

PERSPECTIVES

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"And, paradoxically, the more the individual is concerned with the reality that is not available to perception, the more must he concentrate his attention on appearances" (Erving Goffman, *The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life* [Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1959], p. 249).

TALMUDIC EXEGESIS OR IDENTIFICATION WITH THE AGRESSOR?

Charles Camic

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In characterizing the field of sociological theory as suffering at present from a dysfunctional "multiple personality disorder," Janet Saltzman Chafetz (*Perspectives*, January 1993) applies a bit of psychiatric terminology to commentary on the theory area. The general thrust of her remarks, however, and, in particular, her derogatory comments about the "exegesis of classics" suggest that another clinical concept might be more apropos: "identification with the aggressor."

As coined by Anna Freud, the concept refers to the process in which individuals struggle to defend themselves against the condemnations and criticisms of threatening authority figures by taking on the aggressors' hostile attitudes and turning these back upon other persons.

It seems to me that there has been a fair amount of this process going on in the theory area the past few years. Chafetz's denunciation of "exegesis" and related activities echoes a view that some in the theory area are increasingly voicing in articles, exchanges, and reviews of one another's work and meets with considerable assent in different circles. It is a view that critics outside the field have long expressed, namely, that all this about what Durkheim, Weber, Mead, Parsons, and the rest is pretty superfluous to the real sociological task of analyzing the social world.

That some outsiders would hold this opinion is not surprising. Disciplines and subdisciplines thrive on misconceptions and negative stereotypes about other fields with which they have no familiarity. Economists misperceive sociology and devalue sociological work; social theorists trivialize the work of methodologists; and sociologists (who are outside the theory area and devote little time to the works of Durkheim and Parsons and still less to research by scholarly interpreters) denigrate social theorists as sterile exegetes. This is academic business-as-usual and often inconsequential, at least until scholars in the devalued areas feel the need to appease the skeptics, when, for instance, they seek funding from panels of economists and assimilate their perspectives or when they chafe at their problematic position in the discipline and aim for some of the benefits (recognition, funding, journal space, etc.) at the disposal of persons critical of their area.

This last state of affairs partly describes, I think, the recent situation in the theory area. Rather than simply taking uninformed outside attacks with a grain of salt or working from a secure appreciation for the proven value of the area's interpretive modes of inquiry, members of the theory area have started outpacing one another in the rush to adopt the outlook of critics. And now Chafetz does likewise. Chafetz's response to empirical researchers who find little of use in discussions of the classics to help them understand what they are examining is a response of complete agreement: A proposal for theorists "to attend to the

world around them," "to raise interesting and important questions about the observable social world," and to relinquish the "Talmudic exegesis of classics by long dead scholars."

When the alternatives are presented in this stark manner, it is easy, of course, to side with Chafetz. But why accept this false choice? Most methodologists accused of fostering an atheoretical orientation would resist the charge by challenging the opposition of method and theory, which their critics assume. But Chafetz, rather than challenging the categories of theory critics, accepts that "attending to the world" is an observational activity separable from the intellectual traditions in which the social scientist is situated as if "interesting and important questions" were independent entities existing outside of the problematics/paradigms/presuppositions/cognitive frameworks/literatures/theories of the intellectual fields where the social scientist works. Since thinkers as varied as Weber, Parsons, and Bourdieu (among many others) have denied the practice of observation this kind of independence from theory, it is curious to find Chafetz embracing the contrary opinion. This, though, is thoroughly consistent with her view that "dead forebears" and "contemporary Europeans" have little to teach us.

In any case, to raise the specter of "Talmudic exegesis" is to verge on the kind of indiscriminate name-calling sometimes practiced by those unfamiliar with interpretive research. Work in the areas of sociology that Chafetz admires—urban, medical, political, etc.—is highly variable in its value. The same obviously holds for scholarship focused on the ideas of "long dead" sociologists. Many years ago, Robert Merton remarked that "the study of classical writings can be either deplorably useless or wonderfully useful." Has the second possibility really vanished? Granted, we have all seen our share of marginal Durkheim or Weber papers, but what serious reader has not benefited from Lukes, Jones, or Alexander's work on Durkheim; Peel's work on Spencer; Joas's analysis of Mead; Collins, Roth, Hennis, Brubaker and Kalberg's writings on Weber; or Levine's work on Simmel and Parsons?

I deliberately refer here to examples that represent different orientations toward the study of the classics. By no means are the theorists mentioned of one mind about why or how one engages in interpretive research—nor need they be to produce eye-opening work. Rather than buying into the attacks of critics, commentators on the theory area would do well to expand the collective recognition of the range of current interpretive practices and the benefits to those in and out of the theory field. There have been some notable statements along this line (years ago by Merton and Shils, more recently in Alexander's essay on the "Centrality of the Classics"), but Chafetz bypasses these. The only value she seems to assign to the

Pearls and Scraps...

"In certain cases there is more truth in the unreal than in the real. To present objects with their exact geometrical forms would be to distort nature and render it unrecognizable" (Gustave LeBon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind* [Marietta, Georgia: Larlin, 1982], p. vii).

"Here I would like only to add the suggestion that the arts of piercing an individual's effort at calculated unintentionality seem better developed than our capacity to manipulate our own behavior . . . the witness is likely to have the advantage over the actor" (Erving Goffman, *Presentation of Self in Everyday Life*, [Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1959], pp. 8-9).

"If science differs from metaphysics in describing facts and relations between facts, the problem of demarcation leads to the problem of what the significance of the positivity of facts actually is. Epistemology, having been disavowed, revenges itself with an unsolved problem that now has to be dealt with by an ironically restored ontology of the factual" (Jürgen Habermas, *Knowledge and Human Interest* [Boston: Beacon Press, 1968], p. 81).

"Dialectics, Engels argues, is a continuous process of transition from one definition into the other . . . But he does not even mention the most vital interaction, namely the 'dialectical relation between subject and object in the historical process', let alone give it the prominence it deserves" (Georg Lukacs, "What is Orthodox Marxism?" in *History and Class Consciousness: Studies in Marxist Dialectics* [London: Merlin Press, 1968], p. 3).

classics is that of "dressing up" (legitimizing?) contemporary research, a position that impels her to ask, "Does it even matter that Marx (Weber, etc.) first had the general idea . . . that someone [now finds] useful?"

This is a deeply asociological and ahistorical sentiment. While the classics may and may not dress up what we say, they certainly provide a rich exposure to voices that are not our own. They furnish an indispensable means to acquire something that is never mentioned by Chafetz—self-reflexivity about the intellectual traditions. Self-reflexivity is the mode in which we carry out our theoretical and empirical work; it informs us of the questions, debates, and assumptions that were constitutive of the traditions that the discipline followed or did not follow; it reveals (as some recent feminist writing has done) the ways in which our thinking may remain rooted in neglected past choices that we may now wish to abandon or revive; and it makes us aware of the range of intellectual alternatives which were closed off as sociology developed and which we may now wish to reappropriate for sociological analysis.

This is obviously not to say that the analysis of classics is the only task for those in the theory field or something incumbent on every theorist. The authors of many of the exemplary interpretive studies mentioned above have contributed to what Chafetz calls "sub-

stantive theory," and there is no reason why the theory area cannot ecumenically accommodate all the interests raised in Chafetz's essay—setting aside fears of a multiple personality disorder. In reiterating the familiar observation that earlier theorists like Marx and Durkheim were driven by "substantive interests," Chafetz forgets that these interests went hand in hand with serious interpretive concerns (Marx with the political economists, Durkheim with Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Saint-Simon, etc.).

Granted, the time may be approaching when the burdens of specialization force those in the theory area to concentrate more exclusively on either interpretive or empirically-focused research, but Chafetz's proposal to purge from sociology the study of earlier social thinkers and to relegate this area to the field of intellectual history pushes specialization the wrong way. Chafetz's proposal neglects the fact that, while intellectual historians and sociologists share certain topics and methods, they approach the past with very different questions in mind.

When aggressive impulses culminate in a plan to purge productive (and innocent) group members, perhaps what is in order is some serious introspection about the collective circumstances that have unleashed this hostile reaction.

ON CHAFETZ ON THEORY

James D. Miley

Kansas State University

In the face of intense concern in regard to just what sociology is all about, a concern inspired mostly by contemporary European thinkers outside the bounds of sociology, we have the piece by Janet Saltzman Chafetz in the January 93 issue of *Perspectives*, who denies that any of this questioning is necessary and wants to reaffirm traditional ("antediluvian," her word) sociological values. This piece is the sociological equivalent of Dan Quayle's attack on Murphy Brown and the "cultural elite."

Her "critique" never reaches the level of critique. She presents a "typology" based on invidious distinctions and pejorative characterizations; she then

proceeds to affirm and defend one of her own straw men against others. Virtually all of her diatribe can be reduced to the statement: "I like this kind of theory/research and this kind only." The kind she likes is a pretty straightforward version of Durkheimian social factism.

I knew that this kind of attitude was still common in the field, but I am surprised to find it where I found it. The editors have justified its inclusion with talk of "real conversation," but publishing this piece is not an invitation to a conversation. Just the opposite. What the piece says is, if you are not doing what I am doing, shut up. It is not an argument, it is a catechism.

THE EDITORS TALK

Doubt: Let's talk about Janet Saltzman Chafetz's provocative essay, "Sociological Theory: A Case of Multiple Personality Disorder."

Moodey: I'd also like to talk about the responses to her essay.

Doubt: I was unfamiliar with the usage "bête noire" and, in the role of editor, felt compelled to look up the usage in *Fowler's Modern English Usage* where I read "Those who wish to use the phrase in writing must not suppose that the gender can be varied." It is improper to use the phrase to refer to the female gender. Chafetz uses the phrase to refer to positivism, and I wonder if, as an author and feminist theorist, Chafetz wants to endow positivism with masculine attributes. The accident of this awkward usage raises an interesting subject. Critical theorists, for instance, formulate positivism in virile terms. Chafetz has unwittingly uncovered an interesting problem for both theory and gender studies. Does positivism represent a patriarchal commitment? a chauvinistic ideology? How do feminist theorists who are

committed to positivism reconcile this tension? Along this line, it is interesting to note the sick sexism in Fowler's pedagogy, "WRONG: From the very first, for some reason that has always been a mystery to me, I was his 'bête noire.'"

Moodey: Haraway and Harding, cited in Charles Smith's response, also raise the issue of "masculine" science. It is a sociological version of concerns about the differences between "masculine" and "feminine" literature. I wonder if Chafetz would regard this as an interesting and important question?

Doubt: I thought that the strongest part of Chafetz's essay was its conclusion, "Our first task is to raise interesting and important questions about the observable social world— here, elsewhere, now, and historically." From whence comes these interesting and important questions? the observable world? What criteria do theoretical sociologists use to distinguish interesting and important questions from dull and insignificant questions? Can the observable cont. on page 5

BOOKS TO CONSIDER

James Farganis, *Readings in Sociological Theory: The Classic Tradition to Post-Modernism*. McGraw-Hill, 1993.

This anthology of primary readings in theory is divided into three sections—The Classic Tradition, Contemporary Sociological Theory, and Modernity/Post Modernity. The reader contains notable selections from Comte, Marx, Durkheim, Nietzsche, Weber, Simmel, Mead, and Mannheim; then Parsons, Dahrendorf, Blau, Schutz, Berger, Blumer, Goffman, and Smith; and, finally, Habermas, Foucault, Lyotard, and Rorty. The reader serves students by providing a fine selection of primary texts in the history of sociological theory and the recent developments in social theory. (K. Doubt)

Joseph B. Gittler (ed.), *Annual Review of Conflict Knowledge and Conflict Resolution*. Volume 2. Hamden, CT: Garland Publishing, 1992. 314pp. \$42 cloth.

The annual is devoted to the investigation, management, and termination of conflicts at the interpersonal, intergroup, interinstitutional, and international levels. Volume 2 covers such topics as intra-psychic conflict, substance abuse, small group conflicts, crime and delinquency, adversarial media, terrorism, and diplomacy. An introductory essay by Gittler draws on Aristotle, Wittgenstein, and Bridgman to define human social conflict. (Volume 1 is still available for \$34, or \$65 for both.)

Stanford M. Lyman, *Militarism, Imperialism, and Racial Accommodation: An Analysis and Interpretation of the Early Writings of Robert E. Park*. Fayetteville, AR: University of Arkansas Press, 1992. 331pp. NLP.

This is really two books in one. The second book (pp. 177-318) is a collection of Park's writings on atrocities in the Belgian Congo (five essays ca. 1904-1907), Black America (four essays and an exchange of letters with Booker T. Washington), the German Army ("the most perfect military organization in the world"), Sombart, Sumner, and great teachers. The last essay, a first-person account of Park's encounters with William James, John Dewey, and Booker T. Washington, is a delight of the first order. These essays have been omitted from previous collections for want of sociological content, a misconception Lyman quickly lays to rest. The first book is Lyman's exposition of the writings. The first book, largely biographical in organization, will be valuable to those unfamiliar with Park's life before joining the faculty at the University of Chicago in 1913. A superb volume which deserves a wide readership. (C. Prendergast)

Werner Stark, *The Sociology of Knowledge: Toward a Deeper Understanding of the History of Ideas*. Introduction by E. Doyle McCarthy. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991. 356pp. \$21.95 paper.

This reissue of the now-classic work published in 1958 by Werner Stark (1909-1985) serves as an introduction to the field as well as an interpretation of the thought of the major figures associated with its development. (E. Doyle McCarthy)

R.S. Perinbanayagam, *Discursive Acts*. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter, 1991. \$36.95 cloth. \$18.95 paper.

This work applies various philosophical, literary, and linguistic theories to the analysis of the discourses of everyday life. Its explanation of the elements and processes of language use synthesizes European structuralist theory and semiotics with American pragmatist theory. A companion volume to the author's *Signifying Acts* (1985). (E. Doyle McCarthy)

Georg Ritzer, *The McDonaldization of Society*. Thousand Oaks: Pine Forge Press, 1993.

"... genuinely succeeds in communicating the sociological imagination... and would serve as a wonderful catalyst for an extended discussion on rationalization, modernity, and a number of related issues" (P. Kollock).

Benno Werlen, with Preface by Anthony Giddens, *Society, Action, and Space: An Alternative Human Geography*. London: Routledge, 1992.

The first English translation of a book which has been widely recognized in Europe as a major contribution to the important intersection of social theory and human geography. Werlen's original analysis sounds the death-knell for the idea that geography is a "science of the spatial" and opens new horizons in the study of social space and action. Drawing upon a phenomenological perspective, the author develops a discussion of Popper's critical rationalism. This epistemological debate is then linked to the sociological action theories of Pareto, Weber, Parsons, and Schutz. In the words of one reviewer, "this is a bold book... [which] will rank in its thoroughness with such classics as those by Castells, Lefebvre, and Harvey." For members of the Section, it offers a fresh approach to action theory and an excellent window on spatial debates within human geography and social philosophy. (D. Boden)

...Dogmas and Heresies

"For the effect of identifying society with the world of eternal objects is to eliminate the creative element of action altogether. Their defining characteristic is that the categories of neither time nor space apply to them. They 'exist' only 'in the mind.' Such entities cannot be the object of an explanatory science at all. For an explanatory science must be concerned with events, and events do not occur in the world of eternal objects. Durkheim's sociology in so far as he takes this direction, becomes, as Richard puts it, a 'work of pure interpretation'" (Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, [New York: Free Press, 1968], p. 445).

"Americans believe in facts, but not in facticity. They do not know that facts are factitious, as their name suggests. It is in this belief in facts, in the total credibility of what is done or seen, in this pragmatic evidence of things and an accompanying contempt for what may be called appearances or the play of appearances—a face does not deceive, behavior does not deceive, a scientific process does not deceive, nothing deceives, nothing is ambivalent (and at bottom this is true: nothing deceives, there are no lies, 'there is only simulation,' which is precisely the facticity of facts)—that the Americans are a true utopian society, in their religion of 'fait accompli,' in the naivety of their deductions, in their ignorance of the evil genius of things" (Jean Baudrillard, *America* [London: Verso, 1989], p. 85).

"In the present developing state of sociology, there is a prime need for a 'disciplined eclecticism'—close familiarity with the distinctive strengths and limitations of a plurality of theoretical orientations rather than pursuit of the chimera of a single unified theory that would be competent to deal with the entire range of sociological problems" (Robert K. Merton, "Foreword" to Lewis A. Coser, *Masters of Sociological Thought: Ideas in Historical and Social Context*, [San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971], p. viii).

LIKELY PERTINENT INFORMATION

Call for Papers

Special Issue: Lesbian/Gay Social Theory

Sociological Theory will publish in 1994 a symposium concerning the ways that lesbian and gay theory can inform and expand sociological theory. We encourage papers that examine the ways sociological theory might contribute to lesbian and gay theory. The editors are interested in papers that deal with social constructionism, poststructuralism, postmodernism—with respect to issues of the body, desire, identity, community, and politics—and variants of “queer theory” which bridge the gap between conventional theorizing and new ways of conceptualizing the social world. This is an opportunity to address the heteronormativity within sociology and the limits of lesbian/gay theory by scholars positioned to do so most effectively. Steven Seidman, Professor of Sociology, SUNY/Albany, will serve as Guest Editor of this symposium. Please send four copies of your manuscript no later than October 1, 1993 to Alan Sica, Editor, Sociological Theory, 211 Oswald Tower, Penn State University, University Park, PA 16803-6207. It is important for authors to follow ASA style requirements as expressed in any recent issue of the journal. There is a \$15 processing fee for all nonstudent members of the ASA.

The 31st Congress of the International Institute of Sociology will be held 21-25 June 1993 at the Sorbonne in Paris. Over 70 working sessions have already been confirmed, and 500 participants are expected, including over 100 Americans. The two official languages for this Congress are French and English. The registration fee is \$100.00 (if paid before 15 April 1993), and one does not have to be a member of the IIS to submit for this Congress; members, however, are guaranteed a place on the program to present their work. A rating and price range of hotel accommodations near the Sorbonne is available, and the IIS is negotiating a discount fair with a major American airline.

For a complete list of confirmed working sessions and chairs, mailing addresses, and additional information about the 31st Congress—including hotel and travel information—contact David Sciulli, Sessions Coordinator, at Department of Sociology, Texas A&M University, College Station TX 77843, (409) 845-5133. For information about membership, contact R. Alan Hedley, IIS Secretary, at Department of Sociology, Uni-

versity of Victoria, Victoria, British Columbia, Canada, V8W 3P5, (604) 721-8653.

International Conference/Lancaster University De-Traditionalization: Authority and Self in an Age of Cultural Uncertainty July 8th to 10th, 1993 De-traditionalization involves a shift of authority from “without” to “within.” The process of de-traditionalization provides a useful way of reflecting on the nature of, and the relationships between, the pre-modern, the modern, and the post-modern. The conference is organized in four “streams,” exploring different aspects of the process: (1) Discourse, Hermeneutics, and Identity, (2) Aesthetic, Memory, and Meaning, (3) Cultures of Nature, and (4) Self, Ethics, and Religion. Speakers include: Robert Adam, Zygmunt Bauman, Ulrich Beck, Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim, Steve Bruce, Colin Campbell, Mary Douglas, Terry Eagleton, Mike Featherstone, Phil Hammond, David Harvey, Charles Jencks, Niklas Luhmann, Richard MacCormac, Michael Phillipson, Roland Robertson, Nikolas Rose, Ninian Smart, Bryan Turner, and Glyn Williams. Further details are available from Eileen Marton, CSCV, Lancaster University, Furness College, Lancaster, LA1 4YG. Telephone: (0524) 65201 Fax: (0524) 847039.

Monograph Series in Social and Cultural Theory JAI Press, Inc. Series Editor: Ben Agger (Sociology, SUNY-Buffalo) This series of monographs responds to the recent explosion of interest in social and cultural theory from within and beyond sociology. We publish high-quality books on topics of current interest to scholars and students of social and cultural theory. Our books are distinguished by the rigor of their scholarship and their accessibility. Although the impetus for the current transformations of social theory is largely European, ranging from critical theory and postmodernism to feminist theory, books in this series suggest applications of these and other perspectives in domains of research, policy, and practice. As such, the series will be of interest not only to professional social and cultural theorists, but to sociologists and social scientists who do empirical work.

The first volumes in the series will be available in 1994. Authors are invited to submit manuscript proposals to Ben Agger, Department of Sociology, 430 Park Hall, SUNY-Buffalo, Buffalo, New York 14260.

WHAT DISORDER?

A Response to Chafetz

Charles W. Smith

Queens College and Graduate Center, CUNY

If one ever doubted that there was a need within sociology for theorists who focus on basic epistemological and ontological issues bearing on the discipline, they need only to read Janet Chafetz's brief piece “Sociological Theory: A Case of Multiple Personality Disorder” in the January, 1993 issue of *Perspectives*, in which she minimally protests such efforts. As someone who thinks of himself as a theorist and who has spent most of his professional life doing empirical research, I agree with Chafetz that practical research, substantive issues, and theory are best combined. Unfortunately, Chafetz's contention that theorizing should be restricted to those doing substantive work gives me pause.

As sociologists, we should recognize the extent to which unrecognized assumptions, everyday practices, and other sorts of externalities can and do bias all undertakings, including sociology itself. We also know something—I hope—about networks and patterns of influence which would indicate that people tend to be more responsive to other ingroup members than outgroup members. I mention these matters only because they would seem to underscore the potential value of sociological theorizing. Given that sociologists tend to be more responsive to the critiques of fellow sociologists, it is not sufficient that just philosophers and historians be concerned with these more abstract issues—these more abstract issues need to be critically engaged by sociologists themselves.

In support of the above, I will cite one central “philosophic” issue touched on by Chafetz. She writes:

I accept as a matter of working faith (in practice, if not as a matter of TRUTH) the possibility that we can develop relatively general, abstract explanations of why and how empirically observed regularities in the social world occur. Moreover, these explanations are amenable to some form of empirical testing, to some manner of deciding that a given set of ideas is more credible than others—however crude the measures and regardless of the particular method employed.

Even ignoring such words and phrases as “working faith,” “relatively,” “to some form,” “to some manner,” “more credible,” which beg the question, this article of faith is simply misplaced. Accounting for nomothetic empiricism has been shown to the satisfaction of many critical thinkers to be a false objective. I am referring not only to those with a post-modern inclination, who question the possibility of “scientific knowledge” as commonly understood, but also to critical theorists, who argue for a different scientific agenda. See, for example, Bhasker (1975, 1979, 1982), Clough (1992), Haraway (1989, 1991), Harding (1986), Harre (1972, 1975), and Manicas (1985, 1987). Counter arguments can be made, but the issue is that what Chafetz is asking sociologists to take for granted requires the very type of abstract theorizing that she scorns.

Given that I share much of Chafetz's irritation with a good deal current social theorizing, I feel uncomfortable being so critical. The

continued on page 5

What Disorder? *cont.*

problem, however, is not the sorts of theorizing that Chafetz criticizes, but the way in which it is done. Chafetz's comments relating poor theorizing to poor training and lack of more substantive interests are probably correct. But bad sociology—be it theory or anything else—will always predominate. Why should we expect sociology to be any different than law, medicine, or music?

More troubling to me, however, is Chafetz's explicit judgment that there is no need for a theory section, journals, or required courses. It is this tendency to legislate for others, coupled with the "True Believer" tone of her piece, that gives me pause. I do not see sociological theory as a "Case of Multiple Personality Disorder" except insofar as life embodies just this sort of condition. I see it rather as quite normal, if not exactly awe inspiring. I have not yet decided how I would diagnose Chafetz's distress with the situation.

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The Editors Talk *cont.*

social world in and of itself provide the criteria for making the distinction between interesting and important questions and dull and insignificant questions? See the Habermas citation in this issue on page two. To my mind, Chafetz's comment is what Erving Goffman would call a "communication out of character." Chafetz discloses that, in her back region, she is a committed and passionate theorist. Her essay is a "front," in the strongest sense of the term. Chafetz continues, "Theory should constitute our accumulated tool kit of abstract, general ideas that can be applied in helping to answer important questions as well as possible at a given time in the development of the discipline." Who would disagree?

Moodey: Even widespread agreement with that notion will not prevent theorists from disagreeing about many very important issues. I disagree with any attempt to impose a unity of faith upon sociological theorists. I see no prospects for the emergence of a charismatic leader capable of converting sociologists from their

diverse "working faiths." Pluralism is inescapable in sociology, just as it is in modern society, and we will accept this to the extent that we lose our obsession with the way sociology ought to be. In Charles Camic's words, we need to listen to sociological "voices which are not our own," whether those come from the past or present.

Doubt: I wonder, if only for the sake of argument, is there no Noam Chomsky or Ronald Dworkin in our midst? Is theoretical sociology better than theoretical linguistics or theoretical jurisprudence because it lacks charismatic figures?

Chorus: James D. Miley asks whether or not Chafetz's article is an attempt to silence voices that are too different from her own. We cannot speak for Chafetz (in the next issue she has the opportunity to speak for herself), but we believe that it is important to listen to a full range of voices, even those which sound authoritarian and dogmatic.