synthetic or even dialectical approach, the *interpenetration* of the components of behavior is usually scanted, often because of the urge to assert the "ultimate" priority of culture or instrumental reason. A more fruitful program is to find a properly synthetic understanding of genetic dispositions, instrumental reason, and culture.

There are hints in the literature on how this can be done. Anthropologists have explored the bearing of culture on emotional life. While 'constructionists' consider emotions to be entirely social products: "Positivists suppose the existence of a small number of culturally universal 'primary' emotions [like anger, fear, and disgust] associated with specific physiological changes, onto which are grafted an indefinite number of culturally defined 'secondary' emotions during affective socialization" (MacKinnon 1994:125). The latter approach argues that while emotions have a biological core, they are profoundly mediated by culture.

A philosophical foundation for the view that emotions are culturally constituted can be found in Wittgenstein's analysis of "inner" experience. He argues, for example, that, unlike pain, "love is not a feeling." This gnomic remark is elaborated by noting that: "Love is put to the test, pain not. One does not say: 'That was not pain, or it would not have gone off so quickly'" (1970, para. 504). What Wittgenstein means is that emotions do not come labeled: they must be interpreted and cultural conventions play a key role in this process. Hence, we distinguish love from infatuation and puppy love from genuine love, not by introspection, but through a culturally informed interpretive process. In this view, emotions are articulated in their dialectical relation with culture.

There is also room for instrumental reason in understanding emotions. Arlie Hochschild's (1979) analysis of "feeling rules" aimed to demonstrate "the power of the social" and "obedience to rules." But Hochschild also demonstrates how emotions are constructed in light of practical exigencies as well as culture. For example, she cites a college athlete who had lost interest in the game: "I did everything I could to get myself 'up.' I would try to be outwardly 'rah rah' or get myself scared of my opponents - anything to get the adrenalin flowing." The process through which emotions are rationally managed, or instrumentally constructed, has been elaborated in economic psychology. Robert Frank (1988), e.g., argues that "irrational" passions, like anger or love, can serve instrumental purposes: those prone to anger are less likely to be trespassed upon and those capable of love beyond reason inspire reciprocal commitments in others.

A properly synthetic multidimensionality would thus see the components of action as interpenetrating. That is, emotions, desires, etc. are constituted in light of culture and practical reason. Hence their study should not be seen as a rival or threat to sociology: their proper understanding *requires* a sociological analysis of

their embeddedness in culture and social structure.

The advantage of a dialectical approach is that while the interpenetration of the components of action is revealed, they are not collapsed into one another, i.e., their partial autonomy is recognized. While emotions, etc. should be understood in their interrelations with culture and social structure, we cannot make whatever we will of them. For example, disgust, an evolved reaction to threatening substances, cannot be "constructed" as love. Hence, the professional inclinations of sociology should be held in check. A return to the oversocialized view would preclude the ability of sociologists to use evolutionary psychology to discover the properties of human nature that "undergird and set in motion the whole process of human interaction" - the "biological facts" to which "universal accommodation[s]" must be made. For all his constructionism, Wittgenstein believed that we have ingrained impulses: "it is a primitive reaction to tend, to treat, the part that hurts when someone else is in pain" (1970, para. 540). Like evolutionary psychologists, he argued that many social practices are rooted in human nature: "Our language-game is an extension of primitive behavior" (para. 545).

The social construction of emotions is nicely illustrated by Bynes and Parsons' (1993) analysis of homosexuality. Reviewing the deficiencies of a strictly biological account of sexual orientation, they argue that certain traits believed to be heritable - like novelty seeking, harm avoidance, and reward dependence - can lead to either heterosexual or homosexual orientation. Ordinarily, a boy high in novelty seeking and low in reward dependence might be inclined towards the adventure of an unconventional sexual life. But in the context of, say, an absent father and an overly protective mother who discouraged sports, the same traits might encourage emphatic masculinity. Arguing that "(s)exual orientation emerges from an interaction between the environment

See NATURE on page 8

MASTERS from page 3

While many of these women were widely recognized during their lifetimes (although not necessarily as sociologists) their works were not readily adopted within the canon of sociological thought. More specifically, while these women had much to say, and perhaps offer us the possibility of rewriting or reworking the key paradigms present within sociological thought, we cannot argue that these scholars have had a major impact on the discipline given that their works have not been widely cited or explicated. However, we can imagine the ways that these works alter existing understandings. Additionally, we can examine the linkages between these works and the more traditional founding ideas.

Including the women founders will necessarily shift existing conceptions of the major classical schools of thought. The founding women do not (and I would argue cannot) neatly fit within functionalism, conflict theory, or symbolic interactionism. Interestingly, their works oftentimes combine these major areas of social theory and offer us alternative understandings of social life. However, to accomplish such a goal, we must move beyond a feminist critique of the male founders (Lehmann 1994; Sydie 1987) and consider the ways in which we can create a more unified and indeed accurate interpretation of the key ideas in the field regardless of the gender of their originators. Further, texts that treat women's work in isolation, although this was necessary for a time, do not create a unified body of social thought (Deegan 1991; Lengermann & Neibrugge-Brantley 1998). We must move to research and texts that examine the lives of the major contributors, men and women in tandem. Obviously, such an inclusion will also contribute to the racial/ethnic diversity of such texts (consider the writings of Anna Julia Cooper, Ida B. Wells, and W.E.B. Du Bois). This unification of thought should not be an attempt to dethrone more widely accepted and acclaimed scholars such as Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Karl Marx, Georg Simmel, to name a few. Instead, maybe we can imagine them sharing the stage with Harriet Martineau,

Jane Addams, Charlotte Perkins Gilman, and the numerous others who worked to further sociological discourse.

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On The Web

Mathieu Deflem (Purdue University) sent us this information: the original edition of Max Weber's "Die protestantische Ethik und der Geist des Kapitalismus" is available on the website of the University of Potsdam. The online edition can be consulted freely, excluding any commercial usage, and forms part of a larger collection of Weber texts, the "Max Weber, Gesammelte Politische Schriften, Potsdamer Internet-Ausgabe." The address of the site is: <http://www.uni-potsdam.de/u/paed/pia/index.htm>

REPORT from page 2

this is not the most important reason. By far the most common reason for not publishing more papers in categories (1) through (6) is that they do not survive the review process. I always try to select reviewers who work within or near the subject of the paper, but even biasing reviewers in this way, it is still difficult to get three or four reviewers to agree. Most reviews are negative or mildly positive with some serious reservations. It is clear that theorists do not agree on what constitutes "good theory," even theorists who are working in the same or closely allied genres. A positivist and postmodernist would not agree, but I do not send

articles from one to the other since this would obviously be unfair. But, what is surprising is that one's fellow travelers may be more likely to trash something than one's enemies.

Editors of regular sociology journals have also complained about the "problem with theory." There are rather clear standards as to what constitutes competent empirical work, whether quantitative or qualitative, but such standards do not exist in theory. Theoretical work is so diverse and conducted in accordance with so many different standards that it is very difficult to get consensus on reviews of a paper. I have no problem publishing a

paper with some negative reviews, especially if it seems (to me) to raise some important and/or interesting issues of broad interest to theorists; and in fact, most of the papers that I have published had negative comments from one or two reviewers. Still, I am bothered by the inability to reach consensus on most papers. Without consensus, only two options are available to an editor: 1) look at reviews as "votes" and simply count them or 2) look at reviews as advisory and make an independent judgement. I do both, although I probably rely upon (2) more than (1). I am at a particular disadvantage when I do not know an area very

See REPORT on page 8

NATURE *from page 6*

and personality characteristics of the individual" (1993:237), the authors conclude that sexual orientation involves both biologically based temperamental traits and "a cascade of choices made in the context of changing circumstances in one's life and enormous social and cultural pressures."

Recognition that humans carry biologically ingrained "wants, feelings, and impulses" should not be seen as a rival to the sociological perspective. Indeed, the process through which they are constructed in light of cultural resources and practical exigencies opens the door to a promising line of research - and the development of a fully multidimensional sociology.

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Correction:

Stephen Kalberg's translation of Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (April 2001) is being published solely by the Roxbury Press. The January 2001 *Perspectives* incorrectly listed that it was being co-published by Roxbury Press and Blackwell Publishers. The new translation is being distributed outside North America by Blackwell Publishers.

REPORT *from page 7*

well, and as a result, I often must fall back on (1) because I do not think that I am competent to pass an independent judgment (and the reviews are too split or too negative for me to override).

Thus, theorists pay a price for their diversity. Even a theory journal, much less a more general journal in the field, cannot secure consensus over what we do. I used to think, rather naively, that theory could be unified under the rubric of scientific explanation. The power of a theory to explain with principles and models the empirical world would guide us in selecting the best theories. I still think that this is the best criterion to use in evaluating

work, but obviously, I could not do so given the current constitution of the field. Even works that metatheorize could contribute to explanatory sociology by raising problematic issues, by clarifying or synthesizing concepts, by questioning hidden assumptions, by bringing neglected theorists' ideas to the table, by integrating diverse strains of thought on an idea, and by many means. Thus, using the criterion of explanatory science would not have to be a straight-jacket that would exclude other kinds of thinking. But even this expanded view of what might contribute to explanation would be inappropriate because so many theorists do not accept in any form the epistemology of science. Indeed, many see it as the "enemy," and so there is little hope that theoretical sociology will reveal much unity.

Thus, I will muddle along, trying to publish representative work but clearly with a bias toward theories that address forces, processes, and events in the empirical world, whether present, past, or future. As is evident, the journal is not overly biased to my position, but there is a slight over-representation of articles in this direction. But, I have tried to be inclusive, publishing the very best pieces working in a wide variety of traditions. If there is a bias it has been towards historical/comparative work trying to explain important processes in history. I am very happy to provide an outlet for these kinds of articles. I continue to hope that more explanatory articles outside of comparative/historical sociology will come in; and I encourage authors to submit these to me—recognizing that I am employing a very broad definition of "explanatory." And of course, I am open to quality articles in the first six categories listed above.

Theorizing of all kinds is, therefore, welcome. Perhaps the most important goal is to increase the number of submissions so that I can make a strong case for a quarterly journal. If we can do this, then there will be room for the best articles in all genres.