Chapter 1. Ceuta, Bojador, and Beyond

1. The official version of Ceuta’s capture is recounted in Zurara, Conquests and Discoveries, 31-315. Boxer, Portuguese Seaborne Empire, 15-19, discusses the significance of the expedition.

2. According to Zurara, King John considered waging war against Portugal’s nearer rival, Castile. But his youngest son pressed the case for attacking the Moors. Castile’s king, argued Prince Henry, is an enemy “only so by accident (being a Christian like ourselves), whereas the Infidels are our enemies by nature.” Conquests and Discoveries, 41. For the larger setting, see Kedar, Crusade and Mission.


4. “Portugal was the first European country in which oversea exploration, whether with trade or conquest in mind, was actively supported over a long period by government.” Parry, Discovery of the Sea, 89.

5. Mauny, Navigations Médiévales, discusses maritime exploration in this area before ships rounded Cape Bojador and returned to Europe.

6. See Zurara, Conquests and Discoveries, 119-155, and Parry, Discovery of the Sea, 89–107, on explorations sponsored by Prince Henry. For Cape Bojador’s reputation as the Cape of Fear and the significance of Gil Eannes’s voyage for later maritime exploration, see Chaunu, European Expansion in the Later Middle Ages, 111–16.


8. There is, of course, no distinct boundary between Europe and Asia. Neither does any clear geographic or political marker separate Europe’s western portion from the rest of the continent. By “western Europe” I mean the eight countries noted here, or more generally the segment of Europe west of 14 degrees of latitude east of Greenwich. I call people from western Europe Europeans. This reflects the way they often thought of themselves when interacting with people from other continents, and by using it I avoid undue reliance on the awkward term “west European.”

9. Parry, Discovery of the Sea; Wilford, The Mapmakers, 7–86. The evolving European worldview
as explorers conveyed their findings to cartographers is beautifully illustrated in Campbell, Early Maps.

10. Although Russia and Japan held overseas possessions, their empires differed from west European ones in important respects. Russia's expansion was overwhelmingly inland. Its North American possessions, held for less than a century, were economically and strategically peripheral and not central to Russia's image of itself as a vast multicultural empire. In contrast, Japan's overseas empire comes closest to systems of rule discussed in this book. Japan could not have expanded except by sea, and its foreign policy initiatives from the 1870s onward were deliberately patterned on the west European model. But the scope of Japan's power was regional rather than global, as seen by its proximity to its principal possessions: Korea, Shantung, and Taiwan. In the late sixteenth century the great military leader Hideyoshi devised a plan of conquest that included India, Southeast Asia, and the Philippines and would have made Japan an imperial power on a par with any European state had it been carried out. But Hideyoshi failed to develop the navy his plan required. And his army failed to subdue the Koreans, first on the list of peoples marked for subjugation. Hideyoshi's plan was abandoned at the very time several European powers were asserting themselves overseas. Kuno, Japanese Expansion on the Asiatic Continent, 143–77.

11. A strength of the world-system approach pioneered by Immanuel Wallerstein is its tendency to regard western Europe as a unit, with patterns of production and trade that enabled it to become the globe's "core" economic zone. But this tendency also weakens world-system theorizing. The political fragmentation of western Europe and rivalries among its leading states, though noted, are relegated to the background when the question arises why the core came to dominate the modern world economy. See the critique by Zolberg, "Origins of the Modern World System."

12. The career of Central Asian conqueror Timur (ca. 1336–1405) provides horrific examples. Timur was famous for erecting towers from the skulls of enemy soldiers killed in battle and of civilians slain en masse following his army's victories.

13. Steve Stern's description of the Inca Empire fits many non-European cases: "As a 'redistributive' state, the Inca Empire absorbed surplus labor from a self-sufficient peasantry and disposed of this labor to the royal population and its retainers, the army, peasants on coerced duty, strategic beneficiaries, and so forth, but without in general transforming local modes of production." Stern, Peru's Indian Peoples, 22.


15. For fascinating discussions of these transfers, see two works by Alfred Crosby—The Columbian Exchange and Ecological Imperialism—and Hobhouse, Seeds of Change. On the role of botanical gardens in improving and transplanting tropical export crops in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Headrick, Tentacles of Progress, chap. 7, and Brookway, Science and Colonial Expansion.

16. For the transformative character of European rule in a wide variety of settings, see Bakewell, Miners of the Red Mountain; Curtin, Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex; Davis, Modern Industry and the African; Drabble, Rubber in Malaysia; Gide, Travels in the Congo; Hecht, Continents in Collision; Hulme, Colonial Encounters: Europe and the Native Caribbean; Keith,
Conquest and Agrarian Change ... on the Peruvian Coast; Moorhead, Fatal Impact: ... the Invasion of the South Pacific; Murray, Development of Capitalism in Colonial Indochina; Schwartz, Sugar Plantations in the Formation of Brazilian Society; Sherman, Forced Native Labor in Sixteenth-Century Central America; and van der Kroon, Lombok.

17. Among numerous accounts of the disruptive effects of European settlement on indigenous societies are Chevalier, Land and Society in Colonial Mexico; Hecht, Continents in Collision; Hemming, Red Gold: The Conquest of the Brazilian Indians; Kanogo, Squatters and the Roots of Mau Mau; Plaatje, Native Life in South Africa; and Price, Western Invasions of the Pacific and its Continents.

18. Erickson, Emigration from Europe, 1835–1914. For comparative studies of European overseas settlement, see Hartz et al., The Founding of New Societies; Denoon, Settler Capitalism: ... Development in the Southern Hemisphere; and Platt and di Tella, eds., Argentina, Australia, and Canada.

19. "To consolidate their gains ... the pastoral conquerors usually adopted the administrative models of the peoples that they had overcome. In practice this meant that the nomads of the western steppe followed Islamic prototypes, while those of the eastern steppe and desert borrowed the models of the Han Chinese," Wolf, Europe and the People without History, 33. On Aztec adaptation to the cultural patterns of settled urban populations in the Valley of Mexico, see Fagan, The Aztecs, 27–63.

20. Exceptions, from the early period of expansion I, term phase 1, include the syncretistic culture of British East India Company officials in India, Dutch East India Company officials in Java, and Portuguese presidios in Mozambique. Other examples are adoption of Amerindian lifestyles by some English and French colonists on the North American frontier. See, for example, Isaacman, Mozambique: Africanization of a European Institution; and Axtell, The invasion Within, "The White Indians," 302–37. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Europeans were much less inclined to adjust to other cultures or engage in sex across racial lines than in phase 1. Changing attitudes as they affected India are described in Balfour, Race, Sex, and Class under the Raj.

21. Effects of the colonizers' attitudes on colonized peoples' self-images are sensitively discussed in Fanon, Black Skin, White Masks; Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized; Mazrui, The African Condition; Manguy, Looking through the Keyhole; and Nandy, The Intimate Enemy.

22. See the appendix for these countries and criteria employed to assign starting and ending points of European rule. Different criteria would, of course, produce different results. I classify under the imperial heading territories with a wide range of legal statuses, including protectorates (e.g., French Morocco and the informal British protectorates over small emirates on the Arabian peninsula), mandate territories of the League of Nations (e.g., French Syria, British Transjordan, and Belgian Ruanda-Urundi), and U.N. trusteeship territories.

23. "International relations" and "international system" are more familiar terms than "interstate relations" and "interstate system," hence will generally be used in this text. The latter terms, however, are more accurate and will be used as well. The world's key political units are the territorially bounded, bureaucratically administered entities called states, not groups of people regarding themselves as historically coherent, culturally integrated nations. Indeed, the vast

21. I define an institution as a complex organization with an identifiable hierarchy, a primary purpose relating to the world outside the organization's boundaries, and procedures and norms giving individuals associated with the organization incentives to support its primary purpose through their own actions. This definition is more structural and less comprehensive than the one North offers in *Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance*, 3: “humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.” But it benefits from North’s emphasis on individual incentives and the role organizational procedures and norms play in shaping them.

22. I do not assume that all societies share the same set of functional requisites for maintaining themselves over time. The notion of sectoral activities employed here is derived from an examination of historical events and sequences in several European countries. It is not deduced from macrofunctionalist premises about how every society operates.

23. In all the cases just noted, except France and Haiti, the metropole emerged on the winning side. Though France eventually lost the Napoleonic Wars, it lost Haiti at a time when it had fought well enough in Europe to manage a stalemate with its enemies.

Chapter 3. Phase I: Expansion, 1415–1773


4. Because England’s rulers steadily extended their jurisdiction within the British Isles during phase 1, it is unclear at what point the polity ceases to become England and is more accurately designated Britain. For phase 1 I use “England” unless the reference is to Parliament following the Union of England and Scotland in 1707. I use “Britain” and “Great Britain” for subsequent phases.

5. Data from Kohn, *Dictionary of Wars*. For an overview, see Kaiser, *Politics and War: European Conflict from Philip II to Hitler*, parts 1 and 2. During the half century preceding its internationally recognized independence from Spain, Holland conducted foreign affairs as a de facto independent state.


10. By “race” I mean a socially defined category assigning special importance—typically, unequal social status—to physical differences among people with different continental origins. Race
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has a subjective component, permitting definitions of its boundaries to change over time and
from one place to another. But it also has an objective component, pointing to observable
features that vary systematically among groups tracing ancestry to different continents. Racial
categories are constructed. But they are not invented. That is, they are not based solely on the
"inventing" group's interests, projected desires, or misconceptions.
11. McAllister, Spain and Portugal, 344, gives estimates for the Iberian empires. Estimates for Peru
are from Anna, Fall of the Royal Government in Peru, 16-17.
12. Perkins, Economy of Colonial America, 1-2. See also Nash, Red, White, and Black: the Peoples of
Early America.
13. Estimates for Spanish and Portuguese territories are taken from McAllister, Spain and Portugal,
344. Estimates for the British West Indies and southern BNA colonies are from Engerman,
"Notes on the Patterns of Economic Growth in the British North American Colonies in the
Seventeenth, Eighteenth, and Nineteenth Centuries," in Bairoch and Levy-Leboyer, eds., Disparities in Economic Development Since the Industrial Revolution, 47. See also Nash, Red, White,
and Black, chap. 7.
14. Estimates for 1650 for the Iberian colonies are from McAllister, Spain and Portugal, 344; for
Peru from Anna, Fall of the Royal Government, 17. Estimates of mestizos in New Spain very widely.
Maclean and Rodriguez, The Forging of the Cosmic Race, 197, cite Gonzalo Aguirre
Beltirán's estimates (1972) of 6 percent in 1646, 10 percent in 1744, and 11 percent in 1793.
The much higher figure in the text is from Cook and Borah, Essays in Population History: Mexico
and the Caribbean 2:268. See James, The Black Jacobins: Toussaint Louverture and the San
Domingo Revolution for the social and economic role of mulattoes in Saint Domingue.
17. Ibid.
18. Two stimulating comparisons of South African and U.S. history are Fredrickson, White Supremacy,
and Lamar and Thompson, eds., The Frontier in History. On early cross-cultural
encounters, see Elphick, KhoeKhoe and the Founding of White South Africa.
19. Crosby, The Columbian Exchange. Not all items exchanged were deliberately transferred—
disease viruses, for example. Neither were they all commercially viable. See the chapter enti
titled "Weeds" in Crosby, Ecological Imperialism.
20. Schurz, The Manila Galleon. New World bullion stimulated not only a direct lateral trade with
East Asia but also a substantial increase in vertical trade between Europe and East Asia. About
half the four hundred million silver dollars imported from South America and Mexico into
Europe between 1571 and 1821 was used to purchase Chinese products. Gernet, A History of
Chinese Civilization, 485.
22. An exception is sugar grown on New World plantations. Sugar shifted from a luxury to a
middle class consumption good because of the technical efficiency of plantation operations,
the artificially low cost of slave labor, and the enormous volumes exported. See Mintz, Sweet
ness and Power, and Curtin, Rise and Fall of the Plantation Complex.
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23. The Industrial Revolution's start is conventionally dated at about 1750. Its impact on England's economy and society was minimal, however, until early phase 2. Steam engines incorporating James Watt's invention in 1765 of a separate condensing vessel were not produced commercially until 1775. The first yarn-spinning mill employing Richard Arkwright's spinning frame and carding machine began operations in 1772. Mass production of cotton in the Americas, complementing the new spinning and weaving technologies, awaited widespread adoption of Eli Whitney's cotton gin, invented in 1793.

25. Parry, The Discovery of the Sea, 177.
27. Panikkar, Asia and Western Dominance, 90.
28. Quoted in Teng and Fairbank, China's Response to the West, 19.
32. Sources on phase 1 chartered companies include Blaauw and Gaastra, eds., Companies and Trade; Chaudhuri, The English East India Company . . . 1660–1640; Furber, Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1500–1800; Haudricour, La Compagnie Française des Indes aux XVIIIe Siècle, 1719–1793; Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1585–1740; Newman, Company of Adventurers: The Story of the Hudson's Bay Company; Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the Seventeenth Century; Tracy, ed., Rise of Merchant Empires; and Tracy, ed., Political Economy of Merchant Empires.
33. Lippy et al., Christianity Comes to the Americas, 1492–1776, 58, 137.
34. For far-flung Jesuit activities, see Alden, The Making of an Enterprise: The Society of Jesus.

Chapter 4. Phase Two: Contraction, 1775–1824

1. Indirect beneficiaries of phase 2 independence movements are territories that broke from previously independent countries to become sovereign states on their own. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua defected peacefully from Mexico in 1823 as the United Provinces of Central America and became separate states in 1838. Panama was part of Colombia until, under intense U.S. pressure, it became a republic in 1903. Colombia, Venezuela, and Ecuador were joined as Gran Colombia during the struggle for independence. But Simón Bolívar's experiment in pan-American solidarity collapsed when Venezuela and Ecuador seceded in 1830.
2. The battle was actually fought on Charlestown's Breed's Hill, less elevated than Bunker Hill but closer to the harbor, which British troops controlled.
3. The phrase is Lipsky's; see The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective.
37. Nehru, Nehru, the First Thirty Years, 210.
38. Nigeria, Western Region, Proposals for an Educational Policy, 6.
39. Smith, We Must Run While They Walk: A Portrait of Africa's Julius Nyerere.
40. Achebe, A Man of the People, 34.
42. See, for example, L'Afrique Révoltée, by the Dahomean intellectual Albert Lewoïde.
45. For the impact of the Accra conference on Roberto's thinking and subsequent activities, see Marcum, Angolan Revolution, 164-70. Among leaders Roberto met were Nkrumah (Ghana), George Padmore (Trinidad; Nkrumah's advisor on pan-African affairs), Sékou Touré (Guinea), Kenneth Kaunda (Northern Rhodesia); Tom Mboya (Kenya), and Frantz Fanon (Martinique and Algeria).
50. Morgenthau, Political Parties, 64, notes the impact of political advances in Togo in the mid-1950s on the thinking of French West African leaders.

Chapter 8. Western Europe as a Region

1. This is a classic problem for causal theorizing in the social sciences. In Arend Lijphart's words, "The principal problems facing the comparative method can be succinctly stated as many variables, small number of cases." Lijphart, Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method, American Political Science Review, 885. One response is to increase the number of cases. This is the methodological advantage of treating European imperialism as two distinct expansionist phases rather than a single half-millennial episode. Even then, so many plausible independent (causal) variables remain that imperialism remains overdetermined, i.e. explained several times over. Here the challenge is as much to eliminate contenders from serious consideration as it is to identify those remaining after passing a series of plausibility tests.
2. On multiple conjunctural causation, see Rabin, The Comparative Method, chaps. 1–3.
3. Polynesians were the world's premier long-distance sailors in the premodern era, their ships covering enormous distances throughout the Pacific. I do not list them here because it is
not clear their vessels would have been able consistently to return home port had this been the goal.

4. "In the four and a half centuries from the consolidation of the Sung empire to the great period of expansion of the Ming empire China was the greatest maritime power in the world." Gernet, A History of Chinese Civilization, 326. See also Needham, The Grand Tntitration: Science and Society in East and West, 109.

5. Cipolla, Guns, Sails, and Empires, 137 and passim.


10. McAlister, Spain and Portugal in the New World, 468; Landes, The Unbound Prometheus, 36.


17. Columbus took a heavily annotated copy of Marco Polo's Voyages on his first transatlantic voyage. Following landfall he kept looking for the Great Khan as he sailed from one unpromising island to the next. The great mariner was off target by about twelve thousand miles, half the earth's circumference.

18. Jones, European Miracle. Jones argues that the concentration of wealth in many Asian courts resulted from the conquest of agrarian societies by traditionally pastoral groups. Alien dynasties had opportunities and incentives to extract economic surplus from the agrarian base. In the process they enriched the court while keeping the base in essentially unchanged conditions of poverty. Jones contends that Europe's failure to experience nomadic invasions permitted evolution of a more equitable distribution of resources than in the great Asian polities. Europe's image of Asian affluence in early phase 1 was in reality the image of wealth concentrated in the hands of Asian rulers.

19. Columbus, The Log of Christopher Columbus, 51.


21. Columbus, The Journal of Christopher Columbus, 28 (entry for October 14, 1492).

22. Raleigh, The Discoverie of the Large and Bewtiful Empire of Guiana, 72. The sexual reference here is clear: imperialism is analagized to rape.


27. Quoted in Axtell, The Invasion Within, 137. See also Pearce, The Savages of America, 3–24.
29. See capsule biographies in Waldman and Wester, Who Was Who in World Exploration.
31. See Collingwood, The Idea of Nature. The author asserts (11) that this view of Nature became prominent during the Renaissance—i.e., early in phase 1.
32. Arciniegas, America in Europe: A History of the New World in Reverse, chap. 4.
Mackay, In the Wake of Cook: Exploration, Science, and Empire, 1760–1801.
34. Brockway, Science and Colonial Expansion: The Role of the British Royal Botanic Gardens;
Headrick, The Tentacles of Progress, chap. 7.
35. Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men.
36. On European state formation from phase 1 onward, see Poggi, Development of the Modern State; Tilly, ed., Formation of National States in Western Europe; Hall, Powers and Liberties: Causes and Consequences of the Rise of the West; Bendix, Nation-Building and Citizenship;
Anderson, Lineages of the Absolutist State; and Barker, Development of Public Services in Western Europe, 1660–1930. My debt to Max Weber is obvious.
39. The impressive exploratory activities of Norse/Viking sailors in the North Atlantic did not produce colonies, in the sense in which I employ the word, because there was no significant metropole to administer the scattered settlements settlers founded.
40. See, Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 184.
41. Camoëns, The Lusiads, 64.
42. Symonds, Oxford and Empire, 33–34, 161, 162. See also Betts, “The Allusion to Rome in British Imperialist Thought of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries,” Victorian Studies.
43. Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States, A.D. 900–1990, 47. For the economic role of European cities in the late Middle Ages, see Braudel, The Perspective of the World, chaps. 2, 3;
Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, chaps. 2–4; North and Thomas, Rise of the Western World, chaps. 6, 7; and Tilly, Coercion, Capital, and European States.
45. Poggi, Development of the Modern State, 36–42.
47. By focusing on urban-based institutions and values favoring productive recycling of profit, I associate capitalism with European history from the late Middle Ages onward. This approach differs from Marx in stressing the bourgeoisie’s insulation from state control in the crucial initial phases of capitalist development, rather than bourgeois control of the state. It differs
from Weber in not identifying capitalism so closely with Protestant northern Europe. The problem with Weber’s analysis is that key procedures for recording, generating, and recycling commercial gain were developed in Catholic, pre-Renaissance Italian cities, long before Calvin elaborated the predestinarian ideas Weber considers so important. My approach differs from Immanuel Wallerstein in not defining capitalism in terms of relations of trade. Wallerstein is clearly on the mark, however, in emphasizing the profitable role played by intraregional and global trade. See stimulating discussions of the emergence of European capitalism in Rosenberg and Birdzell, How the West Grew Rich, chap. 1—4; North and Thomas, Rise of the Western World, parts 2, 3; and Baez and others, Europe and the Rise of Capitalism.

48. For examples, see, for example, Andrews, Trade, Plunder, and Settlement, and Israel, Dutch Primacy in World Trade, 1550—1740.

49. See the insightful discussion in Mann, Sources of Social Power 1, chap. 10. Jews inhabiting various urban centers of western Europe comprised a visible and often prominent community. But their small numbers and strong pressures from Christians to isolate and discriminate against them limited the pluralizing effect of their presence on European religious life.

50. Hennessy, The Frontier in Latin American History, 54—60; Clarke, West Africa and Christianity, chaps. 1—3; Aijani, Christian Missions in Nigeria, 1841—1891.


52. Ibid., 81—87.

53. For a survey of Christian-Muslim relations from the seventh through the sixteenth centuries, see vols. 2 and 3 of Kenneth Latourette’s monumental History of the Expansion of Christianity: The Thousand Years of Uncertainty: A.D. 500—A.D. 1500, esp. chaps. 6, 7; and Three Centuries of Advance: A.D. 1500—A.D. 1800, esp. chap. 1. Also Malouf, Crucades Through Arab Eyes.


55. This discussion benefits from the stimulating comparisons of European, Arab/Islamic, and Chinese civilizations in Hall, Powers and Liberties, chaps. 2, 4, 5, and Levenson, ed., European Expansion and the Counter-Example of Asia.

56. Abun-Nasr makes this point with respect to North Africa west of Egypt in A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period, 12. In the Muqadimma, the great historian Ibn Khaldun (1332—1406) advanced a theory of the rise and fall of Islamic dynasties based on the sharp contrast in lifestyles between urban dwellers and pastoralists.

57. Levenson, European Expansion, 45.

Chapter 9. Western Europe as a System of Competing States

1. In this discussion “state” refers to a central government, in particular to civilian and military agencies charged with formulating and implementing policies toward governments of other countries. More generally, “state” denotes a territorially bounded unit recognized by others as having sovereignty, and the people living within that unit.

2. Mann, The Sources of Social Power 1511. “Preparation for war,” writes Charles Tilly, “has been the great state-building activity. The process has been going on more or less continuously for at least five hundred years.” Tilly, ed., The Formation of National States in Western Europe, 74.

4. This process is copiously illustrated in Cipolla, *Guns, Sails, and Empires*. See also Parker, *The Military Revolution*, esp. chap. 1. For diffusion of military technology among major European powers during phase 1, see Headrick, *The Tools of Empire*, chaps. 4, 5.


9. An example is the Liverpool merchant John Holt, who traded along the West African coast for years prior to the 1880s. In a letter to British foreign secretary Lord Granville in 1882, Holt warned of growing French and Portuguese political interest in Africa and urged that Britain “not allow the trade at present possessed by her to be confiscated for the benefit of protectionist competitors; but that the influence due to her by virtue of her great colonial and trading interests in Western Africa . . . will be maintained, and, if necessary, her territory extended, in order to prevent the encroachments of those foreign powers whose interests are antagonistic to those of Great Britain.” Cited in Chamberlain, *The Scramble for Africa*, 121.


11. Quoted in Ibid., 85.

12. Robinson and Gallagher, with Denny, *Africa and the Victorians*, illustrate this kind of thinking among British officials at the time of the scramble. Defense of India, so the reasoning went, entails control of South Africa and Egypt. Defense of Egypt entails control of the source of the Nile—that is, Uganda. Access to Uganda entails control of Kenya, and so forth. In the authors’ felicitous phrase, the British government advanced along “new frontiers of insecurity.”


16. Andrews, *Trade, Thieves, and Settlements; Earie, The Sack of Panama; Lang, Conquest and Commerce: Spain and England in the Americas*. Writing in 1629, a year before setting out to found “a plantation in New England,” John Winthrop asserted that “it will be a service to the church of great consequence, to carry the gospel to those parts of the world, and to raise a bulwark against the kingdom of Antichrist which the Jesuits labour to rear up in all places of the world.” Massachusetts Historical Society, *Winthrop Papers* 22:17.


18. Hemming, *The Search for El Dorado*, chap. 10, describes Raleigh’s futile attempts to find what he called “that great and golden city which the Spaniards call El Dorado and the naturals Manoa.”

20. This helps explain the limited number of settlers from France as compared to those from Spain (in phase 1) and England/Britain (in phases 1 and 3). The largest concentration was in Algeria, a territory sufficiently close at hand that settlers could readily be mobilized to fight on French soil should this become necessary—as it was in World War I.


23. Holland’s pioneering role in west European economic modernization is stressed in North and Thomas, *Rise of the Western World,* chap. 11.


26. See the comparative studies of phase 1 chartered companies in Blusse and Gaastera, eds., *Companies and Trade*; and two works edited by Tracy, *The Rise of Merchant Empires and The Political Economy of Merchant Empires.*

27. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery,* chaps. 1–7. Whereas Spain’s phase 1 heroes were conquistadors whose exploits took place on land, most of Britain’s early heroes were seafarers. Sir Francis Drake, Sir Walter Raleigh, Henry Morgan, Sir John Hawkins, Capt. James Cook, and (in phase 2) Admirals George Rodney and Horatio Nelson come to mind.

28. Hartz et al., *The Founding of New Societies,* 3–16 and ff. The case studies here show that British settlers were more inclined to insist on self-government than settlers from Spain, Portugal, and France.


31. Axtell, *The Invasion Within,* contrasts the missionary work of English-speaking Protestants in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century BNA with the far more extensive—and considerably more successful—efforts of Jesuit contemporaries in French Canada. For a New World overview see Latourette, *Three Centuries of Advance,* 186.


Education, Missions.

34. This phrase African Slave by Henry 1841 to 185; Nigeria.

35. A biographic advocates.

36. See works

37. Gann and *Leopold’s
Oliver, The Missionary Factor in East Africa; Ross, John Philip (1775–1851); Roibeig, Christian Missionaries and the Creation of Northern Rhodesia, 1880–1924; Sanderson and Sanderson, Education, Religion, and Politics in Southern Sudan, 1899–1964; and Temi, British Protestant Missions.

34. This phrase summed up the arguments of Thomas Fowell Buxton's widely read tract, The African Slave Trade and its Remedy (1840). Buxton's ideas were elaborated and put into practice by Henry Venn, the influential secretary of the (Anglican) Church Missionary Society from 1841 to 1872. See Webster, "The Bible and the Plough," Journal of the Historical Society of Nigeria.

35. A biographer calls him "one of [nineteenth-century] imperialism's earliest proponents and advocates." Jelal, Livingstone, 188.

36. See works by Ajayi, Oliver, and Ross cited in n. 33.

37. Gann and Duignan, The Rulers of Belgian Africa, 1884–1924. 29. See also Hochschild, King Leopold's Ghost; Anderson, The King Incorporated: Leopold II in the Age of Trusts.

Chapter 10. The Institutional Basis for the Triple Assault

1. On this last point, see Schwallet, Origins of Church Wealth in Mexico... 1523–1600. Alden, The Making of an Enterprise: The Society of Jesus... 1540–1750, part 4, discusses the Jesuits' wide-ranging economic activities.


3. For a discussion of principal-agent relations, see Milgrom and Roberts, Economics, Organization, and Management, esp. chap. 5, "Moral Hazard and Performance Incentives," 166–98. Moral hazard is "the consequence of postcontractual opportunism that arises because actions that have efficiency consequences are not freely observable and so the person taking them may choose to pursue his or her private interests at others' expense." Ibid., 167. Moral hazard is most likely to occur under conditions of long-distance institutional stretching analyzed here.

4. Referring to the early seventeenth century, Winius observes, "While official India drifted in military and financial crisis, the bureaucracy went shamelessly about its private business. Shielded by the distance from Portugal, the deliberate weakness of the viceregal office, and the restricted personnel policy, its members connived to pursue their private fortunes in as many ways as individual, traditional, or collective ingenuity could devise." Winius, The Fatal History of Portuguese Ceylon, 99.

5. Cortés, Five Letters of Cortés to the Emperor, 249. Cortés was not, strictly speaking, an agent of royal power, as his expedition left Cuba for the mainland in defiance of orders from the island's governor. He is better described as a self-designated agent. This makes even more striking his insistence on conquering on behalf of a distant ruler who could not possibly have known what was happening in the field.


7. European governments frequently sponsored overseas settlement of people they least wanted to have living at home. Convicted criminals, sentenced in British courts to "transportation," formed the core of settler society in Georgia and Australia. Other territories serving as penal