History 498

Devine

Fall 2010

Study Questions: American Escalation in Vietnam

David L. Anderson, “The American War in Vietnam: Escalation

1. Upon assuming the presidency, why did Lyndon Johnson decide to continue the U.S. commitment to supporting South Vietnam?

2. Why did the Gulf of Tonkin incident end up having broader significance? Was this, as some have argued, a deliberate deception on the Americans’ part that Johnson used as an excuse to widen the war? How would this incident later challenge Johnson’s credibility?

3. What were the arguments for and against U.S. bombing of North Vietnam? Why did Johnson decide to go forward with both the bombing and the introduction of ground troops?

4. According to those in the “liberal-realist” school, why did the U.S. become involved in Vietnam?

5. Some historians call the Vietnam war a “quagmire”; some call it a “stalemate.” What is the difference?

6. How do radicals’ and conservatives’ explanations and assessments of the American role in the Vietnam war differ from those of the “liberal realists”?

Gareth Porter, “Explaining the Vietnam War: Dominant and Contending Paradigms”

1. According to Porter, what are the three “central assumptions” of the dominant “Cold War consensus” paradigm? What evidence have historians used to defend these assumptions?

2. Porter claims there are too many “anomalies” that undermine the legitimacy of the three dominant paradigms’ assumptions. What evidence does Porter provide in arguing that each of the three assumptions should be abandoned?

3. How does Porter interpret Dulles’ strategy toward Vietnam and China in 1954-1955? Why does he see it as more offensive (projecting US power) than defensive (reacting against communist expansion)?

4. What evidence does Porter introduce to show that Kennedy and Johnson did not agree with policymakers who favored escalation of US military involvement in Vietnam?

5. Porter argues that the primary goal of US policy in Asia was not containing communism in Southeast Asia (Vietnam) or stopping “falling dominos,” but rather keeping steady pressure on China. How effective is he at supporting this argument with specific evidence?

6. How does Porter’s explanation of policy decisions in 1961 and 1964 show that the “dominant paradigm” regarding Vietnam needs to be re-examined?

7. What are some of the assumptions behind Porter’s alternative “Power Imbalance Paradigm”? Why does he suggest that historians should rethink not only the kind of documents they use in building their interpretations, but how they read them?

8. To what extent do you think Porter’s criticisms of the “Cold War consensus” paradigm are persuasive? Should historians abandon the assumptions of the dominant paradigm?

Fredrik Logevall, “‘There Ain’t No Daylight:’ Lyndon Johnson and the Politics of Escalation”

1. What does the “inevitability thesis” argue? Why does Logevall find the thesis unpersuasive?

2. Why does Logevall believe that rather than being painted into a corner regarding escalation, Johnson “chose” war?

3. Does Logevall believe U.S. policymakers were well-informed enough to make a choice regarding escalation in Vietnam? What does he make of Robert McNamara’s “if only we had known” defense of the administration’s decisions?

4. Why did Johnson worry that not escalating the war would cost him politically? What did he stand to lose? Why does Logevall believe LBJ’s concerns were unwarranted?

5. What arguments did Hubert Humphrey make in encouraging Johnson to avoid escalation in Vietnam?

6. Why did Johnson want to avoid a public debate on U.S. intervention in Vietnam? According to Logevall, what factors led LBJ to embrace escalation?

7. Why was there little opposition to Johnson’s decision to escalate, even though many in Congress and elsewhere had deep misgivings about the policy?

8. How does Logevall revise conventional wisdom about LBJ’s political acumen?

Sandra C. Taylor, “Lyndon Johnson and the Vietnamese”

1. Taylor quotes another historian as saying, “the case that [Johnson’s] boorish manners were crucial to policy has yet to be made.” Does she make the case? Was there a direct link between Johnson’s provincialism and his policy decisions?

2. How did Johnson’s ideologically-driven anticommunism shape his views of the North Vietnamese? Once he had adopted these views, how, if at all, did they shape the policies he pursued?

3. Why was it so hard for Johnson and other U.S. officials to get a better understanding of Vietnamese culture? Does Taylor introduce any evidence that suggests they would have pursued different policies if they had had such understanding?

4. How did Johnson’s notions about how politics worked keep him from understanding the North Vietnamese point of view?

5. Taylor suggests Johnson was racist yet also saw all people as essentially the same. Can these two positions be reconciled?

6. How did Johnson’s behavior – as opposed to his pubic and private rhetoric – reveal his views of the North and South Vietnamese?

7. In the final analysis, which seems more determinative in driving Johnson’s policies, his racial stereotypes of the Vietnamese or his commitment to the notion that American ways were superior and universally applicable?