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REACTION AND ACTION: ANALYZING JAPAN'S RELATIONS WITH THE SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM

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As Japan has become a world economic power, its foreign policy has come under increased scrutiny. A common view of Japan's international behavior is that it is essentially reactivist. Japan is portrayed as passive, risk-avoiding, and ineffective in conducting foreign policy.[1] Though all states of course react to events and pressure from outside, Japan is seen as being purely reactive, lacking any substantial proactive policies of its own.

This chapter examines Japan's policy toward the Social Republic of Vietnam (SRV), a nation at the heart of international political and military conflicts in recent decades. Through this analysis, the paper reveals the limitations of the reactivist view of Japan and instead proposes a hybrid model of reactivism. The paper maintains that Japan's diplomacy toward Hanoi has fluctuated greatly between reactivism and proactivism for the last decades and that this fluctuation has resulted from two competing foreign policy goals: (1) to become a regional leader in Asian political and economic affairs and (2) to maintain close strategic relations with the United States. While these goals are often compatible, at other times they conflict. The tension between these two goals requires Tokyo to carefully calibrate the external environment in order to promote policies which maintain the proper balance.

This study first discusses the notion and applicability of the reactivist model to contemporary Japanese policy toward Vietnam. Next, it clarifies how and when proactivism takes place in Japanese policy toward Vietnam and modifies the reactivist model by proposing a hybrid analytic model combining reactivism and proactivism. It then briefly discusses the historical relationship between Japan and Vietnam prior to the establishment of the SRV. Finally, it illustrates Japan's reactive-proactive diplomacy by analyzing recent Tokyo-Hanoi relations in three periods: (1) the early 1970s-1978 (initial proactivism following US withdrawal from Vietnam), (2) 1979-the late 1980s (reactivism during the years of Vietnam's occupation of Cambodia), and (3) the late 1980s-present (renewed proactivism after the end of the Cold War).

Through this discussion, the study seeks to remedy the shortage of analysis on Japanese proactive foreign policy by proposing the hybrid analytic model of reactivism and proactivism. It does not, however, attempt to apply this hybrid model to Japanese

foreign policy in general; further research is needed to see in what other situations and issue areas this reactive/proactive model holds true.

Reactivism

The main focus of the reactivist perspective is on the role of *gaiatsu* in Japanese policymaking. The reactivist school argues that *gaiatsu* provides a powerful stimulus to the Japanese domestic policymaking process—frequently characterized as immobile—and that *gaiatsu* is the foremost factor determining the direction of Japan's diplomacy. According to this school of thought, changes in Japanese foreign policy occur as responses to the international community rather than to domestic needs.[2]

Another main theme of the reactivist view is the centrality of the United States in affecting Japan's foreign policy. The reactivist school assumes that the external pressure on Japan usually comes from Washington.[3] Lincoln explains why Tokyo has so often yielded to US *gaiatsu*:

> The U.S. government has been the principal source of the outside pressure, a role that has come about as a result of historical legacy (the war and occupation), a vague sense of international hierarchy (the Japanese still view the United States as more prestigious and powerful than their own country), and overwhelming focus on maintaining access to American markets for goods and investment (given the large shares of exports and investment destined to the United States), and a concern for maintaining the U.S.-Japan mutual security treaty as the cornerstone of Japanese foreign policy.[4]

Many reactivists distinguish Japan's behavior in economics from that in the political/strategic arena and argue that Japan is an aggressor in low politics but a dwarf in high politics. Some attribute Japan's reactiveness to the "Yoshida Doctrine" of the 1950s, which emphasized post-World War II economic reconstruction and development, minimum defense, and reliance on the US-Japan Security Alliance that guaranteed American military protection of Japan. According to Hellmann, the Yoshida Doctrine has been kept intact by an international "greenhouse" created by the United States in the early Cold War era. In his view, the Yoshida Doctrine under the protection of the international greenhouse has made Japan an economic superpower while allowing it to remain a dwarf in world politics. Hellmann asserts that because of Japan's special "incubator" conditions under the greenhouse provided by the United States, Tokyo has never faced an urgent need to develop long-term strategic security planning.[5] According to him, "Japan was and still remains essentially a passive actor on the world political state, more a trading company than a nation-state, a nation without a foreign policy in the usual sense of the word."[6] Similarly, Funabashi argues that Japan has eschewed political involvement in

international affairs while focusing on economic gains since the end of World War II. He claims that for the last four decades "all the nation's (Japan's) energy and resources were mobilized exclusively for economic reconstruction and expansion" and that security issues were placed on the back burner.[7]

In contrast, other reactivists do not draw a line between politics and economics and maintain that Japan is reactivist even in the economic sphere. According to Calder, Japan is a typical "reactive state" in economic policymaking, partaking the following "essential characteristics " of the reactivist state:

> (1) the state fails to undertake major independent foreign economic policy initiatives when it has the power and national incentives to do so; and (2) it responds to outside pressures for change, albeit erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely.[8]

From Calder's point of view, Japan avoids taking independent economic policy initiatives despite the country's "manifest economic and geostrategic resources and its demonstrated ability to operate strategically within its national boundaries."[9] Calder wonders why, despite its enhanced national capacity, Japan has been reactive to international events and has been more deferential to US *gaiatsu* than have most middle-range powers such as major European states.[10]

While divergent opinions exist as to whether Japan is reactive only in high politics or whether it is reactive even in low politics, there is consensus among reactivists over the manner in which Tokyo conducts foreign policy. The unanimous view is that Tokyo's reactive policymaking involves minimalist, passive, and risk-avoiding diplomacy. Blaker describes the essence of Japan's foreign policy as "coping." In his view, Japan just copes with situations created by others; Japan's foreign policymaking involves "carefully assessing the international situation, methodically weighing each alternative, sorting out various options to see what is really serious, waiting for the dust to settle on some contentious issue, piecing together a consensus view about the situation faced, and then performing the existing situation with the fewest risk."[11]

Another view on Japan's foreign policy shared by the reactivists is that Japan's foreign policy approach is ineffective. As Calder claims in the above statement that Japan responds to foreign pressure "erratically, unsystematically, and often incompletely,"[12] many scholars argue that Tokyo unsuccessfully implements a new policy after an impetus of *gaiatsu*. According to Blaker, Japan's "minimalist, coping approach has become jarringly inappropriate to Japan's vastly expanded, international presence today."[13]

A well-cited example of Tokyo's ineffective reactivist policy is the country's role in the Gulf War in 1990-91. Lincoln claims that Japan failed to take a clear stand or to quickly join the war effort, but instead reacted defensively to US pressure. He points out that

Japan's tardy response to the war invited severe criticism from the United States and other countries despite Tokyo's eventual contribution of $13 billion, roughly 20 percent of the total cost of Desert Storm.[14]

The reactivist perspective is useful in explaining the importance of *gaiatsu,* particularly US pressure, in influencing Japanese foreign policymaking. The proponents of the reactivist perspective are correct in their assessment that US-Japan relations should be a focal point of analysis of Japan's foreign policy. Their view that Japanese foreign policymaking is slow and risk-avoiding is also accurate and useful to understanding Japan's behavior.

This reactivist model, however, is by itself insufficient to explain Japan's foreign policy in many regions in the world, such as Southeast Asia, a region where Japan has taken important diplomatic and economic policy initiatives. The main problem with the reactivist model is its premise that changes in Japanese foreign policy occur only as a result of *gaiatsu*. This model neglects proactive policy initiatives by Japan and instead postulates that a reactive, passive, minimalist approach prevails at all times any places. Closer examination of Japan's foreign policy reveals that Japan does indeed take indigenous initiative to pursue its interests. One well-cited example of Japan's activism is its recent Official Development Aid (ODA) policy, demonstrated by such initiatives as aid doubling plans and four debt relief plans for debt-plagued developing countries in the 1980s.[15] Japan's Vietnam policies in the post-Vietnam War era have similarly been proactive. Japan has consistently sought to pursue its political and economic interests in Indochina since the 1970s, succeeding at some times and failing at others.

Another significant problem with the reactivist model is its failure to clearly delineate Japanese foreign policy at times when Japan does not face *gaiatsu*, particularly from the United States. The reactivist model implies that Japan always faces a constant flood of *gaiatsu* from the United States and that Tokyo incessantly adjusts itself to American demands. But the United States does not necessarily make demands on Japan when there are no high stakes for Washington. For example, Washington did not exert much pressure on Tokyo over Japanese policy toward Vietnam in either the 1970s or the 1990s. An oversimplified image of US-Japan relations—that the United States constantly pressures Japan and Japan grudgingly accommodates US demands—obscures the more complex reality of US-Japan relations. While United States sometimes exerts strong pressure on Japan regarding issues of critical importance to Washington, at other times the United States remains sanguine or at least tolerant of Japan's foreign policy role, as seen for example in Vietnam.

Balancing Act: Dual Relationship with the United States and Asia

Japan's reactivism/activism takes place within the framework of Japan's dual relationships with the United States and Asia. As reactivists correctly point out, US-Japan relations have been a crucial point of reference for Japanese international behavior. The bilateral relationship has provided a critical link for Japan to the global system by keeping Tokyo closely aligned with Washington's policies in world affairs. At the same time, Japan has cherished its relations with other Asian countries. Asia has been the central stage for Japan's economic and political activism. Asia has provided a significant market for Japanese products and has been the largest recipient of Japanese ODA throughout the post-World War II period. Asia has been the centerpiece Japan's political activism, as seen for example by the deployment of the Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF) to Cambodia for UN-sponsored peace-keeping operations in 1992-1993.

In recent decades Tokyo has attempted to strengthen and balance both its US and Asia linkages in conducting foreign policy. Soeya asserts that Japan has tried to take independent policy initiatives in Asia while at the same time promoting the fundamental principle of global cooperation with the United States, still Tokyo's key foreign policy and economic partner. According to Soeya, Japan's diplomacy has involved a balancing act between these two desires—taking independent policy initiatives in Asia on the one hand and strengthening US-Japan relations on the other—and that Japan has attempted to strive for policy coordination to achieve both these goals.[16]

Managing a balancing act between these aspirations, however, becomes extremely difficult when one linkage—the US connection—imposes constraints on the other, Japan's Asia connection. If the constraints are insurmountable, Japan yields to US *gaiatsu*, sacrifices its regional aspiration, and follows the US lead in conducting its Asia policy. Soeya argues that an important condition for Tokyo's autonomous diplomacy in Asia is the absence of serious conflicts of interest with the United States and that should any major conflicts of interest with Washington arise, Japan would pull back from its pursuit of regional activism.[17]

Japan's policy toward the SRV presents an excellent example of the dual-linkage framework. For the last decades since the 1970s, Japan has pursued a balancing act between its own desire to conduct an independent policy toward Vietnam on the one hand and its obligation to maintain the fundamental framework of US-Japan cooperation on the other. The balancing act becomes difficult when the US-Japan relationship poses constraints on Japan's foreign policy toward the SRV. If the constraints are insurmountable, Japan gives up its own desire to pursue an active regional role in order to accommodate US needs.

Reactivism and Proactivism

In Japan's policies toward the SRV, there has clearly been a combination of reactivism and proactivism. Here proactivism means that "Japan has its own ideas, interests, and policy objectives... Its policies are not based solely on the expectations foreign countries nor in response to direct foreign pressure."[18] The hybrid model of reactivism and proactivism does not discount the principle features of the reactivist model, such as the prominent role of *gaiatsu* in Japanese policymaking, the centrality of the United States in Japanese foreign policy, or the "coping" manner of diplomacy. Rather, this model clarifies the definition of Japan's reactiveness, expands the reactivist model to include proactivism, and links Japan's diplomatic behavior to its dual relationship with Asia and the United States. With this hybrid model, we can make several propositions about Japan's foreign policy behavior and Japan's relations with Vietnam in particular.

First, the hybrid model of reactivism and proactivism has a number of variations depending on time, location, and issue. In some situations, Japan may simultaneously exhibit both reactive and proactive policies toward the same country or region over different issues. For example, Tokyo is proactive on issue X toward country A but reactive towards the same country on issue Y. Another pattern of the hybrid model would be that Tokyo alternates between reactivism and proactivism toward the same country or region over an extended period of time. For example, Tokyo may be reactive toward country A during a certain period of time on issue X but may shift to proactivism in that country on the same issue at another time. It is also conceivable that Japan's policy in country A is reactive at one time not only over issue X but also over most issues involved in the bilateral relationship and that Japanese general policy toward A switches to activism at another time. Another pattern would be that Japan's reactivism in one country or region can be coincided with its proactivism in another country/region. For instance, Japan's reactivism toward country A may simultaneously takes place with its proactivism in country B. In this case, the Japanese policies toward A and B can be either linked or unrelated to each other.

Japan's relations with the SRV have alternated between reactivism and proactivism toward Hanoi over an extended period of time. During the reactive period, mainly due to US *gaiatsu*, Japan gave up its aspiration to conduct autonomous diplomacy in Asia and followed American policies in the region. During the proactive period, Japan has acted relatively free from constraints of US-Japan relations and has searched for greater political and economic influence in Vietnam by formulating new doctrines, taking aid initiatives, and promoting regional integration policies. Japan's reactivism and proactivism in its policy toward Vietnam are not limited to a single issue, but effect the overall nature of relations between the two nations in given time periods. Japan is never *exclusively* reactive or proactive toward Vietnam, but its overall policy toward Hanoi can be defined as principally reactive or proactive during the particular time periods.

Second, there are two faces of *gaiatsu*: one pressuring Japan to *act* and the other pressuring it *not to act*. As we have seen, the example of the Gulf War illustrates a case in which the United States pressures a passive Japan to act when it does not want to. This study argues that Japan has all along hoped to take a proactive policy toward Vietnam since the end of the Vietnam War and that US pressure was exerted on Japan not to act when it in fact wanted to. The role of this type of *gaiatsu* is significant in Japan-Vietnam relations, for the reduction of the *gaiatsu* has contributed to Japan's more proactive stance toward the SRV. Japan has taken a reactive stance during periods of intense US *gaiatsu* and a proactive stance when US *gaiatsu* eases. Since Japan has continuously hoped to pursue activism in the SRV, one can argue that Tokyo has switched its *modus operandi* to reactivism unwillingly and has converted to proactivism voluntarily.

Third, Japan is susceptible to a *synergistic linkage* strategy. According to Schoppa, linkage refers to "cases where a nation seeks to take advantage of its power advantage in one area by linking it to an issue area in which it has fewer power resources."[19] The United States, for example, sought to influence Japan's SRV policy in the 1980s by linking it to American security interests in Southeast Asia and to US-Japan bilateral trade relations. Given America's advantageous position over Japan in security (i.e., Japan's need for a US security umbrella) and trade (i.e., Japan's need for an open US market), Tokyo became vulnerable to American *gaiatsu* to isolate communist Vietnam in the 1980s.

Fourth, *gaiatsu* can affect Japan through domestic politics, especially when the foreign government succeeds in changing the perceptions of various Japanese actors about the cost of no compliance. For example, during the 1980s, when the United States exerted a great deal of pressure on Japan to comply with the US containment policy toward Hanoi, many Japanese policy leaders—politicians, bureaucrats, and business leaders alike—resented American pressure and would have preferred to strengthen economic and political ties with Hanoi. Yet, they eventually yielded to the *gaiatsu* because they came to realize that the cost of non-compliance would be higher than that of compliance. Here, Schoppa's synergistic linkage applies. Japanese policy-makers reluctantly accepted the American demand in the end because they linked it to Japan's other relations with the United States. Specifically, Japanese bureaucrats (particularly officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or MOFA) and politicians yielded to the US demand because they did not want to risk overall US-Japan security and economic relations in the future; the Japanese business leaders stopped opposing *gaiatsu* because they did not want to lose open American market for Japanese goods.[20] In this way, *gaiatsu* works in combination with Japanese domestic politics. Unlike the reactivist model that simply singles out the role of *gaiatsu* in moving Japan, this study argues that foreign pressure works well when it can change the perspectives of policymakers by relating a given issue to their concerns and interests.

Fifth, Japan's proactivism does not necessarily mean that Japan aggressively or high-handedly imposes its proactive policies. Japan's proactivism is constrained by the anti-Japanese sentiment shared by many Asian countries. Their antipathy toward Japan's military aggression during World War II has been a formidable challenge to Japan's leadership role in Asia, as they continue to see Tokyo as not having come to proper terms with its past. While anti-Japanese feelings have recently subdued in some areas in Asia and increasing number of Asian leaders have begun to positively see Japan's economic activities and even its military presence in their region,[21] Japan still has to take its World War II legacy into consideration in conducting its foreign policy. Thus even during proactive periods, Tokyo takes a cautious approach, carefully calculating the international situation to its advantage and minimizing risks.

Sixth, Japan's restricted military capacity and its continued reliance on US military protection have greatly affected Tokyo's diplomatic course, confining it to resort to what Baldwin calls "economic statecraft",[22] or more specifically what Wan calls "spending strategies" such as ODA.[23] While economic statecraft or spending strategies can be quite effective when the international environment is peaceful and stable, they are by themselves often limited during a time of crisis or war.[24] Japan thus places extraordinary emphasis on maintaining peace and stability in the international order as it would lose its leverage in situations of conflict and crisis. Although in recent years Japan has begun to develop the military means to increase its presence in the world, with Tokyo now sending its SDF to conflict regions, Tokyo's use of military means has still been an anomaly. This is seen for example in Japan-SRV relations, with Japan relying principally on economic means to gain both economic and political influence during the proactive periods.

In summary, this section proposes a reactive/proactive model with six propositions: (1) there are various patterns of reactivism and proactivism and Japan's relations with the SRV takes the form of alternation between the two; (2) there are two types of *gaiatsu* on Japan, one pressuring Japan to act and the other pressuring it not to act, and the second type of *gaiatsu* applies to Japan's relations with the SRV; (3) *gaiatsu* works well through a synergistic linkage; (4) *gaiatsu* is intertwined with domestic politics *and* is effective when it changes the perspectives of Japanese domestic actors; (5) Japan's manner of proactivism is not aggressive but cautious; and (6) Japan relies on spending strategies to implement its proactive policies.

Background: Japan and two Vietnams

Japan's policy toward two Vietnams prior to the establishment of the SRV was strongly influenced by Tokyo's defeat in World War II and the subsequent American domination of Japanese foreign policy. During the early post-war era Japan adhered closely to the anti-communist political and military policies of the United States. Japan did not seek an

independent political role in Southeast Asia and maintained a low profile in regional affairs.

Japan had had limited contact with Vietnam before occupying Indochina during World War II. The lack of interaction largely stemmed from trade restrictions imposed by Japan under the Tokugawa Shogunate from the seventeenth to the nineteenth century and by France, the colonial power in Indochina from the mid-19th century to the 1930s. Japan's direct contact with Vietnam began with Japanese troops stepping in to control northern Vietnam in 1940. In the following year Japan stationed its forces throughout all of French Indochina and gained free access to all ports, bases, and airfields in the region. In March 1945, Japan carried out a *coup d'etat* against France and recognized the nominal independence of Vietnam, while virtually taking over the colonial function from its predecessor. Japan's harsh five-year rule over Vietnam (1940-45) ruined the local economy and sparked widespread Vietnamese nationalism. In 1944-1945, nearly two million people in northern Vietnam died of starvation. The Viet Minh, an anti-foreign nationalist group formed by Ho Chi Minh in 1941, demanded independence from both France and Japan. To the Vietnamese, Japanese rule was not any better than that of France. Many Vietnamese blamed the Japanese for substituting a new imperialism and exploiting natural resources in Indochina. Japanese control of the region ended in August 1945, when Japan surrendered to the Allied Forces.[25]

Japan's first direct post-war contact with Indochina began in 1951, when Tokyo signed a peace treaty with 48 nations, including the French-sponsored State of Vietnam (SOV) under Bao Dai in Saigon.[26] The peace treaty did not include the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV), a government in Hanoi established by Ho Chi Minh in 1945. Japan, having been defeated in World War II by the United States and just emerging from a lengthy US occupation, was careful to follow the American lead in its post-war Asia policy and thus did not recognize the DRV. In 1959 Japan agreed to provide war reparations ($39 million), aid loans ($7.5 million), and private loans ($9.1 million) to the newly established Government of Vietnam (GOV) in Saigon under Ngo Dinh Diem. In contrast, Japan denied any financial assistance to the DRV, with which it still lacked diplomatic relations.[27] Japan's refusal to pay reparations to the DRV was a bitter irony, as northern Vietnamese suffered from Japan's rule during World War II more than their southern counterparts. The reparations to Saigon were not paid in cash but in Japanese goods and services, thus paying the way for Japanese products to penetrate into South Vietnam as in many other parts of Asia.

During the Vietnam War, the Japanese government firmly supported US policy toward Hanoi. Under the US-Japan Security Treaty (signed in 1951 and renewed in 1960), the United States was entitled to maintain American military bases in Japan for use in preparing ground and air operations in Vietnam. Though the Vietnam War was generally unpopular in Japan, with citizens' groups, trade unions, and leftist politicians protesting the American bombings raids, the Japanese government backed Washington's war efforts

primarily for pragmatic reasons. Japan provided goods and services to both US and South Vietnamese forces, and the Japanese economy profited substantially from that collaboration. In addition, Tokyo also hoped that in exchange for Japanese backing in the Vietnam War, the US would return control over the islands of Okinawa to Japan. Regaining sovereign control over Okinawa was one of the foremost important issues in Japan's relations with the United States in the 1960s and early 1970s. Japan's proving that it was a loyal US ally was a critical prerequisite for the retrocession of the southern islands.[28]

According to Havens, what the Vietnam War meant to the Japanese was "fire across the sea," or *taigan no kaji* ("fire on the opposite shore").[29] It was an American war in Asia and Japan was not directly involved. Japan did not send any military personnel to the region due to constitutional restrictions. Japan's policy in Indochina was in line with the Yoshida Doctrine; Tokyo stayed aloof from regional conflicts while concentrating on its own economic growth.

After the completion of war reparation payments in 1965, Japan's bilateral financial assistance to South Vietnam was halted for a few years due to the escalation of the Vietnam War. After the announcement of President Richard Nixon's Guam Doctrine in 1969, which stated that the United States would expect its allies to take more responsibility for containing communism in Asia, Japan renewed its ODA to Saigon.[30]

While Japan recognized only the Saigon government, Tokyo dealt privately with the DRV through the Japan-Vietnam Trade Association (JVTA), a non-governmental pro-Hanoi organization established in 1955.[31] The trade with Hanoi was based on Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda's pragmatic policy for relations with communist nations: "the separation of politics and economics" (*sei kei bunri*). The most valuable export from Hanoi was Hongay coal which the Japanese had been purchasing since the French colonial era. Once the United States entered the war in full force in March 1965, however, trade with Hanoi became extremely difficult. Goods had to be shipped between the DRV and Japan in third-country vessels. The Japanese government banned the export of items which could bolster North Vietnam militarily. From 1965 until the signing of a Paris Peace Accord in 1973, political and economic contacts with the DRV to a minimum.[32]

Initial Pursuit of Activism in the SRV (the early 1970s to 1979)

Toward Diplomatic Normalization with Vietnam

The situation in Indochina rapidly changed in the early 1970s as US influence in the region declined. The weakening of US influence was signaled by the withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam following the 1973 Paris Peace Accord as well by the collapse of US-led anti-Communist organizations. For example, the Southeast Asia

Treaty Organization (SEATO), established in 1954 at American initiative, stopped its military functions in 1973 and dissolved in 1975. Similarly, the Asia and Pacific Council (ASPAC), established by South Korean initiatives, died out in 1973. The liberation of Saigon in 1975 was the final blow effectively ending US dominance of Vietnam.

The 1970s saw an emergence of new thinking among Japanese foreign policymakers who tried to take a policy stance independent of the United States. A significant incident that prompted Japan to search for a more independent role was the 1971 Sino-US Shanghai Communiqué announcing President Nixson's forthcoming visit to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The communiqué caught Japan by surprise, and Japanese leaders were bitter about not being consulted prior to the announcement. Japanese policymakers learned that the United States could not be always relied upon to take Tokyo's views into consideration before making major changes in its policy in Asia. The decision by the Japanese leaders to take more independent policy initiatives was also bolstered by increasing confidence in Japan's rapid economic development in the 1960s and early 1970s. With the successful economic growth, Japanese leaders came to believe that Tokyo could and should play an independent role in international affairs. An early indication of Tokyo's greater foreign policy independence came in 1973 when Japan, heavily dependent on Middle Eastern oil, broke ranks with the US and declared its support for the right to Palestinian self-determination.[33]

The US withdrawal from Southeast Asia and America's declining influence in the confirmed to Japanese policymakers that they could no longer depend on US political-strategic leadership in Asia. They welcomed the changing political climate in Southeast Asia, finding new opportunities to have a freer hand to implement an independent policy in the region for the first time since World War II.[34] In their thinking, anti-communist ideology mattered little, particularly after the announcement of Nixon's visit to China and the diplomatic normalization between Japan and China in the same year. Japan became eager to strengthen its political and economic ties with communist Indochina. With a policy often characterized as "omni-directional diplomacy" (*zenhoi gaiko*), Tokyo tried in the 1970s to improve relations with Hanoi while maintaining its alliance with the United States and other Western countries.

Vietnam offered both economic and political opportunities to the Japanese leadership. Tokyo's economic goal was to help bring about the reconstruction of Vietnam's war-damaged economy and promote the incorporation of Indochina into the market economies of Asia. Japanese leaders were convinced that when integrated into the capitalist economies, Vietnam would provide impressive economic opportunities for Japanese firms seeking to expand trade and investment, extract natural resources, and establish offshore manufacturing in Indochina. Japan's political goal, on the other hand, was to induce Vietnam to loosen its ties with the communist bloc and become "a Socialist country of the Yugoslav type, open to the Western world."[35] Japan was particularly interested in

contributing to the creation of a new equilibrium between ASEAN and Vietnam to promote peace and stability in Southeast Asia.

Japan began taking independent initiatives to reach these goals well before the 1975 liberation of Saigon. In 1970, the Director General of the First Southeast Asia Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kazusuke Miyake, contacted North Vietnamese officials in France to explore possibilities of rapprochement with Hanoi. In 1971, the Japanese embassy in Paris continued these discussions and offered to send Miyake to Hanoi in order to negotiate normalization between Japan and Vietnam. In February 1972, Miyake first visited Hanoi to advance the negotiations toward normalization.[36] In May 1973, four months after the signing of the Paris Peace Accord, Miyake made another visit to Vietnam to finalize normalization, which led to the official signing of diplomatic normalization between Japan and the DRV in September 1973.[37]

After diplomatic normalization, rapprochement accelerated between Japan and the DRV.[38] Communications between the two countries increased and even conservative Diet members started contacting elected officials in Hanoi. In 1974, Japanese and Vietnamese politicians established the League for Japan-Vietnam Friendship to promote mutual understanding and friendship. The Japanese members included Diet members not only from the pro-Hanoi Socialist and Communist parties, but also from traditionally anti-communist parties, such as the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Socialist Party (DSP). The LDP Secretary General, Yoshio Sakurauchi, was appointed as chairman.[39]

The liberation of Saigon in April 1975 encouraged Japanese leaders to take more initiatives in Indochina. In June 1975, Japanese Foreign Minister Kiichi Miyazawa indicated Japan's readiness to play an active political role in Southeast Asia:

> Japan is now a huge economic power and is politically stabilized. It is very necessary that Japan should keep a relationship of mutual understanding with all of the countries in Southeast Asia, in order to maintain peace and stability in Asia, where there exist various unstable factors and a fluctuating situation. Japan can contribute to the stabilization of the area by promoting mutual understanding and keeping friendly relations with all the countries, even though some of them have a different political system from ours."[40]

Miyazawa's statement confirmed Japan's omni-directional diplomacy and showed its strong interest in maintaining regional stability and peace, necessary conditions for Japan's exercise of economic power in the region.

Proactivism through Aid

Japan's main means for gaining influence in Vietnam was through spending, particularly through the disbursement of ODA. Without waiting for the United States to start its own relief program, Tokyo provided the newly unified SRV with $28 million in grant aid for FY 1975 and $17 million in grant aid for FY 1976.[41] Japan did not agree to any further assistance in FY 1977 due to a disagreement over the debt incurred by the Saigon government; Japan claimed the SRV should assume responsibility for the debts of about $50 million the Saigon government had owed to Japan.[42] In December 1978, Japan resolved the dispute by announcing that it would provide $55 million in grant for FY 1979 in exchange for Hanoi's payment of the South Vietnamese government's leftover debts.[43]

The beginning of ODA to Hanoi had an important impact on the Japanese private sector. Japanese exports increased rapidly and Tokyo immediately became Vietnam's second largest trading partner after the Soviet Union. Japanese goods such as steel, machinery, and fertilizers were exported to Vietnam for its urgent postwar reconstruction. In return Japan imported maize and petroleum from Hanoi. In 1976, Japan's exports to Vietnam reached $167 million while Japanese imports from Vietnam totaled $49 million.[44] The Japanese private sector was so eager to do business in Vietnam that it came up with a solution to Vietnam's mounting trade deficit with Tokyo; Japanese city banks provided commercial loans to the Vietnamese government in 1977 and 1978 so that Hanoi could continue to purchase Japanese goods.[45]

Fukuda Doctrine

The zenith of Japanese proactivism in the 1970s was Prime Minister Fukuda's speech (known as "the Fukuda Doctrine") in Manila in August 1977. Only two years after the end of the Vietnam War and merely one year after the unification of Vietnam. Fukuda's speech revealed that for the first time in the post-World War II era the Japanese government was willing to play an active role in Southeast Asian affairs, "without depending on military imperatives and in such a way as to make military considerations less prominent."[46] Soeya calls Fukuda's Manila speech the "basic tenor of Japan's Indochina policy." [47] The speech consisted of three principles: (1) rejection of the role of a military power, (2) consolidation of the relationship of mutual confidence and trust based on "heart-to-heart" understanding, and (3) equal partnership with the ASEAN for building peace and prosperity throughout Southeast Asia. [48] The most significant point in the speech was the third principle which indicated that the Japanese government was willing to act as a political mediator between the ASEAN and Indochina to bring about a peaceful co-existence between the two blocs.[49] It was the first statement in the post-World War II era that explicitly expressed Tokyo's political intentions in Indochina. In Tokyo's strategic thinking, Vietnam was the focal point; the ultimate goal for Japan was to play a role in neutralizing Vietnam so that all Indochina would become open to the Western world.

The first and second principles of Fukuda's speech were also significant, indicating Japan's attempt to improve the prevalent Japanese image as a potential military threat and an economic aggressor in Southeast Asia. In particular, these two points were designed to reduce resentment which had arisen toward Japanese business activities in the region due to the rapid penetration of Japanese goods into Southeast Asia since the end of World War II. The 1974 anti-Japanese riots occasioned by Prime Minister Tanaka's trip to Jakarta and Bangkok had alarmed Japanese leaders. They felt they had to articulate Japan's policy stance toward the region in order to soften opposition to the Japanese economic presence. Fukuda's speech, an attempt to forge friendly relations with Southeast Asian countries, reveals Japan's caution in taking initiative in the region, due to the historical legacy of Japanese military aggression and the emerging fear of Japanese economic activities.

Another important aspect of Fukuda's "doctrine" was the way it was created. Unlike previous policies, Japanese officials in MOFA took independent initiative in developing the Fukuda doctrine without consulting the United States prior to the Manila announcement. Fukuda's speech was primarily the brainchild of an informally organized MOFA group consisting of four policy coordinators in the Asian Affairs Bureau.[50] Soeya observes that Fukuda's speech "reflected Japan's aspiration for a larger role in areas where there was no major conflict of interest with the United States."[51] Since Washington did not oppose the Fukuda Doctrine, Tokyo was able to proceed to implement it immediately after the Manila announcement.

Retreat from Activism in the SRV (the 1980s)

Vietnam's Occupation of Cambodia

Japan's proactive policy in Vietnam did not last long. Cold War geopolitical struggle intensified in Indochina at the end of the 1970s and Japan could not resist international pressure, particularly from the United States, to act in concert with the West to isolate Soviet-backed Indochina. The third principle of the Fukuda Doctrine that stressed Japan's role as a mediator between the ASEAN and Indochina was thus stalled, along with the more general notion of omni-directional diplomacy. The 1980s saw a retreat of Tokyo's independent, proactive policymaking in Vietnam.

A series of events triggered Cold War conflicts in Indochina in the late 1970s, polarizing the region into Soviet and China/US blocs. First, Pol Pot's Democratic Kampuchea (DK) and the SRV began intensive fighting on their border, which became intertwined with Cold-War conflicts at the global level: the DK strengthened ties with China while the SRV drew closer to the Soviet Union. As tensions intensified in the region, Vietnam broke its formal equidistance between the USSR and the PRC by joining the Soviet-led Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) in June 1978. A month later, the PRC completely stopped aid to Vietnam, and in November of the same year, Hanoi signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with Moscow. A month later, the United States and China

officially normalized diplomatic relations. The US-PRC rapprochement effectively severed US-Vietnam relations as Washington stopped negotiating with Hanoi for diplomatic normalization in order to complete the normalization with China.[52]

Tokyo did not want to sacrifice its improved ties with Hanoi, but the signing of a Sino-Japanese Peace and Friendship Treaty in August 1978 aggravated Japan-SRV relations. The conclusion of the treaty caused serious contention between Japan and the Soviet bloc as it included an "anti-hegemony" clause seemingly targeted at Moscow. Japan-Vietnam relations further worsened as a result of the establishment of the Soviet-Vietnam friendship treaty in 1978 that clarified Hanoi's stance on the Sino-Soviet conflict.

Tensions reached a peak in December 1978-January 1979, when the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) entered Cambodia and forced out of power Pol Pot's DK, installing Heng Samrin's People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK). With the Khmer Rouge escaping to rural areas, a proxy war developed as the PRC, the ASEAN, and the United States backed the deposed Pol Pot regime, while the Soviet Union and Vietnam supported the Heng Samrin government. The situation in Indochina further deteriorated in February 1979, when the PRC attacked Vietnam to reprimand the PAVN's earlier invasion of Cambodia.

Suspension of Foreign Aid

When Vietnam occupied Cambodia in January 1979, Japanese foreign policymakers were initially hopeful that the PAVN would soon withdraw from Cambodia. Tokyo responded ambiguously to the Vietnamese occupation of Cambodia. At first, Tokyo avoided using the term "invasion" to refer to the entry of Vietnamese forces into Cambodia. And while Japan officially postponed the disbursement of promised FY 1979 ODA to Vietnam, Tokyo avoided making an official decision as to whether aid should be continued or ended.[53]

Tokyo had various reasons for not wanting to terminate its aid agreement with the SRV. First, Japan's MOFA hoped to maintain lines of communication with the SRV to pursue the Fukuda Doctrine and to maintain its influence in the country and in Indochina as a whole. MOFA officials believed that Japan should continue to offer a carrot (i.e., ODA) to Hanoi rather than a stick (i.e., the suspension of ODA). Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda explained why Japan's ODA to Hanoi should not be stopped:

> Our country is one of very few (non-communist) countries which can communicate with Vietnam....I believe that it was not wise to discontinue the aid. The reason was that we had to maintain a communication channel with Vietnam. In order to invite Vietnam's self-restraint, I judged it much more effective in the long run to tell Vietnam what we should require through this communication route than to suspend our economic assistance of 14 billion yen per year.[54]

Second, MOFA wanted to avoid public acknowledgment of its failure to have accurately assessed Vietnam's intention to invade Cambodia.[55] The occupation of Phnom Penh by the PAVN took place only two weeks after Tokyo and Hanoi had signed a $55 million grant aid agreement for FY 1979. Rather than admit to the Japanese public that it had misjudged Vietnam's intentions in Cambodia, MOFA laid its hopes on the chance that the SRV would soon withdraw its troops from Cambodia.[56]

Third, many members of the Japanese Diet, particularly those in the League for Japan-Vietnam Friendship such as Yoshio Sakurauchi and Takeo Kimura, were adamantly opposed to the suspension of the aid to the SRV. In 1979, the League sent a delegation consisting of two LDP (Sakurauchi and Kimura), three Socialist, and two Communist members to Hanoi to improve Japan-Vietnam relations. Upon his return to Tokyo, Kimura issued a statement that the SRV hoped for a peaceful environment for its post-Vietnam War economic reconstruction and thus that the Japanese government should keep open communications channels with Hanoi by providing aid.[57]

Fourth, Japanese business leaders opposed the suspension of Japanese ODA to Vietnam as detrimental to their interests. The suspension of Japanese ODA was accompanied by termination of government loan guarantees, export insurance, and funds from the Japan Import-Export Bank for Japanese companies. Thus Japanese companies who chose to remain in Vietnam would have to operate without government guarantees or support. Bilateral trade relations between Japan and Vietnam had improved since the early 1970s and the Japanese business community hoped to continue to expand trade with Hanoi. Japanese companies with vested interests in Vietnam lobbied for liberalizing bilateral relations and demanded that the Japanese government not suspend ODA.

As the Cambodian conflict prolonged, *gaiatsu* on the Japanese government to suspend the aid package to Vietnam mounted, especially from the United States but also from the PRC and the ASEAN members. For example, at the ASEAN Ministerial Conference in Bali in July 1979, the United States and ASEAN exerted strong pressure on the Japanese government to freeze ODA to Vietnam. Japan tried to turn aside the *gaiatsu*, defending its position by saying that Tokyo could maintain more influence over Vietnam by keeping open communication channels with Hanoi rather than cutting off aid.[58]

Of all the *gaiatsu* on the Japanese government from a number of allies, US pressure had the most significant impact. While Japanese policymakers—MOFA officials, politicians, and business leaders—wanted to continue the ODA, they were concerned that they would be seen by Washington as having legitimized the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and that security and economic relations between the United States and Japan would deteriorate as a result.

Furthermore, the Japanese aid decision could not be taken in isolation from other issues of US-Japan relations around the globe. The US-Japan relationship underwent a serious test in November 1979 when the Iran hostage crisis broke out. In retaliation against the taking of more than 50 American hostages by Iranian militants in Tehran, the US asked its allies to support US economic sanctions against Iran. Defying the US call for united economic sanctions, Japanese firms covertly bought large amounts of Iranian oil at escalated prices in late November of 1979. US policymakers learned of these purchases and were outraged. Immediately after hearing of the Japanese purchase of petroleum, US Secretary of State Cyrus Vance expressed his strong criticism to Japanese Foreign Minister Saburo Okita. Following this incident, the Japanese government realized that it would have to regain the trust of the Carter administration or else risk serious deterioration of bilateral relations with the United States. Similarly, Japanese business leaders came to realize how serious a rift was occurring in US-Japan relations; they feared that if they were to oppose American policy in Southeast Asia, they would risk losing the entire American market for Japanese products. [59]

When US-Soviet Cold War rivalry reached its peak following the deployment of Soviet troops to Afghanistan in late December 1979, Japan could no longer refrain from taking a clear stance on its aid to Hanoi. Tokyo was compelled to follow the lead of the United States, the ASEAN, and China in working to isolate Soviet-backed Indochina from the rest of Asia. Following the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan, Tokyo officially suspended the aid to Hanoi as a punishment for supporting Russia's incursion in Afghanistan. Japan announced that Japanese ODA to the SRV would not be released until the PAVN withdrew from Cambodia.[60] This announcement of Japan's aid decision finally proved Tokyo's allegiance to the United States and demonstrated Japanese support for the American effort to deter Soviet influence in Southeast Asia. The official aid postponement also indicated that Tokyo would not hesitate to sacrifice its relations with other countries if the United States pressured Tokyo to do so. As illustrated by Tokyo's aid decision following the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan, Japan's main concern was with how its reaction to the Afghan crisis would affect future US-Japan relations.

Throughout the 1980s, Japan did not recognize the Heng Samrin government in Cambodia supported by the SRV and followed the United States, the ASEAN, and the PRC in supporting the Pol Pot's DK as the legitimate Cambodian government at the UN from 1979 for two years. In 1982, Tokyo, along with its allies, gave support to the Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea (CGDK), a Cambodian tripartite coalition in exile consisting of the Front Uni National pour Cambodge Indépendent, Neutre, Pacifique et Coopératif (FUNCINPEC), the Kampuchean People's National Liberation (KPNL), and the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK). These parties were led by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Son Sen, and Pol Pot respectively. Consequently, Japan provided relief aid to the CGDK, not to the Phnom Penh government which was in more dire straits.

While Japan did not completely abandon the Fukuda Doctrine to play a regional role in mediating between the ASEAN and Indochina in the 1980s, there was little Tokyo could do to achieve this goal. Japan began to provide small-scale humanitarian relief aid to Vietnam in 1982 in a hope to draw Hanoi closer to the capitalist world in Southeast Asia. Nevertheless, Tokyo's attempt was minuscule and did not bring any positive diplomatic results. In most of the 1980s, Japan kept a low profile in Indochina and failed to play a mediator role in Indochina.

Preserving US-Japan Economic Ties

Japan's compliance with US *gaiatsu* over the SRV throughout the 1980s was also related to bilateral trade disputes between the United States and Japan over Tokyo's swelling trade surplus. Anti-Japanese sentiment heightened in the United States in the second-half of the 1980s, particularly in the spring of 1987 when it was revealed that Toshiba Machine Co. had sold sophisticated milling equipment for submarines to USSR in violation on the CoCom (Coordinating Committee for Export Control) restrictions.[61] After the incident, the Japanese government and business community had to heed the rising anti-Japanese sentiment over Japanese business practices in the United States as well as other parts of the world, such as in Vietnam.

During most of the 1980s all major Japanese general trading firms (*sogo-shosha*) established dummy firms in Vietnam to carry out business activities under disguised names to keep a low profile in the country. Unlike the United States, Japan did not impose trade sanctions on the SRV as a reprisal for the overthrow of Pol Pot's government and thus trade between Tokyo and Hanoi continued. However, Japanese trading firms were afraid that if they openly engaged in trade with Vietnam, their business activities in the United States would be adversely affected by possible retaliatory measures by the US Congress. For example, Mitsui Co., one of the largest Japanese *sogo-shosha*, created a shadow company named Shinwa Co. to continue trade in Vietnam.[62] Japanese trading houses' fear of US retaliation reached the peak in September 1987, when the Kasten Resolution by the US Senate condemned Japanese economic activities in Vietnam and urged the Japanese government to persuade Japanese private firms to refrain from trading with Vietnam. The Kasten Resolution singled out Japanese business activities in Vietnam and ignored those of other countries, such as France, Malaysia, and Thailand, thus creating resentment among the Japanese business community which perceived the resolution arising more from America's "Japan-bashing" than its genuine concerns over the presence of Vietnamese forces in Cambodia.[63] Japanese firms, however, could not ignore this resolution. Honda Motors, for example, voluntarily abandoned its plan for a motorcycle assembly plant in Ho Chi Minh City for fear of risking its US market.

For the ten years following the 1979 Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, Japan reacted passively to political developments in Indochina. While Japan never abandoned the idea of taking a leadership role in Indochina throughout the 1980s, there was little Tokyo

could do other than adjust itself to the rapidly changing international environment. Political developments in the world, and specifically in Indochina, were beyond Japan's control. Despite the lack of legal restrictions on Japanese firms, Japan refrained from openly seeking an economic role in Vietnam. American pressure kept Japan self-refrained politically and economically in the region.

Revival of Pursuit of Activism toward the SRV (1989-present)

Cambodian Peace Process and Aftermath

With the end of the Cold War, the political situation in Indochina rapidly changed in the late 1980s. The largest factor for the change was that with the demise of the Soviet bloc, Vietnam no longer appeared a threat to the capitalist Southeast Asia. Hanoi completely withdrew the PAVN from Cambodia in 1989 and tried to concentrate on its own economic development through a national policy of *doi moi* (renovation) adopted in 1986. The changing political climate in Southeast Asia was perhaps best expressed by Thailand's Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan, who stated in August 1988 that Indochina should be transformed "from a battlefield to a trading market." Chatichai's statement indicated Thailand's changing attitude from hard-line to moderation toward the SRV and the Phnom Penh government now led by Hun Sen. The international environment was becoming favorable to a settlement of the Cambodian conflict. In September 1988, peace negotiations began in Indonesia among Cambodia's four warring factions: Hun Sen's Kampuchean People's Revolutionary Party (KPRP), Prince Sihanouk's FUNCINPEC, Son Sen's KPNL, and Pol Pot's PDK.

The end of the Cold War had another profound impact on Japanese policy toward Indochina. Washington's interest in the Cambodian conflict declined as the issue had little meaning to Washington in the post-Cold War era. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the United States was less worried about possible communist expansion in Southeast Asia. The new US attitude toward Cambodia set Tokyo free from previous constraints on its policies. Given the declining US influence in the region, Japanese leaders began to seek ways to act independently of the United States in pursuit of Tokyo's own political and economic interests.

The Cambodian peace negotiations from the late 1980s to the early 1990s became Tokyo's first litmus test for political activism in Indochina in the post-Cold War era. Also, the settlement of the Cambodian conflict was a necessary condition for Tokyo's improvement in relations with the SRV. From the late 1980s Tokyo tried to establish itself as a legitimate participant in the Cambodian peace process along with the ASEAN countries, Australia,[64] and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council ("Perm Five"). Japan first indicated its interest in the Cambodian peace process in August 1988, when it invited Prince Sihanouk to Tokyo as a national guest to discuss

peace resolution for Cambodia. In May 1989, Prime Minister Noboru Takeshita stated during his ASEAN tour that Japan was willing to offer assistance in resolving the Cambodian conflict. At the Paris Peace Conference in July 1989, the Japanese delegation lobbied for a greater role for Japan and accepted co-chairmanship of the Standing Commission on Cambodian Reconstruction and Refugees. In February 1990, Japan's MOFA unofficially sent its diplomat, Masaharu Kono in the Southeast Asia Division, to Phnom Penh to meet with Hun Sen and his government officials. Kono's visit to Cambodia represented Tokyo's first contact with the Phnom Penh government since its establishment in 1979. Kono's mission signaled to Hun Sen that Tokyo was moving towards a recognition of Phnom Penh as the *de facto* government of Cambodia. After Kono's meeting with Hun Sen, Tokyo ended its support for the anti-Hun Sen tripartite coalition of FUNCINPEC, KPNL, and PDK[65] and launched diplomatic efforts to seek a peaceful solution in Cambodia. These efforts included
(1) co-hosting a conference with Thailand for the four rival Cambodian factions in June 1990, (2) offering a new proposal to the Cambodian factions in March 1991 to complement the comprehensive peace plan developed the previous year by the Perm Five, (3) sending the SDF in the PKO of UNTAC from September 1992 to May 1993, (4) providing the world's largest financial contribution for the operations of UNTAC in March 1992-May 1993, and (5) convening a Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia in June 1992 to coordinate international economic assistance for the war-torn society.

Of these five Japanese achievements in the Cambodian peace process in the early 1990s, the first and the third—hosting the Tokyo Conference and sending the SDF to Cambodia—were especially significant in Tokyo's Indochina policy. These measures did not represent the usual Japanese "check-book diplomacy" and they thus helped Tokyo gain political capital for its peacemaking role.[66] At the Tokyo Conference on the Cambodian Settlement in June 1990, the Japanese government demonstrated that it would not only finance the reconstruction of the war-torn Cambodia but also participate actively in helping promote and guide the peace process. The conference had been proposed by Thailand's Prime Minister Chatichai to Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu in April 1990 to invite the Cambodian factions to negotiate for a peaceful settlement. Although Khmer Rouge spokesperson Khieu Samphan boycotted the conference,[67] Prince Sihanouk and Hun Sen participated and decided that the tripartite coalition (FUNCINPEC, KPNL, and PDK) and the Phnom Penh government (KPRP) would share equal representation in the Supreme National Council (SNC).[68] The decision on the two party representation at the SNC was significant, as it became the basic framework of the SNC throughout the years of UNTAC's rule in Cambodia.[69]

The deployment of the SDF to Cambodia marked a milestone in Japanese foreign policy, as it became the first dispatch of Japanese military forces overseas in the post-World War II era, making an important precedent for further military participation by Tokyo in international conflicts. The Japanese Diet passed a PKO bill in June 1992 to allow

Japanese SDF to provide logistical support to UNTAC, an operation headed by a Japanese UN diplomat, Yasushi Akashi. Although the issue of sending SDF overseas incited the Japanese left to organize large demonstrations, the deployment proceeded anyway and the Japanese government demonstrated that Japan was willing to join in international peace-making efforts by sending its own troops to the world's conflict zones. At the same time, the Japanese use of military forces was limited because of the strict application of the PKO bill. This bill limited the SDF missions to traditional peace keeping operations (e.g., use of weapons only for self-defense) and humanitarian assistance. These limitations on military deployment indicated that military strategies were not replacing Japan's spending strategies.

Tokyo's participation in the Cambodian peace process was not free from criticism from the international community. Some Western observers accused Japan of being more interested in enhancing its own political standing in rather than solving the stalemate between the Cambodian government and the opposition factions. They claimed that Tokyo hastily joined the peace process to compensate for its diplomatic blunder in its response to the Gulf War and to gain approval for its membership of the UN Security Council.[70]

In fact, though, Japan did not act hastily or aggressively. When Japan started testing the international waters in search of its appropriate role in the Cambodian peace process, Tokyo acted cautiously rather than taking abrupt or bold steps to overturn the current established state of affairs in Indochina. According to Cronin, "(a)fter years of avoiding the political limelight, Japan is moving cautiously but steadily to play a political and diplomatic role more commensurate with its economic strength."[71] This cautious approach is reflected in Japan's desire not to stir suspicion that Tokyo might have military intentions in Southeast Asia.

Since the 1993 UNTAC-sponsored general elections in Cambodia, Japan has continued playing an important diplomatic role in that country. When the political climate in Cambodia grew volatile in June 1997, with the two prime ministers—First Prime Minister Prince Norodom Ranariddh (FUNCINPEC) and Second Prime Minister Hun Sen (the Cambodian People's Party or the CPP)—in conflict, Tokyo immediately sent Sachio Imagawa, former Japanese ambassador to Cambodia and Japan's top advisor on the country, to Phnom Penh to represent the Group of Seven (G-7) nations. Following Hun Sen's coup d'etat and ouster of Prince Ranariddh in July 1997, Tokyo has been trying to broker a settlement between Hun Sen's government and the prince. Japan has become an active member of a Friends of Cambodia group consisting of several aid donor countries in Cambodia such as the United States, France, and Australia. In January 1998, Japan proposed a peace plan to Hun Sen and Ranariddh to end fighting in Cambodia and to pave a way towards the expected general elections in July 1998.[72] The international community, including the Friends of Cambodia and ASEAN, has fully supported the Japanese peace plan and has pressured Hun Sen and Ranariddh to accept the deal, to

which they eventually agreed. The Japanese plan has provided an important step toward a peaceful settlement in Cambodia.

Resumption of ODA

The progress of the Cambodian peace process served to thaw the freeze on Japanese bilateral aid to Vietnam. In 1992, Japan resumed its ODA to Vietnam after a series of negotiations with the United States. Due to unresolved MIA (Missing in Action) problems between Washington and Hanoi, the United States had originally opposed Japanese aid resumption. It was only after Japanese Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe intervened directly in the US-Japan negotiations and also persuaded Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam to move forward with the MIA issue that the United States finally gave tacit approval to the Japanese government to restart aid. As it was, the United States requested Japan to announce its ODA resumption plan after the 1992 US presidential election; Japan did so within a week after the election.[73] This case illustrates how Japan's relations with the SRV were influenced by US-Japan relations, particularly by US *gaiatsu* on Japan. As soon as the American *gaiatsu* declined, Japan moved rapidly toward proactivism.

The 1992 resumption of ODA to Hanoi illustrates how Japan has used its spending strategy to achieve its diplomatic goals in the second proactive period. Tokyo restarted full-scale bilateral ODA to Hanoi for the first time in 13 years with 45.5 billion-yen ($275.81 million).[74] The amount of the 1992 ODA disbursement was roughly equivalent to the debts Tokyo claimed that the South Vietnamese government had owed to it prior to the unification of Vietnam in 1975. This financial aid was given in exchange for Hanoi's payment of South Vietnam's leftover debts. The aid resumption was highly political and a significant step toward proactivism because it indicated that Tokyo would improve bilateral relations with Hanoi at the time that the United States, Japan's strongest ally, still had an economic embargo against Vietnam. At the same time, the resumption sent a strong signal to the Japanese private sector to move forward with trade and investment in Vietnam. Since the 1992 resumption of ODA, Tokyo has become the largest among the aid donors to Vietnam.

Multilateral Development Plans

Japan's economic strategy has also been extended to multilateral arrangements in which Japan has wielded its spending power not only for narrow economic aims but also for wider political goals, such as gaining international prestige and recognition. In Cambodia, Japan has exerted leadership in organizing a International Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) in order to coordinate foreign aid to Phnom Penh. ICORC was established at the Ministerial Conference on the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of Cambodia in June 1992 to oversee the aid program. Japan has served as chair since the first ICORC meeting in Paris in September 1993. In Vietnam, Japan worked with France in April 1993 in proposing granting Vietnam access to the IMF loans; the two countries eventually paid off Hanoi's debts to IMF in order to restart loans

to Hanoi. Japan's interest in the economic reconstruction in Indochina was further underscored by its role in the Mekong River Commission (MRC), which was re-established in 1995 from its predecessor, the Mekong Committee (MC).[75] The MRC has been promoting the development of the Mekong River region since its establishment in 1995. Japan has been one of the main financial contributors to the organization. The current chief executive officer of the MRC is a Japanese bureaucrat, Yasunobu Matoba, from the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery.

Recently, Japan's policy toward Indochina has merged with its ASEAN policy as the whole Indochina is moving toward "ASEANization." Vietnam joined the organization in 1995, Laos followed in 1997, and Cambodia is expected to join the organization as well contingent upon its achieving domestic political stability. Japan's main goal in Southeast Asia has not changed since the 1970s: to accelerate the integration of Indochina into the ASEAN market. Tokyo welcomed the new membership of Vietnam and Laos in the ASEAN and hopes that Cambodia will soon follow their footsteps.

Of the three nations in Indochina, Vietnam is most involved in multilateral regionalism and has the most contacts with Japan. Along with Laos, Vietnam became a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) upon the admission to the ASEAN. The ARF is a forum set up by the ASEAN in 1994 for discussing security in Asia and its members are the ASEAN, Japan, the United States, and China. Vietnam is also expected to participate in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in the end of 1998. Japan fully supports Hanoi's integration into these regional multilateral institutions.

The Revival of the Fukuda Doctrine?

Some observers of Japanese foreign policy believe there has been a revival of the principles of the Fukuda Doctrine in the 1990s, as Japan has once again pursued an active, independent role in Southeast Asian politics.[76] Japan's current policy goals are generally similar to those of its first proactive period of the 1970s. As before, Japan now hopes to accelerate the integration of Indochina into the rest of Southeast Asia, to maintain regional peace and stability in the region, and to increase Japan's economic and political influence in the region predominantly by means of spending strategies. To achieve these goals, Tokyo also tries to ensure its Asian neighbors that it will not become a military power in the region.

According to Soeya, the revival of the Fukuda Doctrine was first signaled by Prime Minister Kaifu during his ASEAN tour in May 1991.[77] In a speech in Singapore Kaifu expressed Japan's strong interest in assuming a greater political role in Asia. Kaifu stated that Japan was expected from the international community to make greater contributions in the Asia region not only in the economic sphere but in the political sphere as well. As an appropriate role for Japan in the political sphere, Kaifu stressed Japan's role in searching for a solution to the conflict in Cambodia [78] At the same time, Kaifu apologized to the ASEAN audience for the Imperial Japanese Army's actions during World War II by

expressing "sincere contrition at Japanese past actions which inflicted unbearable suffering on a great many people of the Asia Pacific region." [79] The timing for such a speech was appropriate. Responding to the diplomatic debacle of the Gulf War, the Japanese government decided in April 1991, a few weeks before Kaifu's speech, to dispatch its SDF mine-sweepers to the Gulf region, the first operational mission sent beyond territorial waters since the end of World War II.[80] The content and tone of Kaifu's speech were basically the same as those of Fukuda's 1977 statement. Kaifu reiterated two of the principles of the Fukuda Doctrine of 1977: Japan would take on a political role in contributing to regional stability in Asia, particularly in Indochina, and Japan vowed never again to become a military power. According to a Singaporean diplomat, Kaifu's statement represented a cautious, step-by-step approach to gaining Asian support for Japan's larger political role.[81]

The Japanese government issued another similar statement in January 1993, when Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa visited Bangkok during his ASEAN tour. Miyazawa indicated Japan's interest in promoting the integration of Indochina into the ASEAN-led market and proposed that Japan and ASEAN cooperate together in the economic reconstruction of Indochina. The regional cooperation would include such areas as transport and communications and developing human resources. In the speech Miyazawa proposed the establishment of a Forum for Comprehensive Development of Indochina (known as "the Indochina Forum"), including ASEAN members and other countries in an effort to bring economic prosperity to the war ravaged Indochina. Miyazawa's statement on Japan's role in Indochina, however, was intentionally kept low-key, as Tokyo was aware of uneasiness felt by some Asian leaders toward the resurgence of Japanese power in the region. [82]

In January 1997, Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto tried to further reinforce Japan's role in Indochina during his visit to Southeast Asia. He made a speech in Singapore, again reminiscent of Fukuda's doctrine of 20 years before. Hashimoto reiterated that the "heart-to-heart" cooperation between Japan and the ASEAN for the last twenty years has built the foundation of Southeast Asia's rapid economic growth and called for further intense cooperation with ASEAN into the 21st century.[83] Hashimoto went on to propose that Japan-ASEAN relations be elevated via a summit-level forum that would regularly discuss security, trade, and investment. Hashimoto's proposal indicated that Japan would plan to be a much more vigorous foreign policy actor in Asia. At the same time, Hashimoto emphasized that the US-Japan alliance would remain the core of Japanese foreign policy and that Japan's commitment to the US role in Asia has not changed in the post-Cold War era.[84] Hashimoto's speech revealed Tokyo's long-standing aspirations of taking initiatives in Asia on the one hand and cementing the foundation of cooperation with the United States on the other.

Whether Japan succeeds in pursuing initiatives to contribute to Southeast Asia's stability and development while accommodating American policy in the region is yet to be

determined. The Fukuda Doctrine withered in the 1980s due to the US pressure on Japan to curtail contacts with the SRV in the midst of heightened Cold War tensions. Is Japan's current regionalism destined to follow the same fate? A large part of its success depends on how Tokyo can manage its dual relations with Asia and the United States. Japan needs to conduct a balancing act between its own desire to play an independent role in Asia and its obligation to maintain the fundamental framework of US-Japan cooperation in Asia.[85] The balancing act becomes especially difficult when the United States poses *gaiatsu* on Japan's pursuit of an active foreign policy. If the constraints are insurmountable, Japan gives up its own desire in order to accommodate US needs. The balancing act becomes easier when US *gaiatsu* is at a minimum. With the Cold War now over, one might expect that US *gaiatsu* on Japan would be minimized, but there are a host of other bilateral and international issues that could result in increased US pressure in the future.

Conclusion

This analysis of Japan-Vietnam relations shows the difference between reactivist perspectives and a hybrid reactivist/proactivist perspective. What reactivist and hybrid approaches share in common is the recognition of the key role of US *gaiatsu* in influencing Japanese foreign policy; indeed, the focus on the impact of US *gaiatsu* is the main strength of the reactivist perspective.

Yet where these two views differ is in their analysis of what happens during periods of limited US *gaiatsu*. The reactivist school would have us believe that in the absence of *gaiatsu* Japan takes no initiatives on its own. Yet an analysis of Japan-Vietnam relations shows that this is not the case. Japan has consistently sought to take a proactive policy toward the SRV, making definite (albeit cautious) efforts to pursue its economic and political interests through foreign policy during periods of limited *gaiatsu*. It is only during periods of intense US *gaiatsu* that Japan has reverted to a reactive stance. Japanese foreign policy toward the SRV is thus characterized by an alternation between reactivism and proactivism rather than a simple reactivism.

The hybrid model of reactivism and proactivism takes place within the framework of Japan's dual relations with the United States and Asia. In the case of Japan-SRV relations, Japan pursued an active policy toward Vietnam when the United States did not exert strong pressure on Tokyo not to do so. When serious conflicts of interest arose between Japan and the United States, Washington exerted strong *gaiatsu* on Japan and Japan gave up its independent policy in the SRV. The dual linkages of Japan with Asia and the United States requires Tokyo to take a careful balancing act between the two and Tokyo's active regional policy occurs when the balance is maintained.

This hybrid approach toward understanding Japan-Vietnam relations still leaves many questions unanswered—for example, the relationship between the intended policies, implemented policies, and impact of Japanese proactivism toward Vietnam—but

recognizing the coexistence of reactivism and proactivism is a necessary first step toward addressing these broader questions. At the same time, further study is required to indicate whether and to what extent this hybrid reactivist/proactivist model also holds true in Japan's foreign policy in other regions of the world.

Endnotes

[1] See for example, Kent Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State," *World Politics*, 40 (July 1988); Edward J. Lincoln, *Japan's New Global Role* (Washington, DC, The Brookings Institution, 1993); Donald Hellmann, "Japanese politics and Foreign Policy: Elitist Democracy Within An American Green House," in Takashi Inoguchi and Daniel I. Okimoto (eds.), *The Political Economy of Japan: vol. 2: The Changing International Context*, (Berkeley, CA: Stanford University Press, 1988); Donald Hellmann, "The Confrontation with Realpolitik," in James Morley (ed.), *Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970s* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1972); Michael Blaker, "Evaluating Japan's diplomatic performance," in Gerald L. Curtis (ed.), *Japan's Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Coping with Change* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1993).

[2] See Dennis Yasutomo, *The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), chapter 2. Yasutomo discusses four main tenets of the reactivist approach: (1) the external origin of reactivity, (2) the United States as the primary locus of reactivity, (3) the immobile domestic policymaking process as the fundamental causes of reactivity, and (4) the scope of reactiveness as both foreign economic policy and political-strategic diplomacy.

[3] See Donald Hellmann, "The Confrontation with Realpolitik"; Michael Blaker, "Evaluating Japan's diplomatic performance."

[4] Edward J. Lincoln, *Japan's New Global Role*.

[5]Donald Hellmann, "Japanese politics and Foreign Policy: Elitist Democracy Within An American Green House."

[6]Ibid., p. 358.

[7] Yoichi Funabashi, "Japan and the New World Order," *Foreign Affairs* (winter 1991-92), vol. 70, no. 5, p. 61.

[8] Kent Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation: Explaining the Reactive State," p. 519.

[9] Ibid., p. 520.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Michael Blaker, "Evaluating Japan's diplomatic performance", p. 3.

[12] Calder, "Japanese Foreign Economic Policy Formation," p. 519.

[13] Michael Blaker, "Evaluating Japan's diplomatic performance", p. 4.

[14] Edward Lincoln, *Japan's New Global Role*. Failing to recognize how serious the crisis was, Japan initially hesitated to contribute financially to the allied forces. In August 1990 Tokyo pledged a mere $1 billion. In September of the same year, following intense US pressure, Japan reluctantly announced that it would provide an additional $3 billion.. It was only in March 1992, well after the actual end of the war, that the Japanese Diet passed a bill authorizing a $9 billion contribution for the Desert Storm Operations.

[15] See for example, Dennis Yasutomo, *The Manner of Giving: Strategic Aid and Japanese Foreign Policy* (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1986.

[16] Yoshihide Soeya, "Jishu Gaiko in Action," *The Woodrow Wilson Center Asia Program Occasional Paper*, no. 64 (June 8, 1994).

[17]Ibid.

[18] Yasutomo, *The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy*, p. 57.

[19] Leonard J. Schoppa, *Bargaining with Japan: What American Pressure Can and Cannot Do* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997), p. 36.

[20] See Hisashi Nakatomi, *Jikkan Bieronamu Keizai* (Tokyo: Nihon Hyoronsha, 1995); and Mitsunobu Nakahara, *Betonamu e no Michi* (Tokyo: Shakaishisosha, 1995).

[21] Charles Morrison, "Southeast Asia and U.S.-Japan Relations," in Gerald Curtis (ed.), *The United States, Japan, and Asia: Challenges for U.S. Policy* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994).

[22] David A. Baldwin, *Economic Statecraft* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1985). Baldwin explains that statecraft refers to the selection of means for the pursuit of foreign policy. Economic statecraft has negative and positive sanctions. The negative sanctions include embargo, boycott and tariff increase. The positive sanctions include tariff reduction and granting "most-favored-nation" treatment. Economic strategies can be used to pursue various goals of a state. They can be used to pursue only economic ends, or for other purposes such as political, psychological, and military goals.

[23] Ming Wan, *Spending Strategies in World Politics: How Japan Used Its Economic Power 1952-1992*, unpublished doctoral dissertation, Harvard University, 1993. Wan distinguishes spending from earning strategies. He refers to spending as a means to influence other nations with wealth, whereas earning aims at accumulating wealth.

[24] See for example, Lincoln, *Japan's New Global Role*, chapter 6. Lincoln points out the limits of Japan's economic power particularly at a time of crises. "[N]ot all of the world's problems are economic, and the nation (Japan) still faces a major question: how to participate more fully in solving international political problems or crises" (p. 201).

[25] Thomas R. H. Havens, *Fire Across the Sea: The Vietnam War and Japan 1965-1975* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987).

[26] Shiraishi, , *Japanese Relations with Vietnam* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 4.

[27]Havens, *Fire Across the Sea*.

[28]Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Shiraishi, , *Japanese Relations with Vietnam*.

[31] The JVTA was established in 1955 by Mitsunobu Nakahara and his associates, who had fought in World War II as Japanese soldiers in Vietnam, and then remained in Vietnam and fought in the First Indochina War as Viet Minh soldiers. Interview, General Manager of Representative in Hanoi, JVTA, May 1997; Mitsunobu Nakahara, *Betonamu e no Michi*.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Yasumasa Kuroda, "Japan and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict," in Edward Lincoln (ed.), *Japan and the Middle East* (Washington, DC: The Middle East Institute, 1990), pp. 40-49.

[34] Seki Tomoda, *Nyumon Gendai Nihon Gaiko: Nichu Kokko Seijoka Igo* (Tokyo: Chuoshinsho, 1988).

[35] Shiraishi, *Japanese Relations with Vietnam*, p. 72.

[36] Seki Tomoda, "Taietsu Enjo Saikai no Keii to Haikei," *Asia University Asia Research Project Report* (March 1997).

[37]Shiraishi, *Japanese Relations with Vietnam*.

[38] Between 1973 and 1975, Japan had diplomatic relations with two Vietnams: DRV in the North and the Republic of Vietnam (ROV) in the South.

[39] Ibid.

[40] Kiichi Miyazawa, "Saikin no Kokusaijosei to Nihon no Gaiko: Indoshinahanto no Kyuhen o Chushin ni," *Asia Jiho* (September 1975), p. 7, translated and cited in Shiraishi, *Japanese Relations with Vietnam*, pp. 70-71.

[41] Shiraishi, *Japanese Relations with Vietnam*, p. 55.

[42] Ibid.

[43]Ibid.

[44] Ibid., p. 53.

[45] Ibid., p. 55.

[46] Soeya, "Vietnam in Japan's Regional Policy," in James W. Morley and Masashi Nishihara (eds.), *Vietnam Joins the World* (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1997), p. 179.

[47] Soeya, " Jishu Gaiko in Action," p. 1.

[48] Sueo Sudo, *The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992).

[49]*Japan Times*, August 19, 1977 p. 14.

[50] Sudo, *The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN*.

[51] Soeya, "Vietnam in Japan's Regional Policy," p. 180.

[52] Tomoda, *Nyumon Gendai Nihon Gaiko*. For a detailed account of US decisionmaking of the normalization with the SRV under the Carter administration, see Nayan Chanda, *Brother Enemy: The War After the War* (New York: Collier Books, 1986). Chanda delineates conflicts between the State Department and the National Security Council over Vietnam policy.

[53] Tomoda, "Taietsu Enjo Saikai no Keii to Haikei."

[54] Sunao Sonoda, "Nihon Gaiko no Tenkan o Kokoromite," *Chuokoron Keiei Mondai* (March 1980), translated and cited in Shiraishi, *Japanese Relations with Vietnam*, p. 71.

[55] Some MOFA officials felt they had been betrayed by Vietnamese officials. In December 1978 they had asked Vietnamese officials for a peaceful resolution of the Cambodian conflict because there was a rumor that Vietnamese forces were planning an attack on Cambodia. In reply Vietnamese officials had promised the Japanese government that Vietnamese forces would not enter Cambodia. Two weeks later their "promise" was broken. See Tomoda, "Taietsu Enjo Saikai no Keii to Haikei."

[56] Tomoda, *Nyumon Gendai Nihon Gaiko*.

[57] *The Asahi Shimbun*, August 2, 16, 17, 22, 23, 1979, cited in Shiraishi, *Japanese Relations with Vietnam*.

[58] Tomoda, " Taietsu Enjo Saikai no Keii to Haikei."

[59] Tomoda, *Nyumon Gendai Nihon Gaiko*; Yoshihisa Komori, "Okoreru Amerika to 'Kiku to Katana'," *Bungei Shunju* (February 1980), pp. 114-123.

[60] Shiraishi, *Japanese Relations with Vietnam*.

[61] Tomoda, *Nyumon Gendai Nihon Gaiko*.

[62] These trading houses quietly conducted business activities in Vietnam via the JVTA, which had close ties with the SRV. Interview, General Manager of Representative in Hanoi, JVTA, May 1997.

[63] Susumu Awanohara and Charles Morrison, "Looking Beyond Cambodia: Japan and Vietnam," *Indochina Issues* (August 1989).

[64] Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans played a significant role in making a proposal for creating an international peacekeeping operation in Cambodia, a model on which UNTAC was based.

[65] Tadashi Ikeda, "Kanbojia Wahei e no Michi: Tai to no Kyodo Sagyo," *Gaiko Forum*, no. 81 (January 1995), pp. 88-95; Seki Tomoda, "Japan's Search for a Political Role in Asia: The Cambodian Peace Settlement," *Japan Review of International Affairs*, vol. 6, no. 1 (September 1992), pp. 43-60.

[66] Japan's proposed peace plan provided for step-by-step monitoring of a cease-fire, the rejection of participation in the 1993 elections by any faction violating the Paris Agreement of 1991, and the establishment of a special body to investigate human rights violations during the Pol Pot's rule in 1975-78. However, the proposal failed as none of the Cambodian factions supported it. See Tomoda , "Japan's Search for a Political Role in Asia."

[67] Khieu Samphan boycotted the conference because the Khmer Rouge opposed the two-party representation at the SNC. The Khmer Rouge insisted that each of the four factions should have an equal representation at the SNC. Khieu Samphan was vice-president of the CGDK, and Sihanouk was president. The Prince broke ranks with the Khmer Rouge and participated in the Tokyo Conference as a private citizen. See Tomoda, "Japan's Search for a Political Role in Asia."

[68] Yasushi Tomiyama, *Kanbojia Senki* (Tokyo: Chukoshinsho, 1992).

[69] Donald S. Zagoria, "The Great Powers and Indochina," *The Challenge of Indochina: An Examination of the U.S. Role*, ed. by Dick Clark (Queenstown, MD, The Aspen Institute, April 19-21, 1991), pp. 34-35.

[70] Murray Hiebert and Louise do Rosario, "Japan Poised to Play Role in Reviving Indochina: Waiting in the Wings," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (May 30 1991), pp. 68-69.

[71] Richard P. Cronin*, Japan, the United States, and Prospects for the Asia-Pacific Century: Three Scenarios for the Future* (New York: St. Martin's Press), p. 57.

[72] The peace proposal consisted of four principles: (1) the renunciation by FUNCINPEC of any ties with the Khmer Rouge; (2) a cease-fire between Hun Sen's and Ranariddh's troops and the reintegration of the latter into the former; (3) the conclusion of a trial in absentia of Ranariddh and a royal pardon granted by Sihanouk that would allow his son Ranariddh to participate in the elections; and (4) the safety of Ranariddh's return and full participation of opposition parties in the political activities for the elections. *The Japan Times Weekly International Edition*, February 9-15, 1998, p. 3.

[73] Tomoda, " Taietsu Enjo Saikai no Keii to Haikei."

[74] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, *Japan's ODA Annual Report: 1995* (Tokyo: The Association for the Promotion of International Cooperation, 1996), p. 42.

[75] The MC was established in 1957 by Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos under the auspices of UN's regional body, the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ESCAP). The current MRC has the same original members of the MC. See OECF, *OECF Newsletter*, August 1996.

[76] Soeya "Jishu Gaiko in Action"; Tomoda, "Japan's Search for a Political Role in Asia."

[77]Soeya "Jishu Gaiko in Action."

[78] Michael Vatikiotis, "The Gentle Giant: Kaifu Soothes Fears Over Japan's Political Plans," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 16, 1991, pp. 11-12.

[79] Vatikiotis, "The Gentle Giant," p. 11.

[80] Robert Delfs, "To the Gulf, at Last," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 9, 1991. p. 19.

[81] Vatikiotis, "The Gentle Giant."

[82] Robert Delfs and Michael Vatikiotis, "Low Key Diplomacy: Miyazawa Treads Delicate Path in Region," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 14, 1993, pp. 11 , 14.

[83] "Heart to Heart: First Clean Your Own House, "*Asia Times*, January 14, 1997, p.8.

[84] Chiyo Kato, "Nichibei Ampo Taisei o Chushi," *The Asahi Shimbun*, April 30, 1997.

[85] Soeya, "Jishu Gaiko in Action."