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II.
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Preliminary remarks:
- Fannius: Who deserves the title `wise'? (sapiens) It is (or should be, as in Scaevola's case) a tribute to character (natura and mores) and learning (studium and doctrina). The Elder Cato had prudentia and constantia and was acutus, and was called Wise in his old age.
- Scaevola: Somebody who accepts a tragic death "stoically" is wise, as Cato the Elder in the case of his son.
- Laelius: Yes, but, note that no harm happened to him in the rest of his life and he died after a great career, honored by his grateful country with every honor it could bestow. (Cf. Herodotus, Book I: Tellos the Athenian). The soul is immortal, Scipio is in heaven, and having had his friendship will give his friend (Laelius) a kind of immortality.
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6–16 |
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III. |
Laelius' discussion of friendship.
- Friendship is the strongest tie among humanity
- Friendship is the greatest gift of Heaven to humans
- Friendship stimulates hope and maintains spirits (Empedocles:
unifying force of the Universe)
- Friendship is not from `weakness' but a natural inclination
- Feelings of love among animals and more so among humans
- Loveableness of virtue, even in people we have never seen
- Desire for advantage does not make friendship: Friendship is a natural inclination, stimulated by an admiration for virutes of a friend, and his service on our behalf.
- Pleasure is not the reason for virtue (anti-Epicurean statement).
- Friendship is destroyed by:
- Change of tastes in the passing of time
- Rivalry (Love, money, politics)
- Demands made contrary to virtue and morality
- Affection and Friendship (sect. 36-55)
- Do not make or respond to dishonorable requests. (sect. 40-43)
- A friend should be honest, outspoken, interested:
Wrong philosophical attitudes: shun friendship as dangerous, worrisome (Epicurean); seek friends only for advantage. (44-48)
- Advantage is a consequence, not a cause, of friendship: virtue seeks virtue.
- Wealth and power are no substitute for friendship (52-55)
- Limits to friendship: (Other philosophical positions, Stoic refutations)
- `Have the same feelings for friends as for ourselves.'
BUT: We do things for friends that we wouldn't do for ourselves.
- `Love them as much (and just as much?) as they love us.'
BUT: This is cold and calculating.
- `Seek to be valued by friends as we value ourselves.'
BUT: The duty of a friend is to cheer and inspire.
- Limits to friendship: Stoic position. [sect. 61-64]
- We may support a friend, even in extreme situations, provided there is no disgrace.
- Examine and test friends most carefully, especially when they are in unfavorable circumstances.
- Loyalty [fides] is the most important quality: but they must be free from slander and hypocrisy. [fictum, simulatum]
- New friends / Old friends: old are preferred, but new ones not rejected; all are on an equal footing.
–Friends should be made in maturity, not youth.
–Good will should not lead one to harm a friend: Golden rule. (71-76)
- End of friendships: [76-81]
- faults, on one person's part
- effect of time (to avoid: Choose carefully at the beginning of a friendship)
- Expectations in friendship:
- not an occasion for passion or sin
- affection comes after exercise of judgment
- Carelessness (incuria): One must cultivate a friend.
- Advising: a part of friendship, but not to be done by way of abuse or harshly.
- Flattery (adulatio, blanditia) is equally bad for a friendship.
- Sincerity.
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17–103 |
