Answer Key for Exam 3
True/False:
1. F; it's based on experience, so it's an example of a posteriori knowledge
2. T
3. F; it's a priori
4. T
5. T
6. F; it shows only that God probably exists (it's an inductive argument)
7. F; he's clear that there simply could be no evidence for God's existence, given that God would be indivisible, and the only stuff for which we could possibly have any evidence is divisible matter
8. T
9. F; lots of stuff exists in both
realms, according to Anselm.
10. F; even if we've never seen a thing with Property D actually designed, we can still rightly infer it had a designer
11. F; it's intended to cast doubt
on either God's benevolence or God's omnipotence.
12. T
13. F; Pascal believe God's nature was totally different from ours (actually, it was utterly incomprehensible), so there's no way he's an anthropomorphite (who believes God's exactly like us, only greater)
14. F; I get the tiny harm of having been wrong.
15. F; it suggests only that it could very well be most rational not to believe in
God, depending on the assumptions we build in about God's nature.
16. F; it may take some doing, but it's possible with behavior
therapy.
17. F; lots of other possible gods could fit the bill.
18. T
19. T
20. F; there are several other possible reasons for the existence of the
"so-called" mistakes.
21. T
22. T
23. F; he
believed there were very good (rational) reasons for belief in god.
24. F;
they maintain to the very end that there seems to be no good reason for the evil in the
world.
25. T
26. T (it's that the good far outweighs the evil).
Multiple Choice:
1. b
2. b
3. d
4. c
5. g (you
should've remembered the right answer: I cannot cause myself to exist, because
it's logically impossible. I'd have to both exist (in order to create myself)
and not exist (in order to be created)).
6. c
7. e
8. d
9. h (the
only qualification necessary to being Aquinas's first cause is that the entity
have some power).
10. c (Paley's god would have to at least be intelligent,
if nothing else)
11. h (Anselm's definition of God: a being than which no
greater can be conceived; all of these gods have flaws).
12. b
Identification:
1. I
2. H
3. D
4. A
5. E
6. J
7. K
8. F
9. N
10. C
11. G
12. M
13. O
14. B
15. L
Extra Credit: If God could create a stone too heavy for Him to lift, then He couldn't lift it, which is a limit on His power. If He couldn't create a stone too heavy for him to lift, then that's something he couldn't do, another limit on his power. Either way, then, there's something God can't do, so omnipotence (being able to do anything) is logically impossible.
Long Essay #3: It was crucial that you lay out the argument in detail (something like what's found in the webnotes), and then explain each premise (i.e., why would God's inability to prevent evil make him not omnipotent?). In doing so, you also needed to cite some of Philo's/Demea's examples of evils in the world. In detailing your two theodicies, you had three tasks: (a) explain the theodicy in some detail, i.e., don't just mention the one-line (webnotes) version -- instead, apply it to some evils in the world, and then thoroughly explain how it's supposed to help us; (b) discuss in real detail a rebuttal to it (drawn from class or something you've come up with on your own), again not by just citing a one-liner, but by going into some detail about how the rebuttal is a real problem; and (c) discuss your own reaction to each rebuttal, i.e., does it work to undermine the theodicy, or is there a possible reply on behalf of its advocate (remember, each of the theodicies would remain logically possible in the face of the suggested rebuttals).
By way of example, I have simply copied out a good answer from one of your classmates -- it received 28/30 points; note the structure of the answer as well as the attempt to provide some original thinking on the topic.
The problem of evil basically questions God's omnipotence and omnibenevolence through the presence of evil. It goes like this: If God is willing to prevent evil, but is not able to do it, then he is not omnipotent. If God is able to prevent evil, but is not willing to, then he is not omnibenevolent. What the premises are trying to say is, since there is so much evil in this world, something must be wrong with God's alleged properties, and the ones in question here are His omnipotence and omnibenevolence. The evil in the world can't be denied. Examples of this include the recent forest fires, the diseases that affect so many people and innocent children, and the non-stop murders humans commit. So if there is evil in the world, then God should be either not omnipotent, or not omnibenevolent. And if one would observe, there is an abundance of evil. Therefore, God is either not omnipotent, or not omnibenevolent.
I think that one theodicy that could justify evil in the world is that all this will serve an ultimate harmony in the end. All we need to do is trust in God, and trust that, in the end, everything will be revealed to us, and that everything will fit together. Now a possible objection to this would be that the price would be too high. One may say that children suffering or that millions of homes wrecked by a calamity would be too much of a price to pay to get into heaven. I think with this objection the theodicy could survive. One doesn't really know what heaven is. It is preached to be the greatest world. Maybe all this suffering is worth heaven. Maybe heaven is greater than what one thinks it is. Not being able to see it, or be in it, means that no one on earth really can imagine how great it is. So maybe all the suffering is worth it, and even worth more. [HERE I REMARKED THAT THIS DOESN'T QUITE COME TO GRIPS WITH THE POWER OF IVAN'S COMMENTS IN THE BROTHER'S K.]
Another theodicy would be that all this evil could just be a test of faith. That God could just be using it to know and to determine how strong your faith is. An objection to this is it can't account for mass murders. I think death isn't really evil. After death is heaven, wherein there would be no evil. It's the better world, and so dying and moving on, wouldn't really be so evil. [TO WHICH I REMARKED, THEN WHY DON'T WE ALL JUST KILL OURSELVES?] But another objection to the theodicy is that if God is really omniscient, then He would know what the outcome is in testing you. One possible escape for the theodicy would be to accept that God is not omniscient. But if He's not, then we should be scared of the evils He brings to test faith, for He may not know what harmful outcomes may arise. But in another view, all the more we should worship Him and show faith, so that He would test us less. But then He wouldn't deserve to be called God, for that is not the definition of the term. He has to be omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient. And so "God" has to know the outcome of His tests, if He really IS God. But again, he can be a non-omniscient God, so the theodicy survives in a way.